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Abstract
This Study aims at exploring the relation between economic liberalisation and Egyptian foreign 
policy orientation. It argues that the roots of the restructuring of Egyptian foreign policy since 
1970 could be traced in the process of transforming the populist statist model of managing the 
Egyptian political economy.
The study of Egyptian foreign policy has been hitherto dominated by the psychological- 
perceptual analysis of the Egyptian presidents’ belief systems. Implicit in such analyses is the 
assumption of a docile socio-economic set up and an omnipotent leader capable of making abrupt 
changes in the basic thrust and orientation of Egyptian foreign policy according to his preferences 
and perceptions. This study seeks to challenge this assumption. As opposed to the asocial 
conception of a transcendent leader deciding freely on foreign policy matters, major shifts in 
Egyptian attitudes and behaviour towards its regional and international environments, it will be 
argued, were deeply linked to, and largely dependent on, the transformation of the Egyptian 
political economy, as well as its pace.
To this end, the thesis is divided into four chapters apart from the introduction and the conclusion. 
The first examines the foreign policy implications of the populist statist model that prevailed 
during the 1950s and 1960s as well as the origins of the restructuring process. The second, third 
and fourth discuss the first wave of restructuring during the 1970s, the hesitant decade of slow 
transformation (the 1980s), and the second wave of restructuring in the aftermath of the Gulf war 
respectively. The focus of analysis will remain throughout the study on the exploring patterns of 
interaction between transforming the political economy and reorienting foreign policy.
* * *  Word Count 92,436 words.
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Introduction
“There are no economic problems, there are only problems and they are complex”
Gunnar Myrdal, Noble Prize Laureate in Economics
“Historia non facit sabbatum ” (History is never discontinuous)
Roman Proverb
This study aims at exploring the relation between economic liberalisation and foreign 
policy restructuring in Egypt. Its central argument is that the roots of Egyptian foreign 
policy restructuring since 1970 could be traced in the process of transforming the 
populist-statist Egyptian political economy. It seeks to identify the different patterns of 
interaction of Egyptian political economy and foreign policy throughout this process.
The 1970s witnessed a far-reaching transformation of the Egyptian political economy and 
foreign policy. In lieu of Nasser’s etatisme, in which the state took charge of social and 
economic transformation and became the centre of gravity in Egyptian society, an open 
door policy (infitah) was introduced, and the populist-statist apparatus of the 1960s was 
gradually dismantled. Economic liberalisation has proceeded steadily, notwithstanding 
few and limited setbacks, ever since. Similarly, a radical reorientation of the Egyptian 
foreign policy took place over the same period. Once a forefront of nationalism, based on 
anti-colonialism, non-alignment, pan-Arabism and anti-Zionism under the leadership of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the years of Anwar Sadat were associated with accommodation to 
the west, especially the United States, and eventually to Israel (Korany 1991:197-200). 
Egypt’s international and regional priorities and policies were, therefore, fundamentally 
and perhaps irreversibly, altered.
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Mainstream analysis of this foreign policy transformation has thus far been dominated by 
the psychological-perceptual analysis of the Egyptian presidents’ belief systems1. Thus, 
the development of post-1952 Egyptian foreign policy is normally divided into three 
phases, corresponding to the reigns of the three Egyptian presidents: Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. The typical argument is that whereas Sadat 
departed radically from Nasser’s flamboyant, ultra-nationalist, non-aligned and anti­
colonialist policies, opting instead for realignment with the United States and the west, 
discrediting pan-Arabism, and embarking on an individual peace agreement with Israel; 
Mubarak sought and, according to some analysts, achieved a balanced foreign policy by 
reintegrating Egypt into the Arab world whilst strengthening its alliance with the United 
States and confirming Egypt’s commitment to peace with Israel (Kramer 1987:387). 
Sadat’s foreign and economic policies were, accordingly, the antithesis of Nasser’s, and 
Mubarak’s formula was an attempt to reach some form of a synthesis between the 
approaches of his predecessors.
Implicit in these prevailing analyses of Egyptian foreign policy is the assumption of a 
docile and ineffective socio-economic set up and an omnipotent leader capable of making 
abrupt changes in the basic thrust and orientation of Egyptian foreign policy according to 
his private preferences, perceptions, value-system, and strategic choices. The typical 
rationale given for such assumption is drawn from the prevailing theories of foreign 
policy making in developing countries2 which, it is argued, lack established foreign
1 The vast majority of studies on the topic have invoked this approach. See: Gum’a (1988); Zahran (1987); 
Selim (1982); Burrell and Kelidar (1977); Entelis (1974); Nasr (1983).
2 For a critical survey of these theories, see: Korany (1983; 1986).
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policy bureaucracies and democratic traditions, thereby enabling political leaders to 
monopolise foreign policy decision making.
This study seeks to challenge this assumption. As opposed to the asocial conception of a 
transcendent leader deciding freely on foreign policy matters, shifts in Egyptian foreign 
policy are examined as a function of socio-economic changes that go well beyond the big 
brother’s preferences and choices. I take as my starting point Light and Hill’s (1985:160) 
argument that however personal perceptions and bureaucratic inter-rivalries may 
influence foreign policy, its basic thrust is provided by the deeper structure of society and 
its ideology. Foreign policy should, therefore, be conceived of as the external activity of 
the politico-economic system, that is, an integral part of the polity.
As such, the distinction between the “internal” and the “external”, which is largely 
responsible for the intellectual gap between studies on Egyptian foreign policy and 
political economy, becomes increasingly difficult to maintain (Moon 1985:328). As 
Holsti (1990:13) observed, all states seem to share four main broad goals: autonomy, 
welfare, security and regime maintenance. They act simultaneously in their domestic and 
international environments in pursuit of these goals. It is therefore necessary to analyse 
state action in a way that crosses the “great divide”, to quote the title of Caporaso’s 
(1997) influential article, between the “domestic” and the “international”.
Two intellectual gaps in the literature on Egyptian foreign policy, and for that matter, on 
foreign policies of third world countries by large, are identified and addressed in this
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study: a theoretical and an empirical gap. On the theoretical level, this study seeks to 
contribute to the redressing of both the predominance of structural (systemic) bias of 
mainstream international political economy (IPE) literature , and the predominance of the 
psychological-perceptual foreign policy analysis (FPA) of third world countries. It is 
argued that an intellectual encounter between these two academic traditions is essential 
for understanding developing countries’ foreign policies. Insights from an IPE 
perspective are needed on the political economy o f foreign policy, that is, the study of the 
political implications for states’ foreign policies, not only in the strictly economic issues, 
but also in the traditional strategic issues of war, peace and alignment, of domestic and 
international economic environments. As Evangelista (1989:151) noted, the value of 
domestic approaches to IPE analysis will be enhanced if its explanatory power was able 
to account for issue-areas beyond economics. This study is an attempt in that direction, 
seeking to demonstrate the interpretative ability of the political economy approach, and 
its contribution to accounting for Egypt’s foreign policy.
The raison d ’etre of foreign policy analysis is that the interactions that take place in the 
"black box", that is, inside the state apparatus, are the key to understanding the state’s 
foreign behaviour. In this sense, FPA is essentially an interdisciplinary enterprise (Gemer 
1995:17). However, as Korany (1986:51) remarked “the interdisciplinary analysis o f  
foreign policy was limited to the increased borrowing from psychology at the expense o f  
political economy or sociology”. This study aims at addressing this weakness and
3 There has been a recent resurgence of interest in the domestic approaches to IPE, led by Helen Milner, 
Robert Keohane and others. However, their work remains largely focused on the study of advanced 
industrial economies, and seeking mainly to explain their foreign economic policies, rather than the 
politico-economic determinants of their foreign and security policies.
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attempting to present a narrative of Egyptian foreign policy restructuring since the 1970s 
that integrates political economy and foreign policy analysis.
On the empirical level, this study argues that there is a logical inconsistency between the 
two analytic traditions that dominate the literature on Egyptian political economy and 
foreign policy. These are: a) the socially deterministic conceptions of the hydraulic 
society in Egypt, which are central to much of the analysis of Egyptian political 
economy; and b) the highly individualistic psychological-perceptual analysis of Egyptian 
foreign policy. One emphasises the deterministic primacy of the social structures of the 
Asiatic mode of production in Egypt, and the subsequent capitalist transformation4, 
whereas the other offers an overly “voluntaristic” account emphasising the centrality of 
the political leader’s perceptions and idiosyncrasies. The political economy o f foreign 
policy approach, argued for in this study, seeks to transcend this duality, and present a 
more holistic account of the patterns of interplay between the internal and external 
activities of the Egyptian state than those provided by either tradition.
This study falls within the methodological tradition which Hollis Mid Smith (1990) called 
“understanding”, as opposed to “explaining”, international relations. As such, it does not 
aim to present a parsimonious and straightforward causal analysis of the re-structuring of 
Egyptian foreign policy since 1970. Rather, it agrees with Muller and Risse-Kappen 
(1993:25-26) that to pose the question of the determinants of foreign policy in an “either- 
or” formula is to misconceive the problem. Any form of single-causation of such a 
complex process as the transformation of Egyptian political economy and foreign policy
4 The classic example of this line of argument is: Ayubi (1989a).
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would necessarily be reductionist. There is a need to present a complex narrative that 
integrates the different variables and levels of analysis, to account for this complex 
societal process. Parsimony of the behaviouralist approaches to social sciences, as Hay 
and Marsh (1999:8) noted, is often bought at a strikingly high price in terms of relevance. 
Analysing the complex patterns of interaction between states’ economic and foreign 
policy represents one of the many cases in which parsimony must be sacrificed for 
relevance, since, as Susan Strange (1994:218) argued, “Simpler, more parsimonious 
theoretical explanations of complexities are fruitless and therefore self-deluding”.
Hence, this study will aim at presenting a complex narrative, which subordinates the 
individual decision makers to some larger social process, and permits a greater 
appreciation of the origins, evolution, and consequences of the process of transforming 
populist etatisme and restructuring foreign policy.
To this end, this study proposes a four-pillared conceptual framework to analyse the 
restructuring of the Egyptian foreign policy since 1970, within the context of the 
transformation of the populist-statist model of political economy. Transforming the 
populist-statist model of Egyptian political economy, it will be argued, developed 
through two grand waves; the first was during the 1970s whereas the second took place in 
the aftermath of the second Gulf War in 1991. In the 1980s, the progress of such 
transformation was interrupted by several social, political, and economic crises. It was 
also during this decade that the foreign policy reorientation slowed down significantly, to 
the extent that led many analysts to argue that the ruling elite is rethinking it. Major shifts
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreien Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970_________ Yasser M. Elwv 12
in Egyptian attitudes and behaviour towards Egypt’s regional and international 
environments, it will be argued, were deeply linked to, and largely dependent on, the 
success or failure of the transformation of Egyptian political economy, as well as its pace.
This study is, therefore, divided into five chapters apart from the introduction and the 
conclusion. The first engages critically with the available literature with the aim of 
developing a framework for analysing the political economy of Egyptian foreign policy. 
The second examines the development and foreign policy implications of the populist- 
statist model that prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s as well as the origins of the 
restructuring process. The third, fourth and fifth discuss the first wave of restructuring 
during the 1970s, the hesitant decade of slow transformation (the 1980s), and the second 
wave of restructuring in the aftermath of the Gulf war respectively. The focus of analysis 
will remain throughout the study on the interaction between transforming the political 
economy and reorienting foreign policy.
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Chapter I 
The Political Economy of Egyptian Foreign Policy: 
A framework of analysis
"The Great man o f the age is the one who can put into words the will o f his age. He actualises his age. ”
Hegel
"Human agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense intertwined 
entities. Hence we cannot account fully for one without invoking the other" 
Joe Hagan etal, Emerging issues in Foreign Policy Restructuring
1. Foreign Policies of Developing Countries: The Political Economy 
Approach
(1.1) International Political Economy and Foreign Policy Analysis: another case of 
mutual neglect?
In the April 1970 issue of International Affairs, Susan Strange published her seminal 
article “International Relations and International Economics: a case of mutual neglect”. It 
was above all a manifesto of a new trend within the international relations community, 
expressing what Gill and Mittleman (1997) later called a “healthy disrespect” for the 
academic conventions that divide social sciences into separate disciplines, and arguing 
for a more holistic and inter-disciplinary method that bridges the gap between 
international relations, economics, and political science. Such was the mission statement 
of International Political Economy (IPE).
A consensus on the nature of IPE, or its methodology, however, never existed. IPE 
remained merely a “hosting metaphor” (Higgot 1994:157), highlighting the increasing
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discontent with the prevailing methods of mainstream economics and international 
relations and suggesting a focus of attention on phenomena that lie at their crossroads -  a 
signal of an attempted “scientific revolution”, to use Thomas Kuhn’s terminology, within 
the international relations community.
IPE sought to explain how political power shapes economic outcomes and how economic 
forces can guide, or constrain, political action both on the structural -  systemic -  level 
(i.e. the interplay between the international economic and political systems); as well as 
the single actor’s level (the interplay between domestic economy and foreign policy on 
one hand, and between international economic environment and the international 
behaviour on the other).
These two “logical” aspects of IPE were not, however, equally emphasised in the 
mainstream research. Studying foreign policy from an IPE perspective remained largely a 
terra incognita. Concerns about globalisation and changes in the international economic 
architecture tended to focus attention on the structural level of IPE at the expense of the 
international actor’s (i.e. foreign policy) level. The inevitable result is that the study of 
foreign policy is left almost exclusively to the “traditional” international relations circles.
It is another case of mutual neglect.
As a critical offshoot of international relations, IPE sought to question international 
relations’ orthodoxies and construct its own alternative problematique. Hence state- 
centric realism was dismissed by many IPE scholars, and the study of globalisation, its
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consequences and discontents, became their chief, sometimes even their exclusive, 
research concern. Indeed, the crux of mainstream IPE research revolves around the 
fundamental tension between the formal nation-state system and the globalised economy 
(Tooze 1998). It is essentially a question of global governance -  of the mechanisms 
through which an anarchic state system can keep the global economy functioning. Thus, 
the editorial of the first issue of Review o f International Political Economy (1994:12) 
expressed the need to “go beyond the state/society to the global level of analysis”. Susan 
Strange (1995:154) explained that the core argument of such pioneers as Keohane, Gilpin 
and herself was that the focus of work in international relations has devoted too much 
attention to “high politics” -  foreign and defence policies and issues of international 
order and security -  and too little was directed to the “low politics” of the management of 
international economy. This was the niche that IPE sought to occupy. Consequently, IPE 
research agenda was defined, according to Murphy and Tooze (1991), in terms of 
"economics first, then the political consequences that follow from it”.
Since its first days, mainstream IPE reflected the primacy of international economic 
problems. The “P” was more often than not forgotten, and when invoked, it was mainly 
to explain the domestic political determinants of economic policy and the mechanisms 
through which domestic political set-ups (e.g. domestic institutions, interest groups, and 
so forth) can shape outcomes in international political economy (cf.: Milner 1997; Hall 
1997), rather than to analyse the “traditional” political issues of security and foreign 
policy from a political economy perspective. Ironically, the editors’ introduction to a 
special issue of New Political Economy, devoted to “bringing the “P ” back in”,
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amounted to little more than another call to transcend state-centric realism (Hay and 
Marsh 1999:7). What started as an attempted scientific revolution was soon becoming a 
normal science, with the study of globalisation and its consequences at its heart.
Oddly enough, it was only within the discipline of international relations that IPE has 
achieved the status of a recognised sub-discipline. To mainstream economics, by contrast, 
little if anything has changed. IPE was considered at best a poor alternative to rigorous 
economic analysis -  an account that lacks technical sophistication. As Hill (1986) noted, 
IPE has not managed to do more than attract the odd dissidents from mainstream 
economics. Even when mainstream economists discussed IPE, they have done so on then- 
own terms, and without taking into account the insights and concerns of other disciplines 
-  least of all those of “traditional” international relations (Strange 1995:156).
As a sub-discipline of international relations, however, the mission of IPE should not 
only be to account for the new phenomena and actors in the world economy, but also to 
provide a more comprehensive account of the traditional international relations’ questions 
of war, peace, foreign policy, and so forth. In other words, there is a need to complement 
IPE research agenda with studies not only on the retreat o f the state as an international 
actor, to quote the title of Strange’s (1996) popular text, but also -  and by no means less 
important- on the adaptive strategies of states to changes in their domestic and 
international environments.
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It is not enough to confine IPE analysis on the actor’s level to the study of foreign 
economic policy. Further insights from an IPE perspective are needed on the political 
economy of foreign policy. That is, the study of the political implications for states’ 
foreign policies, not only regarding the strictly economic issues, but also regarding the 
traditional strategic issues of war, peace, and alignment, of domestic and international 
economic environments.
Likewise, foreign policy analysis (FPA) takes little account of the implications of IPE, 
reducing the political economy to a mere set of economic assets and resources available 
to foreign policy decision makers (cf.: Wurfel and Burton 1990:6). Much of FPA 
research either takes the prevailing economic conditions and policies as given, treating 
them as exogenous to the analysis, or examines them in a crude resources/goals formula, 
studying how the political leaders match their foreign policy goals with the available 
means and resources5.
The original mission of FPA was twofold: it sought by incorporating domestic factors 
and opening the so-called “black box” to offer a more persuasive account of states 
external behaviour on one hand, and to show how domestic environments and processes 
inside countries are affected by external factors on the other (Halliday 1994:3-14). It was 
therefore essentially an interdisciplinary enterprise, expected to draw on the work of 
different social sciences. Mainstream FPA, however, often neglects the impact of the 
domestic economic structures and policies on foreign policy, and is more often than not
5 Korany and Hillal-Dessouki’s (1994) introduction to their collection of essays on the foreign policies of 
the Arab states is a good example of this narrow definition of the political economy approach to FPA.
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confined to the study of domestic “political” variables like bureaucratic models, belief 
systems, and so forth. Even a study like Laura Neack’s (1995), seeking to explore the 
links between “state types” (with all this term’s possible politico-economic connotations) 
and their foreign policies, was confined to explicitly political variables, and made no 
reference to the economic determinants of a “state type” (e.g. its economic organisation, 
class structure, the prevailing mode of production and economic organisation..etc).
An intellectual encounter between IPE and FPA will, therefore, be mutually enriching. 
FPA and IPE share several substantial and methodological concerns. Both purport to 
provide a better approach to the study of international relations by accounting for 
phenomena that are otherwise neglected by state-centric realism. Both are also supposed 
to adopt an interdisciplinary method drawing on the achievements of various disciplines 
and intellectual traditions.
(1.2) Developing Countries’ Foreign Policy Analysis
The need to analyse foreign policy from an IPE perspective is even more pressing when it 
comes to analysing the foreign policies of third world states. It is especially in these 
states, many of which were themselves largely the creation of the international process of 
decolonisation (Clapham 1985:113), that the working of foreign policy should be seen as 
a result of the interaction -  and tensions -  between their domestic modernisation and 
developmental policies and the international setting (Ibid: 5). Indeed, the very existence 
of third world states can be defined not only by their internal characteristics, but also by
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referring to their economic vulnerabilities in the stratified international system (Clapham 
1977:169-170).
Studying the patterns of interaction of the national and the international is, according to 
Halliday (1994:4), the constitutive concern of international relations. It is even more 
important with regards to developing countries, where foreign policy is largely recruited 
to the state building and nation creation tasks (Holsti 1990:17; Hill 1977:7). With 
modernisation and development representing their overarching concerns, the study of 
foreign policies of these countries cannot, and should not, neglect the impact of domestic 
economic structures, processes, and policies on their international behaviour. Indeed, the 
very distinction between the national and the international becomes increasingly difficult 
to maintain in the case of developing countries, where significant features of their 
domestic economic, social and political systems are highly shaped by external factors and 
forces on one hand, and their foreign policies are directed as much towards meeting the 
domestic challenges of development as towards surviving the international state-system, 
on the other (Mastanduno et.al. 1989:457-458).
Notwithstanding this, the study of developing countries’ foreign policies remains today 
like it was twenty years ago when Korany (1983:465) dubbed it “the most 
underdeveloped study o f underdeveloped countries", and is rarely embedded in the 
broader context of the prevailing economic structures, and their modernisation and 
developmental efforts. The reason for that is twofold.
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On one hand, FPA of developing countries is generally neglected by the structural 
accounts -  in their realist and dependencia versions alike. In the realist tradition, foreign 
policy is largely reduced to the study of problems deriving from the “security dilemma” 
in the anarchic world system (Holsti 1990:13). Thus, foreign policy is defined in terms of 
the activities conducted by states to erect, preserve, or challenge balances of power. 
According to such analyses, the detailed study of developing countries’ foreign policy 
makes little sense, since, thanks to their obvious power deficits and structural 
weaknesses, developing countries are hardly more than helpless bearers of systemic 
imperatives and features. Their only option is to accommodate to the prevailing power 
structures. The dependencia version, notwithstanding its emphasis on the primacy of the 
economic rather than the security structures, comes to surprisingly similar conclusions, 
and often amounts to little more than speculating about the mechanisms through which 
the foreign policy orientation of developing states comes to reflect the preferences of 
stronger ones (Hey 1993; Ayoob 1989). As such, the separate study of their foreign 
policies, which necessarily implies focusing on their domestic structures and processes, 
margins of manoeuvre, and political choices, is not analytically worthwhile.
On the other hand, “bureaucratic politics” models, popularised after Graham Allison’s 
classic study of American Foreign policy decision making during the Cuban missile crisis 
in 1962, were rarely invoked to explain developing countries’ foreign behaviour, for 
rather obvious reasons. The model was, as Korany (1986:52) argued, explicitly limited to 
industrialised countries which have established foreign policy bureaucracies, and
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democratic traditions that allow for inter-bureaucratic competition and rivalries to 
surface, and influence foreign policy decision-making processes.
As a result, the relatively limited number of studies on the foreign policies of third world 
states became dominated by the psychological-perceptual explanations (Korany 
1986:39). Following Brecher’s (1969) classic framework of analysis, elite images and 
belief systems were considered the decisive, and in many cases, the exclusive, input in 
the foreign policy system of developing countries.
Despite the apparent reductionism of the psychological-perceptual analysis, and the 
criticisms that were made to its asocial emphasis on the political leaders, it retained much 
of its influence in the study of foreign policy of third world states, as it concurs with an 
important characteristic of many third world polities -the personification of political 
processes. The typical rationale for the predominance of the psychological-perceptual 
models was that, whether in the traditional or transitional stages of political development, 
foreign policy decision-making in third world states remains mainly in the hands of the 
heads-of-states (Heikal 1978:714). Thence, the key to understanding their foreign 
behaviour is to examine the perceptual screen of such leaders, and the factors that 
influence their decision-making. Sayed-Ahmed (1993:89), for example, studying 
Egyptian-American Relations in the 1950s, explicitly remarked that, “when we refer to 
Egyptian [foreign] policy we are referring to the policy ofNasser". Other, non-academic 
studies of Egyptian foreign policy during the same period -  political biographies of
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Nasser, memoirs of his senior advisers and cabinet ministers, and studies by journalists 
and political commentators -  have often entertained similar views.
The problem with the psychological-perceptual approach, notwithstanding its popularity 
in the analysis of developing countries’ foreign policies, is that even in the most 
personified polities, foreign policy remains governed, or at least guided, by several 
domestic and external environmental factors. As Hill and Light (1985:160) postulated, 
however personal perceptions, or bureaucratic inter-rivalries, might influence foreign 
policy, its basic thrust is provided by the deeper structure of society and its ideology. 
Individual decision-makers are, after all, products of the societies in which they live 
(Jensen 1982:45).
Furthermore, the analytical tool that is often used to study the perceptual screens of 
decision-makers, namely, content analysis of their speeches, could sometimes yield 
misleading results. Some of the Egyptian and Syrian leadership statements prior to the 
October 1973 war and immediately after it, for example, were part of a deception 
campaign. Content analysis of President Sadat’s speeches during this period, taken 
uncritically and out of their broader historical context, have yielded ridiculously 
misleading results about his conceptions o f enemies and allies6, that were completely 
belied by his subsequent actions. Finally, as Holsti (1982a: 12) observed, in the moments 
of foreign policy restructuring and far-reaching change, governments may choose not to 
change their foreign policy rhetoric, yet in the realm of action the restructuring of their 
foreign policies is quite obvious. In these cases too, the analysis of decision maker’s
6 See for instance: Zahran (1987).
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speeches would not be very helpful in understanding the actual development of his 
country’s foreign policy. This begs for what modem historians call “reading sources and 
documents against the grain”, so as to understand not only what people said, but what 
also made them say and act the way they did (Arnold 2000:102). The only way to do so is 
by placing decision-makers’ speeches and actions in a broader societal context.
On the other hand, structural analysis, in either its balance-of-power or dependencia 
versions, tends to produce sweepingly generalised accounts of the nature of the 
international system and the patterns of conduct of international actors. The problem with 
such accounts is that broad-brush systemic factors lose much of their explanatory power 
as we move away from generalisations and grand narratives to account for time- and 
space-specific cases (Smith 1986:346). The behaviour of specific actors in specific 
contexts and situations cannot be reduced to the status of bearers of systemic features and 
imperatives. Moreover, even when systemic constraints contribute to, or even force, the 
selection of certain ends or goals, multiple distinct and equally viable routes to these ends 
may be available (Skidmore and Hudson 1993:3). In these situations, the choice amongst 
the alternative means will obviously not be determined by the system itself, but by the 
individual country’s particular circumstances and policy choices.
In all cases, states define their so-called national interest not only in terms of the system’s 
choices and constraints, but also based on the fundamental attributes of their socio­
economic set ups and their political culture. Understanding the socio-economic dynamics 
that underlie the actor’s behaviour is, therefore, indispensable.
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Opening the black box of the state’s political economy is instrumental to transcending the 
overly deterministic structural analysis of realism and dependency theories on the one 
hand, and an overly voluntaristic cognitive analysis on the other.
(1.3) The Study of Change and Restructuring of Foreign Policy
The political economy o f foreign policy approach, argued for in this study, is particularly 
relevant in the moments of restructuring and far-reaching change when the scale and 
magnitude of change are such that they cannot be reduced to changes in the leader’s 
preferences and choices.
In fact, the worst consequence of the psychological-perceptual analysis is that it reduces 
societal transformation to the status of mere outcomes of “the deeds and idiosyncrasies 
o f great men and women”, to use Thomas Carlyle’s words. As such, perceptual analysis 
cannot serve as the basis of any useful generalisation and/or theorising, because cognitive 
behaviour changes not only between people and institutions, but also between decisions 
(Light 1994:99). Incorporating politico-economic variables not only offers a more 
persuasive account of far-reaching changes, but also serves as a better basis for 
generalisations and comparisons.
However, the study of foreign policy restructuring, defined as “the dramatic, wholesale 
alteration of a state’s pattern of external relations, involving a simultaneous reorientation 
of the different aspects of the state’s orientation towards world affairs”, (Holsti 1982: ix;
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Hermann 1990:5-6) remains largely an unexplored area of FPA. The reason for that is 
twofold. The first is the relative novelty of FPA as an academic field of inquiry. The 
development of any scientific inquiry normally proceeds from analysing order to 
analysing change. According to this logic, the study of foreign policy is still in the “study 
of order and pattern recognising” phase (Rosati et.al. 1994:5-7). Second, FPA emerged as 
one of the outcomes of the rise of behaviouralism in international relations (Halliday 
1994:29), which hampered the search for a theory of historical change.
Behaviouralist analysis of foreign policy, particularly in the comparative foreign policy 
(CFP) tradition, is essentially ahistorical. CFP sought to use methods borrowed from 
natural sciences to develop a general theory of foreign policy behaviour. Underlying this 
belief were two assumptions: a) that all nations’ foreign policies are comparable; and b) 
that a general theory that applies to all time- and space-specific cases is both desirable 
and attainable. By contrast, a historicized approach to FPA, which is instrumental to the 
study of change and restructuring, has a very different starting point. It adopts a 
conception of foreign policy as essentially a mechanism through which the nation-state 
adapts to changes in its international environment (Rosati et.al. 1994:8). Consequently, a 
general theory of foreign policy that applies to all times and places is neither attainable 
nor desirable. Instead, the study of change should be at the heart of FPA’s research 
agenda, and a better historically grounded approach is requisite. This does not only mean 
emphasising the relevance of historical analysis to FPA, it also involves invoking a very 
different conception of history itself, than that used in mainstream FPA.
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Mainstream FPA, with its predominantly behaviouralist outlook, tended to sacrifice the 
power of history and historical dialectics in explanation. History was reduced to the status 
of a “social scientist’s laboratory” -  a sheer corpus of value-free data, which could be 
used to test or validate hypotheses about the unchanging, Newtonian-like laws of society 
(Carr 1990:9-10; Amin and Palan 1996:211).
In the study of foreign policy restructuring, a different sense of history should be resorted 
to, as an explanatory tool -  that of historicity, of the historical conditions that influence 
the origin and development of a society, idea or policy (Halliday 1994:51). This entails 
placing historical facts in a wider context or narrative, to establish patterns, and construct 
meaning from the maelstrom of uncoordinated and indeed chaotic inventories of 
historical data. As such, historicity does not suggest any determinism or teleology, a la 
realist or Marxist structural accounts of international politics, mainly because it does not 
accept that structural constraints are sufficient in explaining historical change (Amin and 
Palan 1996:211). Nor does it accept the voluntaristic argument that, subject to the 
decision maker’s preferences and perceptions, any sort of change is possible, since it 
accepts that domestic and external structures are framing conditions of social discourse 
and interaction (Ibid.). As Hagan et.al. (1994:276) explained: “the interaction of different 
causal dynamics of foreign policy change puts the agent-structure debate into sharp 
clarity... Instead of being antagonistic partners in a zero-sum relationship, human agents 
and social structures are in a fundamental sense intertwined entities. Hence we cannot 
account fully for one without invoking the other”.
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The actual state of the study of foreign policy restructuring is, however, far from the 
aforementioned ideal. Still in its infantile stages, it is largely confined to constructing 
typologies of different patterns of change, sources of change, criteria for distinguishing 
different forms of restructuring and description of stages of the restructuring process (cf.: 
Hermann 1990; Holsti 1982a). Furthermore, changes in the domestic and international 
political economy are rarely mentioned as a source of foreign policy restructuring in any 
of these typologies. Hermann’s (1990:11-12) discussion of the domestic sources of 
foreign policy change, for instance, only covers the political variables such as leader 
choices, bureaucratic advocacy...etc. An account of the political economic sources of 
foreign policy restructuring is yet to be seen.
2. The Political Economy of Egyptian Foreign Policy since 1970: An 
overview
Few countries in the world can demonstrate such links between their development 
strategies and their foreign policies as Egypt. Frequently cited as a hydraulic 
society/centralized state par excellence, geographers (Hemdan 1995 [1969]), economists 
(Amin 1979), and political analysts (Baha’ al-Din 1996; Ayubi 1989a; Abdel Malek 
1982) have often noted the coincidence of a strong developmental state and an active 
regional foreign policy, especially on the eastern prong of Egyptian foreign policy, 
Mohamed Ali’s and Nasser’s experiences being their favourite examples.
Several of the decisive moments in the history of Egypt’s post-1952 foreign policy were 
deeply entrenched in Egypt’s bid for populist-statist development. The struggle to build
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Aswan’s high dam and nationalise the Suez canal, which resulted in the Suez crisis, had a 
formative influence on Egyptian foreign policy for at least the following decade, and was, 
in the meantime, the prelude to the advent of the populist-statist model of administering 
Egypt’s political economy.
On the other hand, from the 1970s, Egyptian political economy witnessed a paradigmatic 
shift that resulted in discrediting populist etatisme and launched a slow, albeit far- 
reaching process of dismantling the populist-statist apparatus. Once more, this coincided 
with a major restructuring of Egyptian foreign policy both on the regional level (i.e. the 
Egyptian attitude towards the Arab Israeli conflict as well as the inter-Arab relations) and 
the international level (i.e. the major realignment and shift towards the United States). On 
all these occasions, coincidence suggested correlation.
However, as it was once argued, noticing the existence of a relation between playing 
cards and winning money is not like actually learning how to play poker and win. It is not 
enough to note the existence of a relation between Egyptian political economy and 
foreign policy without systematically explaining their patterns of interaction. 
Unfortunately, apart from sketchy, although sometimes illuminating remarks and 
footnotes, or at best “concluding chapters” on the relation between the core choices in 
Egyptian developmental and foreign policies, as well as some accounts with highly 
ideological overtones attempting at conceptualising such changes in such terms as the 
shift from “independence” to “dependence” (Hussein 1982b), or “the visionary who
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dared” (Finklstone 1996), a systematic account of the links between developmental and 
foreign policies in Egypt is still very difficult to find.
Paradoxically, and despite some scattered remarks on such interconnections, the bulk of 
systematic studies on Egyptian foreign policy remain within the psychological-perceptual 
paradigm7, which necessarily ignores the domestic socio-economic set-up or at best, 
takes it as given. Korany and Hillal-Dessouki went even further in their classical study of 
the foreign policies of the Arab states, suggesting that Egypt provides a unique example 
of a country where foreign policy is conducted in complete separation from the domestic 
environment (sic.), thereby highlighting what remains largely an accepted assumption, 
albeit implicitly, of much of the work on Egyptian foreign policy8.
(2.1) Mapping the territory: a bird’s eye view on the key literature
Three major schools of thought dominate the analysis of post-1952 Egyptian political 
economy -  Marxist, functionalist and elitist (Hinnebusch 1985:3-7). However, diverse, 
they seem to converge on one main feature of the Egyptian political economy: the 
predominance of the state over society, and the central role played by the state in 
modernisation and development.
Egypt was one of the cases chosen by Karl Wittfogel as exemplar of a hydraulic society -  
his contribution to the development of Marx’s concept of the Asiatic mode of production. 
His thesis had a formative influence on many students of Egyptian political economy.
7 See sources cited in footnote 1 above.
8 Korany and Hillal-Dessouki (1994:7). See also Hillal-Dessouki’s introduction to (Zahran 1987).
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970_________ Yasser M. Elwv 30
Many accepted it without reservations, and some even tried to trace it to earlier writings 
of Egyptian “renaissance” thinkers, notably Rifa’a El-Tahtawy9. As early as 1869, El- 
Tahtawy argued that the existence of a strong, centralised state is necessary for the 
organisation of irrigation and public works along the Nile, and hence is crucial to the 
economic prosperity of Egypt10. Ever since, the arguments about the need for a 
centralised state to control the artificial irrigation along the Nile and lead the economic 
development became a conventional wisdom amongst Egyptian thinkers. Intellectuals, 
liberals and left wing alike, seemed to accept these arguments unquestionably (Ayubi 
1989a; Eissa 2000).
Critics of Wittfogel’s thesis fell into two main categories: the first accepted the main 
premises of the model whilst pointing out to some of its shortcomings. Ayubi (1989a), for 
example, largely accepted Wittfogel’s arguments about the hydraulic origins of the 
Egyptian centralised state, but also pointed to their failure to explain links between 
bureaucracy and oligarchy on one hand, and to account for the possibilities for and 
patterns of social mobility within the Asiatic mode of production on the other. The 
second line of analysis refutes the model altogether. Wahba’s (1994) doctoral dissertation 
is an exemplar of this trend, accusing Witffogel’s model of being ahistorical and static, 
and arguing that the development of a centralised state corresponded to particular needs 
of the dominant classes at certain points in time, rather than being the natural result of the 
existence of a static Asiatic mode of production and oriental despotism.
9 The term “renaissance”, when used in the context o f Egypt, refers to the works of thinkers of the 
nineteenth and sometimes the early decades of the twentieth century in Egypt mainly and to a lesser extent 
in the Levant. See: Ayubi (1992).
10 Cited in: Eissa (2000:130-131).
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Despite these criticisms of Wittfogel’s thesis, few would disagree with the proposition 
that Egypt has historically witnessed an overdeveloped state apparatus that enjoyed a 
relative autonomy from the major social formations, and controlled the extraction of 
surplus from society and the path of its socio-economic development.
Ayubi (1989a:5-9) argued that the course of history of the development of the Egyptian 
state was the exact opposite of that of the European nation-state. In Egypt, the centralised 
state predated the development of the bourgeoisie, and it soon became responsible for the 
introduction of capitalism. All major efforts of modernisation and industrialisation since 
the nineteenth century were, therefore, led by the state. Nasser’s post-1952 endeavour 
was no exception.
Prior to 1952, the quasi-liberal regime that had governed Egypt since 1922 entered into a 
severe crisis. The nascent capitalism failed to provide for the basic needs of the majority 
of the Egyptian population. Political parties, including the Wafd party, long considered 
the bastion of middle class nationalism, were increasingly dominated by landowners and 
occasionally upper class industrialists, much to the alienation of the middle and lower 
classes.11. The military defeat in Palestine intensified the polarisation between the king, 
the Wafd, the emerging lower-middle class political movements (Young Egypt, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and the Communist organisations), and the military (El-Sayed 
1992:243).
11 For an excellent account of the crisis in the Wafd, and the rise of the new lower-middle class political 
parties and movements, see: El-Bishry (2002).
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The 1952 revolution represented a classic case of a “revolution from above” (Trimberger 
1978), and indeed all social conditions in Egypt by the late 1940s were ripe for a 
revolutionary intervention by part of the state apparatus. The military bureaucracy was in 
a particularly autonomous position in the late 1940s. Before 1936, the Egyptian army was 
under British control, commanded by officers of upper, landed, classes. Thanks to the 
1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and the need to increase the size of the Egyptian army to 
defend Egypt against any possible Italian invasion, especially after the Italian conquest of 
Ethiopia in 1935, its ranks were opened to cadets with petit bourgeois backgrounds. By 
the late 1940s most of the lower- and middle-ranked officers were without the traditional 
links with to the ruling class. As Trimberger noted (1978:152-153), of the hundred 
families that owned the largest estates in Egypt, 30 were represented in the Parliaments 
between 1942 and 1952, 18 provided cabinet ministers during the same period, but none 
provided an army officer. For the first time in the twentieth century, the army officers 
were not recruited from the dominant landed, commercial, or industrial class.
The military defeat in Palestine in 1948 furnished the necessary conditions for the 
politicisation of army officers, and unleashed their revolutionary potential. A “revolution 
from above” was now possible. As Rostow (1962:26-27) noted "national reaction to 
political humiliation or a military defeat was the greatest engine o f social change in 
Germany, Russia, Japan and China". The Egyptian case was no exception.
The “free officers” were mainly of petit bourgeois, rural origins. They had limited 
connections with some lower-middle class political movements. Two officers (Khaled
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Muhi al-Din and Youssef Sedeek) were members of HADETU, the largest communist 
movement in pre-1952 Egypt, and three were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Abdel Mun’im Abdel Ra’uf, Rashad Mehanna, and Abdel Mun’im Amin). The rest, 
including such key figures as Nasser, Abdel Hakim Amer, Abdel Latif al-Boghdady, 
Salah and Gamal Salem, and Zakariya Muhi al-Din, had no clear organisational 
affiliation with any political movement at the time of their coup. Consequently, the “free 
officers” had no clear ideological program, except within the very broad framework of 
what Ayubi (1989a:93-106) calls “developmental nationalism”. Their twin goals were the 
same as those of pre-1952 nationalist, lower-middle class political movements: a) to 
secure independence from any foreign tutelage, and b) to develop the country’s economy 
(Aulas 1988:134). In his Philosophy o f the Revolution (Abdel Nasser 1960:25-26), 
Nasser referred to the need to conduct two simultaneous revolutions: a political 
revolution aiming at political independence, and a social revolution to achieve 
modernisation. In the National Charter, he argued that the 1919 uprising “failed because 
its leaders could not realise that they cannot achieve their aims unless they go beyond 
mere political goals, and tackle the roots o f economic and social problems”12. Foreign 
policy objectives were, therefore, from the very first moments of the 1952 revolution 
interwoven with modernisation goals.
That this broad nationalist agenda was transformed into a corporatist form of etatisme 
was as much the result of international pressures as of domestic needs (Aulas 1988:40). 
After four years of attempting to encourage private-sector-led capitalist industrialisation, 
etatisme, the vesting of power in the state as the principal agent of social and economic
12 Cited in: Mansfield (1969:19).
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreien Policy: State, ldeoloev and Modernisation since 1970_________Yasser M. Elwv 34
change (Scruton 1988:156), became inevitable. Strategic necessities (US’s collusion with 
Israel, USSR’s support for the so-called “non-capitalist path of development” in Egypt, 
and the Suez crisis and its aftermath) pushed the populist-statist model even further.
The roots of thinking about etatisme in Egypt could be traced to the inter-war period, 
when members of the Egyptian industrial capitalist class expressed on various occasions 
the need for an active and protectionist state intervention (Wahba 1994; El-Sayed 
1989:176). Two key characteristics of post-1952 etatisme, however, were: a) the state 
control of the means of production, particularly after the large-scale nationalisations of 
1961, and b) the populist dimension of the statist policies. This was embodied in the 
famous slogan “efficiency and equity”. The state aimed at combining a productive and a 
distributive function. The stated economic goals in the National Charter, for instance, 
were to raise both consumption and investment simultaneously. The only way to do so 
was through Nasser’s ability, through his active foreign policy, to secure large quantities 
of foreign aid (Amin 1974:52).
Post-1952 populist etatisme entailed combining a corporatist conception of 
developmental nationalism (Ayubi 1989a: 138-139), whereby economic and social 
interests and groups were integrated into the hierarchical organisation of the state so as to 
break up and prevent the conscious and well organised class interests, with an activist, 
multi-dimensional foreign policy aiming at securing national independence, Pan- 
Arabism, and “positive neutralism” which later developed into non-alignment, as well as 
generating strategic rent from abroad to finance developmental plans. Before 1952,
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Egypt’s foreign policy was confined to the questions of evacuation and securing the unity 
of Egypt and Sudan under the Egyptian crown (Heikal 1978:718). After 1952, Egypt 
adopted a far more sophisticated notion of independence, as it had to face the Cold War 
realities, which necessitated dealing with subtler forms of foreign intervention and 
influence. The west pressured Egypt to join its sponsored regional alliances (METO, 
MEDO then CENTO) as a means to defend Egypt, and the vulnerable Middle East 
region, against communist infiltration. Nasser, whilst not a communist himself, rejected 
the western conception of the Middle East as a vulnerable landmass close to the “soft 
belly” of the USSR, and hence needing to be protected through a close alliance with the 
western bloc. He saw that the answer to the threat of communist infiltration did not lie in 
joining western-sponsored alliances with their imperialist overtones, but rather in 
promoting internal economic and social development and affirming the spirit of 
nationalism, independence, and positive neutralism /non-alignment (Ibid.: 720).
The struggle over building the Aswan high dam, nationalising the Suez Canal, and the 
ensuing crisis meant that positive neutralism and non-alignment were transformed into a 
de facto confrontation with the west. In the meantime, Egypt moved swiftly towards a 
clearer form of populist etatisme, especially with the large-scale 1961 nationalisations, 
and the adoption of the first quintennial plan.
Similarly, it was a combination of domestic and international crises that led to the 
dismantling of populist etatisme. Once more, this was combined with a major 
restructuring of Egyptian foreign policy.
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(2.2) End of Etatisme and Transforming Foreign Policy
The dramatic restructuring of Egyptian foreign policy since the 1970s was cited by 
K.J.Holsti (1982) in the introduction of his classic collection of essays on foreign policy 
restructuring as exemplary of a deep and far-reaching foreign policy change. A more 
recent volume of collected essays on the subject (Rosati et.al. 1994) also included a 
chapter on the Egyptian foreign policy restructuring in the 1970s. Most of the writings on 
Egyptian foreign policy under Sadat attempted to account for the shift in Egyptian 
foreign policy in his years through examining his personal belief system, which they also 
held responsible for the simultaneous liberalisation of the Egyptian economy. Literature 
on Egyptian political economy, on the other hand, more often than not made quick 
references to the foreign policy changes within the context of discussing the infitah of the 
1970s and the transformation of Egypt’s etatisme thereafter (Moursi 1976; Waterbury 
1985).
It is possible, however, to identify two major weaknesses in the mainstream literature on 
the transformation of Egyptian foreign and economic policies since the 1970s. First, with 
their emphasis on the role of the leader’s perceptions, most studies on Egypt’s foreign 
policy restructuring, and even some studies on infitah, take as their starting point the rise 
of Sadat to power in 1970, or his triumphant emergence from the May 1971 power 
struggle, and fail to trace the roots of the transformation process to the final years of 
Nasser’s reign. Second, many of the studies that address Egypt’s foreign and economic 
policies since 1970s fall short of addressing the continuities between the transformation 
processes through the 1980s and 1990s, opting instead for the “three-phases’ model” ,
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corresponding to the reigns of the three Egyptian presidents. In either case, the narrative 
remains incomplete.
This study seeks to address these weaknesses, tracing, on the one hand, the roots of the 
transformation of etatisme and Egypt’s foreign policy to the last years of Nasser’s era. 
The transformation is analysed as a result of the heightening of inherent, and unresolved 
contradictions and tensions within the Nasserist populist-statist model itself, rather than a 
mere outcome of the rise of a new president to power. On the other hand, developments 
in the 1980s and 1990s are conceived of as integral phases of a single transformation 
process of the Egyptian political economy and foreign policy that took place since the 
1970s, not as an attempt by a new president to strike a balance between the policies of his 
predecessors as is frequently argued.
A central argument in this study is that the roots of the crisis and transformation of 
etatisme could be traced to the last five years of Nasser’s era (see: Amin 1981). Like the 
rise of etatisme, its decline was a result of a blend of domestic and external factors. The 
first quintennial plan (1959/1960-1964/1965) was quite successful, achieving a 6% 
annual rate of growth (Al-Alem 1994:375), in spite of various political and economic 
problems that faced it (a cotton crop crisis inl961, the war in Yemen..etc). A comparable 
success was achieved on the distributive level as well (e.g. the July 1961 “socialist” laws 
and the government’s commitment to full employment of university graduates). This dual 
success was only made possible by Nasser’s ability to secure foreign aid from the Eastern 
and Western blocs. In addition to being a beneficiary of the United States’ “Public Law
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480” aid program, providing for cheap wheat imports, Egypt managed to receive no less 
than 20% of the total credit commitments of the Soviet Union to developing countries 
between 1954 and 1966 (Amin 1974:9). By the end of the first quintennial plan, however, 
the Egyptian government started to realise that foreign aid was not likely to continue at 
similar rates. This rendered the Egyptian government unable to publish its second 
development plan until well after the first had ended in June 1965, or even decide 
whether it was going to be a seven- or five- or three-year plan. A three-year plan was 
finally decided on in December 1966 and was called “the accomplishment plan”, 
meaning that during these years, only the projects which had started already would be 
completed, a task which Galal Amin (Ibid.: 56) accurately noted, should not have 
required a plan at all.
Egypt was also suffering from rising fiscal deficits and shortages of capital on the one 
hand, and over-investment on the other. The ambitious industrialisation plans of the first 
quintennial plan rested on two core assumptions, which were later proved to have been 
over-optimistic: a) the government’s continued ability to secure foreign aid, and b) the 
ability to export manufactured goods and generate much needed hard currency. 
Consequently, factories were built on a scale that could hardly be justified by the size of 
the home market alone (op.cit: 57-58). When total imports, particularly those of 
intermediary goods, rose, export performance fell short of the earlier expectations, and 
aid declined, a major balance-of-payments crisis emerged. The military defeat in 1967 
further complicated the situation, resulting in a sharp deterioration of state revenues due 
to the loss of Suez Canal remittances mid the oil revenues of Sinai, as well as a sharp
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideology and Modernisation since 1970_________ Yasser M. Elwv 39
increase in military expenditure, reaching 19.6% of GDP in 1970 (op.cit.: 43), to rebuild 
the army. In fact, an economic disaster would have been unavoidable were it not for the 
immediate Arab cash flows in the aftermath of the Khartoum summit in August 1967. An 
overwhelmingly technocratic government was formed on June 19th, 1967, and an 
emergency budget was introduced, raising taxes, reducing allowances, and increasing the 
price of non-absolute necessities (Mansfield 1969:175). The welfare function of populist 
etatisme was proving increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to sustain.
The impact of the 1967 military defeat could not, however, be reduced to the resulting 
economic losses, or even the occupation of Egyptian territories. The whole populist- 
statist model was questioned, and the integrity of the regime and its ideology was 
doubted. Massive protests in 1968, which forced the government to issue what was called 
the 30th o f March Manifesto, were a further reminder that the support of the masses to 
Nasser’s populist etatisme was not anymore unqualified.
Under these conditions, the populist-statist model ran out of steam, and the last three 
years of Nasser’s era witnessed limited measures of economic liberalisation, and a 
decline in the developmental, and particularly the distributive, functions of the state 
(Amin 1981; Wahba 1994). Whilst the state retained its central role in the economy and 
society, the populist dimension was increasingly eroding. A post-populist form of 
etatisme was emerging.
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Meanwhile, foreign policy started to show the first signs of reorienting. The influential 
journalist Mohamed Heikal started writing about the importance of “neutralising” rather 
than confronting the United States (Mansfield 1969:176). The Khartoum Summit in 
August 1967 witnessed an emphasis on a less flamboyant formula of Arab nationalism. 
The classic goal, Wahdat Al-Hadaf (unity of goal), which implied ideological similarity 
or at least homogeneity gave way to Wahdat Al-Saf {unity of ranks), implying some form 
of conciliation with the “reactionary” Arab regimes.
The death of Nasser and the emergence of a victorious Sadat from the inter-elite power 
struggle of May 1971 added further impetus to the process of dismantling the populist- 
statist model. As early as 1971, liberalisation laws aiming at encouraging private and 
foreign investment were introduced. The most significant measure, however, took place 
after the October 1973 war. An open door policy “infitah ” was introduced from 1974, 
with the aim of alleviating the hardships of the people after seven years of war economy 
and introducing some form of dividends for the victory of 1973. Inherent in this process 
was an end to both the developmental and distributive functions of the state. Instead, 
foreign capital and other sources of hard currency were looked upon as the driving force 
for capital accumulation. Law 43 of 1974 gave generous incentives to foreign investors 
that were even denied to local industrial capitalism (Soliman 1998). As a result, the share 
of industry in GDP fell sharply in the 1970s and rent (oil, Suez Canal and tourism 
revenues, and expatriate workers’ remittances) became the main source of growth and 
hard currency. State capitalism was giving way to some form of a rentier-consumerist 
society. A web of relations was emerging amongst the three factions of the bourgeoisie
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(the traditional pre-1952 capitalists, the bureaucratic faction consisting of senior 
bureaucrats who managed to accumulate private capital during the “socialist” years, and 
the parasitic infitah opportunists) on the one hand, and between this rising capitalism and 
the state on the other (Ayubi 1989a: 179-188).
Simultaneously, Egypt rearranged its alliances both in the region, where a Tehran- 
Riyadh-Cairo axis replaced the previous Cairo-Damascus-PLO, and on the international 
level where the United States and Western Europe replaced the Soviet Union and third 
world countries as Egypt’s new allies (Heikal 1978:726). From 1977 onwards, peace with 
Israel was marketed to the Egyptian population as the road to prosperity and access to 
foreign capital. The populist-statist model was now evolving into what Hinnebusch 
(1985) called “post-populist authoritarianism”. The state maintained its coercive role, as 
well as a central role in the economy as a broker with foreign capital, but gave up its 
developmental and distributive roles (Helal 1993:31).
In other words, the 1970s witnessed the decomposition of state capitalism and the 
reduction of the state to a coercive and rent-seeking apparatus (Ibid: 58) -  a de- 
Nasserisation of Egypt as it was called at that time. This transformation rested on three 
ideological pillars: Islamisation, traditional morality, and most importantly, a revival of 
“Egypticity” in lieu of Pan-Arabism (Ibid: 148) as the guiding framework for statecraft.
The process of dismantling the populist-statist model of political economy was, however, 
far from frictionless. Increasing mal-distribution of income as well as the unpopularity of
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the new foreign policy orientation led to increasing popular opposition and political 
instability. The bread riots of January 18th and 19th 1977 are the most frequently cited but 
by no means the only example. They revealed the socio-economic tensions brought about 
by infitah, and currents of political and social unrest that had long been hidden, but had 
never been absent. The new foreign policy generated similar sentiments. Liberal, Islamist 
and left wing intellectuals alike argued that the foreign policy restructuring amounted to a 
“sell out” to Washington, and “betrayal of the Arab cause”, which brought few if any 
appreciable benefits to Egypt (Burrell and Kelidar 1977:25).
In response to this growing discontent, Sadat promised his population prosperity by the 
year 1980. He even designated it in his late 1970s speeches as “the year of prosperity”. 
Ironically, this year witnessed instead mounting socio-economic tensions. By 1981, 
Egypt entered one of its severest political crises in the twentieth century. On September 
5th, 1981 Sadat ordered massive arrests of politicians of all convictions, fundamentalists, 
and journalists. This signalled, as Ajami (1995:74) argued, the breaking of the moral and 
social contract between Sadat and his country. It was a desperate throw of the dice by 
Sadat and it backfired. Sadat was assassinated in October 6th, exactly one month later.
Despite his commitment to dismantling the populist-statist model of political economy, 
the overarching priority of Mubarak’s government throughout the 1980s was to contain 
the political and socio-economic crises of the infitah political economy. As Soliman 
(1998) argued, the state signalled its willingness to shift many of its economic policies
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towards re-industrialisation, albeit private-sector-led this time. The private sector was 
responsible for most of the (limited) industrial growth in the 1980s.
Political discourse renewed its emphasis on distributional justice, and the maintenance of 
food and energy subsidies. “La Massass” (Arabic for no jeopardising of the gains of the 
poor) became the most frequently invoked slogan throughout the 1980s (Ibrahim 
2000:258). On the external level, Egyptian foreign policy, whilst firmly committed to 
preserving close ties with the west and peace with Israel, showed more consideration for 
internal and external protest against these ties. It therefore sought to re-integrate into the 
Arab world and restore its relations with the USSR and developing countries whilst 
maintaining its strong alliance with the United States and without jeopardising its peace 
commitments to Israel. This meant that Egypt had to perform a continuous tightrope act. 
And it did. By the end of the 1980s, Egypt had become anew a full member of the Arab 
League, had restored relations with the USSR and developing countries, whilst surviving 
several crises in the relations both with Israel (the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the 
Intifada), and the United States (Achille Lauro affair and the interception by American 
fighter planes of the Egyptian Aircraft carrying Palestinian commandos in October 1985, 
and the American raids on Libya in 1986).
The most significant characteristic of the 1980s, however, was what appeared to be the 
hesitance of the Egyptian government, and the conflicting, and in many instances 
contradicting, signals that it gave, indicating its lack of any ability to declare its strategic 
choices, defend them, and carry them on (Ibrahim 1982:16-19). Political stability and
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containing the heightening hegemonic crisis, in the Gramscian sense of the term, were the 
overarching concerns -  anything else had to wait.
As a result, the progress of the transformation of the populist statist model was hampered 
by several social, political and economic crises throughout the 1980s. The failure of the 
1987 stabilisation agreement with the IMF was another example of the “hesitant” 
economic policy during this decade (Helal 1993:45-46) as a result of the primacy of 
hegemony restoration during Mubarak’s first decade in power. The economy stagnated in 
1980s while external debt rose by a staggering 150% from $21 billion to $50 billion 
(Reed 1993:95) making Egypt’s debt-to-GDP ratio one of the highest in the world. 
Likewise, it was also during the 1980s that the foreign policy re-orientation seemed to be 
slowing down and the political elite sometimes even showed signs of rethinking it.
The Gulf War in 1991 offered the Egyptian government its long-awaited opportunity to 
resume the process of dismantling the populist-statist apparatus at an accelerated pace. 
Egypt’s alignment with the US-led coalition during the war reinforced its foreign policy 
reorientation and facilitated the sealing of a deal at more convenient terms with the IMF 
in May 1991 -  only a few weeks after the coalition’s guns in the Gulf fell silent. A 
vigorous program of stabilisation and structural adjustment followed. The program 
achieved significant macroeconomic successes. The infusion of aid after the Gulf War, 
the debt write-offs, and the stabilisation package reduced foreign debt from $50 billion in 
1990 to $26 billion in 1994. The budget deficit fell from 20% of GDP in 1990 to less than 
1% in 1993, and foreign currency reserves rose from $2.7 billion to $20 billion
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(Cassandra 1995:11). On the external level, radical Arab nationalism was discredited and 
Egypt became actively involved in brokering the Arab-Israeli peace process. The process 
of transformation on both the economic and foreign policy levels was moving anew -  and 
at full speed.
The transformation of the Egyptian political economy, however, came at hardly tolerable 
social and political costs. According to the World Bank, real per capita GDP fell from 
$680 in 1986 to less than $600 in 1993 (Ibid.), and economic inequality and 
unemployment rose to alarming levels. As a Middle East Journal article, written under 
the pessimistic pseudonym Cassandra (1995:11) put it “the rising expectations 
engendered by Nasser’s rhetoric, Oil Boom, American Largesse, and Sadat’s infitah have 
been followed by bitter disappointment”. The picture of the real economy too was far 
from the macro-economic success stories. Investment rates actually declined during the 
stabilisation years, from 26% of GDP in the mid-1970s to 18% in 1990 (Hirst 1999), 
primarily because private savings did not make up for the deterioration of the public 
ones. By the late 1990s the Egyptian economy was showing signs of a renewed crisis, 
and simultaneously, debates on the orientation of foreign policy gained a new life.
This is best exemplified by the prolonged and heated debate on the “role of Egypt” (Abou 
Taleb 1996). First popularised by Nasser in his Philosophy o f the Revolution, this concept 
comprises various dimensions regarding the nature and direction of domestic political 
economy and foreign policy. Nasser invoked the concept of Egypt’s role to defend 
etatisme and a Pan-Arab, anti-colonialist, and non-aligned foreign policy, whereas Sadat
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resorted to a different conception of the role to facilitate the dismantling of the populist- 
statist model and re-aligning with the United States and the West. By contrast to his 
predecessors, Mubarak disdained grandiose visions, often seeking to project the image of 
a practical man -  a problem solver. However, the lack of an articulated doctrine put 
Mubarak’s regime at a disadvantageous position in the heated ideological debate over the 
role of Egypt. Throughout the Mubarak years, unsettled debates on the prospects of this 
role reflected the state of confusion and disorientation that Aulas (1988:133-134) best 
described as, “It is as i f  the body [was] deprived o f its soul”. Thus, the second wave of 
restructuring developed from a “troubled liberalisation” phase throughout the 1990s to a 
“comprehensive crisis of governance” from 2000.
The political economy o f Egyptian foreign policy is an attempt to present a systematic 
framework of analysis for understanding the reasons for, and the shifts in Egyptian 
Foreign Policy, within the context of this lengthy and problematic transformation of 
etatisme since 1970.
3. Research Question and Proposed Methodology
(3.1) Key Debates and Critical Issues
All perspectives and theories of international relations include, as Smith (1986:13-14) 
argued, a certain notion of what the state is and how its policy results. All international 
relations theories are, therefore, in some sense, theories of foreign policy analysis. As a 
distinctive approach, however, mainstream FPA tended to focus on the decision-making 
processes. It developed along two distinct lines of analysis. The first, associated with the
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so-called “English School” of international relations, is analytical, often case-oriented, 
with explicit links to history, political theory, and the study of institutions. The second, 
more predominantly used in North America, is formal and macro in its approach to 
generating a grand theory of foreign policy analysis (Light and Hill 1985:161; Smith 
1986a:345). Both trends, however, notwithstanding their methodological differences, 
often take specific decisions as their focal point of analysis.
Although this study necessarily entails examining a number of specific decisions (e.g. 
Sadat’s infitah and peace decisions 1974-1979, and Mubarak’s decisions during the Gulf 
war 1990-1991 and its aftermath), it does not intend to make the analysis of decision­
making its focal point, for a twofold reason. First, this study agrees with Korany’s 
(1986:39) view that foreign policy is essentially a continuous activity, and that decision 
making is best analysed as part of this whole. Second, as Light and Hill argued 
(1985:158) it is not possible anyway to discuss the reason behind a decision without 
arguments about the underlying values to be served. Such values are always deeply 
embedded in the state’s socio-economic structure, its relations with society, and the 
general worldview of its ruling elite. Consequently, decisions will be examined in this 
study as part of a broader conceptualisation of the transformation of the Egyptian state, 
an approach that is often neglected in mainstream FPA.
Indeed, mainstream accounts of IPE and FPA often confound their rejection of the realist 
depiction of the state as a rational, power-driven unitary actor with the importance of the 
state as a formative unit of the international system as well as a valid unit of analysis.
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Rejection of the realist account of state behaviour often translated into a de facto 
underrating of the state as an analytic category.
What in fact should be deservedly questioned is the legal-territorial conception of the 
state that underlies the realist accounts of foreign policy. This indeed is one of the areas 
in which FPA may benefit from more openness on sociology. Rather than the unitary and 
rational representative of the “national interest”, modem sociological research has 
developed a richer and more heuristic conceptualisation of the state13. According to 
which, the state is conceived of as a set of institutions based at the centre of a 
geographically bound community known as society, responsible for the authoritative 
allocation of values, and controlling vital monopolies, including, inter alia, the monopoly 
of violence and a virtual monopoly of the right of taxation (Hall and Ikenberry 1989; 
Linklater and Macmillan 1995:12). These institutions are engaged in socially significant 
processes -  extracting resources from the population to pursue state, class, or group 
interests (Hollist and Caporaso 1985:31). Finally, the state is a Janus-faced apparatus that 
looks inward to its national society and outward to other societies with which it must 
interact and make its way (Hall and Ikenberry 1989:12). Its behaviour in one area can 
often only be explained by its activities in the other. Foreign policy is therefore best 
viewed as the external activity, indeed an integral part of the political system. 
Analytically this implies the need to cross the dividing boundaries of international 
relations, comparative politics, and economics, and examine foreign policy as the product 
of a certain pattern of interaction between the national and the international.
13 This distinction between legal-territorial and sociological conceptions of the state, and the discussion that 
follows are inspired by Halliday’s (1994) discussion of the impasse on state and society in International 
Relations.
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(3.2) Proposed Conceptual Framework
Earlier attempts at crossing this intellectual divide of the national and the international 
developed along two main lines of analysis: Internationalisation and Politics as 
Economics. The first reflects the salience of the international as a level of analysis in 
modem IPE and international relations research agenda. It conceptualises changes in the 
domestic economy and politics as a function of changes in the international environment, 
and considers internationalisation, defined as the exogenous reduction in the costs of 
international economic flows relative to domestic ones, the central explanatory variable 
(Keohane and Milner 1996:4), arguing that its implications should represent the central 
research question. Internationalisation, it is argued, tends to generate new domestic 
coalitions revolving around the differential effects of greater openness of and deeper 
engagement with the world economy (Ibid: 15). Keohane and Milner’s (1996) collection 
of essays, as well as Gourevitch’s (1978) "second image reversed’ are Kuhnian 
exemplars of this trend.
The second line of analysis represents an outgrowth of neo-classical economics to 
account for market failures where rational economic behaviour results in Pareto sub- 
optimal outcomes on one hand, and non-economic phenomena on the other. Economics 
here, to use Karl Polany’s famous typology, is understood in its formal sense (that is, as a 
logically distinct way of behaviour aiming at the efficient allocation of resources) rather 
than substantially (i.e. as the processes by which people secure a livelihood). Institutional 
economics and public choice theories are but two examples. According to this trend, the 
political economy approach has been less about the interrelation of politics and
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economics, and more about the subordination of the political to the economic -  the latter 
understood as a rigorous and quantifiable method of relating means to ends that could be 
applied to all spheres of human activity (Caporaso and Levine 1992:21-32).
However diverse, these two traditions share several ontological and methodological 
assumptions that render them inadequate for the purposes of our analysis. First, both 
accept the primacy of economics. Changes in the international and occasionally the 
domestic economy are given priority as the formative pillars of the area of investigation 
in IPE (ontological primacy), and neoclassical methods are extended to account for non­
economic phenomena (methodological primacy).
Second, both tend to perceive eclecticism and interdisciplinary analysis in a linear and 
simple manner, according to which they amount to nothing more than an outgrowth of a 
protruding analytic tradition, namely neo-classical economics, given its prominent 
position within social sciences, and the extension of its methodology to other social 
sciences.
As such, the linear interdisciplinary approach of these lines of analysis fails to account 
for various instances in which foreign policy was not a direct result of states’ economic 
policies or their international environments. The situation is further complicated in cases 
where foreign policy is a source, not an outcome of economic policies (e.g. US president 
Johnson’s emphasis on the great society program to secure support for the Vietnam war,
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and the role of Egyptian foreign policy during the second Gulf War in 1991 in facilitating 
the deal with the IMF).
This creates a need for a more complex interdisciplinary approach that views the relation 
between domestic (economic and political) and foreign policies as dialectic and mutually 
fertilising. The state behaviour in one area is examined as an input to its behaviour in the 
other. Consequently, the study of the state behaviour becomes less about establishing 
simple “linear” causal relations with clear “independent” and “dependent” variables, and 
more about constructing a complex narrative that examines the mutual interaction and 
cross-fertilisation of a multiple set of variables.
One important attempt to develop such a complex interdisciplinary method is represented 
by Putnam’s (1988) logic o f two level games, and Evans et.al’s (1993) double-edged 
diplomacy, which aim at analysing the relation between states’ behaviour in international 
negotiations and their domestic lobbying for ratification of the outcome of these 
negotiations. Unlike classical state-centric analysis, the two level games model recognises 
as Putnam (1988) explained, the inevitable conflict about what national interest entails 
and requires. Unlike the second image reversed and internationalisation analyses the 
two-level games approach recognises that decision makers strive to reconcile domestic 
and international imperatives simultaneously, and consequently it does not aim at 
establishing a simple causal hierarchy between the domestic and external determinants of 
state action, but to examine their patterns of interaction.
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However, although this approach recognises the continuous interplay of the domestic and 
the international, it is heretofore confined to one aspect of foreign policy -  international 
negotiations and the problems of ratification and securing domestic support for their 
outcome. A broader-gauged approach that examines the interplay between the different 
sources and tools of foreign policy on one hand, and the domestic economic and political 
structures and processes on the other is yet to be seen.
Any such account should aim at studying the changes and continuities in foreign policy in 
the light of changing patterns of interaction between the domestic, psychological and 
international environments of foreign policy. The crux of such holistic framework of 
analysing the political economy of foreign policy should revolve around four analytically 
distinct, albeit continuously interacting pillars; the state, economic structures and 
policies, ideology, and foreign policy.
a) The State
Defined sociologically rather than territorially, the state structure, its relations with the 
society, and the inter-elite struggles for the control of the state apparatus should be 
studied in so far as they influence the structuring or restructuring of foreign policy.
The state here is understood in the Weberian tradition, which considers the state more 
than the government apparatus. It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and 
coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and 
public authority, but also to structure many crucial relations within civil society itself
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(Skocpol 1986:7). In doing so, the ruling elite need to build policy coalitions and 
social/support bases, and make choices that necessarily entail differential gains and losses 
amongst the different social groups and classes. The state could not, therefore, be 
considered a neutral arbiter between competing demands of different social groups. To 
the contrary, a state’s authoritative allocation of resources is always for something, and 
for someone. There are always winners and losers.
Under certain domestic and international circumstances, the revolutionary potentials of 
the state apparatus could be unleashed, and the state becomes the primary agent of social 
change, and may even embark on what Trimberger (1978) calls “a revolution from 
above”, and arbitrarily impose its policies on interest groups and organisations, and force 
the construction of corporatist structures. Under other circumstances, the revolutionary 
state apparatus may be dismantled, and the state becomes a bastion of conservatism.
Although the state officialdom may be institutionally distinct from dominant classes, all 
state action privileges some interests and excludes others, and it supports certain 
identities and marginalizes others. In moments of large-scale transformation and/or 
revolutionary change, such processes are intensified. There is a need to examine the 
power struggles that underlie the state’s foreign and economic policy choices, particularly 
in such revolutionary circumstances and in their aftermath, and to bring the age-old 
question Cui bono? back in.
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Governments act simultaneously at home to meet international challenges abroad and to 
solve domestic problems. Internationally, they need to mobilise resources to foster 
economic power and development, as well as to achieve what Mustanduno et.al. 
(1989:464-466) called “international validation”, that is, international recognition and 
support -  moral, political and economic. Domestically, they extract resources from 
society mainly to implement their developmental but also military and foreign policy 
goals. On both levels, they are striving to strike a balance between four key goals: 
autonomy, welfare, security, and regime maintenance (Holsti 1990:15).
The study of the state, for the purposes of this framework of analysis, is, therefore, based 
on answering a set of interrelated questions regarding: a) the structure of the state, the 
social disposition of the ruling elite, and its support base; b) the interests and identities 
privileged or marginalized by state behaviour; c) the evolution of specific patterns of 
relations between state and society; and d) the domestic and international policy choices 
that states make under specific historical conditions and their implications.
b) Economic Structures and Policies 
However important, economic structures and policies will not be examined in their own 
right. Rather, the emphasis will be on the mechanisms through which they influence, and 
are influenced by changes in foreign policy.
Far from reducing foreign policy to a mere outcome of societal changes, this study rests 
on the assumption that the interplay of foreign and developmental policies in Egypt was a
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two-way process. The transformation of Egyptian political economy and foreign policy 
was a complex process that aroused several tensions within the ruling elite. Each stage of 
this long and complex process involved a certain pattern of interplay between economic 
and foreign policy goals.
It is important, however, to define what economic structure and policies mean. This study 
takes the prevailing mode of production as given, since the Egyptian political economy 
remained throughout the twentieth century capitalist. The focus of its analysis will be on 
the patterns of organisation (etatisme versus neoliberal models) and the economic 
policies taken by the Egyptian government to respond to specific challenges in the 
different stages of the transformation of the populist etatisme.
Economic structures refer to the main attributes of the role of the state in the economy at 
a given period of time. Policies refer to the direct actions of the Egyptian government 
aiming at changing any aspect of the material basis of life in the Egyptian society -  both 
on the productive as well as the distributive levels.
The analysis of the patterns of interaction between economic structures and policies on 
one hand, and foreign policy on the other will, therefore, involve examining: a) the 
general economic conditions and the economic functions performed by (or ascribed to) 
the state at each stage; b) the inherent tensions and contradictions of the Egyptian 
political economy at each stage, and the government’s actions to resolve them; and c) the 
foreign policy implications of economic conditions and policies at the different stages.
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c) Ideology
Ideology, as Michael Howard (1991:139-141) argued, has two different meanings. The 
first refers to a particularly rigorous, comprehensive and dogmatic set of interrelated 
values based on a philosophy, which claims to provide coherent and unchallengeable 
answers to all problems of mankind. The second indicates a less rigorous form, defined in 
terms of the prevailing worldview and attitudes characteristic of a group or a community.
This study will invoke the second definition, focusing on the prevailing perceptions of 
foreign policy priorities and the role the state should play in the international arena, and 
the ways in which such perceptions are firmly embedded in broader conceptualisations of 
the ways the national economy and polity should be managed. Ideology is the 
intermediate variable between the domestic and international environments of foreign 
policy decision-making. It constitutes the cornerstone of the perceptive screens of the 
ruling elite as well as an important source of their political legitimacy (Dahl 1997:82).
This analysis of ideology and its role in the process of transforming populist etatisme in 
Egypt is based upon my reading of Gramsci’s exposition of the concept of “hegemony”. 
In his revision of the classical Marxist conception of the relation between the 
superstructure of society and the underlying socio-economic forces, Gramsci argued that 
political leadership of a dominant class was based on cultural and moral ascendancy as 
well as on economic predominance. The rule of one class over the others, therefore, did 
not depend on economic and physical power alone, but rather on persuading the ruled to 
accept the system of beliefs of the ruling class and to share their social, cultural and
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moral values (1971:169-170). To do so, the rulers need to recast their interests in a 
broader worldview that can appeal to broader segments of society. In the Egyptian case, 
the concept of the “national role” and the debates thereabout represented a cornerstone of 
the ideological aspects of the rise and subsequent transformation of the populist-statist 
model.
The concept of “national role” is an important analytical tool used in explaining the 
regularities in the relations between governments (Backman 1970:311). Its use is ancient, 
dating, as Korany (1991:211-212) noted, to the Hindu six-type classification of foreign 
policy patterns. In its modem usage in international relations theory, however, the 
concept of national role refers to the policy makers’ own definitions of the general kinds 
of decisions, and commitments suitable to their states, and the functions their state should 
perform on a continuing basis in their international or regional environments (Holsti 
1970:245-246). National roles serve two functions: a) as a guide to policy action, and b) 
as a source of mobilisation and political legitimacy -  a key component of the ruling 
elite’s hegemony. Once established by the elites and accepted popularly, national roles 
become major components of the prevailing political culture, and a source of 
distinguishing what is legitimate or illegitimate in the eyes of society.
Foreign policies do not always rest on a monolithic conception of a single national role 
ascribed to their states. As Korany (1991:212) argued, states sometimes have to choose 
between different and even mutually exclusive roles. In which case, policy makers have 
to make hard choices as their country is facing a role conflict and a crisis of hegemony.
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The transformation of Egyptian political economy and foreign policy since the 1970s 
represents an excellent case study of role conflict and crisis of hegemony. Mirrit 
Boutrous-Ghali (1978), writing amid the 1970’s heated debate about Egypt’s role and her 
relation to the Arab countries, remarked that “We modern Egyptians are still engrossed 
in our national identity, tom by contradictory influences and pressures ” before going on 
to make the conciliatory statement that “[our] national culture embodies them all in a 
living synthesis However, brushing aside his subsequent value judgement, Boutros- 
Ghali’s earlier statement reflects accurately the ingredients of Egypt’s role conflict in the 
1970s and thereafter. Due to Egypt’s central geo-strategic location and her millennial 
history, the country was subjected to diverse and sometimes contradictory influences. 
Much of the debates about Egypt’s “national role” is about establishing a certain 
hierarchy amongst these influences, or challenging a prevailing one. Competing elites 
invoked different conceptions of the “national role” to justify and/or criticise 
contradictory policies. The rise and fall of the competing conceptions of Egypt’s 
“national role”, and the debates thereabout, will be examined in this study, as the 
ideological component of the process of the transformation of the populist-statist political 
economy and restructuring foreign policy since 1970.
d) Foreign Policy
Foreign policy refers to the decisions and actions taken to achieve stated objectives 
regarding the state’s international environment. Such actions aim at striking a delicate 
balance between the state’s objectives on one hand, and the opportunities and constraints 
given by the external environment on the other.
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This study will only examine two core domains of Egyptian foreign policy, namely, 
Egypt’s relations with the prevailing superpowers, and her attitudes towards the regional 
environment, viz., the Arab world and the conflict with Israel. Other aspects of Egyptian 
foreign policy (e.g. in international organisations and other multilateral forums, towards 
Africa, the Non-Aligned Movement or the Islamic world) will not be examined in this 
study. The focus in particular will be on the interplay between the foreign policy 
restructuring in these two main domains of Egyptian foreign policy, and the 
transformation of the populist-statist political economy since 1970.
(3.3) Chapter Structure
Chronologically, this study attempts to show that the dismantling of populist etatisme, 
like any large-scale societal change, was far from being a straightforward process. 
Several political, social and economic crises slowed down its pace, and at some points 
even threatened to reverse its direction, albeit temporarily. Developmental policies, 
foreign policy, and ideological discourse interacted in different ways since the 1970s 
within the context of dismantling the populist-statist model.
One could indeed argue that transforming the populist etatisme developed through two 
grand waves: the first was during die second half of the 1970s whereas the second took 
place in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The 1980s represented a hesitant decade, in which 
conflicting policies were followed and the transformation processes were significantly 
hampered, or at least slowed down. Major shifts in Egyptian attitudes and behaviour 
towards its regional and international environments, it will be argued, were deeply linked
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to, and largely dependent on, the success or failure of the transformation of Egyptian 
political economy, as well as its pace.
The following chapter will examine the foreign policy implications of the populist statist 
model that prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s as well as the origins of the 
restructuring process. The third, fourth and fifth chapters will discuss the first wave of 
restructuring during the 1970s, the hesitant decade of slow transformation (the 1980s), 
and the second wave of restructuring in the aftermath of the Gulf War respectively.
This study aims at combining a chronological and a thematic approach. Consequently, 
whereas the subsequent chapters correspond to chronological sub-stages of the process of 
transforming the Egyptian political economy and foreign policy, each chapter will 
address the questions outlined in the aforementioned four pillars of the proposed 
analytical framework.
Developments in economic policies as well as in ideological discourse will not be 
analysed in their own right, but only insofar as they were linked to the dismantling of the 
populist-statist model and the restructuring of Egyptian foreign policy. A pure and 
detailed historical account of the Egyptian political economy since the 1970s obviously 
falls beyond the scope of this study, and has been studied in detail elsewhere14. This 
study is only concerned with challenging the psychological-perceptual accounts of the
14 See for example the excellent studies by Ayubi (1989a; 1991) and Wahba (1994), Waterbury’s classical 
work (1983), and Ibrahim (2000).
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restructuring of Egyptian foreign policy since the 1970s by attempting an alternative 
account from a political economy perspective.
4- Conclusion
Another important aim of this study is to demonstrate the interpretive ability of the 
political economy approach in explaining international actors’ behaviour. Underlying 
foreign policy analysis is the assumption that the interactions that take place in the “black 
box" influence, contrary to the realist assumption, the state’s foreign behaviour. In this 
sense, FPA, as Light (1994) argued, was meant to be a bridging discipline, linking micro 
and macro levels of analysis, and drawing on the inputs of various social sciences. 
Ironically, mainstream FPA, governed as it is by the traditional, intellectually enclosed, 
international relations analysis, tends to forget this interdisciplinary mission statement, 
and often neglects the impact of domestic economic structures and policies on foreign 
policy. This study is therefore, in some sense, an attempt to introduce the political 
economy analysis to a hitherto neglected area.
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Chapter II 
The Rise and Crisis of Etatisme in Egypt:
Political Economy and Foreign Policy
"National reaction to political humiliation or military defeat was the greatest engine of social change"
Walt Rostow, The Stages o f Economic Growth
“Development cannot progress only through the work of the manager and the engineer. It needs also 
the vision of the idealist and the determination o f the revolutionary”
Nazih Ayubi, Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt
This Chapter seeks to account for the foreign policy implications of etatisme in post-1952 
Egypt, as well as the origins of the restructuring process. The central argument is that the 
rise of post-1952 etatisme was a result of a specific pattern of interplay between the 
Egyptian political economy and foreign policy. Similarly, the early efforts of 
restructuring etatisme since the mid-1960s were as much a result of domestic crises and 
inherent contradictions within the populist statist political economy, as they were due to 
international pressures and foreign policy crises. Seeking to reveal and analyse these 
patterns of interplay between Egyptian political economy and foreign policy, this chapter 
will be divided into four sections. The first examines the crisis of the ancien regime and 
the prelude to post-1952 etatisme. The second and third discuss, respectively, the rise of 
etatisme and its crisis and the early efforts of restructuring. Finally, a concluding section 
will aim at abstracting specific patterns of interplay between Egyptian political economy 
and foreign policy throughout Nasser’s years.
1- The Crisis of the “Ancien Regime”
Few would disagree that the army’s coup in July 1952 came at a time when Egypt was 
witnessing an unprecedented crisis economically, socially, and politically. On 26/1/1952, 
less than six months before the officers’ coup, Egyptians watched, in apathy and even
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreien Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970_________ Yasser M. Elwv 63
half sympathy, the modem “European” quarter of Cairo, with which they could hardly 
identify, put to flames and robbed by hundreds of young jobless thugs (Abdel Malek 
1968: 36). The events of this day, often referred to as Black Saturday, were “a 
culmination o f 70years’ impatience” (Hopwood 1985: 32), indicating that the mounting 
socio-economic tensions were no longer containable. The following six months witnessed 
the succession of four governments, demonstrating the inability of the ruling classes to 
contain the crisis.
In the meantime, Egypt’s struggle for national independence had also reached a 
stalemate. The only breakthrough that was made since the 1919 revolt and the creation of 
Wafd Party was the 1936 treaty, which effectively amounted to little more than a 
redeployment of the British troops from Egyptian cities to the Suez Canal zone along 
with a few nominal gestures of independence. Even these nominal gestures did not last 
for long. The British were back in the Egyptian heartland with the outbreak of the Second 
World War three years later, and were directly intervening in Egyptian politics15. Wafdist 
Premier Mustafa Al-Nahas’ dramatic abrogation of the treaty on October 8, 1951 and call 
for “jihad” did not launch a new phase in Anglo-Egyptian relations. It was indeed, more 
than anything else, a declaration of the end of the Wafd’s national vision for liberating 
Egypt through constitutional means.
15 This intervention went as far as to force Mustafa Al-Nahas’ Wafd government into power on February 
4th, 1942 to help contain the anti-British and pro-Axis sentiments showed not only amongst the Egyptian 
populace, but also by significant parts of the ruling elite. See: Heikal (2002a).
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Never since its creation in 1919 has the Wafd been the political wing of an armed national 
liberation movement. Since its very first days it remained a constitutionally minded 
national front committed to political means and negotiations as the only route to 
liberation. By declaring the “negotiations option” futile, it was effectively passing the 
same judgement on its fundamental strategic choice and on the ability of the inter-war 
quasi-liberal regime in Egypt to achieve national independence (El-Bishry 2002:383).
This created a revolutionary situation par excellence, and led analysts from across the 
political spectrum to accuse the 1952 coup of sabotaging the revolutionary moment. 
Leftists argued that the free officers’ coup aborted the potential of a proletarian 
revolution in Egypt (Hosseinzadeh 1989). Liberals condemned the pre-emption of the 
constitutional struggle for independence, and the “natural” course of development of 
Egyptian society (Ibrahim 1982a).
However plausible such arguments might seem, they could be challenged both on 
historical and methodological grounds. First, they fail to recognise the traditional 
historical role of the military in Egyptian protest politics. As El-Bishry (1991:77) and 
Abdel Malek (1968) noted, the military had played a key role in Egyptian revolts since 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Two of the three major Egyptian insurrections 
in less than 75 years (in 1881-1882, 1919, 1952), were led by the military (El-Bishry, 
Ibid). To ignore the historical precedents of the military’s intervention in Egyptian 
politics and argue that the military came from nowhere to intervene in, and abort the 
revolutionary situation in Egypt is at best historically myopic. Second, these arguments
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fail to explain the relative ease with which the military seized power and managed to 
neutralise and eventually destroy the power bases of all key actors in pre-1952 Egypt 
(e.g. landowners, political parties, workers’ organisations) without having to resort to 
mass violence, nor the profound socio-economic changes that took place after 1952. The 
scope and radical nature of these changes suggest that the military’s movement in 1952 
was not just a mere coup d ’etat that changes the rulers but leaves the socio-economic 
order intact. Rather, it was a military-led “revolution from above”. Understanding such 
transformation requires a careful examination of the crisis of the ancien regime and the 
nature of the social forces that it marginalized, and that the 1952 free officers’ movement 
represented. Third, the methodological assumption on which the arguments that the 
military “stole the revolutionary moment” are based is highly questionable. Explaining an 
historical transformation of such magnitude as an historical rupture in which a new comer 
to the Egyptian political scene manages to seize power and consolidate it without any 
serious challenge from any of the pre-1952 key actors, is based on an extremist version of 
the “voluntarist/idealist” view of history, whose various weaknesses were discussed in 
the previous chapter.
An important attempt at explaining the post-1952 “revolution from above” was 
Trimberger’s (1978) thesis, which aimed at identifying the conditions under which the 
military bureaucrats successfully led the process of social change in Egypt and elsewhere. 
Trimberger (Ibid: 41-43) argued that revolutions-from-above are dependent on three 
conditions: a) that the officer class or a significant segment of it is independent of those 
classes which control the means of production; b) that the military bureaucrats become
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politicised; and c) the existence of contradictions in the international constellation of 
power that can be exploited to increase national autonomy.
The only problem with Trimberger’s study is that it focuses exclusively on conditions 
related to the agents of change and their international environment. An examination of 
the domestic environment, and the extent to which it was conducive to a successful 
revolutionary intervention by the military, is indispensable for a fuller appreciation of the 
anatomy of the revolutionary situation in pre-1952 Egypt, the nature of the revolution- 
from-above that took place, and its subsequent development.
The forces which the military represented and their agenda for social change and national 
liberation were both products of the pre-1952 revolutionary crisis in Egypt. This 
revolutionary crisis had four major components: a) mounting social, economic and
political tensions that created an intolerably severe crisis of governance in Egypt; b) the 
inability of the ruling classes to contain these tensions and preserve the status quo; c) the 
inability of the other key social forces in pre-1952 Egypt to intervene and seize power or 
force fundamental social transformations; and d) the willingness and ability of the 
military to interfere and force their agenda for modernisation and national liberation. 
Trimberger’s study has convincingly analysed the fourth component. I will therefore try 
to examine the first three.
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(1.1) The Crisis of Governance in Pre-1952 Egypt
In most cases of nationalist “revolutions from above”, military defeats or unfavourable 
encounters with a foreign hegemonic power played a central role in drawing the 
revolutionary elites’ attention to the need for rapid modernisation, and convincing them 
that political independence cannot be sustained under conditions of economic 
backwardness. As a result, nationalist “revolutions from above” often adopted the twin 
goals of political independence and economic modernisation. Such, for instance, was the 
relation between the arrival of the Kurobune (black ships) of Commodore Perry to the 
Japanese coasts and the Ishin Meiji (Meiji restoration) that launched Japan’s “revolution 
from above”. Egypt’s case was no exception. It is widely accepted that Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s short-lived French invasion (1798-1801) provided the stimulus for 
overthrowing the quasi-feudalist structures that prevailed in the previous three centuries, 
and launched Egypt’s quest for modernisation. Since the British occupation of Egypt in 
1882, the quest for modernisation became incorporated in the broader context of the 
struggle for independence, and the twin goals were adopted by the anti-colonial elites.
The earliest attempts at industrialisation and modernisation were led by the state under 
Mohamed Ali (1805-1840). Similarly, it was the state that created the bourgeoisie, which 
was, as Zaalouk (1989:1) argued, unlike its European counterpart, largely dependent on 
education rather than property. Its members included state technocrats, administrators, 
clerks and army officers. Mohamed Ali and his successors encouraged the rise of this 
administrative class that became the basis of their power and grew even more under the 
British occupation (Vatikiotis 1995:15). They represented the foundation of the Egyptian
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bourgeoisie. Private ownership of land appeared only in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, and henceforth formed the production basis of the Egyptian bourgeoisie. From 
that moment until the 1952 revolution, the Egyptian bourgeoisie remained predominantly 
agrarian (Zaalouk 1989:23). The industrial wing of the bourgeoisie had to wait for more 
favourable conditions in the international division of labour to develop. These came 
during the First World War, which entailed a disruption in Egypt’s trade patterns and 
created a de facto protected market allowing nascent industries to develop and accrue 
handsome profit margins (Wahba 1994:27-28). The war’s impact on industrialisation was 
twofold: a) it demonstrated the need for economic diversification to make up for the 
sharp decline in imports due to war circumstances; and b) it gave the agrarian bourgeoisie 
a flavour of the potential profits of manufacturing. It was also during the war years that 
the first calls for state intervention to protect national markets and create incentives for 
industrialisation were voiced, particularly with the creation of the “commission on trade 
and industry” (CTI) in 1917 (Ibid; Abdel Malek 1968:10). As soon as the war ended, 
however, imports returned to Egypt and a large part of the emerging manufacturing 
industry was ruined.
The great depression provided further impetus to industrialisation, with the deterioration 
of Egyptian terms of trade by 31.5%, and the rising imports of cheap Japanese cotton, 
which threatened Egypt’s major cash crop (Owen and Pumuk 1998:34-39). This led to a 
shift in the interests of the bourgeoisie as they realised the vulnerability of their 
dependence on cotton, and the need to diversify their investments. The government 
sought to encourage the nascent industrialisation efforts, hence, housing rents were
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stabilised (Zaalouk 1989:9), creating a disincentive for investments in the housing sector 
(a traditional outlet for the agricultural bourgeoisie’s investments), and higher tariffs were 
introduced (Owen and Pumuk 1998:39). The Second World War witnessed the second 
boom in Egyptian industrialisation, again thanks to the obligatory protectionism it 
entailed.
During the Second World War, a consensus emerged amongst all major political parties 
on the need for industrialisation and modernisation, considering them to be an integral 
part of the Egyptian struggle for independence. Nationalism and the quest for 
independence were translated in the economic sphere into the twin goals of 
industrialisation and Egyptianisation of the Egyptian economy. Efforts to achieve these 
goals, as Owen and Pumuk (1998:36) accurately pointed out, were more nationally self- 
conscious than most historians allowed -  they were seen as part of the anti-colonial 
struggle.
Nevertheless, by the early 1950s, the performance of the Egyptian economy in both 
spheres was far from satisfactory. The development of Egyptian industry followed a clear 
pattern whereby gains made during the periods of compulsory protectionism during the 
world wars eroded as soon as the guns fell silent and international trade flourished anew. 
Thus, the rate of growth in manufacturing slowed down after the end of World War II 
(Wahba 1994:36), and there was a dramatic drop in new investments in the 
manufacturing sector (Abdel Malek 1968:39). Even more disturbing was the fact that the 
growth of industrialisation was never enough to generate a significant rise in the incomes
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of Egyptians. This created what some called “development without growth”, as it became 
clear that the economic diversification through industrial expansion was not sufficient to 
cater for the needs of the rising population and absorb the work force (Owen and Pumuk 
1998:35). Half of the factories in pre-1952 Egypt were too small to employ paid labour 
(Hassanein 1978:20). It was not possible to count on these mostly family-run workshops 
to absorb significant proportions of the work force.
This created the need for etatisme and state support for industrialisation. And indeed, 
since the creation of the CTI in 1917 several efforts were made by the successive 
Egyptian governments to encourage industrialisation, but all fell short of generating a 
structural transformation of the Egyptian economy. The reason for that is primarily that 
the predominantly agrarian bourgeoisie resisted all efforts at limiting the profitability of 
agriculture and creating incentives for industrialisation at its own expense. All proposals 
presented to the post World War II Egyptian parliaments to introduce land reform, or 
even restrict the purchasing new land in order to channel the economic surplus into 
industrialisation, were vigorously resisted, and eventually defeated, by the agricultural 
bourgeoisie (Wahba 1994:37-39). In 1946, for the first time in Egyptian history, a five- 
year plan was adopted -  thus far the most daring statist effort (Wahba 1994:43-44). Its 
failure illustrated yet again that the predominance of the agricultural wing of the Egyptian 
bourgeoisie on one hand, and the limited independence Egyptian governments had in 
adopting measures to protect their infant industries on the other, were imposing serious 
limits on any effective state promotion of industrialisation. The importance of this ill- 
fated plan, however, as far as the development of etatisme in Egypt is concerned, is that it
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demonstrated both what needed to be done, and why it was not possible under the 
prevailing power structures in pre-1952 Egypt.
Likewise, all efforts aiming at Egyptianising the economy came to naught. The failure of 
Talaat Harb’s pioneering attempt (Bank Misr) in die 1930s and 1940s to accumulate 
capital and invest it independently from the European and the mutamassir (foreign 
resident) capital is the obvious example (Ayubi 1995:173). A less famous, but equally 
significant example was the failure of the Egyptianisation laws 138 and 139 of 1947. 
These laws sought to reserve 51% of the capital of joint-stock companies for Egyptians. 
However, as Wahba (1994:45-47) explained, they were easily evaded by foreign capital 
(as many of the mutamassir capitalists applied for Egyptian nationality in the same year, 
and were all successful).
The economic crisis resulting from the failure of industrialisation and Egyptianisation 
was exacerbated by rising rural and urban inequalities. Egyptian society resembled a 
pyramid with an extremely flat base and a very narrow apex. Between 1939 and 1952, 
notwithstanding the increased profits accrued by the bourgeoisie and large land owners 
under the favourable conditions of World War II, the real income of the average Egyptian 
declined by 7 per cent (Abdel Malek 1968:15-16). Rural landlessness was also on the 
rise, with over half of the families in Upper Egypt and between 36 and 40% in Lower 
Egypt owned no land at all (Owen and Pamuk 1998:32), and so was urban poverty as a 
result of the failure of Egyptian industries to absorb the growing proletariat, which
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amounted to over 2 million by 1951 (Hassanein 1978:35)16. On the other hand, Egyptian 
Industries were becoming increasingly concentrated, with 68 factories accounting for half 
of the industrial production, and the number of small factories declining from 14850 
factories in 1947 to 7360 in 1950 (El-Bishry 2002:402). No successful efforts to redress 
these inequalities were made since the deprived classes were hardly represented in pre- 
1952 parliaments. As El-Dessouki (1975:212-213) documented, large landowners 
provided over 58% of the membership of all parliamentary committees between 1924 and 
1952, and were therefore able successfully to resist all efforts at introducing tax reforms 
or any income-redistributing measures. As a result, strikes and social protests escalated, 
with 49 workers’ strikes in 1950 alone, and peasant revolts rising from 1951 onwards (El- 
Bishry 2002:428-429).
If the failure of industrialisation and Egyptianisation curbed the prospects of growth in 
the Egyptian economy and created the need for etatisme to foster industrialisation; the 
rising inequalities added a distributive dimension to the calls for etatisme. A distributive 
(populist) form of etatisme was needed, but was unattainable under the prevailing social 
structures in pre-1952 Egypt.
16 These workers were previously absorbed in catering for the needs of the allied troops based in Egypt. 
Work at the “omous " (Egyptian mispronunciation of “ordinance house”, meaning generally work at the 
camps of the allied troops), was a major source of absorbing the emerging working class during the war 
years.
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(1.2) The Crisis of the Governing classes in Pre-1952 Egypt
The mounting tensions of the late 1940s in Egypt were combined with a sharp decline in 
the representability of the Wafd and other bourgeois parties, and in their ability to achieve 
their twin goals of political independence and economic modernisation, thereby resulting 
in the rise of extra-parliamentary populist groups (Ayubi 1995:107).
The Wafd was originally a national front based on an alliance of landed bourgeoisie, 
merchants and the intellectuals (educated and bureaucratic bourgeoisie) (Abdel Malek 
1968:10). Traditionally, it was the educated and bureaucratic faction of the bourgeoisie 
that provided the party’s leadership17. However, the 1940s witnessed the rise of Fouad 
Sirag al-Din, one of the large landowners, to become the secretary general of the Wafd 
replacing such urban petit bourgeois intellectuals as Makram Ebeid (who deserted the 
party altogether) and Sabri Abu Alam18. This signalled a major transformation in the 
Wafd’s social disposition, alienating the middle and lower-middle classes, which were the 
main support base of the party (Ayubi 1989a:58). The influence of these alienated social 
forces in Wafd was confined to its weak left wing, which clustered around its daily 
newspaper Sawt Al Umma (Voice of the Nation), edited by the renowned literary critic 
Mohamed Mandur, but could not counter-balance the skyrocketing influence of the 
landed bourgeoisie. This power shift put serious limits on Wafd’s ability and willingness 
to support industrialisation. Its members of parliament vigorously resisted and defeated 
all proposals put forth by the Sa’adist party and other minority parties to limit land
17 Saad Zaghloul was a lawyer and Moustafa El-Nahhas a judge.
18 Heikal (2002b:50); El-Bishry (2002:386).
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purchases and raise land taxes to create more incentives for industrialisation, or redress 
inequalities in land ownership (Wahba 1994:38). Nevertheless, the Wafd retained its 
leading role in the struggle for political independence. This created a fundamental 
contradiction between Wafd’s populist anti-colonial political discourse on one hand, and 
the conservative socio-economic outlook of its influential landed bourgeoisie on the 
other. Wafd’s agenda was increasingly becoming one of political independence without 
economic modernisation.
On the other hand, other bourgeois parties with more aggressive agenda for 
industrialisation and etatisme, notably the Sa’adist Party, which represented the industrial 
bourgeoisie, did not play an important role in the struggle for political independence19. 
Theirs was, therefore, an agenda for economic modernisation without political 
independence.
Hence, not only were bourgeois parties increasingly alienating the middle and working 
classes, but also none of them possessed a clear vision of integrating the twin goals of 
political independence and economic modernisation. There was a need for new political 
parties representing the alienated classes and re-integrating the twin goals of the Egyptian 
national movement. This was the role that the rising extra-parliamentary populist groups 
that flourished in the 1940s in Egypt sought to play.
19 One of the idiosyncrasies of pre-1952 Egyptian history, as Ayubi (1989a:55) perceptively noted, was that 
the Egyptian industrial bourgeoisie, contrary to its European counterparts, chose to ally itself with 
conservative minority parties rather than support the struggle for national independence.
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(1.3) The role of the extra-parliamentary groups
During the 1940s and early 1950s several extra-parliamentary political movements 
exercised significant influence in Egyptian political life. Although none was strong 
enough to challenge the supremacy of the Wafd or other bourgeois parties, let alone to 
initiate a popular revohition-ffom-below, they managed to force their own economic, 
political and foreign policy agenda on the mainstream bourgeois parties. This reflected 
the rise of the petite bourgeoisie and its attempt to regain the initiative after its retreat in 
mainstream parties. The predominantly agrarian nature of the bourgeoisie, and the limited 
political role of its industrial wing on one hand (Hassanein 1978:61), and the 
underdevelopment of the proletariat due to the limited scope of industrialisation 
(Springborg 1975:84) on the other, meant that none of the major classes was ready to lead 
the struggle for political independence and economic modernisation. This created the 
suitable environment for the petite bourgeoisie to take the lead of the Egyptian national 
movement.
Of the various petit bourgeois extra-parliamentary groups in pre-1952 Egypt, three were 
particularly influential, and were the only pre-1952 political movements with which some 
of the free officers were affiliated: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communist Movement, 
and the pseudo-fascist Misr Al-Fatat (young Egypt). The Muslim Brotherhood was 
particularly successful amongst the petite bourgeoisie of rural origins, interpreting their 
alienation in terms of the increasing westernisation of the Egyptian society and adopting 
a vague programme based on a populist call to “return to Islam”. Its main political 
influence on mainstream politics was forcing the question of Palestine on the Egyptian
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political agenda. Indeed, as Ayubi (1989a:61-62) noted, its rise as a key political force in 
pre-1952 Egypt was associated with its support for the Palestinian revolt in 1936. It was 
also one of the key supporters of Egypt’s decision to participate in the 1948 Palestine 
War.
On the other hand, four communist organisations flourished during the 1940s, reflecting 
the increasing awareness of the social inequalities in pre-1952 Egypt. Although 
fragmented and confined in their influence to the lower-middle class intellectuals and, to 
a much lesser extent, the small urban proletariat, they played a key role in re-integrating 
the twin goals of the Egyptian national movement and emphasising that they need to be 
achieved simultaneously (Ibid: 63-64). This was particularly evident in the formation of 
the “national committee of workers and students” in 1946, which published a charter that 
emphasised the goals of “total evacuation and liberation from economic subjection” 
(Abdel Malek 1968:23).
Finally, more than any other petit bourgeois political movement, Misr Al Fatat reflected 
the crisis of the lower-middle class, and its lack of clear vision. Over the span of a little 
more than a decade, it changed its name (and political agenda) from Misr Al Fatat (young 
Egypt) to the National Islamic Party then to Egypt Socialist Party (better known as the 
Socialist Party). Through its different phases, however, it stuck to a populist agenda 
calling for an Egyptian empire that includes Egypt and Sudan and an alliance of the Arab
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states, as well as a reformist socio-economic agenda calling for protecting Egyptian 
industry, Egyptianising foreign enterprises, and free education20.
Together, these movements contributed to emphasising the populist dimension of the 
economic agenda, as well as broadening the conceptions of independence and 
emphasising the eastern prong of Egyptian foreign policy. Prior to the 1940s, Egyptian 
foreign policy was confined to the questions of evacuation and unity of Egypt and Sudan 
under the Egyptian crown. The 1930s and 1940s witnessed the rise of what Heikal 
(1996a: 142-145) calls “the Mashriq school in Egyptian foreign policy”, that is, an 
increasing number of fringe politicians arguing for a more active role of Egypt in the 
Levant, and emphasising that such role is intrinsically linked to securing national 
independence and should therefore be the key objective of Egyptian foreign policy (El- 
Bishry 2002:311-331). Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Misr Al Fatat supported this 
view without reservations, and so did a significant faction of the communist movement 
(Al-Dajani 1987:50-52).
This new conception of national independence represented a momentous challenge to the 
traditional consensus on Egyptian foreign policy that had hitherto dominated all 
mainstream bourgeois parties. And since foreign policy, and at its heart the struggle for 
national independence, was the main source of legitimacy of the Wafd and even some of 
its rivals, they had to respond quickly to this challenge. Consequently, the Wafd started 
to adopt a sympathetic discourse towards Arab nationalism. It was noteworthy that 
Makram Ebeid, the representative of the middle class intellectuals (i.e. of the closest
20 See: Ayubi (1989a:61); Wahba (1994:33); and Abdel Malek (1968:21-23).
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background to the social base of the three petit bourgeois movements), was the most 
outspoken amongst Wafd members on this issue. In the same way, other bourgeois parties 
were forced to make similar adjustments. The way the Sa ’adist government was forced, 
under popular pressure led by the three movements, to enter the Palestine war in 1948 is 
an obvious example.
The most important development, however, as far as the role of the petite bourgeoisie in 
Egyptian politics is concerned, was its infiltration of the military. After the 1936 treaty, 
the army ranks were opened to cadets with petit bourgeois backgrounds21. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that six of the fourteen members of post-1952 revolutionary command 
council (RCC) were graduates of the 1938 cohort, having entered the military academy 
with the first group of the plebeian cadets after the treaty (Binder 1965:397). By the end 
of the 1940s, most of the lower- and middle-ranked officers were without the traditional 
links with the ruling classes. The debacle in Palestine increased the levels of politicisation 
and discontent amongst the officers, some of whom were already members of populist 
petit bourgeois movements. The majority were not, but were influenced by the broad 
elements of their political agenda: the twin goals of political independence and economic 
modernisation; the necessity of a form of etatisme with a distributive dimension to foster 
economic development and address the growing inequalities; and the broader conception 
of Egyptian foreign policy which emphasised the indispensability of a leading Egyptian 
role in the Levant. Thus began the 1952 revolution from above.
21 The 1936 treaty sought to shift the burden of defending Egypt and Sudan against any potential Italian 
invasion to the Egyptian army. Hence, the treaty provided for a significant increase in the size of the 
Egyptian army, allowing, for the first time the recruitment of petit bourgeois cadets.
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2- The Rise of etatisme: 1952-1965
The free officers’ coup in 1952 launched a qualitatively different phase in the historical 
trajectory of etatisme in Egypt. The identifying characteristics of post-1952 etatisme, 
were fourfold: a) only after 1952 did etatisme develop into an official ideology of the 
regime; b) as opposed to earlier forms of etatisme, the state took direct control over a 
significant proportion of the means of production; c) post-1952 etatisme involved a 
populist dimension, whereby the state took responsibility for both production and 
distribution; and d) post-1952 etatisme was fully aware of its external dimension and was 
intrinsically linked to the activist foreign policy pursued by Nasser’s Egypt.
The development of post-1952 populist etatisme, and the specific forms it took, was a
result of the interplay of internal and external factors as the petit bourgeois officers
sought to operationalise a broad vision of what Nazih Ayubi called “developmental
nationalism”22. In the following, I will examine this process along the four pillars of the
conceptual framework of this study. Before doing so, however, one methodological note
may be in order. This study, as I explained in the introduction, falls within the
methodological tradition which Hollis and Smith (1990) called “understanding”, as
opposed to “explaining”, international relations, hence, it does not aim to give a
parsimonious account based on single causation. Rather, it aims at presenting a complex
narrative that integrates the different explanatory variables and levels of analysis. The
order of the four pillars of the framework of analysis adopted in this study does not,
therefore, necessarily imply any causal hierarchy, or suggest that developments in one
22 Anouar Abdel Malek (1968) refers to the same phenomenon as “Nationalitarianism” to distinguish it 
from the “western” conceptions of nationalism and highlight its developmental agenda. I preferred Ayubi’s 
clearer term.
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area always predated developments in the others. Indeed, one of the underlying premises 
of this study is that they were continuously interacting and influencing each other. The 
main goal is, therefore, to explain their patterns of interaction, rather than assign decisive 
causal weight to one of them, and assume that the others were simply dependent 
thereupon.
(2.1) The State
The free officers’ group constituted a broad front representing the petite bourgeoisie of 
mainly agricultural or minor civil service backgrounds (Ayubi 1980:158). Not having an 
elaborate plan of action, they only clustered around the broad political agenda expressed 
by the petit bourgeois extra-parliamentary movements before 1952. This petit bourgeois 
background of the free officers is essential to understanding the form of etatisme that 
developed in Egypt after 1952.
The petite bourgeoisie, being an intermediary class between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, is often said to be tom between its vulnerability to impoverishment and the 
risk of proletarisation on one hand, and its firm belief that it is still bourgeois and its 
aspiration to the lifestyle of the superior class on the other (Mclean 1996:369). Hence, 
whereas it can partly identify with the distressed classes and adopt a radical approach to 
change their lot, it remains essentially reformist and committed to maintaining control 
over, and emphasising its distinctions from the working classes. In other words, it could 
adopt a populist agenda, whilst, paradoxically, emphasising its autonomy from the classes 
which this populist agenda purports to represent -  a “populism-from-above”.
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In Post-1952 Egypt, the free officers were able administer this populism-ffom-above by 
adopting what could be called a technocratic approach to politics. Coming from the most 
bureaucratised section of the petite bourgeoisie (the military), and lacking a coherent 
ideology for national reconstruction and social change, the free officers were in their 
approach to statecraft more empirical and pragmatic problem solvers than ideologues, 
envisioning their country in terms of an organisational model, and adopting an 
administrative logic to solve the problems facing the state as a whole, rather than a 
political logic that acknowledges that statecraft inevitably involves representing a specific 
set of interests within the society, not the whole “national” interest of the populace 
(Heaphey 1966:177).
In so doing, these petit bourgeois officers needed to establish their autonomy from both 
the proletariat and the ruling class of the ancien regime -  the landed bourgeoisie. The 
suppression of industrial strikes in Kafr Al-Dawar in August 1952, less than four weeks 
after the coup, established the regime’s authority vis-a-vis the workers (Matar 1975:54- 
57). As for the large land owners, two steps were taken to curb their influence: a) the first 
law of agrarian reform in September 1952, which deprived them of the material base of 
their power; and b) the dissolution of political parties in January 1953, which deprived 
them of their political arm (cf.: Zaalouk 1989:26).
The officers’ action against the landed bourgeoisie was based on a distinction between 
the landed bourgeoisie, whose influence the officers sought to curtail, and the industrial 
bourgeoisie, with which the officers were willing to cooperate to foster economic
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development. Such cooperation was not regarded as incompatible with the free officers’ 
populist objectives, thanks to their technocratic approach to politics, which was reflected 
in a corporatist conception of the state, whereby different class interests were not 
incompatible, and could indeed be disciplined in the “national” interest of the state. It was 
the same corporatist view that underlay Nasser’s firm rejection of the notions of class 
conflict and multi-party system in favour of a national coalition of social represented by 
the corporatist single party system (Al Takriti 2000:185). Indeed, the very name used by 
the free officers to refer to the single party, Al-Tanzeem Al-Syassy (literally, the political 
organisation), was replete with these organisational, corporatist connotations. Its main 
function was mobilising the masses behind the corporatist goals of the new regime, and 
its structure was designed to represent the different elements of the “national” coalition 
(Helal 1987:118).
The officers’ populist social agenda was, as Ayubi (1980:161) argued, a function of their 
nationalistic vision. As such, it was not seen as conflictive with the corporatist conception 
of society, since the social measures were “meant to ferment national harmony through 
the removal of striking disequilibria” (Ibid). The drift leftward and the adoption of 
“socialist” slogans since the mid 1950s were a result of restructuring the regime’s 
alliances in the aftermath of domestic and external confrontations rather than a matter of 
pure ideological choice.
Thus, it was only after the Suez crisis that the first wave of “Egyptianisation” took place 
in the form of the military order no. 5 for 1956, confiscating assets owned by British and
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French nationals. In the following year, an agreement was reached with the British and 
French governments, whereby all companies and shares owned by British and French 
nationals were nationalised, and in exchange, Egypt did not ask for war reparations 
(Wahba 1994:56). In the same year, the term “socialism” was first used in official 
Egyptian discourse, when the goals of the newly established political “organisation”, the 
National Union, included the creation of a “cooperative democratic socialism”. In 1960, 
the reluctance of Bank Misr group to act in accordance with the government’s ambitious 
development plans increased the officers’ pessimism regarding the possibility of creating 
a state-guided capitalism23. The government was running out of patience and decided to 
take control over the financial sector, and nationalised Bank Misr in 1960 (Abdel Fadil 
1974:13). Similarly, it was no coincidence that the transition from state-guided capitalism 
to full-fledged etatisme, involving direct state control over the means of production, took 
place during the peak of Nasser’s clash with the Syrian bourgeoisie during the Egyptian- 
Syrian unity.
In all these cases, domestic and external clashes led to restructuring the national alliance, 
emphasising the role of certain elements and social classes and excluding others. What 
remained intact, however, was the regime’s commitment to corporatism. All the political 
“organisations” created by the officers emphasised this corporatist commitment. The 
“Liberation Rally” was created in December 1952 as a mass organisation to fill the 
political vacuum created by the dissolution of pre-1952 political parties. Its basic slogans 
(“we are all of the Liberation Rally”, and the more famous one, “unity, organisation and 
action”,) were essentially corporatist, appealing to all Egyptians to transcend their
23 This will be discussed in some detail in the next sub-section.
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ideological differences to liberate Egypt from foreign occupation and rebuild the 
economy. After a new constitution was drafted in 1956, the “National Union” replaced 
the Liberation Rally, but upheld its corporatist goals (Al-Takriti 2000:180). It was 
moulded after the national coalition organisations, which were created by populist 
regimes to secure national unity in Tito’s Yugoslavia (the League of Communists) and 
Salazar’s Portugal (the National Union) (Beattie 1994:128). Finally, the “Arab Socialist 
Union” (ASU), created amid the transformation towards “socialism”, also maintained the 
corporatist formula, albeit with a re-structured membership of the national alliance in the 
aftermath of the previously mentioned domestic and external confrontations. This was 
reflected in the union’s slogan “the alliance of the people’s working forces”. The concept 
of “people’s working forces” was very broadly defined to include workers, peasants, 
intellectuals, professionals, students, and “national capitalism”, thereby retaining the 
corporatist formula.
This continued commitment to corporatism was not a matter of ideological preference. It 
reflected primarily the structure and interests of the new ruling elite, and the rise of new 
social forces, which, although owing their influence to the transformation towards 
populist etatisme, were keen on maintaining their autonomy from, and unrivalled control 
over, the same classes which the populist statist apparatus purported to represent. The 
ruling elite consisted of the army officers on the one hand, and the technocrats and senior 
bureaucrats on the other. Etatisme, for this elite, furnished a convenient opportunity to 
rise and amass power, and in some instances, private wealth. Thanks to the corporatist 
formula, the new elite could rule in the name of the “masses”, whilst maintaining its
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control over, and distance from, them. Populism, consequently, remained a government- 
led enterprise -  a “populism-ffom-above”.
One of the RCC’s first decisions was not to allow the officers that participated in the 
coup to return to the army. The idea was to try to re-establish a professional army in 
which there is no place for politicised officers. Many officers were therefore offered 
positions in the state administration and media as “representatives of the revolution” (El 
Said 2002:169). After Egyptianisation and nationalisation laws, officers quickly 
permeated the nationalised enterprises. During these years, Egypt was witnessing what 
Dekmejian (1975:187) called the rise of the “officer-technocrats”, that is, officers who 
went to receive civilian academic degrees and joined the senior ranks of the bureaucracy 
and even some ministerial positions24. The cohort (D ofa ) became the basis of an 
Egyptian version of an “old boy network” amongst those officers-tumed-bureaucrats. As 
Springborg (1975:99) noted, belonging to a “Shilla” -  a term indicating a group of 
friends, often belonging to the same cohort, working together to achieve individual goals 
-  became a key means to career advancement. Abdel Hakim Amer, who was entrusted 
with the military’s command, was increasing his influence by the day, and developing 
extensive patronage network amongst the army officers.
On the other hand, the consolidation of state capitalism in the beginning of the 1960s was 
accompanied by the rise of what was later referred to as the “new class” of top managers 
and technocrats, who, thanks to their senior positions in the bureaucratic apparatus
24 Sidki Soliman, Tharwat Okasha, Mahmoud Younis, and Abdel Kader Hatem are the more famous, but by 
no means the only examples.
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entrusted with running state capitalism, effectively controlled the appropriation and 
allocation of economic surplus, and were often inheriting many of the privileges of the 
old ruling classes25.
Together, these social forces (the military and the “new class” technocrats) were 
efficiently able to keep populism in check and resist all attempts to curb their influence, 
and revolutionise the state apparatus or the political “organisation”. Nasser’s attempts to 
limit Amer’s patrimonial influence within the army were fruitless. In August 1962, in the 
aftermath of the Syrian secession from the United Arab Republic, for which Amer’s 
mismanagement bore the lion’s share of the blame (Heikal 1988:554-566), Nasser 
proposed a government re-organisation, creating a presidential council, which would 
include all RCC members and some ministers, and would, inter alia, supervise the 
military. The proposal was fiercely resisted by Amer who threatened to resign, and 
argued that he alone, with his “special” relations with the officers could guarantee the 
military’s security and loyalty. Nasser had to give in and Amer kept his undisputed 
control over the military all the way until 1967 (Beattie 1994:159-163). His patronage 
networks and Shilla-based politics remained intact, and years later, once more, bore the 
lion’s share of the blame for the 1967 defeat, and even, according to some analysts, for 
the quick deterioration of the populist statist apparatus itself (cf.: Hussein 1982a).
25 The term “new class” was first used by the Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas, to account for the rise of 
social strata in Tito’s Yugoslavia which, whilst not legally owning the means of production, were able, 
through their senior positions in the party or state apparatus, had enormous privileges that made them 
effectively a ruling class in a way that is hardly compatible with any claims to egalitarianism (Robertson 
1993:346). The notion was first discussed in Egyptian context during the first conference of the students 
sent by the Egyptian government to pursue post-graduate studies abroad (Al-Mab’uthin) (Ayubi 1980:179- 
183). Although Nasser rejected the term at the beginning, he used it later during the period of revisionism 
that followed the 1967 defeat.
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On the other hand, the rise of the “new class” technocrats constituted the Achilles’ heel of 
Nasser’s populism-from-above. Nasser’s “ideological offensive”, which started in 1963, 
with the creation of two ideological organisations (Socialist Vanguard, and Youth 
Organisation) within the ASU, and an “Institute for Socialist Studies”, was a desperate 
attempt to build political cadres and revolutionise the state apparatus. However, the lack 
of a clear ideology, and the failure to transform the new organisations into grass-root 
agencies, meant that these new organisations maintained all ASU’s defects. Also, the 
recruitment mechanisms were not conducive to building cadres as they were entrusted to 
senior bureaucrats and beneficiaries of the very system that Nasser attempted to 
revolutionise26.
By the mid-1960s, Nasser’s “populism-from-above” produced an elite whose interests 
were gradually diverging from the regime’s populist policies. This elite was in full 
control of the appropriation and allocation of economics surplus, and was managing it in 
ways that were necessarily at odds with the populist agenda27. This indeed constituted the 
fundamental contradiction of the Nasserist state -  a contradiction that eventually led, as I 
will seek to demonstrate later, to the dismantling of the populist-statist apparatus 
altogether.
(2.2) Economic Structures and Policies
Up until 1952, the Egyptian economy was still stuck in the vicious cycle of short periods 
of growth under conditions of forced protection during world wars, followed by the
26 For a detailed discussion of this “ideological offensive” and the reasons of its failure see: (Al-Takriti 
2000:212-224; Beattie 1994:166-180). I will return to this point again in the following section.
271 will return to this point in the next sub-section.
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erosion of most industrialisation gains as soon as the “forced protection” was lifted and 
the imports returned. The experience of World War II and its aftermath created a 
consensus on the need for distributive (populist) etatisme (Abdalla 1987:203), and 
demonstrated, in the mean time, how populist etatisme was unattainable under the social 
structures that were prevailing before 1952.
The free officers were children of this post-war period experience. Representative of the 
frustrated petite bourgeoisie, they viewed large landowners as the major stumbling block 
to their “developmental nationalist” agenda. It was therefore no surprise that the first law 
of agrarian reform was issued less than two months after their coup, in September 1952. 
The aims of this law were threefold: a) a political goal: to destroy the material base of 
landowners’ power and establish the power and autonomy of the petit bourgeois officers; 
b) a developmental goal: to liberate “capital from the land”, to quote Nasser’s words28, 
and diversify the investment outlets of the economic surplus; and (3) a populist goal: to 
redress the alarming inequalities in the countryside, and establish a support base for the 
free officers amongst the peasants.
According to this law, land ownership was fixed at a maximum of 200 feddans per 
person, and a grace period was given to landowners to sell any lands in excess with up to 
100 feddans going to dependants (Wahba 1994:50). All confiscated land was 
redistributed to the landless peasants who had been previously working on them as
28 In a speech on 23/7/1954, on the second anniversary of the revolution, Nasser said “agrarian
reform rendered a service to Egyptian capital, which was buried underneath the ground”, (cf: Wahba
1994:59).
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tenants or labourers in lots of five feddans, and agricultural cooperatives were created to 
ensure that the fragmentation of the redistributed land did not result in diseconomies of 
scale.
It is worth noting that the first law of land reform was quite modest compared to the 
proposals presented by Misr Al-Fatat or the communist movement prior to 1952. The 
reason for this is that the law had to strike a balance between its political and populist 
goals on one hand, and the developmental goal (i.e. the need to ensure that the 
bourgeoisie was not scared off) on the other, since the Egyptian government at that time 
was still committed to free-market policies. Several measures were taken to reassure the 
local and foreign capitalism and encourage them to participate in the officers’ 
developmental plans. The free officers went even as far as to reverse some of the 
Egyptianisation laws issued in 1947 in order to attract investments. The decree-law 
120/1952 abrogated the 51% provision, changing the minimum participation by 
Egyptians to 49% (Wahba 1994:54). Several other laws including law 156/1953 for 
foreign investment, law 430/1953 for tax exemptions; and the companies’ law 26/1954, 
provided unprecedented incentives to local and foreign capital (Al-Maraghy 1983:48).
The Egyptian government remained throughout the 1950s committed to a form of state- 
guided capitalism without the state taking direct control over the economy (Mabro 1976). 
The free officers made a distinction between the landed bourgeoisie, which was a main 
obstacle to be removed, and the industrial bourgeoisie, local and foreign, with which they 
hoped to cooperate. Thus, the industrial bourgeoisie was entrusted with the
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implementation of the industrialisation plans, and laws were issued to encourage it, 
whereas the landed bourgeoisie was the target of their earliest populist and re-distributive 
measures. The government even provided advice and technical assistance to the industrial 
bourgeoisie. Thus, in October 1953, the government created the “permanent council for 
the development of national production” (PCDNP) to set developmental plans and study 
specific projects -  an advisory body to the would-be entrepreneurs (Abdalla 1987:205)
The PCDNP then started to collaborate with the private sector in joint-ventures. The 
government, in its attempts to encourage the private sector, went as far as to guarantee 
minimum profit rates to the shareholders in these joint-ventures (Ibid). After the Suez 
crisis and the Egyptianisation laws of 1957, the law-decree 20/1957 created the 
“economic organisation” (Al-Mouassasa Al-Iqtisadiya), to manage the government share 
in the joint-ventures, as well as the government-created companies. The newsletter of the 
general federation of Egyptian chambers of commerce welcomed the creation of the 
economic organisation, and accepted the role of the state in such projects with “a high 
level of risk and low returns” (Abdel Fadil 1974:12). These early steps of etatisme did not 
in any way mean a break from the government’s commitment to free market. The general 
pattern of the state’s policy towards private capital throughout this period remained not to 
invest directly where the private sector would, and never to clash with private capital 
unless it had to (Al-Maraghi 1983:57). Hence, as late as 1959/1960 (the year in which the 
first quintennial plan started), only 18% of the GDP originated in the public sector 
(Mansfield 1969:117).
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The experience of the 1950s was, however, far from satisfactory, and the government 
eventually decided that a transformation to full-fledged etatisme was inevitable. The 
failure of the 1950s guided capitalism was due to domestic and international factors. 
Domestically, the distinction between the industrial and landed factions of the 
bourgeoisie, which underlay the officers’ economic thinking, proved to be a major 
misjudgement, as it ignored what Abdel Fadil (1974:10) called the organic links between 
the two factions of the bourgeoisie. As explained earlier, the industrial bourgeoisie 
emerged in the first place as a result of the measures taken by some members of the 
landed bourgeoisie to diversify their investments under domestic and international 
economic pressures. The landed faction of the bourgeoisie was, therefore, since its 
earliest days, intrinsically linked to the industrial faction. As a result, the actions taken 
against the landed bourgeoisie sent the wrong message to the industrial bourgeoisie and 
generated a process of disinvestment amongst some of Egypt’s largest firms. Fixed 
capital formation rates declined dramatically in the first half of the 1950s (Abdel Fadil 
1974:12), and firms opted for higher rates of profit distribution, as the private sector 
sought to keep as much as possible of the economic surplus away from potential 
sequestration or nationalisation (Wahba 1994:55). The private sector failed to cooperate 
with the government’s sectoral plans between 1957 and 1961, and the only sector in 
which bank loans to “industry” increased was building and construction -  the very sector 
in which the government sought to discourage investment. Long and medium-term loans 
in all other industries decreased (Wahba 1994:71), highlighting the lack of trust between 
the government and the private sector, and casting much doubt on the reliability of the 
private sector in implementing the regime’s developmental plans. On the other hand, the
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foreign policy struggles of Nasser’s regime added further tension to the relation between 
the state and private capital. The Suez crisis, and the Egyptianisation of the French and 
British assets thereafter, ruined the chances of any cooperation between the state and 
foreign and Mutamassir capitalists, who controlled the lion’s share of the Egyptian 
economy (Ayubi 1989a:95).
By the end of the 1950s, economic performance fell unacceptably short of the 
government’s ambitions. The private sector was not cooperating with the regime’s 
developmental plans; the economy was still dominated by the foreign and Mutamassir 
capitalists; and the main populist effort -  the agrarian reform law -  had limited effects as 
it turned out that it only affected 13% of the agricultural land and 9% of the rural 
population (El-Sayed 1982:73).
In a regime that was committed to developmental nationalism, and that viewed economic 
development as an integral part of the realisation of national aspirations, such economic 
mal-performance was not tolerable as it was shaking the regime’s sources of legitimacy. 
The government realised that it had to take direct control over the economy to achieve its 
developmental and populist goals. This was achieved through three steps: a) mobilising 
the economic surplus and using it according to the government’s plans; b) direct 
ownership of the means of production; and c) centralised planning through quintennial 
plans.
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The financial sector was amongst the first to be nationalised. The first step came with the 
Egyptianisation laws in 1957, which brought to government hands seven British and 
French-owned banks as well as five insurance companies (El-Sayed 1982:61-62). In 
February 1960, Misr Bank group, which controlled 40% of the total deposits in Egyptian 
banks and owned 27 trade and industrial companies, was nationalised. Its nationalisation 
came in the aftermath of a major disagreement between the government and the bank 
management over the bank’s investment policies. The bank insisted on investing 
primarily in the textile sector, its traditional investment outlet, whilst the government was 
pushing for more diversification (Abdel Fadil 1974:31). That this disagreement resulted 
in the nationalisation decision reflected how committed the government was to 
controlling the mobilisation and investment of the economic surplus.
In July 1961, 44 industrial companies were fully nationalised, and the government 
controlled 50% of the capital of 86 other companies. In 1963 and 1964, the government 
fully nationalised all the companies that were nationalised partially in 1961, and 
government ownership was extended to the pharmaceutical sector. As a result, the share 
of the public sector in manufacturing rose to 60% in 1963, and it was employing 30% of 
the labour force (El-Sayed 1982:58-60).
Alongside these statist transformations, the so-called “July 1961 Socialist laws” included 
an important populist dimension, providing for, inter alia, limits on the salaries of 
managers of the public sector, workers’ representation in the boards of directors, a 
reduction of working hours to a maximum of 42 hours per week, as well as raising the
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minimum wages, and granting workers 25% of the net profits (Wahba 1994:85-87). Free 
education was extended to the secondary and university level, and the government was 
committed to the employment of all university graduates.
The first quintennial plan (1959/1960-1964/1965) reflected this dual commitment to 
developmental etatisme and populism. The aim of the plan was to increase the national 
income by 40%, as the first stage of the overall goal stated in the National Charter: 
doubling the national income in ten years (Owen and Pamuk 1998:132). The plan was 
reasonably successful in achieving the desired developmental goals. National income 
increased by the desired 40%, with an annual GDP growth rate of 6% (Al-Alem 
1994:375), and even more impressive gains in industry (a 50.2% increase in the industrial 
output between 1959/1960 and 1964/1965), and in the sectors associated with the Aswan 
high dam such as electricity (128.6%) and construction (96.6%) (Owen and Pamuk 
1998:132). On the populist level, consumption rose by 46%, almost double the planned 
rise (25%), which put too much pressure on the savings and accentuated the problem of 
mobilising economic surplus.
Throughout the years of the plan, the main dilemma facing the government was to 
achieve simultaneously two contradictory goals: to increase investment and foster rapid 
industrialisation and to increase consumption levels as part of the government’s populist 
commitments. To mobilise the required resources, the government had three options: a) 
to squeeze the economic surplus from the peasants in the Stalinist fashion; b) to squeeze 
public spending and curtail the privileges of the rising “new class” through an austerity
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program; or c) to rely on external resources. The first option was quickly rejected as it 
was at odds with the regime’s populist commitments. The second option was also 
forgone, albeit for very different reasons. It was simply impossible to implement given 
the nature of the ruling elite at that time. Any close examination to the pattern of 
allocation of the economic surplus during the first quintennial plan reveals clearly that it 
reflected the preferences of the rising middle class of technocrats and officers.
The grand wave of nationalisation and the government’s populist commitment to full 
employment of all university graduates was reflected in the rise of the services sector 
share in the GDP during the years of the plan. Public consumption increased by 77% 
mainly as a result of this growth of the administrative apparatus. The non-investment 
expenditure in the services budgets increased threefold between 1959/1960 and 
1964/1965 (Abdel Fadil 1974:15-20). The newly founded public sector was placed under 
the direction of 38 holding companies, each responsible to a particular ministry. The 
number of high ranking managerial posts created to manage the emerging public sector 
rose by 61% during the plan years. Their income, however, increased by 230% (Ibid: 31- 
32), reflecting the influence of the “new class” of managers, technocrats and military 
officers.
As many observers noticed, the choices of the projects of the plan did not necessarily 
reflect the needs of the majority of the population. The most frequently cited example is 
the sums invested in manufacturing such luxury goods as private cars and air conditioners 
which, given the average per capita income of that time, were beyond the reach of the
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majority of Egyptians. The structure of the government’s industrialisation plan was 
biased towards light industries and consumer products catering primarily for the needs of 
the new middle class (El-Sayed 1982:67-68). A similar trend could be found in the 
consumption patterns. During the plan years, the increase in the consumption of 
necessary goods ranged between 29% and 60%, as opposed to an average rise of 119% in 
the consumption of such durable consumer goods as refrigerators, radios, air conditioners 
and heaters (Abdel Fadil 1974:20). Naturally, this “new class” which played a key role 
in economic decision-making was not willing to sacrifice its privileges to provide the 
resources needed for the regime’s developmental and populist plans.
As a result of the government’s reluctance to extract resources from the peasantry or to 
squeeze the surplus from the new class, the balance of payments suffered a chronic and 
increasing deficit throughout the plan29. To finance this deficit, and maintain the 
government’s ambitious plans, the government relied on external financing, and its 
ability through a non-aligned, activist foreign policy to secure foreign aid from the east 
and west. Samir Amin estimated that around 50% of the plan was financed from external 
resources in the form of grants or concessionary loans (cf.: Wahba 1994:93).
By the end of the first quintennial plan and notwithstanding its successes, the 
contradictions of the populist-statist model were becoming all too apparent. Commitment 
to populist etatisme entailed increasing consumption and investment simultaneously.
29 The deficit rose from £E 35.7 million in the first year of the plan, to £E120.3 m., then £E154.3m., £E 
170.5m, and £E 135.6m in the second, third, fourth and fifth years, respectively (Abdel Fadil 1974:22-23).
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“Populism-from-above” meant that the implementation of the populist-statist plans was 
left in the hand of the “new class” of technocrats and the military, which controlled the 
appropriation and allocation of economic surplus, and whose interests were reflected in 
the investment and consumption patterns, and were necessarily at odds with the populist 
agenda.
This fundamental contradiction of the populist etatisme was kept dormant through the 
regime’s reliance on its ability to use foreign policy acumen to secure foreign resources 
to muffle this contradiction. From the mid-1960s, when a series of foreign policy crises 
and developments relatively closed the “external window” of extracting surplus, 
contradictions surfaced anew, and the system began to flounder.
(2.3) Ideology
Students of ideology in post-1952 Egypt are often faced with a paradox: on one hand, 
there is a plethora of evidence suggesting the pragmatic nature of the free officers’ 
policies, and their lack of a coherent ideology30. On the other hand, the regime was keen 
on issuing explicit ideological statements and pamphlets (the Philosophy o f the 
Revolution, through the Charter, and the Manifesto o f March 30th, 1968). Nasser’s 
speeches were also replete with ideological references and justifications, and so were the 
countless articles by regime ideologues, most notably Al-Ahram’s legendary editor-in- 
chief, Mohamed Heikal. Such self-conscious ideological documentation suggests a far 
more important role for the regime’s ideology than most analysts allowed. What, then, do
30 Even the Charter for National action, issued in 1962, explicitly admitted that, “this revolutionary march 
started without a complete theory o f revolutionary change ” (Abdel Nasser 1967:5)
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those analysts refer to when they talk about the regime’s lack of a coherent ideology? 
They were probably referring to a particular meaning of the term ideology -  a rigorous 
and comprehensive set of interrelated values based on a philosophy which claims to 
provide coherent and unchallengeable answers to all problems of society (Howard 
1991:139). Once a less rigorous definition of ideology is adopted, referring to the 
existence of broad vision and guidelines for policy action (Ibid), the free officers’ 
ideological paradox becomes more apparent than real. Whilst the free officers, like most 
post-colonial elites in the third world at that time, lacked a detailed program of action, 
they did possess a broad vision of developmental nationalism, clustering around the 
general political agenda expressed by the petit bourgeois movements before 1952.
Nasser’s Philosophy o f the Revolution, published in 1954, was the regime’s first elaborate 
ideological statement. It sought to justify the 1952 coup, to explain the officers’ 
commitment to developmental nationalism, arguing for the need to conduct two 
simultaneous revolutions, a political revolution aiming at political independence, and a 
social revolution to achieve modernisation (Abdel Nasser 1962:25-26), and to sketch a 
broad framework for an active foreign policy, based on Nasser’s conception of Egypt’s 
“national role”. At the heart of this conception, presented by Nasser as the “objective”, 
(i.e. inevitable) consequence of Egypt’s history and geopolitics, were three “circles of 
action” with which Egypt should interact, and around which Egypt’s “role” in the modem 
world should revolve -  an Arab, an African, and an Islamic circle (Ibid:60-80).
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Further developments in the regime’s ideology beyond this sketchy framework came as a 
result of the interplay of several internal and external factors. The shift towards a 
“socialist” discourse and explicit statist ideology, for instance, corresponded to the 
transformation of the political economy and the restructuring of the regime alliances in 
the aftermath of domestic and foreign policy crises (e.g. the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal and the ensuing Suez crisis, the failure of state-guided capitalism and the following 
wave of massive nationalisations). On the other hand, the elaboration of Egypt’s foreign 
policy role as a bastion of anti-colonialism, non-alignment, and pan-Arabism was at least 
as much a result of strategic necessities and foreign policy crises, as it was of ideological 
preference. Developments such as the Czech arms deal in 1955, which followed the 
Israeli raid on Gaza in 1954, the Bandung conference, the political crisis with Iraq and 
the Suez crisis “obliged Nasser to take up the role o f an anti-imperialist Saladin” 
(Mansfield 1969:95). In Nasser’s subsequent speeches throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s the concept of Egypt’s national role in the Arab world was further developed, to 
comprise five main dimensions (Abdel Moneim 1982:209-212): a) leadership of the Arab 
countries; b) contribution to the defence of the Arab states; c) an anti-imperialist role 
within the Arab world; d) a contribution to a long-term process of Arab unification; and 
e) a developmental role to realise the economic potential of the Arabs.
The ideological development of Nasser’s regime was influenced by two main factors: (i) 
Nasser’s perception of the inherently conflictual nature of the international system; and 
(ii) the implicit modernisation ideology that underlay the regime’s developmental 
policies. Selim’s (1982:180) study of Nasser’s belief system revealed that, for Nasser, the
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international system was ontologically conflictual, comprising two main conflicts: a) 
between the two main superpowers over the domination of the rest of the world; and b) 
between the north and the south over the distribution of global wealth. In such a 
conflictual environment, building alliances with like-minded forces, domestically and 
internationally, becomes indispensable for securing national independence. It is important 
to understand this nationalist, anti-imperialist point of departure of all the political actions 
of the free officers’ regime domestically and internationally. Domestically, the need for a 
corporatist state apparatus was emphasised to integrate societal forces and prevent 
internal contradictions from surfacing and increasing the regime’s vulnerability31. Even 
when he invoked an explicitly “socialist” discourse, Nasser emphasised his rejection of 
the notion of class conflict and the need for a national alliance of the “people’s working 
forces” including representatives of “national capitalism” (Al-Hakeem 1971:83-86). 
Internationally, Egypt sought to forge alliances with other developing states, first through 
the loose Bandung formula, and later on through the more elaborate Non-Aligned 
Movement. Within the Arab world, however, the situation was more complicated, as the 
regime moved back and forth between the two strategies of "wahdat al-hadaf” (unity-of- 
goal, implying alliance with the “progressive” forces in the Arab world), and "wahdat al- 
saff” (unity-of-ranks, implying a minimalist strategy of cooperation with all Arab states).
On the other hand, the officers’ vision for developmental nationalism was, as Aulas 
(1988:141-142) argued, essentially one of Westem-style modernisation, based on the 
necessity of “catching up” with the developed countries. This commitment to
31 In a speech on 27/11/1959, Nasser explained that, “the creation of the National Union does not resolve 
contradictions in our society. It only offers a framework of national unity that allows contradictions to be 
balanced”. (Al-Ahram, 28/11/1959).
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideology and Modernisation since 1970_________ Yasser M. Elwv 101
modernisation remained intact, notwithstanding the regime’s “apparent” ideological 
shifts (from state-led capitalism to populist etatisme, and from unity-of-goal to unity-of- 
ranks). Throughout its ideological development towards a more elaborate form of 
etatisme with “socialist” overtones, national independence and economic modernisation 
remained the pillars of the officers’ ideology. Any ideological formulations or 
justifications were merely means to achieve these twin goals, and could thus be kept or 
changed depending on how conducive they were to the realisation of the original 
“modernisation” vision of developmental nationalism.
The implications of the development of populist etatisme, and of the rise of the new elite 
of military officers and technocrats, for the regime’s ideology were twofold. First, the rise 
of the new elite led to further emphasis on the corporatist model and the “technocratic” 
nature of the officers’ management of political economy. From the “unity, organisation 
and work” slogan to the “alliance of the people’s working classes” formula, the regime 
remained committed to a corporatist ideology that assumed compatibility of interests 
amongst the different classes. This corporatist discourse was crucial to defend the 
regime’s “populism-ffom-above”, since the ruling elite could claim that its policies serve 
the “national” interest of the whole populace, rather than reflect the particular interests of 
the military/technocratic elite. In the same vein was Nasser’s usage of the term “scientific 
socialism”, not in the Marxist sense, but to indicate the technical nature of the regime’s 
choice of socialism as a superior strategy for realising modernisation. Second, as a result 
of this technocratic approach to politics, little effort was made to develop a sophisticated 
ideology for the regime beyond the immediate statements issued for justifying or
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mobilising purposes. Aulas (1988:139), for instance, notes that the regime’s commitment 
to pan-Arabism did not result in the development of serious intellectual output on Arab 
nationalism in Egypt. Likewise, the regime’s “Arab socialism” was essentially eclectic, 
borrowing liberally from Marxism, corporatism, and emphasising a nationalist point of 
departure (Akhavi 1975:191). By the 1960s, the regime was increasingly aware of the 
ideological holes of its project, hence the “ideological offensive” of 1963, with the 
creation of the Socialist Vanguard Organisation, and the Youth Organisation within the 
Arab Socialist Union system, as well as the “institute for socialist studies”. This 
“ideological offensive” came to naught, however, as it was entrusted to the regime’s 
bureaucrats32. Its failure meant that the regime’s technocratic elite remained intact. This 
would later be one of the reasons for the easy dismantling of the populist-statist model 
itself.
The regime’s ideology, in its various formulations, reflected the development of the 
populist-statist political economy and the contradictions thereof. The latter were reflected 
in two key dilemmas. First, the regime lacked neither an elaborate ideology to guide 
political action and curb the influence of the “new class”, nor politicised cadres to defend 
the gains of the populist policies. As a result, when, in the aftermath of the crises that 
started in 1965, the populist-statist model became unsustainable, the “new class” was able 
to transform it in a way that maintains its privileges and shifts all the burdens to the 
popular classes, with minimal resistance from the beneficiaries of the regime’s earlier 
policies who remained unorganised and politically inept.
32 Ironically, one of the leaders of the secret “vanguard organisation” was Sha’rawy Goma’a, the interior 
minister -the person responsible for the regime’s security.
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Second, the concept of “national role” was quite problematic. Several key questions 
remained unresolved, including: a) the nature of the role, and whether it is structural (i.e. 
based on natural gifts that necessitate Egyptian leadership of the Arab world) or political 
(i.e. subject to the adoption of a certain set of policies); and b) the extent to which it is 
possible to cooperate with “reactionary” Arab regimes.
This lack of an elaborate conception of Egypt’s “national role”, and for that matter, of all 
aspects of the regime’s ideology, reflected the inherent tensions and contradictions of 
populist etatisme. Likewise, the way the standing ideological questions were 
subsequently resolved, corresponded to the transformation of the regime’s political 
economy and foreign policy.
(2.4) Foreign Policy
Egypt’s post-1952 foreign policy was planned and conducted within the broad framework 
of developmental nationalism, developing well beyond the traditional goals of evacuation 
and unity of Egypt and Sudan under the Egyptian crown to correspond to the new 
complex realities of the cold war, the rising aspirations to an active role in the Levant, as 
well as to the twin needs of securing national independence and fostering economic 
development. However, the regime’s lack of an elaborate ideology meant that its foreign 
policy was essentially a mix of the free officers’ general commitment to securing national 
independence, and realpolitik. Cooper (1982:22) once noted that it was a series of ad hoc 
responses to pressing political crises that led the free officers to state capitalism. The 
same could be said about their foreign policy.
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From the first days of the coup, Nasser demanded total and unconditional evacuation 
(Matar 1975:71). To support these demands, he sought help from the emerging 
superpowers, and his first bet was the US. This was more of a strategic necessity than a 
purely ideological choice, since Stalinist USSR was still busy consolidating its position in 
Eastern Europe, and did not show much interest in the Middle East nor, for that matter, in 
other areas of the developing world that is governed by nationalist petit bourgeois elites.
A delegation was sent in November 1952 to the United States with requests for military 
and political assistance. The visit, however, amounted to little more than a public 
relations exercise. The delegation had to wait for eight weeks until President Eisenhower 
had taken office in January, only to find that Eisenhower decided to keep Egypt’s 
application in the “pending file” whilst he explored the possibilities of fitting Egypt in the 
U.S. cold war strategy (Heikal 1973:37-39). He sent his secretary of state, John Foster 
Dulles to the Middle East early in May 1953 -  the first visit to the region by an American 
secretary of state. It quickly revealed the major contradictions between the American and 
Egyptian agendas. The key determinant of U.S. policy towards the Middle East was the 
Cold War, and the containment strategy (Morsy 1995:308). The U.S. priority was 
therefore to extend its defence alliances to the Middle East and complete the encirclement 
of the USSR. During the Egyptian delegation’s visit to the United States in 1952, major 
general G.H. Olmsted, the director of the foreign military assistance program, spoke 
about the potential for an anti-communist Islamic pact centring around three capitals: 
Ankara, Karachi, and Cairo (Heikal 1973:38). Such statements echoed the earlier 
attempts to create a Middle East treaty organisation (METO), then a Middle East defence 
organisation (MEDO) before 1952. To the free officers’, committed as they were to
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achieving total independence, joining such pacts was out of question. Dulles failed to 
convince Nasser to join an anti-communist alliance, since Nasser insisted that the only 
defence against any alleged communist threat would be through promoting internal 
economic development and affirming the spirit of nationalism and independence (Heikal 
1978:720). After the failure of Dulles’s visit to Egypt, the United States shifted its 
attention to Iraq as the alternative centre of its Middle East anti-communist alliance -  the 
Baghdad Pact. Nasser, aided by the Cairo-based influential radio station “Voice of the 
Arabs” which was created in 1953, attacked the pact ferociously. His assault stemmed 
from the same mix of nationalist ideology and realpolitik. On one hand Nasser was 
committed to what was called “positive neutrality”, which did not only mean refraining 
from taking sides in the Cold War, but also seeking, through multilateral cooperation 
with like-minded states, to play an active role in international politics (Bakr 1982:141- 
150). On the other hand, Nasser feared that the Baghdad pact would divide the Arab 
world and isolate Egypt. After Iraq, he contemplated, Syria, Jordan then the Gulf States 
would join, and Egypt would be left alone to face any Israeli threat (Heikal 1973:75). The 
Israeli raid on Gaza on 28/2/1955, which came amid the political duel over the Baghdad 
Pact, further deepened his suspicions. This raid was an expression, as Heikal (Ibid:27) 
explained, of Israeli Premier David Ben Gurion’s strategy of “forcing peace” on the 
neighbouring Arab countries.
Nasser at that time was not actively involved in the Arab Israeli conflict. Whilst 
perceiving Israel as a potential source of threat, he sought to freeze the situation whilst he 
pursued his development plans and increased Egypt’s military capabilities, in order to
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avoid the repetition of the Egyptian Army’s fiasco in the Palestine war. During Dulles’ 
visit in 1953, Nasser argued that the relation with Israel was not a priority (Baydoon et. 
al. 2002:52-53). However, in response to Dulles’ insistence on resolving the conflict in 
order to focus on the “communist threat”, he was willing to embark on peace negotiations 
on the basis of the U.N. Partition Plan of 1947. Israel was not willing to withdraw to the 
partition lines. Ben Gurion sought to “force peace” on Egypt via limited military 
escalation. Thus came the Gaza raid in February 1955, and the notorious “Lavon 
affair”33.
To Nasser, the Gaza raid demonstrated how pressing Egypt’s need for arms was. Its 
timing led him to suspect that it took place with Western consent to force him to join the 
Baghdad Pact. His response was to seek armament from elsewhere. During the Bandung 
conference of 1955, Chou En-Lai offered to arrange for an arms deal from the Soviet 
Union. In September 1955, the “Czech” arms deal went through (Woodward 1997:45). 
Like the earlier attempts with the United States, this turning point in the relations with the 
Soviet Union was a result of strategic necessity rather than an ideological choice.
In the mean time, Egypt was embarking on its major developmental project, the Aswan 
High Dam. Financing was sought at first from the west and the World Bank. When it was 
declined, Nasser responded by nationalising the Suez Canal on 26/7/1956. It was clear 
that the nationalisation was not just a financial venture, since the resulting income was
33 Israel sent an army intelligence officer to organise a group of young Egyptian Jews to blow up American 
and British installations in Egypt, so as to convince the United States and Britain that Nasser is unable to 
control the country, and delay the British troops’ withdrawal from Egypt. The plot failed, and Pinhas 
Lavon, the Israeli defence minister, had to resign (cfi: Heikal 1973:43-44).
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still insufficient to build the dam, and Egypt subsequently received a loan from the Soviet 
Union to finance the project (Ibid:48). The nationalisation of the Suez Canal, with its 
obvious links to the twin goals of national independence and economic development, was 
the clearest manifestation thus far of developmental nationalism. It was also a turning 
point in Egypt’s foreign policy, and indeed in the development of populist etatisme in 
Egypt. Nasser emerged out of the Suez crisis as an “anti-imperialist Saladin ” (Mansfield 
1969:95). The crisis further reinforced Egyptian-Soviet relations, and, as argued in 
section 2.2 above, speeded up the development of populist etatisme.
The Gaza raid, the Lavon affair, and most importantly the Suez crisis forced the Arab- 
Israeli conflict on Nasser’s priorities. The Suez crisis also had a profound effect on 
Egypt’s Arab policy. Whilst the Philosophy o f the Revolution recognised the political 
vacuum in the Levant, and argued that Egypt was naturally suited to play the leading role 
in the region, Nasser did not argue for creating a united Arab state immediately. He only 
called for Arab solidarity and coordination. It was during these years that the formula 
“unity-of-ranks”, implying policy coordination, amongst ideologically different Arab 
countries, was popularised (Youssef-Ahmad 1982:96-97). During the struggle against the 
Baghdad Pact, Nasser’s tactical alliance with Saudi Arabia against the Saudis’ old 
Hashemite rivals in Iraq and Jordan was a successful demonstration of the “unity-of- 
ranks”. However, after Nasser’s victorious political struggles against the Baghdad Pact, 
and during the Suez crisis, Syrian nationalist officers approached him in 1957, insisting 
on an immediate unity between Syria and Egypt, and arguing that only such unity would
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreien Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970 Yasser M. Elwv 108
prevent a communist coup in Syria34. The United Arab Republic (UAR), comprising 
Egypt and Syria, was declared on 22/2/1958. The creation of UAR, however, did not alter 
Nasser’s classical preference for solidarity and emphasis on the unity-of-ranks. He was 
therefore quick to declare that he had no intention of forcing Lebanon to join the UAR 
(Woodward 1997:61). However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s Nasser’s influence 
rose rapidly in the Arab world. A sweeping revolutionary trend was threatening, and in 
some cases as in Hashemite Iraq, overthrowing, conservative Arab monarchies. An “Arab 
cold war” seemed inevitable as the old rivals the Saudis and the Hashemites in Jordan 
were willing to join forces to fight for the survival of the conservative regimes. The 
secession of the UAR in September 1961, the adoption of the more flamboyant formula 
“unity-of-goal” as the guiding principle of Egyptian foreign policy, and the Egyptian 
imbroglio in Yemen, were, as I will seek to explain later in this subsection, few examples 
of this Arab cold war.
On the other hand, the Suez crisis laid the final touches for Egypt’s close, albeit 
sometimes troubled alliance with USSR. Whereas Stalinist USSR was quick to dismiss 
the officers’ coup in 1952 as a petit bourgeois military takeover, the post-Stalin Soviet 
Union was increasingly intrigued by Nasser’s role in the Bandung conference, and 
particularly by his firm stance against the Baghdad Pact (Heikal 1973:121-122). The 
“Czech” arms deal was as politically important to the Soviet Union as it was strategically 
important to Egypt. It offered the Soviet Union a long awaited chance to break out of the 
potential encirclement threatened by the Baghdad Pact (Woodward 1973:86). The Suez 
crisis, on the other hand, demonstrated Nasser’s strategic importance to the USSR
34 Heikal (1988:235-281); Woodward (1997:65-66)
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strategy, as Khrushchev observed Nasser’s ascendance to the status of the leader of the 
Arab world. After the Suez crisis, Khrushchev was willing to have a “working 
relationship” with, and to offer economic and military assistance to Nasser’s Egypt, 
whilst recognising that Nasser was not a communist (Heikal 1973:141). However, the 
Soviet Union’s commitment to Arab communists, who were vigorously chased and 
suppressed by Nasser, remained a source of potential tension. Nasser’s suppression of 
communists within the UAR, and his bitter hostility with Iraqi leader Abdel Karim 
Kassem, who consorted with the influential Iraqi communists, and was therefore a 
favourite ally of the USSR in the region, increased tensions between Egypt and the 
USSR. When in December 1958, Egypt and the Soviet Union signed the agreement to 
build the first stage of the Aswan high dam, articles in Pravda and Izvestia questioned 
why the USSR was helping those who were arresting the communists, and in the Twenty- 
First Congress of the Communist Party in January 1959, Khrushchev went a step further 
and publicly attacked Nasser and his notions of Arab socialism (Heikal 1973:138-139). 
Moscow was increasingly seeing the UAR and Arab nationalism as potential rivals for 
Marxism, and Khrushchev was overtly supportive of Kassem, whom Nasser accused of 
attempting to establish a “red fertile crescent” (Woodward 1997:88).
Realising the nature of her unsettled alliance with the USSR, Egypt sought to broaden her 
“manoeuvring space” through forging strong alliances with Arab states and other like- 
minded developing states, and even attempting a rapprochement with the United States. 
This was achieved through three simultaneous foreign policy strategies. First, Egypt 
sought to maintain and strengthen the “unity-of-ranks” formula as the basis for a broad
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alliance with as many of the Arab states as possible. Second, Egypt’s “positive 
neutrality” was further reinforced through close coordination with other developing 
countries, particularly during the fifteenth session of the U.N general assembly in 1960, 
when Egypt participated actively in the deliberations on creating an African regional 
organisation and a Non-Aligned Movement. During the sessions, Nasser discussed with 
Nehru Egypt’s troubles with USSR, and India’s problems with China. They agreed that 
the “positively neutral” countries could only be tactically allied with the communist bloc. 
Hence, there was a need for strengthening cooperation amongst non-aligned nations. This 
led to the subsequent creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 (Heikal 1988:461- 
496; Bakr 1982:150-151). Last but not least, when Nasser and Khrushchev duelled over 
Arab nationalism, its relation to Marxism, and the role of Arab communists, Nasser 
attempted to re-activate his relations with the United States to counterbalance the Soviet 
favouritism for Kassem’s Iraq. Thus, Egypt became a beneficiary of Public Law 480, and 
was receiving wheat shipments from the United States covering more than 50% of its 
wheat consumption (Woodward 1997:88). In 1961, during the peak of Nasser’s tensions 
with Khrushchev, when Egyptian students in the USSR were subjected to harassment and 
political pressure, the United States accepted to transfer all 240 students to American 
universities (Heikal 1973:196). Although these gestures, alongside a series of cordial 
correspondence between Nasser and Kennedy, were only made possible by the 
heightening tensions between Egypt and the USSR, it seemed that Egypt and the United 
States had finally managed to find a modus vivendi.
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These diplomatic efforts were not only a means of maintaining national independence, 
but were also crucial to facilitate the regime’s development plans. The success of the first 
quintennial plan was largely dependent on Egypt’s ability to use her diplomatic acumen 
to secure the necessary amounts of foreign aid to finance the ambitious populist and 
developmental plans, since around 50% of the plan was financed from outside resources. 
Egypt was, at the same time, a beneficiary of the United States wheat shipments, as well 
as a recipient of no less than 20% of the total credit commitments of the Soviet Union to 
developing countries (Amin 1974:9). Thanks to her policy of “positive neutrality” and 
leading regional role, both superpowers were willing to offer their economic assistance 
and invest in a working relationship with Egypt. A skilful foreign policy and a large 
“manoeuvring space” were, therefore, indispensable if Egypt’s developmental nationalist 
plans were to bear the desired fruits.
Notwithstanding Nasser’s efforts, Egypt’s manoeuvring space shrank steadily in the 
1960s, limiting Egypt’s ability to use its foreign policy as a mechanism for containing the 
contradictions of the populist etatisme. In September 1961, less than three months after 
the “July 1961 socialist laws”, which were particularly ill received by the influential 
Syrian bourgeoisie, Syria revoked the union. A combination of political and economic 
reasons were behind the secession, including the Syrian bourgeoisie’s rejection of the 
“socialist laws”, Abdel Hakim Amer’s way of running Syria as his fiefdom, and the Saudi 
financial support for the secession (cf.: Heikal 1988:554-566; Woodward 1997:71). This 
blend of economic and foreign policy causes, led Nasser to undertake a major shift in his 
Arab policy. For the first time, he started emphasising that a true unity amongst Arab
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states cannot be achieved without a social revolution that “sweeps the reactionary forces 
within the Arab world” (Youssef-Ahmad 1982:104). He also spoke about the “enemy
o r
within”, whose defeat was a pre-requisite to defeating the “enemy without” .
Thus, “unity-of-ranks” was replaced by the “unity-of-goal”, implying the need of 
ideological harmony amongst the Arab states. This reflected Nasser’s realisation that an 
alliance between the local Syrian bourgeoisie and conservative Arab regimes was the 
decisive factor behind the secession. It also corresponded to the heightening hostility 
between Nasser and Iraq’s Abdel Karim Kassem and the Syrian post-secession regime, 
and was further reinforced by Egypt’s active military support and involvement in Yemen 
from September 1962. The Yemeni Army officers that overthrew the Imam’s regime 
appealed to Nasser for help, and were soon granted what they wanted. The reasons, once 
more, were a combination of ideology and realpolitik. On one hand, Nasser, who was 
now regarded as the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism found it difficult to ignore the 
Yemeni officers’ call for help (Woodward 1997:78). On the other hand, Nasser’s support 
for the Yemeni officers offered him a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, and a chance to 
regain the initiative after the secession blow.
Nasser thought that a political victory in Yemen would only take a limited military and 
technical support for the new regime. However, the situation soon turned into a war of 
attrition for the Egyptian army. Egypt increased her support to the new regime and her 
opponents received massive assistance from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In less than two 
years, 70,000 troops were in Yemen, over one-third of the Egyptian Army (Ibid). The war
35 On this transformation, see Marilyn Nasr’s (1983) excellent doctoral dissertation.
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in Yemen was costing Egypt £E 100 million per annum, more than the cost of Egypt’s 
wheat imports (Heikal 1990:185). Meanwhile, the 1960s also witnessed the fall of many 
of Nasser’s international allies, from Ghana’s Nkrumah, to Algeria’s Ben Bella, Congo’s 
Lumumba, Indonesia’s Sukarno, and Sudan’s Abboud. The demise of many of its historic 
leaders, the Sino-soviet split, and the Indo-China war delivered major blows to the Non- 
Aligned Movement. Finally, the prospects for a modus vivendi with the United States 
were aborted soon after Kennedy’s assassination. Under President Johnson, three major 
problems soured American-Egyptian relations: the crises of Congo and Yemen; the 
renewal of the wheat deals (for which Johnson sought to extract a series of political 
concessions from Egypt in Yemen, Congo, and elsewhere), and increased U.S. support 
for Israel (Heikal 1973:226). Nasser was increasingly trapped between these crises with 
the United States and his political duel with Khrushchev. Regaining the regional and 
international manoeuvring space was essential to sustain the populist statist model that 
was consolidated with the first quintennial plan.
Thus, in 1964, Nasser made another turning point in his foreign policy towards both the 
Arab world and the superpowers. Realising his strategic overstretch and economic drain 
as a result of the Arab cold war, particularly with the increased Egyptian involvement in 
Yemen, Nasser decided that the current circumstances demanded his acceptance of the 
existence of the Arab conservative regimes, and a more conciliatory strategy. He, 
therefore, attempted to revive the “unity-of-ranks” formula, and called for an Arab 
summit in Cairo in January 1964 to contain inter-Arab tensions, and face common 
threats. The Israeli plans to divert the waters of the Jordan River offered Nasser the
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justification he needed for such a foreign policy shift. The summit was a successful 
change of approach by Nasser. This success, however, owes much to the fact that the 
1963 coups in Iraq and Syria ridded Nasser of two of his enemies in the Levant, and 
replaced them with relatively pro-Nasser regimes. A second Arab summit took place in 
Casablanca in 1965. During it, Nasser attempted to push “unity-of-ranks” forward by 
seeking to negotiate a settlement of the Yemen war with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia 
(Heikal 1990:61-62).
However, these attempts came to naught, and the Arab cold war started anew with 
Faisal’s calls in 1965 for Islamic solidarity in lieu of Arab nationalism, and his call for an 
Islamic summit. Nasser viewed Faisal’s calls as a renewed form of Western pacts, since it 
implied allying with the pro-western Turkish, Iranian, and Pakistani regimes, and 
attacked it vigorously. Thus, Nasser’s attempt to redress the strategic overstretch caused 
by the Arab cold war and the Yemen war, which resulted in increasing economic and 
military burdens, failed, and he was forced to return, albeit reluctantly and at a very high 
economic and political cost, to the “unity-of-goal” formula (Youssef-Ahmad 1982:111- 
112).
In the meantime, Nasser sought to restore his relations with the Soviet Union, as he was 
increasingly giving up on having a working relation with Johnson. The fall of Kassem’s 
regime in 1963, and the rise of pro-Nasser regimes in Syria and Iraq made the USSR 
equally interested in ending the political duel with Egypt. Khrushchev’s visit to Cairo in 
May 1964 to celebrate the termination of the first phase of the Aswan High Dam offered
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the opportunity for reconciliation, and Khrushchev spoke favourably about the 
“progressive, non-capitalist path to development” followed by Arab socialist countries 
(Heikal 1990:64-65). This rapprochement, however, was short-lived, as Khrushchev was 
removed from power on 13/10/64. Amongst the criticisms that he faced, and were 
“leaked” to Nasser, was the fact that the non-aligned, anti-communist Egypt received 
more Soviet aid than some members of the socialist bloc (Heikal 1990:78). Regardless 
how reliable this “leaked” information was, it had one meaning to Nasser: that he was not 
likely to get the same generous, unconditional assistance from the Soviet Union in the 
future. His manoeuvring space shrank substantially.
The short-lived rapprochement with Khrushchev, however, increased the tensions with 
the US, especially that it coincided with the end of the 3-year agreements of wheat 
shipments to Egypt signed in 1959 at the height of Nasser’s duel with Khrushchev36. 
Negotiations to renew them reflected the increasing tensions between Egypt and the US 
over the rapprochement with Khrushchev as well as the Egyptian role in Yemen and 
Congo. Johnson’s administration offered to renew the wheat shipments but only for six 
months at a time (Heikal 1973:230), which Nasser rejected, as it was impossible to make 
any long-term economic plans when the future of 50% of Egypt’s key food import was so 
uncertain.
By 1965, therefore, it was becoming clear that Egypt’s ability to use foreign policy to 
resolve the internal politico-economic contradictions of populist etatisme and finance
36 The first agreement of wheat shipments to Egypt according to Public law 480 was signed in 1959 and 
covered the years 1959, 1960, 1961, and in 1960 a second agreement was signed, covering 1962, 1963, 
1964. See: Heikal (1990:180).
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development plans was not sustainable. War in Yemen continued to drain Egypt’s 
economic and military resources. The forced return to “unity-of-goal” and the resumption 
of the Arab cold war made it impossible to obtain economic assistance from conservative 
Arab regimes, and developments in Egypt’s relations with the superpowers put serious 
constraints on Egypt’s ability to mobilise external resources. Without foreign assistance, 
the populist-statist political economy began to flounder under its own contradictions. 
Thus began the restructuring process of Egyptian political economy and foreign policy.
3- The crisis of etatisme and origins of restructuring: 1965-1970
By 1965, Nasser was increasingly aware of the mounting domestic and international 
pressures that were threatening the future of his populist etatisme. In a speech on 
12/2/1965, he openly declared “Year 1965 is going to be the most crucial year in our 
national struggle” (Matar 1975:166). The government could not decide on a second plan, 
due to uncertainties regarding its ability to mobilise sufficient resources to finance the 
developmental and populist goals. The discovery of the Muslim Brotherhood’s plans to 
assassinate Nasser in the same year fuelled the regime’s concerns for its domestic 
security and stability. Meanwhile, a plethora of foreign policy crises curbed Nasser’s 
ability to use diplomatic acumen to contain domestic crises and sustain the populist statist 
model. Unable to cope with these mounting crises, the development of populist etatisme 
was brought to a halt, and restructuring became imperative.
A key argument in this study is that the seeds of the dramatic economic and foreign 
policy restructuring that are often attributed to the rise of president Sadat to power in
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1970 were rooted in the very structure of the populist statist model itself. The crisis and 
the subsequent transformation of the economy and foreign policy were products of its 
inherent contradictions, and had started during the last five years of Nasser’s rule. Like 
the rise of etatisme in post-1952 Egypt, its transformation was a result of the interplay of 
domestic and international factors, which I will seek to analyse in this section.
(3.1) The State
The simultaneous pursuit of developmental and distributive goals strained the limited 
resources of Nasser’s populist etatisme. The revolution-from-above created an elite 
whose lifestyle and patterns of consumption further drained these resources. The ensuing 
resource crisis necessitated some form of economic retrenchment, and resulted in covert 
social conflicts over dividing the burdens of restructuring, which was determined, 
naturally, by the balance of power amongst the key social forces.
After the conclusion of the first quintennial plan in 1965, the regime was facing a vicious 
resource dilemma (rising budget and balance-of-payment deficits, and falling foreign 
economic resources at the regime’s disposal). In September 1965, Nasser appointed 
Zakariya Muhi al-Din, a founding member of the free officers who was allegedly rightist 
and well viewed in the west, as prime minister, with a mandate to negotiate a background 
stabilisation plan with the IMF, in lieu of Ali Sabri, who was more associated with the 
left, and whose appointment in 1964 symbolised the intensification of the “transition to 
socialism”, and as such, was particularly suited to host Khrushchev’s visit to Egypt37.
37 Generally speaking, Sabri’s political fortunes (and misfortunes) were viewed as a barometer of Egyptian- 
Soviet relations (Rubenstein 1972:10).
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Aziz Sidky, the flamboyant minister of industry, historically associated with the 
foundation of the ministry of industry and the ambitious industrialisation plans, was 
replaced by the technocratic and cautious Mustafa Khalil. Waterbury (1983:96) argued 
that these changes might have prompted Washington to approve in November 1965 an 
additional £E 20 million in Wheat sales.
The structure of the elite from the mid-1960s onwards, was conducive to this economic 
shift rightward. Three factors are particularly relevant here: a) the embourgeoisiment of 
the military elite; b) the consolidation of the influence of the “new class” technocrats and 
senior bureaucrats; and c) the re-rise of the private bourgeoisie to form a latent, albeit 
influential interest group (Hinnebusch 1985:30).
Abdel Hakim Amer remained in full control of the military, notwithstanding his 
successive failures during the Suez crisis, in Syria and in Yemen. He was gradually 
turning the military into a personal fiefdom, and increasingly becoming a key 
representative of “anti-socialist” interests (Ibid:31). Officers permeated the state 
apparatus and were progressively emerging as the main beneficiaries of populist etatisme. 
All vice-presidents and prime ministers between 1954 and 1970 came from the military 
(El-Said 2002:174). The increasing militarisation of the bureaucracy, and diplomatic 
service led to stretching Amer’s patrimonial spheres of influence beyond the Army (Ibid: 
172). The military elite underwent a rapid process of embourgeoisiment, changed its 
lifestyle, increased its income, and married into upper-class families (Hinnebusch
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1985:108)38. As a result, they welcomed an economic shift rightward as a response to the 
economic crisis since the mid-1960s, since the alternative, economic austerity and 
deepening of the “socialist transformation” would have necessarily robbed them of their 
newly established lifestyle.
On the other hand, the failure of Nasser’s attempts to foster the “transition to socialism” 
and revolutionise the “political organisation” since 1963, further consolidated the role of 
the “new class” in the populist statist apparatus. ASU remained highly bureaucratised, 
tom between an appointed leadership at the top, and a base that co-opted traditional 
power structures in the countryside instead of revolutionising them. It had no significant 
role in recruiting political cadres. Only two of 131 cabinet ministers appointed between 
1952 and 1968 came from the ASU ranks, whereas 83 of them held senior ASU positions 
during or after their cabinet appointment (Dekmejian 1971:269; Entelis 1974:458). 
Technocracy and bureaucracy, therefore, remained the key routes to political power 
amongst civilians during the years of the “transition to socialism”. Technocrats and 
senior bureaucrats were recruited from upper- and middle-class families (Hinnebusch 
1985:16), and were, obviously, not willing to give up their privileges regardless of the 
intensity of the resource crisis. As such, they also backed the shift rightwards.
38 Naguib Mahfouz, Egypt’s most prominent novelist brilliantly depicted this embourgeoisement of the 
military in his novel The Mirrors. Other novels, like Miramar, The thief and the dogs, and Chat over the 
Nile offered harsh criticism to the new class of technocrats and top bureaucrats.
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Finally, an often-overlooked transformation in the post-1965 political economy is the re- 
emergence of the private bourgeoisie39. The populist statist regime permitted the 
existence of “national capitalism”. Under the first quintennial plan, some highly 
profitable sectors such as construction, agriculture, and trade were left to the private 
bourgeoisie, which was also able to obtain substantial subcontracts from the public sector 
(Hinnebusch 1985:29; Abdel Fadil 1974:29). This private bourgeoisie was linked through 
marriage, kinship, and corruption (through subcontracting) to the military and the 
bureaucracy, thereby becoming a covert interest group, whose interests were obviously 
best served by an economic shift rightward.
The aforementioned social disposition of the ruling determined the pattern of dividing the 
burdens of economic retrenchment during the resource crisis. Thus, seeking to redress the 
fiscal deficit, the government resorted in 1966 to raising indirect taxes (the burden of 
which is shouldered primarily by the low-income classes), and the prices of basic 
consumer goods rose by 2%-17% (Shoukri 1987:39). In the same year, public 
consumption (reflecting the untouched, or perhaps even rising, consumption levels of the 
ruling elite) rose by 10.9%, as did private deposits in Egyptian banks (reflecting the 
wealth amassed by the private and state bourgeoisies) (Ibid). The struggle for dividing the 
burdens of restructuring was decisively won by the elite trio: the military; the 
bureaucracy; and the private bourgeoisie.
39 The term “private bourgeoisie” is not tautological, since it used to distinguish the private sector from the 
so-called “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” that constituted the “new class”.
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The humiliating defeat of 1967 only pushed restructuring further, as a result of the 
accentuation of the resource crisis, and the need to divert much of the economic surplus 
to rebuild the army. The structure of the elite after the 1967 naksa (setback, as the defeat 
was officially referred to) was even more conducive to the transformation of populist 
etatisme. Apart from Amer and his entourage, who were dismissed or jailed, the role of 
the military in the populist statist apparatus remained intact, and indeed military 
expenditures rose sharply to rebuild the army. However, the increasing emphasis within 
the army on military discipline and professionalism to prepare for a liberation war meant 
that the steady flow of officers from the army to the top positions in the bureaucracy was 
brought to a halt. This led to a further rise in the role of the technocrats and bureaucrats, 
especially since Nasser decided to focus exclusively on rebuilding the army, and left the 
day-to-day running of the state to the bureaucracy. In the first government after the 
Naksa, senior positions were given to technocrats, and “officer-technocrats”40. Likewise, 
the role of the private bourgeoisie was enhanced, as they benefited from the generous 
subcontracts for construction works needed to rebuild the army. Not surprisingly, the 
political economy shifted more towards the right, and populist policies were frozen.
As a result, the regime began to face the first serious challenge to its hegemony Nasser’s 
rise into power. Massive student and workers protests took place in 1968, initially to 
protest the light sentences that the military commanders responsible for the defeat 
received, but also to call for an overhauling of the political system, democratisation, 
cutting the privileges of the elite, adopting a war economy, and preparing for a “popular 
liberation war” (Beattie 1994:214-215), all of which were demands very difficult, if not
40 Including Sayed Marei, Abdel Moneim Al-Qaisouni, and Mahmoud Younis (Mansfield 1969:195).
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impossible, to implement given the social disposition of the elite. Nasser responded to 
the protest with the March 30th Manifesto, which promised ASU democratisation, offered 
some self-criticism, and emphasised the importance of a “scientific state”, i.e. a more 
efficiently managed state. In effect, the only change that took place was allowing more 
public debate in the newspapers. The Manifesto’s emphasis on the “scientific state” was a 
de facto reproduction of the “technocratic discourse”, reflecting the continuing, and 
indeed rising influence of the “new class”.
Nasser was well aware of the cracks in his regime’s support base as a result of the 
economic restructuring and the “setback”, and the challenge thereof to his regime’s 
hegemony. He considered, as many of his proponents argued41, the economic 
restructuring of the populist statist political economy and the “revolutionary” foreign 
policy a mere tactical retreat, and believed that “socialist transformation” could be 
restored after the liberation war. Meanwhile, besides paying lip service to the importance 
of the continuation of the “socialist transformation”, he made some “revolutionary 
gestures” to assure the public that “socialist transformation” was not over. Hence, a third 
law of agrarian reform was issued in 1969; and Nasser was quick to offer his political 
support to the “revolutionary” coups in Libya and Sudan (Hussein 1985:173-174). 
Nevertheless, the social disposition of the regime raised serious doubts about the chances 
of restoring populist etatisme. Nasser’s nomination of the “rightist” Zakariyya Muhi al- 
Din as a possible heir after the Naksa, and of “rightist” Sadat as his vice president two
41 See Hussein’s (1985:173-174) polemical defence of this allegedly “tactical retreat”.
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years later, had revealing indications42. In any case, Nasser’s sudden death in 1970 
removed an important constraint on economic and foreign policy restructuring -his 
charismatic legacy with its populist burdens43. Restructuring could, therefore, continue, 
this time at full steam.
(3.2) Economic structures and Policies
Notwithstanding its successes, the first quintennial plan, which terminated in 1965, 
demonstrated three inter-related weaknesses in populist etatisme: a) the dilemma of 
surplus mobilisation; b) surplus squandering; and c) over-investment and idle capacity. 
First, the pursuit of simultaneous production and consumption increases, and the regime’s 
reluctance to squeeze the privileges of the “new class” and mobilise resources 
domestically led to over-reliance on external financing from both superpowers through 
foreign policy acumen and manoeuvres. By 1965, foreign policy crises accentuated the 
resource mobilisation dilemma and forced economic restructuring. Second, the rise of 
subcontracting to the private sector contributed significantly to squandering the limited 
economic surplus available. The private sector undertook 70% of the construction works 
of the plan via subcontracts that involved no less than 5% commission and 22% 
administration fees. The value of these subcontracts was estimated at £E 490 million, and 
was therefore seriously draining the economic surplus (Abdel Fadil 1974:29). Finally, as 
Amin (1974:57-58) argued, the plan was based on exaggerated assumptions regarding the
42 The “rightist” implications of the choice of Muhi al-Din (cf.: Shukrallah 1999; Shoukri 1987) were 
firmly denied by Mohamed Heikal (Matar 1975:159). Ironically, Heikal (1990:848) himself later argued 
that Muhi al-Din was chosen since he was better suited to deal with the west, particularly the United States.
On the “rightist” implications of the choice of Sadat, see: Baydoon et. al. (2002:113).
43 It was this charismatic legacy and its burdens that led Nasser to war in 1967 (see sections 3.2 and 3.4), 
and his attempt to maintain it was behind the limited populist gestures after the Naksa.
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ability to export manufactured goods and maintain high levels of foreign assistance. 
Factories were therefore built at a scale well beyond the size of the home market. When 
exports fell well below expectations, and imports rose, causing a foreign currency crisis, 
the government became unable to supply the necessary raw materials and spare parts 
needed to keep these factories functioning at their full capacity. By the fiscal year 
1965/1966, it was estimated that 25% of the productive capacity of nationalised 
industries was idle.
None of these three weaknesses was a strictly technical “economic” problem. They were 
rooted in the prevailing social structures within the populist statist regime. The surplus 
mobilisation problem reflected the embourgeoisiment of the military and the rise of the 
“new class” of bureaucrats and technocrats. Surplus squandering via subcontracting was 
in part a result of the intimate links developed between the state elite and the private 
bourgeoisie. Other parts of the economic surplus were wasted due to the conspicuous 
consumption levels of the elite, referred to in subsection 2.2 above. Idle capacity was as 
much a result of the technical mistake of overestimating the ideal sizes of projects and 
overlooking the links between the different projects (Abdel Fadil 1974:29-30), as it was a 
reflection of the insistence of the new elite on projects that catered for a small market of 
financially privileged individuals, and were dependent on imported components (e.g. 
private cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, and so forth).
Likewise, it was the same social structures that determined the distribution of the burdens 
of the austerity plan of Zakariyya Muhi al-Din’s government. The privileges of the
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powerful “new class”, and the rising private bourgeoisie remained intact. It was the 
populist aspects of etatisme that were the key victim of economic restructuring. And the 
populist alliance began to crack. Muhi al-Din’s government’s call for “economic 
rationalisation” meant an increase in prices and indirect taxes, together with an attempt to 
encourage private foreign investment (Cooper 1982:37). Law 51 of 1966 provided for the 
creation of a “free zone” in Port Said for foreign capital with several guarantees against 
nationalisation (Abdel Khalek 1983:80). Although this law was never implemented, due 
to the 1967 war and the closure of the whole Suez Canal zone, it was indicative of the 
government’s new economic plans.
Meanwhile, the new class continued to grow in size and influence. The civil service, for 
instance, grew, notwithstanding the “austerity” plans, by a staggering 15% per annum 
until 1967 (Amin 1974:84). A large black market emerged for the luxury durables to 
cater for the needs of the “new class” and the rising bourgeoisie, and the government 
created “dollar shops”, first in the airports, then in the centre of Cairo, which acted as 
"legalised black markets” (Wahba 1994, pi 15). As consumption rose steadily after the 
first plan, domestic savings fell by 13.7% (Shoukri 1987:39), accentuating the resource 
gap. The private sector continued to flourish. Bank deposits doubled in one year (1966), 
rising from £E 11.2 million to £E 27.8 million (Ibid). Holders of foreign currency were 
allowed to invest their money in foreign accounts in the Arab African Bank -  which 
acted like a sort of offshore bank in Egypt (Ibid: 116). In the countryside, the influence of 
middle landowners, who were marginally affected by the land reform, rose steadily. They 
continued to consume a disproportionately large share of subsidised agricultural inputs
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(Hinnebusch 1985:27), whilst shifting their production to the more profitable cash crops. 
The burden of restructuring, therefore, fell exclusively on lower-middle and working 
classes. Prices of necessary consumer goods rose significantly in 1966/1967, and their 
consumption fell between 5.2 and 27% (Shoukri 1987:39), reflecting the declining 
standards of living of the lower classes.
The heightening of the crisis, and the subsequent waning of the regime’s populist 
coalition, put immense pressures on the regime’s legitimacy, which depended, at least in 
part, on its populist achievements. In such conditions, Nasser was particularly vulnerable 
to the pressures to support the mounting Syrian-PLO challenge to Israel, since he could 
hardly afford another blow to the other aspect of his charismatic legitimacy -  his 
leadership of the “Arab cause” (Hinnebusch 1985:35). A foreign policy gamble, meant to 
relieve the pressures that were building on the legitimacy of the regime, gave the 
expansionist party in the Israeli government a chance to attack him (Ibid). And the results 
were catastrophic.
The humiliating defeat dealt a lethal blow to populist etatisme. Alongside the physical 
destruction, the government lost major sources of revenue. The Suez Canal was closed 
indefinitely, tourism deteriorated, and the Israeli occupation of Sinai deprived Egypt of 
the oilfields that were responsible for more than half Egypt’s oil production (Mansfield 
1969:175). The necessary diversion of resources to rebuild the army put momentous 
pressures on the regime’s limited resources, and led to further abandoning of the regime’s 
populist commitments, according to the regime’s new slogan “no voice shall be louder
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than the battle After the “setback”, an emergency budget was introduced, raising taxes, 
reducing allowances, and further increasing the prices of non-absolute necessities (Ibid).
The impact of the defeat, however, went far beyond the mere accentuation of the 
regime’s economic dilemma. The legitimacy of the populist statist regime was deeply 
shaken, and calls for reform mounted. Two restructuring alternatives were possible: a) 
austerity and the adoption of a war economy; or b) economic liberalization and 
attempting to secure private and foreign economic resources. The February 1968 
demonstrations, as was argued earlier, were essentially a call for the first strategy (Beattie 
1994:229). On the other hand, the social disposition of the ruling elite, the forced 
reconciliation with Arab conservative regimes in Khartoum summit and the regime’s 
reliance on their economic assistance, and the ability of the government to extract 
resources more easily from the public sector and the popular classes than the private 
sector and the “new class”, rendered this option futile. A rightward shift was more likely. 
Senior rightist economic advisors44 urged Nasser to relax restrictions on private and 
foreign capital, arguing that this is necessary to ease the pressures on the economy and 
open up alternative investment channels (Beattie 1994:223). A new policy, known as 
“the economic and financial reform” was launched in May 1968 (Wahba 1994:99-100), 
offering incentives to the private sector and emphasising the need to manage the public 
sector more efficiently and make profits. As a result, the role of the private sector 
continued to rise, benefiting from the liberalisation package, and relying on the generous 
subcontracts for construction works needed to rebuild the army. The role of the “new 
class” technocrats, and their standard of living remained intact, and indeed continued to
44 Including, Abdel Moneim Al-Qaisouni, Hassan Abbas Zaki, and Moustafa Kamel Mourad.
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rise in spite of the alleged austerity and diversion of resources for military efforts. The 
imports of luxury goods actually rose sharply. As Cooper (1982:57) reported, the imports 
of cars in 1970 alone were greater than total imports between 1963 and 1967. Similarly, 
the black market and the “Dollar shops” continued to flourish. Thus, it can be argued that 
the “setback” further pushed the dismantling of populist etatisme, and indeed facilitated 
the process, since all reductions in the populist allowances could be blamed on the 
“setback”, and any populist protest could be silenced on the grounds that “no voice 
should be louder than the battle ”.
(3.3) Ideology
Given the empirical and pragmatic nature of the populist-statist regime, its ideological 
statements were more often than not serving the ex post function of legitimising the 
regime’s political and economic choices rather than the ex ante function of guiding them. 
This was particularly true after 1965, when the regime was forced to restructure its 
populist etatisme in response to domestic and external pressures. The ideological 
discourse sought to contain these mounting pressures and to legitimise the rightward shift 
through three main steps: a) emphasising the “technocratic” and apolitical nature of the 
rightward shift; b) co-opting any potential leftist opposition; and c) adopting a more 
accommodating foreign policy towards Egypt’s regional and international environments.
The regime’s persistent emphasis on the technical nature of its policy choices, which had 
helped disguise the class interests behind them, was used after 1965 to legitimise the shift 
rightward as a technical necessity rather than as an outcome of the balance of power
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amongst the key social forces. Nasser, addressing the public sector companies’ directors 
at the “Production Congress” in March 1967, spoke about the “science of management”, 
refusing the existence of such a thing as a “socialist or capitalist management” (i.e. 
emphasising the technocratic approach to administering political economy), and went 
even further to argue that “wages should be linked to productivity, and that socialism 
does not mean equal wages but equal opportunities to work” (Waterbury 1983:99; Wahba 
1994:99). An equal emphasis was put on the importance of profitability as the key 
criterion of assessing the performance of the public sector.
A simultaneous effort was made to contain any possible opposition from the left. The 
regime reached a deal with the communist movement whereby the imprisoned 
communists were released, and in return, the Egyptian communist party dissolved itself, 
and its members individually joined ASU. They were allowed to appear in the media, and 
a Marxist journal “Al-Tali’a ” was created for them within Al-Ahram. They were also 
invited to join the staff of the “Institute for Socialist Studies”, which remained under tight 
control from the regime’s “centrists” (Beattie 1994:220). Thus, the regime managed to 
prevent any leftist opposition from threatening its already strained social alliance by co­
opting the communist movement and making its members part of the domestic political 
game, abiding by its rules and red lines.
Meanwhile, Heikal wrote a series of articles calling for “neutralising the United States” 
(Heikal 1982:38) and the need for a more balanced approach to foreign policy in lieu of 
the prevailing confrontational line. These articles launched a major debate between
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Heikal and Al-Ahram on one side, and leftist intellectuals writing at Al-Jumhuriya, and 
Al-Akhbar, over the foreign policy orientation, and implicitly over the general orientation 
of the populist statist regime itself45. This debate highlighted the emerging “role conflict”, 
as the regime was trapped between the pressures to follow an accommodating foreign 
policy to contain the pressures on the regime and maintain its “manoeuvring space” on 
one hand, and the calls for escalation against Israel from Syria and the PLO on the other. 
The latter presented a serious challenge to Nasser’s charismatic leadership of the 
“revolutionary camp” in the Arab world, and eventually led to the series of developments 
that resulted in the humiliating defeat of June 196746.
The impact of the defeat, however, went far beyond the mere territorial losses, physical 
damages, and accentuation of the regime’s economic dilemma. It led to a wave of self­
doubt, and harsh self-criticism, questioning, not only the military performance, but also 
the raison d ’etre of the populist-statist regime itself and its nationalist ideology, and 
investing the “setback” with broader intellectual and political meanings. Syrian scholar 
Sadeq Al-Azm (1969) wrote a particularly harsh treatise in self-criticism. Poets Nizar 
Qabbani and Adonis wrote bitterly on the broader meanings of the “setback”47. In Egypt, 
the poet Ahmad Fouad Negm, and populist singer Sheikh Imam launched a new genre of 
songs hitherto unknown in Egypt -  the underground opposition songs, mocking the 
generals’ corruption and triumphalist rhetoric, and calling for a “popular war” a la Viet
45 Cooper (1982:41) took note of that debate, but inaccurately mentioned that it started after 1967 defeat 
rather than from 1965. The debate intensified after 1967, but it started as early as 1965 (see: Heikal 1982).
46 More details of these events will be offered in the next subsection.
47 Qabbani’s bitter poem “footnotes in the setback’s notebook” was secretly copied and circulated in Cairo, 
after the censorship refused to publish it, and the renowned Syrian poet was denied entry to Egypt for a few 
months after the “setback”.
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Kong. Ahmed Baha’ al-Din (1968) tried to invest the “setback” in broader intellectual 
contexts, arguing that the Israeli challenge is a “civilisational” challenge, not just a 
military one, and implying that the defeat was due to failed modernization. Furthermore, 
students and workers’ demonstrations in February 1968 highlighted the cracks in the 
“support base” of the regime, and indicated that the popular support for Nasser, when 
hundreds of thousands poured onto Cairo’s streets on 9 and 10/6/1067 asking him to stay 
in office, was no longer unqualified.
In response to these pressures, the regime issued its third ideological document -  the 
March 3Cfh Manifesto, which stressed three key principles: a) reconstruction of the armed 
forces; b) economic steadfastness (sumud); and c) reconstruction of the domestic front 
and ASU reforms (Wahba 1994:99). Promises to reform the ASU, however, soon 
evaporated, and political reforms amounted to little more than some relaxation of the 
limits on public debates. The real ideological implications of the manifesto for the 
restructuring of populist etatisme were twofold. First, the regime’s declared foreign 
policy priority was to “remove the traces of aggression”, i.e. to focus of regaining the 
territories occupied in 1967. All other “revolutionary” ambitions to “liberate Palestine”, 
or for that matter, to revolutionise the Arab world via the “unity-of-goal” strategy, were 
postponed indefinitely. This signalled a decisive shift to the milder “unity-of-ranks” 
formula, especially with the increased dependence on the economic support of 
conservative Arab regimes after the Khartoum summit in August 1967. Domestically, the 
adjacent slogan “no voice should be louder than the battle” offered a pretext for the 
sharp decline in the regime’s populist commitments, on the grounds that all resources
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should be diverted to rebuilding the army. Second, in the same vein, the manifesto’s 
emphasis on the importance of a “scientific state” was a de facto reproduction of the 
regime’s “technocratic” arguments, which reflected the rising influence of the “new 
class” after the “setback”.
The regime’s economic shift rightward after the “setback” was reflected in the increased 
emphasis on the “profitability” of the public sector, and the explicit calls for economic 
liberalisation. In his May Day speech in 1968, Nasser declared the new policy of 
“economic and financial reform”, stated the need for managing the public sector in a 
more profitable way, and argued, “we need the private sector...we want to encourage 
national capital and not frighten it o ff’ (Wahba 1994:99-100,119). His minister of 
finance, Abdel Aziz Hegazi, went on to argue that profit-sharing schemes -a  key populist 
achievement of the July 1961 “socialist” laws- should be confined to highly productive 
workers only. He also launched the first attack on the government commitment to full 
employment, arguing that the solution to the unemployment problem should be “adopting 
an open door policy in exporting surplus labour” (Ibid: 100-101). For the first time since 
the crisis of populist etatisme surfaced in 1965, the government was explicitly indicating 
its support for the private sector, and retreating from its commitments to populist 
etatisme. The “setback”, and the ensuing emphasis on “removing the traces o f 
aggression ”, provided the pretext needed for speeding up the process of restructuring 
populist etatisme that had already begun right after the end of the first quintennial plan.
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This post-setback ideological discourse intensified the “role conflict” that emerged since 
1965. The “setback” forced an irreversible shift to “unity-of-ranks” and conciliation with 
the “reactionary” Arab regimes, and made Nasser an easy prey to the attacks from other 
“revolutionary” Arabs, particularly, Syria and the PLO. Heikal (1982:65-69) responded 
with a series of articles in Al-Ahram on 5/9/1967, 27/9/1967, 20/10/1967 and 29/12/1967, 
refusing what he termed “revolutionary auctioneering48”, and emphasising the priority of 
“removing the traces of aggression”
Furthermore, tactical considerations during the war of attrition (1969-1970), particularly 
Nasser’s acceptance of the U.S. secretary of state William Rogers’ initiative, calling for a 
six-month ceasefire in 1970 made him the subject of bitter political attacks from the PLO, 
and forced him to close the Cairo-based “voice of Palestine” radio. Combined together, 
these pressures led to making Egypt’s claims on her “national role in leading the Arab 
revolution” all the more problematic. In response, the official discourse on Egypt’s 
national role highlighted, for the very first time since Nasser popularised the concept of 
national role in his Philosophy o f the Revolution, the “structural” nature of Egypt’s 
leading role in the Arab world. Egypt’s leadership was, therefore, structural (i.e. based on 
natural gifts that necessitate Egyptian leadership of the Arab world) rather than political 
(i.e. subject to the adoption of a certain set of policies that appeal to a broader Arab 
constituency and legitimises Egyptian leadership). On January 22nd, 1968 the Cairo-based 
“Voice of the Arabs” radio argued “Egypt has a special role in the issue... of joint Arab 
action. It is up to Egypt to come up with a suitable formula [for achieving Arab unity, and
48 The concept of “revolutionary auctioneering” as used by Heikal, was akin to Lenin’s famous accusation 
of the “infantile disorder” of the adventurist left.
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struggling against Israel], since Egypt, perhaps alone, is required to make an accurate 
assessment. This special role assigned to Egypt, is indeed a special responsibility which 
Egypt must accept” (cf.: Holsti 1970:261). In a very influential study, geographer Gamal 
Hemdan (1995 [1969]) argued that Egypt’s role is a result of the dictates of the region’s 
geography and history -  a structural phenomenon, that is. Mohamed Heikal and many 
others followed suit. This emphasis on the structural nature of Egypt’s role had an 
important, albeit implicit, corollary -  that Egypt can follow whatever policies she chooses 
without harming her leading role in the region. By the same token, no other Arab regime, 
however revolutionary, rich, or both, can replace Egypt as the leader of the region.
This emphasis on the structural nature of the role allowed the regime to maintain its 
claims to Arab leadership, regardless of the transformations of its economy and foreign 
policy, and was therefore, maintained by Nasser’s successors who found it, as I will 
argue in the following chapters, a particularly convenient tool to defend the dramatic 
economic and foreign policy reorientation after 1970.
(3.4) Foreign Policy
By 1965, the short-lived attempt to follow a conciliatory foreign policy and regain the 
much-needed “manoeuvring space” had already terminated. The Arab cold war was 
escalating rapidly, with Egypt involved in a bitter war-by-proxy against Saudi Arabia in 
Yemen, as well as a diplomatic duel over King Faisal’s call for “Islamic solidarity” 
instead of Arab nationalism. The Egyptian intervention in Yemen was, as Doran 
(2001:112) argued, a textbook case of strategic overstretch. The Egyptian army was
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deployed over the whole of the Yemeni territory, fighting against the Saudi-funded 
“royalist” tribes, as well as French, Belgian and British mercenary forces (Heikal 
1982:57). The increasing involvement in Yemen also worsened Egypt’s already tense 
relations with Johnson’s administration, and forced Nasser into an uncomfortable reliance 
on the USSR (Doran 2001:113), particularly when the post-Khrushchev leadership was 
indicating that their support for the regime was not going to be as generous or 
unconditional. Nasser’s attempt to reach a peaceful settlement with Saudi Arabia during 
the Casablanca summit to reinforce the much-needed “unity-of-ranks” formula failed. 
Nasser was forced to make an ill-timed return to “unity-of-goal” strategy, and the Arab 
cold war continued to drain his regime. All the regime could do was to limit its military 
attrition in Yemen via re-deploying its troops in spring 1966 to the three main cities 
(San’a, Ta’ez, and Hodaida), and leaving the rest of the battlefield to the nascent Yemeni 
republican army and its supporting tribes (Baydoon et. al:70). However, with more than 
one third of the Egyptian army in Yemen, and over 1000 soldiers lost in the war of 
attrition (Woodward 1997:79), the resource drain was far from over.
Meanwhile, other “revolutionary” Arabs dealt the final blow to Nasser’s attempts to 
contain the Arab cold war. The Syrians were championing a hard-line version of anti- 
Zionism, and calling for an immediate war to liberate Palestine, thereby embarrassing 
Cairo and threatening Nasser’s Arab leadership. Jordan, which was another target of 
Syrian agitating propaganda, defended her unwillingness to fight by pointing out to the 
weak Egyptian resistance to Israel (Doran 2001:113). Throughout the early 1960s, Egypt
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resisted these calls to escalate with Israel, trying to strike a balance between supporting 
the Palestinians politically, and not being dragged to an untimely war with Israel (Ibid).
However, with domestic problems threatening the populist statist model, Nasser was 
much more vulnerable to any further challenge to his charismatic leadership. He sought 
to respond with a calculated escalation. Thus when the Soviets reported to him an alleged 
Israeli military build up on the Syrian borders, Nasser remilitarised Sinai hoping that his 
brinkmanship would be enough to deter Israel from attacking Syria, since she would then 
have to fight simultaneously on two fronts, and in the meantime regaining his political 
clout in the Levant (Woodward 1997:108-110; Doran 2001:114). Nasser was, however, 
challenged to ask the UN forces (UNEF) on the Egyptian side of the borders with Israel 
to withdraw to show his seriousness in going to war if need be. Nasser continued with his 
political brinkmanship49, asking UN secretary-general U Thant for a partial withdrawal of 
UNEF from Sinai50. When U Thant refused to make a partial withdrawal, arguing that 
UNEF would either stay or withdraw completely from the borders, Nasser had no choice 
but to ask for a complete withdrawal, and some 80,000 Egyptian troops were hesitantly 
sent to Sinai on 21/5/1967, closing the Aqaba gulf to Israeli shipping. This offered Israel 
a casus belli that was too good to miss (Woodward 1992:110). On 5/6/1967, war broke 
out, and Egypt experienced an unprecedentedly humiliating defeat.
49 The following summary o f the build up to the 1967 war is based on: Heikal (1990); Bregman and El- 
Tahri (1998); Woodward (1992).
50 Egypt’s initial request was a UNEF withdrawal from the area between Eilat and Gaza, whilst maintaining 
UNEF presence in Gaza, and in Sharm El Sheikh, which overlooks the Tiran Straits and controls the Aqaba 
gulf. Nasser’s initial intentions, therefore, were not to close the Aqaba gulf to Isareli shippling -  an act that 
Israel would not have tolerated.
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The scale of the defeat forced a major restructuring of Nasser’s foreign policy that was 
compatible with the restructuring of the populist-statist political economy. The key 
foreign policy objective became to “remove the traces of the aggression”. Any ambitious 
goals to revolutionise and unite the Arab world or liberate Palestine were postponed 
indefinitely. Rebuilding the army became a priority, and Nasser sought financial support 
from the oil-rich conservative Arab regimes. At the Khartoum summit in August 1967, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed to pay Egypt £E135 million annually until the 
lost land and revenue had been restored. This reliance on conservative Arabs’ support 
marked an irreversible termination of the “unity-of-goal” policy. Khartoum summit also 
witnessed an Egyptian-Saudi agreement to end the war in Yemen, and Egyptian troops 
could thus make a hasty withdrawal from Yemen to concentrate on preparing for the 
liberation war.
On the other hand, however, Egypt was becoming increasingly dependent on the USSR 
to rebuild the army. Soviet arms shipments resumed from July 1967, and were 
dramatically increased after Nasser’s “secret” visit to Moscow in January 1970 (Heikal 
1982:46). Convinced that some form of military escalation was indispensable for 
achieving a political settlement that forced an Israeli withdrawal, Nasser declared a “war 
of attrition”, based on hit-and-run attacks by Egyptian troops in Sinai, as well as artillery 
attacks. The main goal of the “war of attrition” was to prevent a de facto annexation of 
the Egyptian occupied land (Woodward 1997:123).
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Meanwhile, Nasser remained open to a political settlement that secured a “removal of all 
traces of aggression”. Thus he accepted the UN resolution 242 on 22/11/1967. When 
William Rogers proposed his plan51 in 1969 to secure an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, 
end the state of war between Egypt and Israel, and re-open the Suez Canal, both Egypt 
and Israel rejected the plan. Israel refused the calls for a complete withdrawal from Sinai, 
whereas Egypt refused a settlement that excluded other territories occupied in 1967 
(Heikal 1996b: 146-147). On 19/6/1970 Rogers presented a more modest initiative 
calling for a 90-days ceasefire, during which UN envoy Gunnar Jarring would seek an 
implementation of resolution 242. Nasser accepted the initiative on 22/7/1970 for two 
reasons: a) that it entailed a comprehensive solution based on resolution 242, not a 
bilateral settlement between Egypt and Israel like Rogers’ earlier plan; and b) that it gave 
him time to continue the installation of the Soviet missile system Sam-3 (known in Egypt 
as the missile wall), which was indispensable for defending Egyptian territories against 
Israeli air raids, as well as any potential troops crossing of the Suez Canal52. Nasser’s 
acceptance of the initiative, however, led to increasing tensions with, and bitter attacks 
from the Palestinians and other members of the “revolutionary camp”, who accused him 
of appeasement and backing down from the “war of attrition”. Nasser responded by 
closing the Cairo-based Voice o f Palestine radio.
Although the 1967 war and its aftermath pushed Nasser on the defensive, forcing him to 
abandon any ambitious discourse on Arab unity, revolution and the liberation of
51 Many writers tend to confuse Rogers’ plan in 1969 with his initiative in 1970, thereby making the 
inaccurate claim that Nasser accepted Rogers’ plan.
52 Three years later, this “missile wall” proved crucial for covering the Egyptian troops that crossed the 
Suez canal during the October 1973 war.
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Palestine, he sought to maintain as much as he could of his charismatic leadership of the 
Arab world, and perhaps regain some political initiative via some revolutionary gestures 
such as backing the “revolutionary coups” in Libya and Sudan. In the same vein, he 
continued his support for the PLO, notwithstanding the latter’s bitter attacks and 
“revolutionary auctioneering”. Thus, Egypt was quick to contain the Lebanese- 
Palestinian clashes in 1969, and impose the Cairo accord between the Lebanese 
government and the PLO. Similarly, following the events of “Black September” of 1970 
in Amman, Nasser spent his last hours working out a ceasefire. Less than 24 hours after 
the ceasefire was agreed in the Cairo Summit, Nasser died on 28/9/1970.
4- Conclusion: The Patterns of Interplay of Egyptian Political Economy 
and Foreign Policy
Post-1952 Egyptian foreign policy was planned and conducted within the broad 
framework of developmental nationalism. National independence and economic 
development were intrinsically linked. After the achievement of Egypt’s formal 
independence, foreign policy was primarily recruited to the national development tasks.
Its development was fundamentally linked to the rise of populist etatisme, as well as to its 
subsequent crisis and restructuring.
Throughout Nasser’s era, foreign policy served two main functions. First, it constituted 
an essential mechanism for the development of populist etatisme, and containing the 
inherent contradictions thereof. The restructuring of the regime’s domestic alliances in 
the aftermath of the Suez crisis in 1956 (excluding foreign and Mutamassir capitalists),
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and the disintegration of the UAR in 1961 (downplaying the role of the private national 
bourgeoisie), are but two examples of the role of foreign policy in augmenting the 
populist-statist political economy and furthering its development. On the other hand, it 
was through diplomatic acumen and ability to secure foreign assistance from both the 
east and west that Nasser was able to meet the conflicting demands of his populist 
etatisme, and conduct a military/technocratic populism-from-above. Foreign policy was a 
key mechanism for muffling the regime’s inherent contradictions. When a series of 
foreign policy crises limited his ability to resolve the domestic resource gap through 
mobilising foreign economic resources, the populist statist political economy crumbled 
and restructuring was inevitable.
Second, foreign policy was a major source of the regime’s hegemony, alongside its 
developmental and populist policies. When the restructuring of populist etatisme forced 
forfeiting some of the regime’s earlier populist achievements, Nasser could not afford 
any further blows to the reputation he had gained through his foreign policy 
achievements. He therefore became more vulnerable to the calls to adopt a more 
aggressive policy towards Israel, hence, his political brinkmanship and major blunder in 
1967. The resulting defeat accelerated the dismantling of populist etatisme, and indeed 
facilitated it, since all reductions in the populist allowances could be blamed on the 
“setback” rather than the social disposition of the ruling elite, and social protest could be 
silenced on the grounds that “no voice should be louder than the battle
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The different shifts in the regime’s foreign policy orientation, from seeking cooperation 
with the west to a troubled alliance with the USSR, as well as the back-and-forth shift 
between “unity-of-ranks” and “unity-of-goal”, corresponded to the development of the 
populist-statist political economy, and the need to adjust the foreign policy to the 
conflicting needs of the regime’s populism-from-above. Several foreign policy decisions 
(e.g. the short-lived return to the “unity-of-ranks” formula in 1964, and the decision to 
restore relations with the conservative Arab regimes after the “setback” and discard 
popular demands for a war economy and a “popular liberation war”) were influenced by 
the social disposition of the ruling elite, and its resistance to any attempts to curb its 
privileges, thereby, rendering impossible any demands for a more “radical” shift as an 
outlet of the resource crisis.
Two main contradictions, however, faced the process of restructuring populist etatisme 
after the 1967 “setback”: a) Nasser’s charismatic legacy, and his need to preserve his 
legitimacy, which led him occasionally to make populist gestures, including issuing in 
1969 a third “agrarian reform law”, slowing down the pace of liberalisation, and putting 
some limits on its scope; and b) the contradiction between the political-military crisis 
after the setback which forced a “leftward” shift of foreign policy towards increased 
reliance on USSR for support to rebuild the army and prepare for a coming liberation 
war, and the economic shift rightwards. The death of Nasser in 1970 resolved the first 
contradiction. The second remained for the succeeding regime to deal with and seek to 
resolve.
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Chapter III 
The First Wave of Restructuring
Fearful I  am that a day will come 
Which they will call “Victory” 
To find that we have recaptured Sinai 
But relinquished Egypt 
Gamal Bekheet*3
This chapter seeks to examine the extensive restructuring process of the Egyptian 
political economy and foreign policy Anwar Sadat’s reign. It does not, however, accept 
the mainstream argument that these changes were a function of the different policy 
preferences and value system of the new president. Instead, it argues that changes of such 
magnitude were reflective of the rise of broader social forces that developed within the 
earlier populist-statist apparatus under Nasser, particularly after 1965.
The death of Nasser removed one of the two key contradictions that hampered 
restructuring. His successor faced two urgent tasks: a) to consolidate his authority, 
restructure the ruling elite to reflect the prevailing social forces, and remove any 
institutional obstacles facing the restructuring process that had started in the last five 
years of Nasser’s rein; and b) to resolve the regime’s central dilemma, namely, the 
contradiction between the political-military crisis after the “setback” which forced a 
leftward shift of foreign policy towards increased reliance on USSR in order to rebuild 
the army, and the economic shift rightwards.
53 From a poem that he read during the student protests in 1972. The same theme, and almost the same 
wording, was later adopted by a song by Sheikh Imam and Ahmed Fouad Negm, circa 1979.
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The October 1973 war represented a major turning point, at which these two tasks were 
finally accomplished. The war established a new source of legitimacy for Sadat’s regime, 
independent from Nasser’s legacy. Consequently, the transformation of Egyptian political 
economy and foreign policy gained much impetus in its aftermath, particularly during the 
first three years of infitah (1974-1977).
This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first will examine the regime’s initial 
efforts to resolve the inherited contradictions from the populist-statist era and consolidate 
its rule between 1970 and 1973. The second and third will examine, respectively, 
restructuring during the infitah years (1974-1977), and the mounting crisis of the infitah 
political economy and the new foreign policy, which started with the 1977 bread riots and 
culminated abruptly with Sadat’s assassination in 1981. The fourth will seek to abstract 
the patterns of interplay between Egyptian political economy and foreign policy during 
the 1970s.
1- Establishing a new political order: 1970-1973
Sadat’s rise to power corresponded to the continued ascendance of the social forces that 
had favoured the restructuring of the populist etatisme since 1965. Consequently, 
restructuring proceeded in the early 1970s, albeit in a zigzag manner, due to: a) Sadat’s 
lack of an independent source of legitimacy, which forced him to emphasise the 
continuity with Nasser’s policies, thereby limiting the pace and scope of transformation; 
and b) the fundamental contradiction between the political economy and foreign policy 
under the conditions of the occupation of Sinai.
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The regime’s continued shift rightwards, however, gave rise to an increasing wave of 
protest especially with the regime’s failure to make any progress towards recovering 
Sinai. Between the rising protests and the failure of Sadat’s attempts in 1971 and 1972 to 
recover Sinai peacefully, the regime was left with no options but military escalation. 
Thus came the October 1973 war.
(1.1) The State
Nasser’s death revealed deep inter-elite divisions that had existed for years before his 
death but were held in check by his charismatic leadership. On one hand, there was a 
small, but relatively cohesive, “left-wing” faction clustering around Ali Sabri, and 
consisting mainly of second-tier officers and bureaucrats, who were associated with the 
turn the populist etatisme had taken during the early 1960s, and perceived themselves as 
the true heirs of “Nasserism”. It included cabinet ministers such as Amin Howeidi, 
Mohamed Fayek, Sarny Sharaf, and Saha’rawi Gum’a54; in addition to senior ASU 
leaders such as Dia’ al-Din Dawoud, Abd al-Mohsen Abd al-Nour, and Labib Shoukeir 
(Farahat 1978:21; Beattie 2000:40-41).
On the other hand, vice-president Anwar Sadat, who was known to have had some 
reservations on the 1960s “socialist” developments, was supported by a larger, albeit less 
homogenous, conservative faction, including veteran free officers Hussein al-Shafe’i, 
Abd al-Latif al-Boghdadi, Zakariyya Muhi al-Din and Kamal al-Din Hussein, all of 
whom were allegedly rightist, and indeed had on occasions voiced reservations on July
54 Secretary of state and former chief of intelligence; minister of information; secretary of state for 
presidential affairs; and minister of interior, respectively.
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1961 “socialist laws”. Veteran diplomat Mahmoud Fawzi, influential journalist Mohamed 
Heikal, as well as conservative “new class” technocrats such as Sayed Marei, al-Qaisouni 
and Abd al-Aziz Hegazi also supported Sadat (Hinnebusch 1985:41-42; Chalabi 
2000:54).
Notwithstanding the first group’s claims, Sadat was Nasser’s obvious successor, being 
the vice-president since December 1969, hence the constitutional candidate for 
presidency, as well as one of the two remaining senior free officers in power (alongside 
Hussein al-Shafe’i). However, to avoid an unwanted confrontation, a compromise was 
reached, whereby Sabri’s group accepted Sadat’s presidency pending the latter’s 
acceptance of the creation of a collective leadership that would be consulted on all major 
issues, and whose decision will made by majority voting. Sadat also agreed not to assume 
the position of prime minister, and to appoint Sabri as vice-president (Beattie 2000:42- 
43).
Under this compromise, Sadat was at best primus inter pares. His most immediate task, 
therefore, became to establish his own authority. To do so, Sadat’s strategy was threefold. 
First, he emphasised continuities with Nasser’s regime and maintained that he was 
Nasser’s true heir, thereby undermining his opponents. Second, he gradually emphasised 
his authority, and skilfully outmanoeuvred his opponents in the May 1971 power- 
struggle, emerging therefrom as Egypt’s unchallenged ruler. Finally, Sadat managed to 
broaden his support base, appealing to a broader “right-wing” constituency, including
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representatives of the pre-1952 private bourgeoisie, the conservative rural middle class, 
as well as members of the Muslim brotherhood.
In his “nomination” speech, Sadat appealed to the electorate to vote for him in the 
referendum to continue “along the path of Nasser” (Mohamed 1990:115). After the 
referendum, his appointment of the 72-year-old veteran diplomat/statesman Mahmoud 
Fawzi as his first prime minister served the twin purposes of a) confirming continuity 
with Nasser’s era, especially since Fawzi’s government maintained many of the members 
of Nasser’s last cabinet; and b) presenting a cautious challenge before Sabri’s faction. 
Sadat’s success in denying members of Sabri’s faction this position, which they 
considered part of the “deal”, was the first manifestation of the real balance of power in 
Egypt.
Throughout the first six months of his presidency, Sadat continued to challenge 
cautiously Sabri’s faction, demonstrating his authority in decision making, particularly in 
foreign policy matters, which, under the conditions of Sinai’s occupation, were central to 
domestic debates. Thus, on February 4th 1971, Sadat presented an initiative for an interim 
peace agreement with Israel without seeking prior consent from, or even informing, 
Sabri’s group. Five weeks later, on March 9th, Sadat ignored the other faction’s calls for a 
start of the military operations in Sinai, and agreed to renew the cease-fire agreement for 
three months. In both instances, Sadat was firmly backed by Mohamed Heikal, and 
premier Mahmoud Fawzi (Beattie 2000:57; Heikal 1982:117-130).
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t V iSix weeks later, on April 17 , Sadat unilaterally decided to agree on a union with Syria 
and Libya. This decision served two purposes: a) to enhance Sadat’s claims to be 
Nasser’s true heir by agreeing to the latest blueprint for Arab unity; b) to marginalize 
further the role of Sabri’s faction, not only by taking the decision unilaterally, but also by 
accepting a binding majority as the decision making mechanism in the union55. Sabri’s 
group objected, claiming that Egypt was now bound by any decision taken by the Syrian 
and Libyan presidents, which diminishes her sovereignty. In so doing, however, they 
were inevitably damaging their image as proponents of Nasserism and Arab unity, which 
further strengthened Sadat’s position.
Sadat retaliated quickly56, dismissing Sabri on May 2nd, followed by Gum’a on May 13th. 
Gum’a’s dismissal prompted a series of resignations by five other ministers, to which 
Sadat responded forcefully, imprisoning all key members of Sabri’s faction in the 
Cabinet and ASU, and accusing them of conspiracy and treachery. Sadat emerged from 
this power struggle as the unchallenged ruler of Egypt.
The swiftness and relative ease with which Sadat managed to oust his opponents, who 
were “formally” in control of several government bodies, the Army, and ASU could not 
be attributed exclusively to his wits57. They were reflective of a transformation in the 
structure of the ruling elite that favoured Sadat and his conservative line. The resulting
55 This meant that Egypt was bound by any decision taken by the majority of votes of the three presidents’ 
council, without seeking approval of the cabinet or ASU (Rubinstein 1972:10).
56 The following summary of the May 1971 power struggle is based on: Beattie (2000); Hinnebusch (1985); 
Rubinstein (1972); Heikal (1989), Ismail (1987); and Shoukri (1987).
57 Obvious as this might be, it is striking how almost all of the biographers of Sadat, sympathetic or 
otherwise, as well as many researchers working within the psychological-perceptual tradition, insist on 
explaining Sadat’s success by emphasising his ability to outwit his opponents. Cf.: Finklestone (1996); 
Heikal (1989); Zahran (1987).
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balance of power between the two factions, which was reflected in the earlier mini-duels 
over the appointment of Fawzi’s government, the renewal of the ceasefire, and the union 
with Syria and Libya, certainly facilitated Sadat’s victory.
On one hand, Sadat’s several meetings with the top-ranking military officers over the 
previous months managed to win over the majority of them, since: a) the professional 
military, objecting to the disunity of political leadership during wartime, were more 
prepared to support the “legitimate” authority (Heikal 1989:99-102); and b) Sadat’s 
conservative line was, as Hinnebusch (1985:43) argued, more appealing to the class 
interests of the military elite. On the other hand, the “new class” technocrats and regime’s 
centrists, stood firmly behind Sadat. Finally, Sadat’s invoking of the themes of 
democracy and the struggle with the “centres of power” during the May crisis, carried 
comforting liberal overtones to the rising private bourgeoisie, whose support was further 
secured through a series of liberalisation gestures discussed in the following subsection.
After his triumphant emergence from the May 1971 power struggle, Sadat went on to 
restructure the state apparatus to reflect more explicitly the social disposition of the ruling 
elite. Hence, in July 1971, when the ASU’s central committee’s elections were held, only 
20 members maintained their positions, all of whom were either rightists or apolitical 
technocrats (Beattie, 2000:79). New rightists, including Sadat’s brother in-law Mahmoud 
Abou Wafia and conservative landowners such as Mohamed Uthman Ismail and Hamed 
Mahmoud, were elected. In September 1971, a new constitution was issued. Two months 
later, general elections were held. Consequently, on his first speech to the newly elected
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people’s assembly on 11/11/1971, Sadat was able to number proudly amongst his 
accomplishments during his first year in office, “reorganising the state apparatus to make 
it more efficient” (Sadat 1971:13).
What this “reorganising” actually did, however, was to make the state apparatus more 
reflective of the composition of the conservative faction. It therefore came as no surprise 
that the year 1971 witnessed a series of economic liberalisation measures, and a slow 
rapprochement with the United States, with the first visit of an American secretary of 
state to Egypt in eighteen years, and Sadat’s proposed interim agreement on the Suez 
canal58.
This steady shift rightward triggered social protest. The failure to recover Sinai was the 
banner of the protests, but they also reflected domestic social crisis. Four developments 
were particularly disturbing to the regime: a) the massive students’ demonstrations; b) the 
mounting workers’ strikes; c) the statements issued by professional syndicates, writers 
and intellectuals in support of the students and workers; and d) the rise of sectarian 
violence.
Earlier in 1971, Sadat declared that 1971 would be the “year of decision”, pledging to 
recover Sinai peacefully or otherwise. When his February initiative came to naught and 
no military operations took place, he contended that, the reason for not going to war was 
a “political fog” caused by the war between India and Pakistan (Hussein 1986:205). The
58 See sections 1.2 and 1.4 below.
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“fog speech”, as it was mockingly referred to, provoked an escalation of student protests 
that had already started in October 1971, and was voicing harsh criticism of both the 
regime’s “appeasing foreign policy”, and criticising the privileges of the elite, and the 
new rightist policies of the regime59. These protests were accompanied by mounting 
workers’ strikes, which had started in the Cairo’s industrial districts Helwan and Shoubra 
al-Kheima, as well as in other industrial centres such as Mahala and Kafr al-Dawar 
(Shoukry 1987:62-64). The workers’ demands were not only political. They also included 
several populist (distributive) demands, such as fuller participation in factory 
management, and less working hours (Ibid). Political and economic demands were 
intrinsically intertwined in the students and workers’ action. Statements from 
professional syndicates, as well as from several writers and intellectuals, were issued in 
support of these demands, adding further pressures on the regime60.
The regime responded with a mixture of security and political measures. On one hand, 
massive arrests followed the students and workers’ action, and more than ninety writers 
who had signed a statement in their support either lost their jobs or were transferred to 
administrative jobs. On the other hand, the regime sought to diffuse the tension by a 
tactical retreat. Thus, an “austerity and confrontation” government was appointed in 
1972, headed by Aziz Sidky, who was more associated with populist etatisme. Sidky’s 
government promised to raise taxes on luxury goods and prepare seriously for the 
liberation war. However, student and workers’ protests continued, albeit sporadically, 
well into 1973 (Hinnebusch, 1985:52).
59 See Abdalla (1985); Shoukri (1987).
60 See: Baha’ al-Din (1987:19-37); Heikal (1989:114-120); Shoukri (1987:135-143).
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In the meantime, the regime sought to consolidate and mobilise a broader conservative 
coalition to face the mounting protests, which were blamed on the left (Chalabi 2000:56- 
60). Two significant developments were particularly noteworthy: a) the rising role of the 
conservative rural bourgeoisie in the confrontation with the left; and b) the reconciliation 
with the Muslim brotherhood.
The conservative rural bourgeoisie representatives, elected to the ASU’s central 
committee after May 1971, were instrumental in the regime’s struggle with the left. In the 
new ASU central committee, several key postings were given to fundamentalist 
rightists61. Mohamed Uthman Ismail was entrusted with two crucial tasks: a) encouraging 
Islamist groups on university campuses to counterbalance the left (Beattie 2000:103); and 
b) heading the ASU disciplinary committee that took action against the signatories of the 
“writers’ statement” (Baha’ al-Din 1987:29). In the same vein, the regime, amidst its 
struggle with the left, sought to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, in August
1971, 138 members of the brotherhood were released from prison. “Political Isolation” 
was lifted in 197262. The beneficiaries of this measure included members of the Muslim 
brotherhood and pre-1952 politicians, both of whom were supportive of the regime’s 
measures against the left.
The regime’s encouragement of the religious right, however, threatened to backfire. In
1972, fundamentalist university students attacked their leftist colleagues using knives,
61 Ahmed Abd al-Akhar was undersecretary for Upper Egypt affairs. Mohamed Uthman Ismail was 
appointed chief whip. Two ex-Muslim brothers, Abd al-Aziz Kamel and Ahmed Kamal Abul Magd, were 
responsible for indoctrination and Youth organisation, respectively (Shoukri 1987:88-89).
62 “Political Isolation” decisions were taken by the post-1952 regime to deny certain politicians the right of 
membership of the “political organisation” (Beattie 2000:82).
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and, when arrested, they announced that “ASU instructed them to fight the atheist 
communists and Nasserites” (Shoukri 1987:76). Outside the university campuses, there 
was a rise in sectarian violence and burning of churches and Christian charities (Ibid: 70- 
75; Heikal 1989:294-295). Sectarian violence was now added to the mounting social 
protest and the accusation of the regime of failing to fulfil its most pressing task -  
preparing for a liberation war.
Between these mounting pressures, and Sadat’s failure to recover Sinai peacefully, 
military action seemed inevitable. Thus came the October 1973 war.
(1.2) Economic Structures and Policies
During Sadat’s first years, particularly after the victorious emergence of his conservative 
faction from the May 1971 power struggle, the transformation of populist etatisme 
developed along two levels: a) dismantling etatisme; and b) relinquishing populism.
A crucial step towards dismantling etatisme was to circumscribe gradually the role of 
central planning. To do so with minimal political cost, the government avoided explicitly 
annulling earlier statist decisions or liquidating the existing statist organisations, opting 
instead for issuing new legislations that effectively robbed them of their influence, and 
created the opportunity for the private sector to gradually take over the economy. Thus, 
law 64 of 1971 was issued to limit the “general organisations”63 control over state-owned 
companies, and to grant directors of the public sector more autonomy (Zaalouk 1989:57).
63 These are the holding companies that controlled the public sector enterprises.
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Rather than dismantling the general organisations altogether and causing a political 
confrontation with their management and workers, this law was in effect rendering them 
ineffectual and obsolete.
This law was followed by Law 65 of 1971, which represented a quantum leap on the road 
to infitah (Abdel Khalek 1983:80). Intended to encourage Arab and foreign investment, 
this law offered guarantees against sequestration and nationalisation, and granted 
investors tax exemptions. The most important feature of this law, however, was that it 
stipulated that all projects based on it would be considered private enterprises, 
irrespective of the legal nature of the shareholders (Ibid). This meant that, for instance, 
joint-ventures with the Egyptian public sector would be treated as private enterprises, i.e. 
as autonomous, profit-seeking entities, free from commitments to contribute to financing 
populist and/or statist objectives, and, most importantly, free from the ceilings on salaries 
for their top management.
As such, this law furnished the necessary conditions to transform the relation between the 
bureaucratic and private bourgeoisies from the latent and shady partnership phase during 
the late 1960s (based on favouritism in subcontracting) to a legalised partnership through 
the establishment of joint-ventures, which would be treated as private sector units, and 
would thus open new opportunities for the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to engage directly in 
surplus accumulation and reinforce its alliance with the private bourgeoisie. This alliance 
would later on prove crucial to the development and consolidation of infitah policies.
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On the other hand, Sadat’s first years in office witnessed a series of decisions 
relinquishing many of the earlier populist measures under Nasser. In his efforts to 
consolidate his broad conservative coalition, Sadat instructed the parliament speaker in 
December 1970 to draft a law providing for the return of some of the sequestered 
properties. Law 34 of 1971 was issued to this effect, and was followed by a series of 
measures that returned sequestered lands to their owners after evacuating it from the 
peasants who had rented or purchased it from the state (Chalabi 2000:54-55). 1971 also 
witnessed another goodwill gesture to foreign capital with the government’s decision to 
pay £E 2 million as financial compensation to European subjects who had suffered from 
the agrarian reforms and/or sequestration measures (Zaalouk 1989:57).
These measures were intended to serve the twin purposes of consolidating the 
conservative ruling alliance, and accelerating the transformation of populist etatisme. 
Their impact on the economy’s performance was, however, less than satisfactory. 
Liberalisation laws elicited limited response from local and foreign investors, since the 
political uncertainty created by the state of “no peace, no war” in the region outweighed 
any possible goodwill gestures by the regime. Thus, between the limited government 
resources available for investment in civilian projects and the private capital’s hesitance 
to make up for the decline in public investments, industrial growth fell to an annual 
average of 1% between 1970 and 1973 (Owen and Pamuk 1998:134).
Meanwhile, imports rose steadily, reflecting the diminishing restrictions on imports, 
thanks to the liberalisation measures on one hand, and the continued rise of the
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bourgeoisie (bureaucratic and private) and its demand for foreign products on the other.
As a result, the non-military component of the foreign debt almost quadrupled from $1.8 
billion in 1970 to $6.3 billion in 1975 (Ibid).
The rise of the bureaucratic and private bourgeoisies created a severe distributional crisis, 
with the richest 4.7% of Egyptian households receiving 22% of the national income in 
1972, whilst the poorest 34% received 11% (Shoukri 1987:82). This fed the social 
protest. Workers voiced various “populist” demands, including an increase in their 
minimal wages and the right to paid sick leave, and the students were very critical of the 
consumption patterns of the ruling elite and the rising bourgeoisie. Populist demands 
were integrated into the protestors’ demands for a liberation war, and the regime had to 
respond to these pressures.
Thus, Aziz Sidky’s “austerity and confrontation” government, appointed on 19/1/1972, 
raised the slogan “everything for the battle” and pledged to prepare seriously for the war, 
and to curb conspicuous consumption. Given the social disposition of the ruling elite, the 
latter goal was more difficult to implement. The new government’s populist efforts were 
confined to pledges to reduce the government’s public relations budgets, refrain from 
buying new cars for government officials, and decreasing the number of telephone lines 
in ministries (Ibid: 115). The earlier liberalisation decisions, and the ensuing economic 
conditions, remained intact. Protests continued, and protestors argued that the new 
government’s decisions fell short of the desired changes.
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The liberalisation measures and the subsequent protests highlighted the regime’s central 
dilemma -  the contradiction between its economic and foreign policy objectives. First, 
the “year of decision” in which the government pledged to recapture Sinai, was the same 
year that witnessed a series of liberalisation measures, and a surge in imports that were 
hardly compatible with the government’s pledges to prepare the economy for war. A war 
economy requires central mobilisation of the economic surplus, and limiting consumption 
of luxury goods. Sadat’s critics could therefore argue that his economic policies were not 
conducive to the forthcoming battle. Such an accusation was, of course, impossible to 
silence by invoking the slogan “no voice should be louder than that o f the battle ”, and 
was therefore particularly disturbing to the regime. Second, the political uncertainty 
created by the “no peace, no war” state, and intensified by the government’s repeated 
pledges to prepare for war offset the liberalisation efforts and attempts to encourage 
investments. Liberalisation simply could not proceed under the conditions of political 
instability and preparation for war. Finally, the government’s failure to liberate Sinai 
created a severe crisis of legitimacy for the regime that was further intensified by the 
anti-populist policies. Reversing these policies was not an option, given the ruling 
alliance’s social disposition. A foreign policy breakthrough was therefore needed to 
establish Sadat’s regime’s hegemony and facilitate the transformation of populist 
etatisme.
The first response by the regime to these pressures was to try to resolve this contradiction 
peacefully. Thus Sadat presented his peace initiative in February 1971, discussed in 
subsection 1.4 below. Alongside the obvious political goals, the economic goals of this
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initiative were threefold: a) to ease the distributive tensions using the revenues of Suez 
Canal and Suez Gulfs oil fields (both of which would be returned to Egyptian control in 
the first stage of the initiative); b) to end the political uncertainty that was rendering the 
economic liberalisation fruitless; and c) to resolve the fundamental contradiction between 
the regime’s economic and foreign policies, and enable the economic transformation to 
proceed.
The failure of this initiative made military escalation inevitable. Once more, the social 
disposition of the ruling elite, the regime’s resulting commitment to dismantling populist 
etatisme, and the government’s reluctance to squeeze surplus from the state or private 
bourgeoisie to finance prolonged military operations, meant that a long liberation war 
was not an option. What was needed was a limited military operation that would create 
enough momentum to make a political settlement possible. Such was the task that the 
October 1973 war successfully accomplished.
(1.3) Ideology
Sadat delivered, on average, about 90 speeches every year between 1970 and 1977 
(Zahran 1987:52). During the first three years of his reign, the government published a 
key pamphlet, Programme o f National Action. A draft of a second one, Guide to Political 
Action, was circulated amongst ASU members. This reflected the extent o f the regime’s 
need for an ideological justification of the undergoing economic and social 
transformations. Like his predecessor, Sadat was a pragmatist, not an ideologue. His 
speeches and pamphlets were, therefore, aimed primarily at meeting the regime’s
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immediate political concerns -  the struggle with Sabri’s faction, establishing the regime’s 
legitimacy, and justifying the transformation of populist etatisme.
Between October 1970 and May 1971, Sadat’s main task was to establish his authority 
vis-a-vis Sabri’s faction, and undermine the latter’s claims to Nasserism. Thus, his 
speeches emphasised continuities with Nasser. Sadat even mimicked Nasser’s rhetoric. 
Between 28/9/1970 and 15/5/1971, he delivered 24 speeches, all but three of which 
starting with Nasser’s classical “fellow citizens”. His May 14th, 1971 speech, justifying 
his dismissal of Sabri’s clique, was the first to diverge from Nasser’s opening and start 
with what was later to become Sadat’s trademark “In the name of Allah, Sons and 
Daughters” (Mohamed 1990:113-134). The emphasis on continuity with Nasser’s regime 
was explicitly expressed in the regime’s first pamphlet, Programme o f National Action, 
issued on 23/7/1971, and replete with praise of Nasser’s reign, and commitments to 
socialist transformation (Shoukri 1987:58-60).
Likewise, the regime’s foreign policy discourse emphasised the continued commitment to 
Egypt’s role as a bastion of Arab nationalism, non-alignment and anti-imperialism. In his 
first year in office, Sadat signed two blueprints for unity with Sudan and Libya in 
November 1970, then with Syria and Libya in April 1971 (Rubinstein 1972:10). These 
gestures sought to enhance the regime’s popularity by demonstrating its commitment to 
unity and cooperation with the “progressive” Arab regimes -  another continuation with 
Nasser’s policies.
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However, the regime’s new policies, particularly after May 1971, required new 
justification. Whereas the “technocratic arguments” and corporatism were perfectly 
suited to justify the regime’s “populism-ffom-above”, and the rule of the military and the 
“new class”, a new formula was needed to defend the new economic policies, and the rise 
of the conservative elite.
In the beginning, the classical slogan “no voice shall be louder than the battle” was 
repeatedly invoked to silence any criticism of the undergoing changes. Nevertheless, the 
profoundness of the changes, and the scale of protest rendered this slogan inadequate. 
Consequently, the regime resorted to a conception of a revised version of corporatism to 
suit its needs -  an “organic corporatism”.
Organic corporatism, whilst maintaining Nasser’s corporatist notion of the compatibility 
of the interests of the different classes, diverged from it in two important respects: a) It 
invoked an organic conception of the state, which likened society to an extended family 
with the president being the patriarch who is best suited to determine the interest of the 
family, and should therefore be obeyed; and b) It appealed to a particular interpretation of 
Islam, whereby several spiritual notions and concepts were recast in secular terms to 
justify social harmony and condemn any claims of contradictions or conflicts of interests 
amongst the different classes.
“7 wish to talk to you as the head o f the family”, Sadat often addressed his populace 
(Israeli 1981:52). In lieu of Nasser’s addressing of the Egyptians as “brothers”, Sadat
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regularly spoke of them as “my children" (Mohamed 1990:217). His conception of 
authority was essentially patriarchal, and he spoke about “love” as the basis of society, 
and condemned what he called “class envy”64.
Insofar as the social transformations in Egypt were concerned, organic corporatism had 
important consequences. Whereas the populist-statist regime in the 1960s acknowledged 
the possibility of the existence of social tensions and contradictions and merely aimed at 
resolving them peacefully and subduing them to an overarching “national interest”, 
Sadat’s notions of a familial/patriarchal society considered harmony an intrinsic feature 
of society. As such, populist and distributive policies were not needed to maintain social 
harmony, since the very nature of the organic corporatist society guaranteed it. Similarly, 
the restructuring of populist etatisme could not possibly threaten the “natural” harmony 
that existed within the Egyptian society. Any references to the class re-alignment of the 
regime could, therefore, be dismissed as manifestations of a “class envy” that threatened 
“national unity”65.
On the other hand, the notions of a familial/patriarchal society had clear conservative 
overtones that appealed to the members of the conservative ruling alliance, particularly, 
the rural bourgeoisie that were instrumental in Sadat’s post-May 1971 regime, and the old
64 Sadat’s discourse on “love society” was, Mohamed (1990:223) noted, reminiscent of Louis XIV’s use of 
the same term to disguise the stark social polarisation during his reign.
65 This argument was often invoked by the official press, whose discourse had shifted significantly 
rightward after the appointment of the anti-leftist Abd al-Kadir Hatem as minister of information and the 
dismissal of many leftist editors after May 1971. Thus, Moussa Sabri dismissed students’ protest in 1972, 
in Al-Akhbar newspaper on the ground that it harmed the “national unity” and benefited the “enemies of the 
nation” (Shoukri 1987:127). Saleh Gawdat of Al Musawwar magazine used similar arguments to attack 
leftist writers, and members of Sabri’s faction (Baha’ al-Din 1987:22-23).
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bourgeoisie who were happy to see any criticisms of the regime’s goodwill gestures 
towards them justified and any calls for populist measures dismissed as “class envy”.
Sadat also appealed to a certain version of Islam that represented a hybrid of 
traditionalism and modernity. He projected the image of the “believing president”, 
dubbed his regime “the state o f science andfaith” (Beattie 2000:102), and encouraged the 
rise of a new generation of conservative Islamic preachers who were critical of the 
“atheist left”, the most famous of whom was the legendary Sheikh Sha’rawy. This appeal 
to Islam served two purposes: a) consolidating the conservative alliance and appealing to 
a broad conservative constituency that included the conservative rural middle class, and 
members of the Muslim brotherhood; and b) as a very effective tool in Sadat’s political 
struggle with his leftist opposition. It was particularly emphasised in the new constitution 
that was issued after the May 1971 power struggle, in which article 2 changed the 
statement in 1958 constitution that “Islam is the state religion” to “ principles of Islamic 
Shari’a are a main source of legislation”. Article 11 qualified the commitment to gender 
equality with the statement “without prejudice to the regulations of the Islamic Shari’a” 
(Chalabi 2000:55). This proved instrumental not only to securing the support of the rural 
bourgeoisie and members of the Muslim brotherhood, but also to improving relations 
with conservative Arab regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, and confronting the leftist 
opposition.
Hence, Abd al-Halim Mahmoud, the Grand-Imam of Al-Azhar, signed a £E 40 million 
agreement with King Faisal to finance an anti-communist campaign (Mohamed
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2000:146). Social protest was invariably blamed on the “atheist left”, and the 
conservative preachers, the Muslim brothers, and Al-Azhar attacked the “atheists” who 
threaten the “national unity” and the “nation’s beliefs” (Ibid).
Changes in the ASU leadership after May 1971 added further impetus to the new 
discourse of organic corporatism. Two ex-members of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
responsible for indoctrination and youth organisation. This was quickly reflected in a 
significant change in ASU’s pamphlets, particularly the Guide for Political Action, which 
was circulated amongst ASU members in 1972, and was the most accurate indication of 
the regime’s new inclinations. First, it emphasised the role of Islam as the guide to the 
“intellectual and political line” of ASU (Shoukri 1987:90). Secondly, it deliberately 
dropped references to social classes and spoke only of “social levels” and “social forces”, 
thereby ignoring, as Shoukri (Ibid: 91) argued, the very existence of classes, let alone 
class contradictions. The document went on to speak about the “ non-exploitative private 
ownership, which is permitted as long as it is consistent with the community’s 
consciousness” in lieu of the Charter’s emphasis on the “public control o f the means o f 
production” (Ibid). Thus, private ownership was not anymore regulated by a clear 
political and legal commitment to the public control of the means of production, but by 
an appeal to the metaphysical notion of the “community’s consciousness”. Naturally, the 
latter position was more consistent with the interests of the rising conservative coalition.
The discourse of organic corporatism was equally instrumental to the transformation of 
the regime’s foreign policy. On one hand, after the dismissal of Soviet experts in July
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1972, conservative preachers spoke about the impossibility of liberation of Sinai using 
“atheistic weapons” (Hinnebusch 1985:52). On the other hand, the concept of Egypt’s 
“national role” was reformulated, for the first time since the 1950s, to include explicit 
references to Egypticity as a source of identity in the Egyptian familial/patriarchal 
society, distinct from, although compatible with, Arab nationalism. Hence, the country’s 
name was changed from the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt, and 
Sadat began to argue that Arab nationalism should not swallow “Egypt’s national 
specificity” (El-Kholi 1986:70).
Although Sadat was keen on emphasising the compatibility of these two sources of 
identity, proclaiming that “Egypticity and Arab Nationalism are our two weapons in the 
coming war” (Ibid); the very emphasis on an Egyptian specificity implied the existence, 
and indeed primacy, of Egypt’s state interests distinct from those of the other Arab 
countries. Such an assumption was used later on to justify the large-scale re-orientation of 
Egyptian foreign policy after 1973.
The new notions of organic corporatism were not, however, sufficient to make up for the 
regime’s failure to recapture Sinai, or compensate for the unpopular new economic 
measures. Only a major political achievement could secure the necessary legitimacy and 
support needed by the regime to sustain and develop its new economic and foreign policy 
plans. This was only attained after the October 1973 war.
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(1.4) Foreign Policy
As the transformation of populist etatisme progressed, the continued occupation of Sinai 
remained a time bomb that threatened to blow the whole regime up (Shukrallah 1989:66). 
First, debates over war preparations, and other foreign policy issues, became central to 
domestic political struggles, and reflective of the deep domestic divisions. Second, with 
the relinquishing of several populist measures, foreign policy pledges to recovering the 
occupied territories and furthering the cause of Arab unity became the only means of 
demonstrating continuities with Nasser’s reign and legitimising Sadat’s succession. 
Finally, the failure to recapture Sinai became a banner for social and political protest. A 
foreign policy breakthrough was, therefore, a necessary condition, not only to consolidate 
and deepen the economic shift rightward, but also to establish an independent source of 
legitimacy for Sadat’s regime. Hence, between 1970 and 1973, Egyptian foreign policy 
was recruited to the twin goals of: a) establishing the regime’s authority vis-a-vis Sabri’s 
faction; and b) resolving the fundamental contradiction between the increased 
dependency on the USSR after the “setback” on one hand, and the economic shift 
rightwards on the other.
The former goal was the main preoccupation of Sadat’s foreign policy activities during 
his first six months in office. To achieve it, Sadat’s strategy was threefold. First, a series 
of token gestures sought to highlight his commitment to Arab unity and cooperation with 
“progressive” Arab regimes. Hence, confederation blueprints were signed with Libya and 
Sudan in November 1970, then with Syria and Libya in April 1971 (Rubinstein 1972:10). 
Second, Sadat cautiously challenged Sabri’s faction by taking these decisions, as well as
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the decision to extend the cease-fire in March 1971, unilaterally. Third, Sadat managed to 
neutralise skilfully the Soviets during and after the May 1971 crisis by signing a 15-year 
treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR on 29/5/1971. This treaty was the 
first of its kind in the history of Arab-Soviet relations (El-Kholi 1986:55), and aimed at 
neutralising the USSR and ensuring the continuation of Soviet military assistance. As 
such, it did not result in any significant improvement in Egyptian-Soviet relations. If 
anything, these relations suffered soon thereafter as the Egyptian government’s anti­
communist activities intensified. In July 1971, Egyptian armed forces intervened to abort 
an attempted communist coup d ’etat in Sudan and restore the rule of Numeiri 
(Lenczowski 1973:14). In July 1972 Egyptian Soviet relations suffered a further blow 
with Sadat’s decision to dismiss the Soviet experts from Egypt (Ibid).
The key reason given by Sadat for this decision was his dissatisfaction with the types of 
weapons and the pace of arms’ deliveries. However, Heikal (1975:164) reported that 
Sadat remarked, a few months after this decision, in December 1972, that the Soviets 
were "dumping him with new weapons ”. Also, only a few months before the decision, 
Sadat (1971:17) publicly expressed his gratitude for the Soviet “support in rebuilding the 
armed forces...[without which] the enemy would have kept [its] superiority”. The 
decision was not, therefore, a mere “electric shock” to express his dissatisfaction with 
Soviet military assistance, as Sadat subsequently argued (El-Kholi 1986:57-59). Rather, it 
was indicative of a more profound change in the social disposition and preferences of the 
ruling elite.
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Expelling the soviets was a common demand of all members of Sadat’s conservative 
constituency. “New class” technocrats expressed anti-soviet sentiments and were in 
favour of a diplomatic solution in the region and rapprochement with the west 
(Hinnebusch 1985:47). Other members of the civilian elite were equally keen on an 
opening to the west. Heikal and Fawzi argued for a balanced approach between the 
superpowers, which de facto meant closer relations with the US (Ibid: 42). In a 
symposium organised by Al-Ahram on the implications of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 
Moscow, senior diplomat Ismail Fahmi advocated rapprochement with the US66. 
Conservative rural middle class members and members of the Muslim brotherhood 
detested the “atheist USSR”. Finally, the private bourgeoisie obviously welcomed the 
liberalisation overtones that the rupture in Egyptian-Soviet relations entailed.
Likewise, the conservative ruling elite welcomed the regime’s early overtures to the US, 
which started with Sadat’s letter to Nixon on 23/11/1970 expressing a desire for good 
relations with the US (Beattie 2000:53). Two channels were opened between Egypt and 
the US: a diplomatic channel with U.S. secretary of state William Rogers (Heikal 
1996b: 187); and a secret channel between Henry Kissinger and Sadat’s national security 
adviser, Hafez Ismail (Ismail 1987). A series of goodwill gestures confirmed Egyptian 
intentions towards the US, from the timing of Sabri’s dismissal, which coincided with 
Rogers’ visit to Cairo, to the dismissal of the Soviet experts in July 1972.
66 See: Hussein (1986:165-166). When pro-Soviet foreign minister Murad Ghaleb protested and asked 
Sadat to dismiss Fahmi, Sadat responded by promoting the latter to the position of special adviser to the 
president, and later on appointed him as foreign minister.
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Regional factors also contributed to the rapprochement with the US. On one hand, 
Egypt’s increased financial dependence on Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, gave 
growing weight to the Saudi view that advocated a break with the USSR and reliance on 
American mediation to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sadat’s activation of the 
“Islamic circle” of Egypt’s foreign policy, on the other hand, enhanced the same shift 
towards the west, with the emergence of a Tehran/Riyadh/Cairo axis and both capitals 
were advocating closer Egyptian-US relations (Heikal: 1978).
Rapprochement with the US sought to achieve two crucial goals for the Egyptian regime: 
to attract much-needed Western capital to further economic liberalisation, and to 
convince the US to exert enough pressure on Israel to withdraw from Sinai. The former 
goal was clearly pending the latter. Hence, after less than four months in office, Sadat 
presented his initiative for an interim agreement with Israel in February 1971, and agreed 
to extend the ceasefire with Israel to give the peace efforts a chance.
The initiative, which Sadat discussed with William Rogers in Cairo in May 1971, aimed 
at re-opening the Suez Canal for international navigation in return for Israel’s 
undertaking to implement “the first phase of a total withdrawal” (Sadat 1971:19). It 
included four key points: a) a first stage of withdrawal from parts of Sinai followed by 
the re-opening of Suez Canal; b) creation of a clear connection between the first phase 
and the comprehensive settlement provided for in the Security Council Resolution 242; c) 
the “total withdrawal” should cover all Arab territories occupied in 1967; and d) Egyptian 
forces must cross to the east bank of the Suez Canal. This initiative was, as Korany
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(1991: 200) argued, a clear message to the US and Israel that the war option was 
downgraded, in consistency with the regime’s need to end the political uncertainty that 
was rendering its efforts to transform populist etatisme futile.
However, this initiative and the subsequent contacts with the US bore no fruition. Given 
the relative regional stability under the “no war, no peace” state, Nixon’s administration 
paid little attention to the Middle East (Quandt 1993:146). The US-Soviet detente meant 
that both superpowers had an interest in maintaining the status quo in the region and in 
avoiding crises. The joint communique issued after the Moscow summit in May 1972 
pledged to maintain the state of “military relaxation” in the Middle East (Lipmann 
1989:25).
Frustrated by the failure of his diplomatic efforts to extract concessions from Israel, and 
fearing that the detente would render any further efforts futile, Sadat decided to launch 
war. What was needed was a limited war aiming only at moving the situation on the 
ground by establishing bridgeheads on the east bank of the Suez Canal and opening the 
way to political negotiations. Sadat even code-named the October 1973 war “the Spark” 
(Hussein 1986:210).
2- Restructuring during the infitah Years: 1974-1977
On October 6 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated military offensive on Smai 
and the Golan Heights. Egyptian forces successfully crossed the Suez Canal and
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a process that had started since the mid-1960s, but was curbed by a series of political and 
foreign policy crises. The October war, insofar as it established decisively the legitimacy 
of the conservative ruling elite in Egypt and reduced the Egyptian dependency on Soviet 
military support, removed the two obstacles that had hitherto hampered the progress of 
the restructuring process of populist etatisme.
After the war, Egypt witnessed three crucial and inter-related developments: a) the 
consolidation of the conservative ruling alliance; b) a series of economic liberalisation 
laws dismantling populist etatisme; c) a slow process of political liberalisation, and a 
series of political measures aiming to mobilise the broadest conservative coalition 
possible to face any opposition to the restructuring process.
The first challenge to infitah came from within the ranks of the ruling elite, and was 
focused on opposing its foreign policy dimensions. However, the legitimacy that Sadat 
gained after the war enabled him to depose the opposition easily. Thus, Sadat dismissed 
his chief of staff, Sa’d al-Shazli, who disagreed with Sadat’s management of the war. 
Heikal too was dismissed after he questioned the wisdom of relying exclusively on a US- 
brokered peaceful settlement. It was clear that the regime had defined its choices, and 
was not willing to rethink them (Hinnebusch 1985:60).
After politically cleansing the ruling elite, Sadat appointed a new cabinet led by Abd al- 
Aziz Hegazi. The government’s mission was to implement Sadat’s vision for infitah, as 
outlined in his October paper, which was circulated in April 1974 (Ibid: 61). Right wing
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journalists were appointed to the editorships of the key newspapers, thereby rendering the 
press unanimously in favour of the new policies (Aulas 1976:91)67.
The new government issued a series of economic liberalisation laws that effectively 
dismantled populist etatisme68 and helped consolidate the role of the bourgeoisie in the 
Egyptian political economy. These laws ended the state monopoly over foreign trade, 
foreign exchange markets, and commercial representation of international companies in 
Egypt, thereby opening new opportunities to all factions of the resurrected bourgeoisie. 
The state bourgeoisie was offered new opportunities in the newly established joint- 
ventures. Infitah laws deliberately exempted the directors of joint-ventures established 
under Laws 43 of 1974, and 32 of 1977 from the £E5000 ceiling on the salaries of public 
sectors directors, set forth by the “July 1961 socialist laws” (Ghoneim 1986:143). Thus, 
Law 43 created an incentive for public sector directors to enter into joint-ventures, 
thereby consolidating their alliance with local and foreign capital. This alliance was 
further reinforced as members of the state bourgeoisie were invited to join the boards-of- 
directors of infitah companies (Imam 1984).
The private bourgeoisie, on the other hand, was granted generous exemptions and 
benefits under infitah laws. They were able also to benefit substantially from the changes 
in the taxation system, which shifted much of the burdens from the high-income strata. 
Imam’s (1984) study of the companies registered between 1974 and 1982 revealed that
67 Ali Amin replaced Heikal as the editor of Al-Ahram. His twin brother Moustafa, imprisoned by Nasser’s 
regime for espionage, was released and returned to Al-Akhbar. Mousa Sabri edited Akhbar El-Yom, and 
Abdel Moneim El-Sawy edited Al-Jomhuriya.
68 These laws will be examined in the next sub-section.
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several of the pre-1952 large capitalist families returned to the Egyptian market, investing 
primarily in the trade and banking sectors, in addition to acting as commercial 
representatives of foreign companies, and importers of luxury consumer goods. The US 
economic aid, which was resumed to Egypt in 1975, furnished further opportunities for 
the private bourgeoisie. Up to 1979, its largest aid programme was the commodity import 
programme (CIP), which sought to finance commodity imports to Egypt from the US 
(Brown 1981:9). This program facilitated the establishment of strong links between 
private bourgeoisie and foreign capital, to which CIP acted as a strong incentive to export 
to Egypt and establish commercial and marketing representatives (Zaalouk 1989:80-81).
Last but not least, was the rise of a “parasitic faction” of the bourgeoisie, whose activities 
focused on rentier sectors, circulation processes, as well as several illegal transactions. 
Waterbury (1985:76) estimated the size of transactions in Egypt’s black economy in 1980 
at a staggering £E 2 billion. Investigations into a series of “economic scandals” in the 
1980s revealed how members of this faction were linked to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
through family links (e.g. Esmat El-Sadat), corruption (bribery, subcontracting...etc), and 
some of them even held parliamentary membership (e.g. Rashad Uthman)69.
A tangled web of relations amongst the three factions of the bourgeoisie, as well as 
amongst them, the state and foreign capital emerged during the infitah years, 
consolidating the rule of the conservative elite on one hand, and giving further impetus to 
the restructuring process on the other.
69 See: Imam (1984); Ayubi (1989a).
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Infitah laws were accompanied with cautious political measures steps, aiming at: a) 
encouraging local and foreign investors through limited political liberalisation gestures; 
b) granting the resurrected bourgeoisie a share in policy making; and c) consolidating a 
broad conservative coalition to defend the restructuring process of populist etatisme 
against the leftist protest. Thus, in August 1974, Sadat issued a paper on ASU 
restructuring, in which he called for “a formula to allow for interaction of different 
viewpoints” (Hillal-Dessouki 1997:197). The paper was debated in the ASU until, in 
March 1976, Sadat decided to create three “platforms” to express the views of the right 
(represented by the liberals), the left (represented by the national progressive unionist 
party NPUP) and the centre (represented by the Egypt Arab Socialist Party EASP). The 
three “platforms” competed in the parliamentary elections of 1976. EASP won 280 seats; 
the liberals 12 seats; the left 2; in addition to 48 independent candidates70. On his 
inaugural address to the parliament, Sadat decreed that the three “platforms” would 
become political parties (Marei 1978:41). Thus began the second multi-party experience 
in twentieth century Egypt.
Simultaneously, a series of political gestures sought to appease the conservative rural 
middle class and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, by allowing the latter to issue its 
magazine Al-Da ’wa, asking the parliament to review Egyptian laws to ensure they were 
compatible with Islamic Shari’a, as well as continuing to encourage the outspoken 
conservative preachers, most notably, Sheikh Sha’rawy (Chalabi 2000:67-71). This 
rapprochement with the religious right was intended primarily to help confront the rising 
opposition by the left to the economic liberalisation measures.
70 See: Korany (1998:49); Hillal-Dessouki (1997:210-211).
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The infitah’s economic measures began to generate social protest as early as 1975, i.e. 
one year after their inception. The protestors included small peasants who suffered from 
the increase in land rents, workers and mid-level state employees whose fixed salaries 
had not kept pace with the mounting inflation (Aulas 1998:157). In January 1975, food 
and wage riots erupted in Cairo (Rubinstein 1976:38). Two months later, textile workers 
in Mahala, Egypt’s largest industrial city, went on strike but were quickly repressed by 
the anti-riot police (Shoukri 1987:235). On May Day, the underground communist party, 
which had dissolved itself under Nasser, announced its re-formation, and resumed 
publishing its underground newspaper Al-Intisar (Aulas 1976:93). A broad coalition of 
Nasserists and communists was emerging under the slogan “defending the revolution ’s 
gains
Sadat responded by dismissing Hegazi, on the grounds that his cabinet did not proceed 
with economic liberalisation as quickly as expected (Hillal-Dessouki 1982b:75), and 
appointed Mamdouh Salem as his new premier. This decision indicated that the regime 
had no intentions of rethinking the new economic policies, and that it considered that all 
problems were due to the slow implementation of economic liberalisation. When Sadat 
launched infitah, he told his populace “four years from now [1974], I  foresee a durable 
and honourable peace in our region. And you will see prosperity that defies imagination” 
(Israeli 1981:55). To Sadat, the economic and political aspects of infitah were tightly 
linked. Politically, infitah entailed rapprochement with the US so as to permit a rapid 
resolution of the conflict with Israel, ridding Egypt from the burdens of war, and allowing 
her a share in the benefits of the oil revolution and massive flows of aid. To reap the
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peace dividends, and enjoy the “prosperity that defies imagination”, Egypt needed to 
abandon “socialism” and open up its economy so as to attract foreign capital and benefit 
from the oil surpluses. Hence, in the face of the protest, Sadat’s strategy was threefold: a) 
frequent cabinet reshuffles and blaming any problems on the slow pace of economic 
liberalisation71; b) encouraging the Islamist right to blame social protest on the “atheistic 
left”; and c) initiating a debate over Nasser’s legacy, which quickly developed into a 
strong attack on Nasser’s policies by the right, launching what came to be known as the 
de-Nasserisation process72.
Protest continued, however, and indeed reached an unprecedented peak in January 1977, 
with the famous bread riots, when the government decided, in response to IMF demands, 
to remove subsidies on basic consumer goods. The demonstrations started in Alexandria, 
but soon spread to every major Egyptian city. They represented an unprecedented 
challenge to the regime’s hegemony, and the army had to be called to the streets to 
contain the riots, for the first time since 1952. The regime’s post-1973 legitimacy was 
rapidly eroding, and a prolonged social and political crisis had started -  a crisis that 
culminated, less than four years later, in Sadat’s assassination in October 1981.
(2.2) Economic Structures and Policies
After the October war, there was little doubt that the Egyptian economy was facing a 
severe crisis. Sluggish growth rates in the early 1970s dropped even further, reaching an 
alarming 1% in 1974. Private consumption dropped in the same year by 7%, and the debt
71 Sadat’s years witnessed the highest degree of cabinet instability in Egypt’s twentieth century history. In 
10 years, Sadat appointed 16 cabinets, for an average of 7 months each (Hillal-Dessouki 1997: 212-213).
721 will return to this point in some detail in sub-section 2.3.
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service was absorbing 40% of the export earnings (Hinnebusch 1985:58). Leftist 
economists argued that with the legitimacy that Sadat gained in the 1973 war, he could 
afford to ask the populace for 3-5 years of belt-tightening, whilst the economy was 
rehabilitated, and the public sector restored after years of negligence due to limited 
investments. This suggestion was, however, quickly discarded. The social disposition of 
the ruling elite rendered any attempts to defer economic liberalisation, let alone restore 
populist etatisme, futile. Instead, the newly acquired legitimacy after the war was seen as 
an excellent opportunity to embark on the economic restructuring plans with as little 
resistance as possible.
The elite’s diagnosis of Egypt’s economic difficulties was straightforward. Due to the 
successive wars and the increase in military expenditure, the rate of growth fell after 
1965. The goal was, therefore, to restore pre-1965 growth rates, which could not be done 
by mobilising domestic resources, hence, the need for foreign capital. Infitah was the 
only way to attract foreign and Arab capital and resolve Egypt’s economic problems 
(Abdel Khlalek 1983:78). Economically, Infitah meant taking the necessary measures to 
open up the Egyptian economy for Arab and foreign private capital. The 1960s “socialist” 
policies, it was argued, could not be repeated, and economic liberalisation was the only 
viable option.
To this effect, 102 new economic laws and regulations were issued between 1974 and 
1977 to transform the economy, of which the most important were the following seven :
73 The following summary of the key infitah laws is based on: Abdel Khalek (1981; 1982a; 1983) and 
Zaalouk (1989).
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(i) Law 43 o f 1974, amended by Law 32 o f 1977: this was the centrepiece of 
infitah laws, aiming to encourage investment by Arab and foreign capital. It 
provided guarantees against all forms of non-commercial risks (including 
nationalisation), offered tax exemptions ranging between 5-15 years, as well 
as exemptions from several administrative regulations.
(ii) The new import-export Law o f 1975: this abolished the import regulations 
provided for in 1959 and 1963, thereby dismantling the state monopoly over 
foreign trade.
(iii) Foreign Exchange Law 97 o f 1976: this abolished the exchange control 
system that was de facto established in Egypt since 1939.
(iv) The Own-Import System: this allowed anyone who had foreign exchange 
resources to import directly without having to go through the banking system.
(v) Phasing out o f Bilateral Trade Agreements, which existed between Egypt and 
countries of the Eastern Bloc.
(vi) Law 111 o f 1975: this went a step beyond Law 64/1971, and abolished the 
“general organisations” altogether.
(vii) Law on foreign representation in 1974: this allowed Egyptian nationals to 
represent foreign firms.
Together, these laws amounted to a de facto dismantling of the populist statist apparatus, 
by abandoning state monopolies of foreign trade and exchange as well as key central 
planning tools (e.g. the “general organisations”). They were devised to attract private 
investment, which was to take over and lead economic growth. Foreign capital, was,
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nevertheless, slow to respond. Between 1974 and 1982, total investments committed 
under laws 43 of 1974 and 32 of 1977 did not exceed £E 5 billion, of which 61% was 
contributed by Egyptian public and private sectors (Farah 1994:150). The picture was a 
lot bleaker with regards to the activities of foreign banks in Egypt. In 1977, the Central 
Bank of Egypt released a report indicating that 20 foreign banks whose total capital did 
not exceed £E 26 million, transferred to their head offices abroad £E 160 million (Hillal- 
Dessouki 1982b:81). Thus, instead of bringing foreign capital to Egypt, foreign banks 
were exporting Egyptian savings for investment abroad.
On the other hand, the state paradoxically failed to encourage the local private sector to 
invest in manufacturing industries. In fact, Egyptian industrial capital was only granted 
the exemptions set forth in the infitah laws, if  it was in partnership with foreign capital. It 
seemed that the government at that time assumed that local capital was not able to invest 
in industry (Soliman 1999:14-15). Between the reluctance of foreign capital to invest in 
industries, and the relatively limited opportunities offered to Egyptian industrial capital, 
the second half of the seventies turned out to be a period of de-industrialisation, with the 
share of industry declining rapidly from 19.7% of GDP in 1973, to 14.9% in 1978 
(Hussein 1982:479).
Having failed to attract investment in “productive industrial projects, the government 
tried to furnish “economic dividends for victory” through what Aulas (1988:154) called 
“a rentier quest”. Hence, capital was sought wherever it existed, without any conditions 
regarding which sectors or projects to invest in. All that mattered was to inject as much
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capital as possible in the Egyptian economy to foster growth, and fend off the dangers of 
social and political protest against dismantling populist etatisme.
Although the period between 1975 and 1985 was a period of relatively high growth, 
averaging 8% per annum (Westley 1999:18), growth was driven not by internal growth 
but by the rise of external rent earnings (Soliman 1999:12). The Egyptian economy was 
driven towards the status of a quasi-rentier state, increasingly dependent on oil exports, 
emigrant worker remittances, and the revenues of Suez Canal’s and tourism. 
Furthermore, growth was accompanied by high inflation, averaging an annual 25-30%, a 
massive budget deficit, which doubled between 1973 and 1976, and a staggering rise in 
external debt, which increased six-fold during the 1970s (Amin 1994a: 125; Abdel Khalek 
1982b).
Alongside the economic liberalisation laws, infitah laws entailed a virtual relinquishing 
of the remaining populist policies. In the countryside, the conservative rural bourgeoisie 
managed to force amendments to the agrarian reform laws, whereby land rent increased 
by 20-25% (Aulas 1976:89-90). In urban areas, high rates of inflation worked as an 
income re-distributing mechanism against all salaried strata. Foreign aid had little 
mitigating effects, since it: a) financed projects that benefited high-income groups 
primarily (CIP was financing mainly the import of luxury goods), and b) showed clear 
urban bias (in the case of infrastructure projects, which were confined to cities)74. As a 
result, the infitah years witnessed a serious distributional crisis that threatened to erode all
74 Abdel Khalek (1982a) presents an excellent analysis of the impact of foreign aid on income distribution.
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populist gains of Nasser’s years. Thus, between 1965 and 1976, the share of the poorest 
60% in the national income fell from 28.8% to 19.93%, the share of the middle 30% fell 
from 40.2% to 21.52%. By contrast, the share of the richest 10% rose from 31.1% to 
58.5% (Chalabi 2000:65-66). The shares of wages in national income fell from 50% in 
1970 to 30% in 1979 (Soliman 1999:56), whereas the share of property earnings 
increased by 40% during the same period. These changes in the distribution of income, 
led to a steep rise in conspicuous consumption and an increase in imports, which, coupled 
with the stagnation of exports due to de-industrialisation, not only added to the balance- 
of-payment deficit, but also had serious political consequences, due to the provocative 
consumerist practices of the high income groups (Hillal-Dessouki 1982:81).
As a result, a broad coalition comprising workers, peasants and the impoverished middle 
class began to emerge from around 1975, with the aim of defending the “gains o f the 
revolution ” (Waterbury 1985:79). Social protest rose steadily, reaching an unprecedented 
level in the food riots of January 1977. The riots were triggered by IMF-induced cuts in 
govemment-subsidies of several basic goods. They demonstrated that the distributional 
crisis had reached an unbearable level that was threatening the very stability and survival 
of the regime.
(2.3) Ideology
Sadat emerged from the October war as “the hero of the crossing”, establishing, for the 
first time since he assumed presidency, an independent source of legitimacy. “The 
crossing” became the regime’s buzzword. Economic plans were called “economic
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970_________Yasser M. Elwv • 181
crossing plan”, and the war was seen as a signpost of a new era. In April 1974, Sadat’s 
regime issued its third, and most comprehensive, ideological pamphlet -  the October 
paper.
The October paper, however, did not explicitly break with Nasser’s policy. Indeed, it 
sought to emphasise continuity as much as change, arguing that the new policies 
represent a mere adaptation of the July Revolution’s principles to a different 
environment. In a speech on 18/3/1974, Sadat argued that, “I f  Nasser had lived to this day 
he would be doing what I  am doing” (Israeli 1981:77). Throughout the first year of 
infitah, the regime maintained this justification of the new policies. Thus, Sadat 
continued to talk of Egypt as revolutionary, even as the bourgeoisie was consolidating its 
position at the heart of the elite, and as a socialist economy even as infitah laws were 
issued to the detriment of any remains of populist etatisme.
However, the profoundness of the transformations, and the rise of an ideologically self- 
conscious opposition, whose discourse revolved around “defending the gains o f the 
revolution” against infitah, and, after the second Sinai agreement in 1975, against the 
regime’s “appeasing foreign policy ”, rendered any claims to continuities with populist 
etatisme incredible. The government devised a new, four-pillared rationale for its 
policies, comprising: a) arguing that peace was the only road to prosperity; b) criticising 
the Arabs for their lack of financial support for Egypt’s, and implicitly questioning Arab 
nationalism; c) launching a de-Nasserisation campaign, aiming at discrediting populist
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etatisme; and d) emphasising Sadat’s organic corporatist formula to silence the leftist 
opposition.
Thus, the October paper blamed the war for Egypt’s economic problems. By contrast, 
peace was presented as the key to prosperity. Disengagement agreements with Israel were 
marketed domestically on the grounds that they were necessary steps to bring in the 
“economic dividends of victory”. More importantly, the October paper argued that Egypt 
entered her successive wars primarily “for the Arabs” (Mohamed 1990:173). This 
argument had two key consequences: a) that the war with Israel, and anti-imperialism at 
large, were not due to strategic necessities or immediate Egyptian security concerns, 
rather, they were costly manifestations of solidarity with Egypt’s Arab brethren; and b) 
that the Arabs countries should compensate Egypt for her massive sacrifices. In a speech 
on 24/8/1974, Sadat complained, “We fought and lost thousands o f lives, and by so doing 
made it possible for [the Arabs] to become fantastically rich overnight without lifting a 
finger. But our Arab brethren are tight-fisted when it comes to sharing their unearned 
wealth with us” (Rubinstein 1976:17). This criticism developed a few years later into a 
full questioning of the viability of Arab Nationalism altogether.
The post-war years also witnessed a major shift in Sadat’s public discourse on Nasser. 
Sadat stopped depicting Nasser as “the leader”, rather, as a former leader whose 
performance was open to controversy and debate (Israeli 1981:78). Sadat occasionally 
went as far as to claim that he was the founder of the free officers75. This gave the green
75 Sadat first made this claim in a speech on 27/3/1976 (cf.: Israeli 1981:81). It was later repeated in his 
“official” ghost written autobiography (Sadat 1982).
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light to a ferocious de-Nasserisation campaign (Hinnebusch 1985:61-62). The right wing 
press began to attack Nasser. The renowned playwright Tawfiq Al-Hakim issued a 
booklet entitled “The Return of Consciousness”, which included a bitter attack on 
Nasser’s regime. Naguib Mahfouz, Egypt’s most celebrated novelist, published a novella 
entitled Al-Kamak, depicting the practices and violations of human rights by Nasser’s 
secret police. Mahfouz’s novella was soon made into a movie, and had indeed set a trend 
for several movies along the same themes76. Al-Akhbar, and Akhbar Al-Yom led the anti- 
Nasser campaign, and the “setback” was for the first time referred to as Nasser’s defeat, 
and contrasted with Sadat’s victory. Representatives of the different factions of the 
bourgeoisie and members of the Muslim brotherhood joined the campaign, accusing 
Nasser of replacing the British occupation with an Israeli one, of dictatorship, and of 
mining the economy with “socialist” policies. The campaign was quite successful, and 
certainly managed to put the political left on the defensive77.
Alongside the de-Nasserisation campaign Sadat emphasised his notions of organic 
corporatism in the face of the leftist critics, denouncing all their arguments about class 
polarisation in Egypt as indicative of a “class envy” that has no place in the “love 
society”78. Meanwhile, the regime’s post-war discourse carried increasing religious 
overtones. The official media began to argue that the “defeat” in 1967 was due to lack of
76 These included Mamdouh Shoukry’s Za’er Al-Fajr (Visitor of the Dawn); Hussein KamaTs Ehna Betu’ 
El-Autobis (We’re the ones that were on the bus), and many others. The government also ordered the 
release of Youssef Chahine’s Al-Osfour (the Sparrow), a movie that depicts corruption of state officials 
under Nasser, and ironically, one which Sadat’s regime refused to show when it was first produced in 1972.
77 Hence, Heikal (1979) had to write a book devoted to refuting the arguments of the anti-Nasserists. Rose 
al-Youssef magazine, a state-owned platform of a very moderate left, was completely exhausted in a battle 
with the rightwing press over the de-Nasserisation discourse.
78 Cf.: Hillal-Dessouki (1982b: 76). Sadat argued in his speech on the 24th anniversary of the July 
revolution in 1976 that "Progress can never take place in an envious society " (Mohamed 1990:221).
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religious commitment, and that the religious war cry “Allah Akbar” in 1973 was the key 
to victory (Mohamed 1990:186). The Muslim brotherhood was granted permission to 
issue its magazine Al-Da’wa (Chalabi 2000:67), and outspoken religious preachers, 
especially Sheikh Sha’rawy became television superstars. The new Islamist right 
dismissed Nasser’s experience, and any calls for “socialism” as atheistic, and was 
instrumental to supporting Sadat’s decision to abrogate the friendship treaty with the 
USSR on 15/3/1976 (Rubinstein 1977:19), as well as his rapprochement with the US and 
the West.
However, these justifications were not enough to keep in check the rising social and 
political protest. The 1977 bread riots indicated the scope the regime’s emerging 
hegemonic crisis. Henceforth, the regime’s legitimacy was sharply questioned, and a 
counter-hegemonic bloc was forming under the slogan of “defending the gains o f the 
revolution ”, thereby launching the regime’s prolonged and final legitimacy crisis.
(2.4) Foreign Policy
From its very first days, the economic and foreign policy aspects of infitah were 
inseparable. First, since war was considered the root-cause of Egypt’s economic ills, it 
was assumed that economic recovery was contingent on the peaceful settlement of the 
conflict with Israel. Second, the October war was seen to have furnished a unique 
opportunity to remove the central obstacle that faced the economic transformation of 
populist etatisme -  the forced dependency on the USSR. Finally, rapprochement with the 
US was considered central to the influx of foreign capital into the Egyptian economy.
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This was why foreign policy restructuring progressed in tandem with economic 
liberalisation.
Indeed, only ten days after the outbreak of the war, Sadat was keen on outlining his 
vision for peace. In his speech on 16/3/1973, Sadat demanded a full Israeli withdrawal 
from all occupied Arab territories, and a UN-sponsored international peace conference in 
which all concerned Arab countries (including Palestinian representatives) would 
participate, and in return he offered opening the Suez Canal for international navigation 
as soon as the guns fall silent (Shoukri 1987:486-487). On 22/10/1973, Sadat sent a cable 
to the Syrian president informing him that he had accepted a ceasefire, explaining that, “I 
am willing to fight Israel, but not the US79” (Hussein 1986:203). Soon afterwards, Sadat 
quickly pursued a US-brokered peace. The settlement process was divided into two 
phases, the first (1974-1976) focused on disengagement and confidence building 
measures, whereas the second (1977-1979) was devoted to negotiating a permanent peace 
agreement.
Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy culminated in two disengagement agreements in 
1974 (Sinai I), and 1975 (Sinai II). Sinai I paved the way for re-opening the Suez Canal, 
which entailed a de facto downgrading of the war option. Sinai II represented a quantum 
leap further, and was indeed the most significant milestone heretofore towards the 
restructuring of Egyptian foreign policy. On the one hand, it was concluded without 
linking it to a similar agreement on the Syrian front (as was the case in Sinai I
79 A few years later, the claim that Egypt was facing the US in the war became the official rationale for 
Sadat’s acceptance of a ceasefire and a US-sponsored settlement.
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agreement), or even consulting with Syria, thereby hinting for the first time at the 
possibility of pursuing an individual peace. Secondly, it included a provision that there 
would be no recourse to force to resolve differences with Israel, and postulations to set 
US-monitored early warning mechanisms, thereby, dropping the war option altogether 
(Baker 1978:138). As such, the agreement brought forth a storm of protest from the 
“revolutionary” regimes in Syria, Iraq, Algeria, as well as the PLO (Beattie 2000:174), 
and instigated a new contentious phase in the Egyptian-Arab relations.
The progress of the disengagement agreements was closely linked to the progress of the 
infitah and economic liberalisation on the one hand, and the realignment of Egyptian 
foreign policy towards the United States on the other. Not only were the disengagement 
agreements intended to pave the way for a peaceful solution in the region, which was 
seen as a pre-requisite to the influx of foreign capital and economic recovery, they were 
also aimed at securing hard currency revenues. Thus, the Sinai I agreement in 1974 made 
it possible to re-open the Suez Canal in June 1975, and the Sinai II agreement in 
September 1975 led to the return of the important Abou Redeis oil fields (Cantori 
1980:38). As the Egyptian economy moved towards a quasi-rentier status during the 
infitah years, foreign policy, and in particular Egypt’s attitude towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict emerged as an essential source of rent. This was reflected not only in the return 
of tourism, Suez Canal, and petroleum revenues, but also in the resumption of US 
economic assistance in the aftermath of the Sinai II agreement, which was in effect a 
direct “foreign policy rent”80.
80 W.H. Blumenthal, the US treasury secretary explained that the US aid to Egypt is an “investment in 
foreign policy” and that “we feel that we are getting our money’s worth” (cited in: Baker 1978:141).
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On the other hand, underlying Egypt’s quest for a US-sponsored peace were three key 
assumptions: a) that only the US could exert enough pressure on Israel to return the 
occupied territories; b) that rapprochement with the US would facilitate the long awaited 
influx of foreign aid and investments; and c) that the kind of American commitment 
needed to recover Sinai is contingent on opening the economy, creating new 
opportunities for American investors, and demonstrating to the US that it had dependable 
allies in the region, other than Israel. Thus, Sadat was keen on giving any concessions 
needed to facilitate Kissinger’s efforts to mediate the disengagement agreements81, 
arguing, in the face of any opposition to the content or implications of these agreements, 
that he was in fact “disengaging with America, not with Israel”, i.e. that his strategic goal 
was to restore good relations with the US, so as to ensure that she would exert the 
necessary pressures on Israel to withdraw from Sinai (El-Kholi 1986:48-49). In the same 
spirit, Egypt and the US restored full diplomatic relations in March 1974, and the 
Watergate-beleaguered Nixon was given a warm popular welcome in the streets of Cairo 
in June 1974. During the visit, a joint statement was issued on 14/6/1974, entitled 
“Principles of Relations and Cooperation between Egypt and the United States”, which 
caused increasing tensions in Egyptian-Soviet relations (Shoukri 1987:176-177).
It was against this background of re-alignment of Egyptian foreign policy that the Soviet 
leadership began to show signs of frustration with the new Egyptian policies. Thus the 
Kremlin postponed the Egyptian foreign minister’s scheduled visit to Moscow on July 
1974, as well as Brezhnev’s visit to Egypt, scheduled in January 1975. Sadat responded 
by criticising the USSR in public, accusing it of: a) remaining hostile to any military
81 For a critical account of these concessions, see: Heikal (1996b); Shoukri (1987).
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action before October 1973; b) refusing to compensate Egypt for the weapons it lost 
during the war like it did with Syria; and c) refusing to reschedule Egyptian debts ($9 
billion) (El-Kholi 1986:63-64). As infitah and foreign policy re-alignment progressed, 
Egyptian-Soviet tensions increased, culminating in Sadat’s official abrogation of the 
friendship treaty in March 1976 (Rubenstein 1977:19).
Meanwhile, Egypt’s regional policies witnessed an equally profound restructuring. On 
one hand, the post-1973 oil boom stimulated a growing perception that Egypt might be 
able to benefit from this sudden wealth, pending some foreign policy and economic 
adjustments, to solve its economic problems. Infitah was in part viewed as a mechanism 
of enhancing Egypt’s chances of benefiting from the “oil panacea” (Ayubi 1982b:350). 
Likewise, the Cairo-Riyadh axis was reinforced, as Egypt became increasingly dependent 
on Saudi financial assistance, and King Faisal needed Sadat to maintain stability in the 
Levant, and to continue the de-radicalisation of Egypt (Hillal-Dessouki 1982c:335). Sadat 
spoke openly of an “Arab Marshall project”. However, although substantial sums were 
obtained from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States82, they were hardly enough to meet the 
government-induced expectations of post-war prosperity. Facing the unfulfilled 
expectations of his populace, Sadat blamed these countries. It was becoming increasingly 
clear that the “oil panacea” that would transform the Egyptian economy was a delusion.
On the other hand, tension with the “progressive” Arab regimes increased after the Sinai 
II agreement. With Egypt effectively abandoning the war option and showing readiness
82 The nominal value of the allocated sums was $7.9 billion, of which $6.7 billion were actually used. See: 
Hussein (1982b:209).
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to reach an individual solution, she was also forfeiting much of her claim to leading the 
Arab struggle of liberation. As a result, the second half of the 1970s witnessed a gradual 
waning of Egyptian influence in the region. When the Lebanese civil war broke out, 
Egypt’s lack of influence became abundantly clear, as Egypt, in sharp contrast to her 
central role in Arab politics over the previous two decade, had to leave it to Syria to 
contain the Lebanese crisis (Aulas 1976:84).
Western economic assistance and investments were Sadat’s remaining hope, but were 
however, dependent on a peaceful settlement with Israel. As Beattie (2000:220) argued, 
Sadat’s predicament became one of “no peace, no FDI, and no successful infitah”, since 
for most foreign investors, the political situation remained risky. Such was the situation 
when the bread riots broke out in January 1977. They indicated that the post-war, 
opposition-free years were over, and that a radical solution is needed, if the regime’s 
legitimacy and stability were to be sustained. The social disposition of the elite rendered 
either radicalisation or a reversal of the infitah policies impossible. With no domestic 
solution in hand, the government resorted anew to the foreign policy arena, in an attempt 
to pull off an international miracle that would release enough “foreign policy rent” to 
resolve the domestic problems and maintain the regime’s hegemony (Cooper 1982:251). 
Thus came Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the peace initiative that launched the second 
phase of the settlement with Israel, and, simultaneously, the prolonged domestic crisis of 
the regime, which lasted until Sadat’s assassination in October 1981.
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3- The Four Years’ Hegemonic Crisis: 1977-1981
The January 1977 bread riots came twenty-five years, almost to the day, after the events 
of “Black Saturday”, which signalled the “beginning-of-the-end” of the pre-1952 regime. 
However, given that infitah reflected, above all, a deep transformation in the social 
disposition of the Egyptian elite, reversing the government’s new policies in the 
aftermath of the riots was no option. Instead, in the face of the “hegemonic crisis” that the 
riots revealed, the government responded by retracting the short-lived “controlled 
political liberalisation” measures that had started after the war.
Alongside this de-liberalisation, the government resorted its classic strategy, namely, 
using diplomatic acumen to generate the much-needed resources to resolve, or at least 
muffle, the domestic contradictions. Thus came Sadat’s famous trip to Jerusalem and the 
ensuing peace negotiations with Israel. This section will examine the government’s bid to 
resolve the domestic crisis with a combination of coercion and diplomatic acumen, and 
the consequences thereof.
(3.1) The State
Although the regime was in no serious danger of falling during the January 1977 riots83, 
the riots dealt a serious blow to the regime’s legitimacy, and indicated at a serious 
hegemonic crisis. From that moment onward, the regime’s decisions and policies were 
subject to close scrutiny and criticism from an increasingly ferocious opposition.
83 Contrary to many exaggerated accounts of the riots, primarily by the Egyptian left, any close examination 
of the scope and duration of the riots reveals that the rioters lacked the strength and the leadership to 
overthrow the regime. Thus, the security forces were able to re-establish their control within 48 hours.
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The government’s response was fourfold, involving: a) a tactical retreat from the 
decisions that triggered the riots, whilst maintaining the general policy line; b) blaming 
the left for the riots and initiating a series of coercive measures against representatives of 
the political left; c) repeating its earlier promises that prosperity would come with peace; 
and d) seeking to accelerate peace negotiations with Israel.
On 19/1/1977, Sadat ordered back the subsidies that were cut on the previous day. This 
was only a tactical move aiming at containing the crisis. The social disposition and 
preferences of the elite meant that rethinking the restructuring process of populist 
etatisme was out of question. Indeed, a close examination of the government reshuffle 
that took place in February 1977, demonstrates that the government stood by its 
economic choices. Whereas the deputy minister of interior lost his job in the aftermath of 
the riots, indicating the government’s diagnosis of the crisis as a security lapse, all key 
members of the cabinet, including ministers with economic portfolios, maintained their 
posts. It was clear that the riots did not weaken the government’s commitment to 
dismantling populist etatisme. If anything, the government saw to it that its coercive 
capacities increased to cope with any future protest. Thus, a qualitative and quantitative 
strengthening of the ministry of interior took place after the riots, under the leadership of 
al-Nabawi Ismail, who was promoted to deputy minister of interior in February 1977, and 
then to minister of interior in the following October. Under his guidance, the police 
forces were greatly modernised, so as to be equipped to “deal with all situations”. The 
paramilitary “central security forces”84 expanded substantially in size and were as well
84 The paramilitary “central security forces” are led by police officers, but their rank and file are recruited 
from the rural, and often illiterate, conscripts performing their obligatory military services. The importance
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equipped as the army (Beattie 2000:222-223). This served the twin purposes of: a) 
enabling the police forces to prevent and handle any future riots without having to call 
the army to the streets; and b) counterbalancing the army, thereby limiting the possibility 
of a military coup.
On the other hand, Sadat blamed the riots on the left and the mobs of thugs. He even 
designated them “the thugs’ uprising”. The riots were followed by massive arrests. 1500 
activists from the left, which Sadat chose to blame, were arrested (Ibid:71). Meanwhile, 
Sadat repeated his claims that prosperity would come in a few years, as soon as complete 
liberalisation and peace were achieved. He repeatedly pledged in his speeches “1980 
would be the year o f prosperity” (Mohamed 1990:243).
The most important action Sadat took, however, was his decision to embark on direct, 
bilateral negotiations with Israel. The domestic crisis meant that resources had to be 
generated to maintain social stability and enable the transformation process of populist 
etatisme to bear its fruits. With the government’s reluctance to squeeze economic surplus 
from the bourgeoisie, using diplomatic acumen to extract resources from abroad was a 
classical strategy that had been used on several occasions by Sadat and his predecessor, 
and was all the more urgent now, given the intensity of the social crisis.
The Geneva conference formula was practically dead. Hence, Sadat decided to act 
individually, and made his famous trip to Jerusalem. Peace talks followed, reaching two 
framework agreements in Camp David in 1978 and a bilateral peace agreement with
of the socio-economic background of these conscripts would prove critical to understanding their 1986 
riots, discussed in the next chapter.
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970_________ Yasser M. Elwv 193
Q C
Israel in 1979 . Thus, according to the regime’s prevailing conception of infitah, the 
conditions were set for reaping the economic gains of peace, and prosperity was expected 
to follow.
Although the trip and the following accords received the blessings of the key members of 
the conservative ruling elite , they did not contribute significantly to containing the 
rising social protest in Egypt. If anything, the protesters now added to their social agenda, 
accusations against the regime of “selling out the Palestinian cause”, thereby appealing to 
a broader audience than the immediate beneficiaries of populist etatisme, and eventually 
breaking the consensus amongst the right over Egypt’s policies. The Muslim 
brotherhood, for instance, whilst firmly backing Sadat’s economic policies, opposed 
fiercely the accords with Israel. So did the rightwing, newly formed, New Wafd Party. 
Sadat’s conservative alliance began to erode, and a counter-hegemonic consensus was 
emerging across the political spectrum (Baker 1981:378-379). Social protest against the 
infitah’s social consequences, became intertwined with the political protest against 
Sadat’s new policies towards Israel and against the resulting isolation of Egypt in the 
Arab world, thereby creating mounting pressures on the regime and beginning what 
turned out to be the regime’s most critical, and indeed fatal, crisis.
With this hegemonic crisis, and the resulting erosion of its alliance base, the regime 
resorted to a two-pillared crisis-management strategy. First, a de-liberalisation process 
started in 1978, reversing the short-lived controlled liberalisation measures. Second, after
85 This will be discussed in sub-section 3.4 below.
86 See: Hinnebusch (1985:72-73)
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its clampdown on its opposition from the right and left, the regime sought to fill in the 
political vacuum by trying to create a new ruling party and “tamed” opposition.
In 1978, after signing Camp David accords, Sadat launched a massive offensive against 
the opposition. The parliament, with its small but agitating opposition against his foreign 
and economic policies was dissolved, giving the regime the chance to arrange, via 
electoral engineering, the elimination of the 17 members who opposed the accords 
(Beattie 2000:241; Hinnebusch 1985:75). Sadat attacked those engaging in “irresponsible 
criticism” of his policies, proposing the notorious “Shame Laws”, to ensure that criticism 
remained “responsible”, and to outlaw the attacks against “traditional family values”, on 
top of which, was disrespect for the “head of the family”87. In a series of referenda, the 
Egyptians allegedly supported the peace accords, and the clampdown on opposition via 
banning “atheists and pre-1952 corrupt politicians” (i.e. left wing and New Wafd) from 
politics, by majorities always within the range of 98- 99%. Anticipating a government’s 
decision to outlaw it, New Wafd disbanded itself on 2/6/1978. NPUP followed suit three 
days later.
The government sought to fill in the ensuing political vacuum via creating a new 
“majority party”, and “tamed opposition”. Hence, Sadat announced on 9/7/1978 that he 
would be forming a new party based on the principles of the “revolutions” of July 1952 
and “May 1971”. His original plan was to transform EASP, which was associated in 
people’s minds with the 1977 riots, to a tamed opposition party. However, EASP’s 
members were quick to join the new National Democratic Party (NDP), in one of the
87 See: Cantori (1980); Shoukri (1987).
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most farcical scenes in Egyptian political life, and EASP was transformed overnight from
OO
a majority party to a no-member party .
Sadat claimed that he had to interfere in party life as a result of Mamdouh Salem’s failure 
to build EASP from below, thereby implying that this would be the key difference 
between NDP and EASP (Beattie 2000:237). Far from being a popular party built from 
the village level upwards, however, NDP was the bourgeoisie party par excellence. Party 
elites were recruited from the three factions of the bourgeoisie alongside, traditional rural 
elites and landowners. It was of very little help in filling the political vacuum and 
mobilising support for the regime’s economic and foreign policies. On the other hand, 
even after the farcical fall of EASP, Sadat had not given up the idea of a “responsible” 
opposition party. Thus, Sadat supported the creation of the Socialist Labour party (SLP), 
and even had a few NDP members of parliament join it. What was intended as a tamed 
opposition party, however, soon turned into a real opposition party, that began to oppose 
Camp David accords, and its newspaper Al-Sha ’b was opened to Sadat’s opponents from 
different convictions. The attempt to build a tamed opposition was a failure (Hillal- 
Dessouki 1997:215-216).
With the clampdown on the opposition, and the failure to fill the political vacuum via a 
new ruling party and tamed opposition, the regime entered a vicious circle of coercion 
and violent opposition. The regime escalated its repressive measures, whilst the 
opposition turned to underground activities (Cooper 1982:250). Repression and 
opposition fed one another. Alongside the leftist opposition, violent fundamentalist
88 See: Hillal-Dessouki (1997); Beattie (2000).
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opposition surged. Sectarian violence rose, alongside social protest and opposition to 
Sadat’s foreign policy, creating mounting pressures on the regime. Such was the picture 
in 1980, supposedly the “year of prosperity”, and ironically, the year that witnessed an 
unprecedented escalation in sectarian violence and opposition to Sadat’s policies. In the 
face of the mounting crisis, Sadat dismissed his government, and assumed himself the 
post of prime minister. His government sought to give a rosy picture of the economy, and 
presented a package of expansionary economic policies, in an attempt to ease up the 
political tension with some economic “belt loosening”. Simultaneously, the government 
sought to intensify its pursuit of Islamic legitimacy, in an attempt to counterbalance the 
growing influence of the radical Islamist groups. Sadat announced steps towards 
codifying Islamic Shari’a, and suggested, in May 1980, a constitutional amendment to 
make Shari’a “the main source of legislation”. The government also introduced the 
notorious “Shame laws”, penalising any abrogation of “society’s basic values”.
Protest, however, intensified as the economic crisis continued, and the inadequacies of 
the regime’s new foreign policy were revealed when it had to stay silent in the face of 
Israel’s military strikes in Iraq and Lebanon. The regime’s hegemony was completely 
undermined, and a counter-consensus was forming across the political spectrum against 
its policies. Failing to contain the mounting pressures, the regime struck the opposition at 
an unprecedented scale. On September 5th, 1981 Sadat ordered massive arrests of 
politicians of all convictions, fundamentalists, and journalists, and deposed the Pope of 
the Coptic Church. This signalled, as Ajami (1995:74) argued, the breaking of the moral
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and social contract between Sadat and his country. It was a desperate throw of the dice by 
Sadat and it backfired. Sadat was assassinated in October 6th, exactly one month later.
(3.2) Economic Structures and Policies
The resource crisis of the infitah political economy came, paradoxically, at a period of 
high growth of the economy, during which Egypt seemed awash in money. The economy 
was growing at an annual rate of 8%. Sinai I, and Sinai II agreements entailed the release 
of key economic resources, namely, Suez Canal and oil revenues, the combined value of 
which increased from $641 million to $6,784 billion between 1974 and 1981 (Owen and 
Pamuk 1990:135). Remittances of migrant workers in oil-rich Gulf States skyrocketed, 
and economic assistance from Gulf States, the US (from 1975) and other Western 
economies arrived in unprecedented sums.
Egypt was indeed awash in money, albeit very unevenly distributed. The crisis of the 
infitah economy was primarily, but not exclusively, a distributional crisis. It had three 
key components: a) an uneven distribution of wealth; b) a structural weakness of the 
productive sectors of the economy; and c) the failure of private capital to make up for the 
decline in public investments.
Growth during the infitah years was associated with a very uneven pattern of income 
distribution. The familial nature of many infitah projects led to a pattern of income 
distribution in Egypt characterised by the emergence of “fat cat” importers and 
government subcontractors with large fortunes and conspicuous patterns of
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consumptions, amid deprived masses (Abdel Khalek 1982b:277). The high rates of 
inflation acted as an income re-distribution mechanism, further impoverishing salaried 
classes, especially that the prices of basic goods rose a lot faster than the general price 
index, itself rising by a staggering 25-30% per annum (Ibid). This meant that the poorest 
strata were the hardest hit.
The government’s fiscal policies exacerbated the resource crisis. Public expenditure, 
particularly to finance the massive expansion of the state security apparatus, as well as 
the conspicuous consumption of the state bourgeoisie, rose steadily89. On the other hand, 
tax revenues lagged, thanks to the massive tax exemption packages under infitah laws. 
Finally, since most infitah projects required massive infrastructural investments, these 
investments had to be financed from the public purse. As a result, budget deficit doubled 
between 1976 and 1979. Meanwhile, exports stagnated, as a result of the de­
industrialisation of the Egyptian economy, whilst the cost of imports increased more than 
tenfold from $427 million in 1973 to $4.4 in 1981 (Weinbaum 1986:119). As a result, the 
chronic balance-of-payments deficit rose steadily during the seventies(Owen 1983:13). 
The massive resources that flowed to Egypt after 1973 were mal-distributed and/or 
squandered.
The infitah years also witnessed a steady decline in the share of the productive sectors in 
the economy. In the countryside, whereas some middle-sized landowners growing fruits 
and vegetables improved their lot during the infitah years, governmental regulatory and 
tax policies acted as a net tax on agriculture (Beattie 2000:218). Industrial capital was
89 For more details on the rise of public expenditure under infitah, see: Ghoneim (1986).
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreien Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970 Yasser M. Elwv 199
relatively marginalized in the ruling alliance of the bourgeoisie. It suffered from imports 
of cheap textiles from China and South Korea throughout the infitah years but the 
government failed to respond to the demands for protection until 1979 (Wahba 
1994:186). Egyptian industrial capitalists could only benefit from infitah laws if they 
were working in joint-ventures with foreign capital or using foreign currency in their 
investments. Industrial capitalists who used local currency had to wait until 1981 to be 
placed on the same playing field with foreign capital (Ibid: 188). As a result, the infitah 
years witnessed several industrial capitalists shifting to the more profitable commercial 
activities (Shoukri 1987:424). Consequently, there was a steady decline in the share of 
productive sectors in the Egyptian economy, which was gradually moving to a quasi­
rentier status. Indeed, Egypt was experiencing its own version of the so-called “Dutch 
Disease”, in which large capital inflows, high inflation, negative interest rates, and an 
over-valued currency encouraged a misallocation of resources, creating a bias in favour 
of non-tradable goods. As a result, investments were directed mainly to infrastructural 
sectors and housing, rather than the productive sectors (Owen and Pamuk 1990:136).
The initial promise of infitah, that FDI and private investments would lead the economy 
and allow Egypt to benefit from the “oil revolution”, was never fulfilled. FDI by Law 43 
companies represented just 2.6% of fixed gross investment in 1977 (Beattie 2000:216), 
and foreign capital was reluctant to invest in the productive sectors, concentrating instead 
in the banking, tourism and other service activities. Infitah projects were mostly capital 
intensive90, as such, their contribution to job creation was limited.
90 The amount of fixed capital per job opportunity was £E 1500, compared to less than half that level in the 
rest of the economy (Abdel Khalek 1982b:277).
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When the bread riots broke out in 1977, the government responded with a tactical retreat, 
withdrawing the planned subsidy cuts, but no attempt was made to redress the structural 
imbalances of the economy. Any form of statist intervention in the economy was out of 
the question, given the structure and preferences of die elite. Hence, the government 
sought to ease the crisis without exerting pressure on the members of the ruling alliance. 
The way to do so was via increasing its sources of external rent.
The experience of the infitah years clearly demonstrated that the main asset and source of 
rent for Egypt was its foreign policy. First, the rise in all sources of foreign currency in 
the aftermath of the October war was directly related to the government’s foreign policy 
stances. Sinai I agreement made the re-opening of the Suez Canal possible, Sinai II 
resulted in the return of Abou Rdeis oil fields, and economic assistance from the Gulf 
States, and more importantly, from the US was politically driven. Second, the rise of 
international oil prices was a direct outcome of the October War. Finally, the October 
paper blamed war for Egypt’s economic problems and equated peace with prosperity.
The government, therefore, calculated that the best way to resolve the economic crisis, 
and fend off the dangers of future riots was to proceed with the political settlement with 
Israel, and rapprochement with the US. Not only would this increase directly Egypt’s 
rentier resources91, but it would also enhance private capital flows, thereby realising the 
original promises of infitah. Hence, Sadat made his trip to Jerusalem a few months after 
January riots, and embarked on peace negotiations. To all social and political protestors,
91 Sadat knew that regaining the rest of Sinai meant, besides the obvious political gains, increased oil and 
tourism revenues, and assumed that peace with Israel would result in massive US aid. He even spoke 
publicly of a “Carter Project” a la Marshal Project. See: Hussein (1982b:386).
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he could now repeat his promise that prosperity would come with peace -  no later than in
1980.
The “peace dividends”, however, fell too short of Sadat’s earlier expectations. Structural 
imbalances, which were not redressed in the hope of solving the economic crisis 
externally, remained intact, and indeed intensified. As a result, the promised “year of 
prosperity” -  1980 -  turned out to be a year of intensified social crisis. Sadat dismissed 
his government, and assumed premiership to “lead the battle of reconstruction” (Baker 
1981:379). His newly appointed economic czar Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Magid, was 
instructed to keep the economy rosy. And indeed, there was a window of opportunity to 
redress the economic imbalances using the upsurge in the country’s resources that year, 
due to the unexpected rise in oil revenues in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution. 
However, like the “window of opportunity” that was available after the October war, this 
one too was missed. The political crisis and mounting protest against Sadat’s economic 
and foreign policies, made it imperative for him to “loosen the belt”, in an attempt to ease 
up the political pressures on the regime. Thus, minimum wages were increased by 25%, 
import duties were reduced on a wide range of commodities, including consumer 
durables, and some tax exemptions were offered to public sector employees (Beattie 
2000:261).
Such measures were hardly enough to contain the crisis. High rates of inflation (25-30%) 
eroded any potential gains from the wage increases. Lowering import duties, given the 
mal-distribution of income and the rise of the “fat cats”, meant, on one hand, a further 
increase in the balance-of-payments deficit, and a further crisis for industrial capitalists
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(due to the sharp rise of imported manufactured goods) on the other. The structural 
imbalances of the economy worsened, and the protest continued well into 1981. With no 
economic means at hand to redress the crisis, the government resorted to increased 
coercion. A vicious cycle of coercion, and violent opposition ensued, culminating 
dramatically with the assassination of Sadat on October 6th, 1981.
(3.3) Ideology
1977 witnessed a turning point in the regime’s ideological discourse, when all the subtle 
references to de-Nasserisation and Egypticity were suddenly emphasised in a most 
explicit manner by Sadat himself. Three key developments triggered this ideological 
shift: a) the food riots of 1977; b) the mini-war between Egypt and Libya in summer 
1977; and, most importantly, c) the peace negotiations with Israel and the following Arab 
protest.
The January 1977 riots dealt a lethal blow to the regime’s legitimacy. They revealed that 
the ruled were no longer accepting the social and economic outlook of the ruling elite, 
thereby initiating a serious hegemonic crisis that lasted until Sadat’s assassination in
1981. In his first speech after the riots, on 5/2/1977, Sadat’s position was twofold: a) 
denying that the riots constituted genuine protest against infitah, and blaming the left and 
“mobs of thugs” for the agitation; and b) reiterating his promise of “prosperity that defies 
imagination”, pledging that “prosperity will come by 1980” (Mohamed 1990: 239-243).
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Sadat not only blamed the “left” for the riots, but also began, for the first time since he 
came in office to criticise Nasser directly. After the riots, Sadat criticised “those who are 
trying to bring back detention camps and a 'socialism o f poverty’ fo r everyone” 
(Hinnebusch 1985:72). The media attacks on Nasser intensified alongside their praise for 
Sadat, who was portrayed as the “hero of the crossing” and the “real founder of the 1952 
revolution”. The May 1971 power struggle was glorified, not as a “rectification 
movement”, as it was hitherto called, but as a full-fledged “rectification revolution” (El- 
Kholi 1986:93).
On the other hand, the mini-war between Egypt and Libya in July 1977, and the rift 
between Egypt and the Arab world in the aftermath of Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, made 
Sadat more explicit, sometimes even overtly abusive, in criticising the Arab states and 
emphasising Egypticity. From that moment on, Egyptians grew used to certain code 
words of Sadat’s increasingly strident attacks on Arab countries, including “dwarfs”, 
“dwarf Qaddafi”, “Alawite B a’th”92, “Takriti B a’th”93 and so forth (Cantori 1980:26- 
29). An intense debate was opened amongst Egyptian intellectuals in 1978 over the “Arab 
role of Egypt”. Some called for Egyptian neutrality between Israel and the Arabs 
(Hopwood 1985:120), arguing that Egypt is essentially a Mediterranean, not an Arab 
country. Others emphasised ancient Egyptian history, suggesting that it conferred on 
Egypt a unique identity, distinct from other Arab states, and occasionally going as far as 
to talk about Egypt and Israel as islands of civilisation in a sea of Barbarism (Hinnebusch
92 Implying the religious minority status of the Syrian President.
93 Mocking the town in which Saddam Hussein was bom.
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1985:117). To these intellectuals, the Arabs became the scapegoat for Egypt’s ills: she 
had spent her blood and ruined her economy fighting for them, but they never showed 
gratitude94. The majority, however, defended the Arabism of Egypt, and demanded a 
continued Egyptian leading role in the Arab world95.
This heated debate was not an abstract intellectual exercise. It was deeply entrenched in 
the political conflict over the new course of Egyptian foreign policy and the infitah 
political economy by large. Social protest was intertwined with the accusation of “selling 
out the Arabs”, and the post-war hegemony was gradually eroding, as a new “counter­
consensus” was beginning to crystallise against Sadat’s infitah and foreign policy96.
In response, the regime’s ideological justification of its policies was twofold: a) 
emphasising organic corporatism; and b) seeking to reconcile the new foreign policy 
orientation with the popular consensus on the need for a leading Arab role for Egypt.
After the events of 1977, the emphasis on “organic corporatism” reached unprecedented 
levels. Praise for Sadat was developed into a “personality cult”, emphasising the unique
94 Sadat was the first to use this line of arguing. In a speech on 26/11/1977, Sadat wondered, “what should I 
tell to my people who have suffered for the Arabs, only to be met with such ingratitude” (Mohamed 
1990:256).
95 For a comprehensive anthology of the key writings of the 1970s debate, see: Ibrahim (1978).
96 This counter-consensus culminated in 1980, when a “Statement by the Egyptians”, including the harshest 
and most articulate criticism of Sadat’s policies, and signed by intellectuals and politicians from across the 
political spectrum, was distributed on 12/5/1980. See: Baker (1981:383).
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideology and Modernisation since 1970____________ Yasser M. Elwv 205
qualities of the “head of the Egyptian family”. Sadat himself often identified the state 
with his personality, not only by speaking of “my army, my people, my relations with 
Britain... etc ”(Sadat 1985:121-129), but also by personalising his foreign policy, and 
basing decisions on his “friendship with Henry [Kissinger]” whom he “trusts 
completely” (Hinnebusch 1985:80-82), and even going as far as to offer Sudan “a gift o f 
Egyptian land on the Mediterranean coast to act as a Sudanese port” (Sadat 1985:113). 
Sadat’s critics were accused of, and called for investigation before the semi-judicial 
“socialist prosecutor” for, “attacking Egypt”91. Domestically, Sadat’s discourse on 
“village ethics” became increasingly nostalgic, going as far to express, on a television 
interview on 25/12/1979, his desire to see Egypt as a “one big happy MeitAboul Kom ”98 
-  a village based on “love”, and respectful of the “head of the family”. This “village 
nostalgia” was even operationalised in the notorious “Shame laws”, which criminalized 
the abrogation of “society’s basic values”. Political opponents were now imprisoned on 
such metaphysical accusations as “harming social peace”, or “abrogating society’s basic 
values”, and so forth.
On the other hand, since 1952, Egyptians have defined their national consciousness in a 
way that revolved around Egypt’s leading role in the Arab World (Cooper 1982:251). As 
argued in Chapter I, national roles, once established by the elites and accepted popularly, 
become major components of the prevailing political culture, and a source of 
distinguishing what is legitimate or illegitimate in the eyes of society. This was why the 
regime’s shift to Egypticity and attack on the Arabs, rather than resolving the regime’s
97 See: Hinnebusch (1985:119). Mohamed Heikal’s (1982) record of the minutes of his investigation is 
exemplar of this “ political inquisitions”.
98 In reference to his birthplace. See: Imam (1986:6).
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hegemonic crisis, intensified it. Hence, in 1980, with the rising consensus against the new 
foreign policy, and the demands for restoring Egypt’s Arab role, the regime resorted to an 
eclectic approach, seeking to reconcile its new policies with the prevailing Arabist 
sentiments. A “White Paper” was issued in 1980, arguing that Egypt’s central role in the 
Arab world was never undermined. Egypticity was no substitute for Arabism. In spite of 
the Arabs’ ingratitude, Egypt remained the heart of the Arab world. And her treaty with 
Israel was not an individual peace treaty, but a first step towards a comprehensive peace 
(Hinnebusch 1985:117). In so arguing, however, the regime’s vulnerability towards its 
critics increased. By accepting the opposition’s terms of reference -  the primacy of 
Arabism, the need for an active Arab role, and the undesirability of an individual peace 
treaty -  it was de facto discrediting much of its post-1973 foreign policies. Opposition 
attacks grew fiercer, and the hegemonic crisis intensified, forcing the regime to resort to 
outright oppression. The September 1981 arrests signalled the culmination of the 
hegemonic crisis, and the break of the social and moral contract between Sadat and his 
populace. One month later, Sadat was assassinated whilst celebrating the eighth 
anniversary of the October war -  his glorious moment that established his regime’s 
hegemony. But the hegemony was over, and so was Sadat’s rule.
3.4 Foreign Policy
With no recourse to the interior to resolve the domestic crisis in the aftermath of the riots 
of 1977, there was only the exterior. Sadat resorted again to foreign policy, in an attempt 
to pull off one more “international miracle” that would materialise the initial promise of 
infitah -  the “prosperity that defies imagination”.
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Sadat’s first attempt to solve his domestic crisis externally was a major miscalculation. In 
19/7/1977, Sadat launched a mini-war against Libya". Sadat’s Libyan adventure had two 
goals: a) occupying the oil-rich, eastern parts of Libya, thereby realising, albeit in a 
perverted way, the dreams of the “oil panacea”; and b) to demonstrate Egypt’s 
importance as a Cold War ally of the US, thereby making up, in terms of a Cold-War- 
related role, for what he lost in terms of Egypt’s Arab regional influence and role100. 
Thus, his onslaught started with the announcement of the signing of a $4 billion arms 
deal between the USSR and Libya, and claiming that Soviet soldiers will be deployed on 
the Libyan-Egyptian borders, thereby, seeking to bestow upon his regional adventure a 
Cold-War-related purpose. On 19/7/1977, Egyptian radio claimed that Libyan forces have 
attacked Salloum101, and the Egyptian operations began. Sadat was, however, 
immediately under domestic, Arab, and most importantly, American pressure to 
terminate his onslaught. He had to order his troops back a few days later. The failure of 
this Libyan adventure had a key corollary -  that an “oil panacea”, through Egyptian 
direct control of the Libyan oil resources, was not possible.
The other option was not only more realistic, but also more consistent with the infitah’s 
foreign policy premises. Initially, the October paper had argued that war was the root- 
cause of Egypt’s economic ills and equated peace with prosperity. After the January 1977 
riots, such arguments gained further impetus. On 21/1/1977, two days after the riots, the 
editorial of the Egyptian Gazette argued that Egypt’s “most economically viable option
99 For a more detailed description of Sadat’s Libyan adventure, see: Heikal (1996b:328-333).
100 Notwithstanding the Libyan imbroglio, the same ambition seemed to have continued in Sadat’s later, 
equally ill-fated and ineffectual, attempts to act as a regional, anti-Soviet policeman in Africa, hence his 
attempts to play a role in the crisis of Angola, against Mangistu’s Ethiopia, in Somalia, and so forth.
101 A small Mediterranean town near the Egyptian-Libyan border.
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was to opt out of the war with Israel altogether” (Beattie 2000:220). Thus came Sadat’s 
visit to Jerusalem and the peace initiative that moved beyond the “disengagement phase” 
and launched the second phase of the settlement with Israel.
Sadat’s initial position, set forth in his speech on 16/10/1973, was that any such 
settlement should be negotiated in a UN-sponsored peace conference in Geneva, attended 
by all concerned parties, including Palestinian representatives. After one preliminary 
meeting in December 1973, however, the Geneva conference was adjourned sine die, its 
problem being the Palestinian representation, since Israel and the US vetoed the PLO 
representation, which the Arab Summit in 1974 recognised as the “sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people”.
Soon afterwards, particularly in the aftermath of Sinai II, Sadat was indicating that he 
would negotiate alone. Sadat was increasingly convinced that there was little, if any, 
benefit in allowing other Arab governments to participate in negotiating the fate of 
Egyptian interests, and was reluctant to accept the Syrian demand of having a joint Arab 
delegation to the Geneva conference (Doran 2001:116). In an interview with the NDP’s 
newspaper Mayo, Sadat argued that, “knowing the political manoeuvres to which the 
Syrians were addicted, I  rejected the proposals that Arabs should go to Geneva as one 
delegation, [telling] Carter that one delegation will achieve nothing. It will be an auction 
for never-ending slogans ” (Sadat 1985:100).
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Nevertheless, Sadat sought to recast his individual peace initiative in a broader set of 
demands, insisting, in his speech before the Knesset, that he was not seeking an 
individual solution, and that the Palestinian question was indeed the crux of the conflict. 
His need for quick results, however, undermined his ability to realise his initial demands 
(Cooper 1982:255). His initiative was a major political risk, and he could not afford to 
negotiate for years. Indeed, as the symbolic benefits of his visits began to erode, and the 
Arab criticisms and accusations of “betraying the Arab cause” began to mount, especially
• 1 (Y)m the aftermath of the Ismailia conference in Egypt in January 1980 , in which Israeli
Premier Begin appeared uncompromising, the regime became particularly vulnerable to 
its critics, and its need for rapid progress increased. It had to give away some of its 
demands to ensure a quick agreement.
Thus, the Camp David talks (5-17/9/1978), resulted in two protocols. The first was 
entitled “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East”. Intended to constitute a basis for 
peace between Israel and its neighbours, it laid down a basis for discussing the future of 
the West Bank and Gaza, through a five-year autonomous self-government, during which 
final status negotiations would be launched between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
“representatives of the inhabitants”, based on Security Council resolution 242. The 
second was a more rigorous document entitled “A Framework for the Conclusion of a 
Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel”, providing for the conclusion of a separate peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel within three months, and a time framework for the Israeli 
withdrawal from Sinai (Sawant 1979:37).
102 For a detailed description of the Ismailia conference, and Begin’s stances, see the memoirs of Egyptian 
former foreign ministers Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel (1987:40-50) and Ismat Abdel Meguid (1998:161-165).
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The Camp David talks represented a major watershed in the region. First, they 
established, decisively and irreversibly, the separation between an Egyptian-Israeli 
settlement and the final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, the first protocol 
ignored the role of the PLO, which the Arab Summit in Rabat in 1974 recognised as “the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians”. Finally, it did not make any reference 
to Israel’s intention to withdraw from all the Arab territories that were occupied in 1967.
As a result, they unleashed a large wave of criticism against Sadat regionally and 
domestically. After an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in March 1979, a so- 
called “Steadfastness Front” was created amongst “progressive” Arab countries, and was 
later on able to mobilise Arab support for collective diplomatic and economic sanctions 
that isolated Egypt in the Arab world for the first time in modem history. More 
importantly, these efforts led to a massive wave of domestic criticism to Sadat, and 
accusations from across the political spectrum of “selling out the Arabs”. In the summer 
of 1981, the Israeli air force conducted two consecutive raids, the first in June 1981 on an 
Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction, and the second in July on Beirut, killing 
hundreds of civilians. Both attacks came within days of face-to-face meetings between 
Sadat and Begin, thereby giving further grounds to the accusation of “selling out the 
Arabs” for an “individual peace”, and making Sadat appear as complicit in the bombing, 
or as an impotent politician whom nobody took into account.
Thus, instead of resolving the crisis of legitimacy of 1977, Sadat’s bid for peace with 
Israel intensified it. Socio-economic criticisms were intertwined with foreign policy
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criticisms, creating the hegemonic crisis that lasted until Sadat’s assassination in October 
1981.
4- Conclusion: The Patterns of Interplay of Egyptian Political Economy 
and Foreign Policy
Notwithstanding the extensive restructuring of the Egyptian political economy and 
foreign policy during Sadat’s years, foreign policy maintained two key functions from 
Nasser’s era:
i) As a means o f resolving the inherent contradictions o f the political economy: 
The rise of Sadat corresponded to the ascent of social forces that had 
supported the restructuring of populist etatisme from 1965. The key obstacle 
facing the regime remained, however, the contradiction between the regime’s 
foreign and economic policies. At first, the regime sought to resolve this 
contradiction externally via the February 1971 peace initiative. When this 
failed, another foreign policy alternative, the October war, managed to resolve 
the fundamental contradiction, and gave the much-needed impetus to the 
restructuring process. Three years later, when the inherent contradictions of 
the infitah surfaced during the January 1977 riots, the regime sought to 
resolve them also via foreign policy acts, hence the Libyan adventure, then the 
Jerusalem visit and the following peace process with Israel.
ii) As a source o f legitimacy and regime hegemony: Foreign policy moves, 
particularly the blueprints for unity with Syria, Libya and Sudan, were
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instrumental in Sadat’s “war-of-position” against Sabri’s faction during his 
first months in office, and eroding the latter’s claims to Nasserism. The 
October war, however, was the turning point insofar as establishing Sadat’s 
regime’s hegemony is concerned. After the war, the regime gained an 
independent source of legitimacy and was, therefore, able to embark on the 
far-reaching transformation during the “hegemonic instance” that followed the 
war and lasted until the January 1977 bread riots.
However, the interplay of Egyptian political economy and foreign policy during Sadat’s 
reign showed a key difference from his predecessor’s era. During the rise of populist 
etatisme, the abovementioned functions of Egyptian foreign policy were complementary. 
Egyptian foreign policy could serve, simultaneously, the dual functions of generating 
external surplus to muffle the domestic contradictions and facilitate the populist and 
developmental policies on one hand, and to maintain the regime’s hegemony on the 
other. The severe resource gap that forced the restructuring of populist etatisme after 
1965 had a key consequence: it demonstrated potential contradictions between these two 
functions. The restructuring process entailed giving away some of the regime’s populist 
and developmental policies, which were essential sources of the populist-statist regime’s 
legitimacy. As a result, Nasser became much more vulnerable to any further challenges to 
his charismatic leadership in the foreign policy front. This vulnerability was, as I argued 
in the previous chapter, a key source of the 1967 crisis and the humiliating military defeat 
the followed.
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During the 1970s, the extensive restructuring of populist etatisme further intensified the 
contradictions between these two functions. Restructuring Egyptian foreign policy 
(realignment with the US, and reconciliation with Israel) was necessary to secure the 
transformation of populist etatisme and realise the promises of the infitah. However, the 
very same measures created a hegemonic crisis for the regime on one hand, and eroded 
its conservative alliance base on the other. From that moment onward, the overarching 
concern of Egyptian foreign policy revolved around striking a balance between its rentier 
and hegemonic functions.
Between dismantling etatisme and relinquishing populism on the one hand, and the 
regime’s failure to realise the infitah promise, “the prosperity that defies imagination ”, 
on the other, foreign policy became the remaining source of legitimacy. As a result, when 
the regime found it imperative to break away from the foreign policy consensus and 
restructure its external alliances to correspond to the needs of the economy, a fatal 
hegemonic crisis ensued, culminating dramatically in the assassination of Sadat.
Political assassination, notwithstanding its roots in the popular disapproval of the 
regime’s new economic and foreign policy, remains essentially a random act, in that it 
does not alter the social disposition or the preferences of the elite. What Sadat’s 
assassination did, however, was to highlight the intensity of the domestic crisis of the 
infitah political economy, and the hegemonic crisis of the regime. Thus, the main task of 
Mubarak’s regime, at least during its first years, became to contain this crisis, and strike 
the balance between, on one hand, maintaining, and furthering the dismantling of populist
A Political Economy o f  Eevptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideology and Modernisation since 1970____________ Yasser M. Elwv 214
etatisme, and, on the other hand, seeking to restore the regime’s hegemony and break the 
counter-consensus, which emerged against the regime’s new economic and foreign 
policies, and was threatening its stability and survival. To fulfil the latter task, the only 
means available at the regime’s disposal, given the erosion of the state’s populist and 
developmental functions, was foreign policy acumen. The key dilemma of the new 
regime was, therefore, the contradiction between its desire to maintain infitah's economic 
policies, whilst reviewing some of its foreign policies to reproduce its hegemony. Such 
was the tightrope act that Mubarak’s regime had to perform to secure the regime’s 
survival during the “hesitant decade” of the 1980s.
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Chapter IV 
The "Hesitant Decade"
1 9 8 1 -1 9 9 0
Estragon: “Ican*tgo on like this** 
Vladimir: uThat*s what you think** 
Samuel Becket (Waiting for Godot)
This Chapter seeks to explore the interplay of Egyptian political economy and foreign 
policy as Mubarak’s administration sought to diffuse the socio-political crisis that Sadat’s 
assassination highlighted, whilst maintaining its commitment to dismantling populist 
etatisme. Although Sadat’s assassination, as I argued in the previous chapter, left the 
social disposition of the ruling elite unchanged, it was indicative of the magnitude of the 
regime’s hegemonic crisis. Political stability and crisis resolution became, therefore, an 
overarching concern of Sadat’s successor.
This was why Mubarak’s regime, throughout the 1980s but particularly during its first 
five years (1981-1986), seemed to be giving conflicting signals, and flirting 
simultaneously with aspects of “Nasserism” and “Sadatism”, in a way that led many 
analysts to argue that Mubarak is seeking to strike a balance between the policies of his 
predecessors103, or to accuse him of being hesitant, averse to risk, and indecisive104.
103 This assumption underlies much of the research on Mubarak’s policies, especially during the 1980’s. 
Springborg (1989:19) argued that Mubarak is “by nature a balancer”, and spent much effort to classify his 
different policy choices as “Nasserite” or “Sadatist” or “balancing”. See also: Kramer (1987); Ibrahim 
(1982).
104 See: Merriam (1982); Bianchi (1986); Ansari (1985) Hopwood (1993:184).
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This Chapter seeks to challenge both lines of analysis, arguing instead that, far from a 
“personal balancing inclination” or “indecisiveness”, the policies of the Egyptian 
government during the “hesitant decade” -  the 1980s- reflected the regime’s response to 
conflicting, and in many instances, contradicting, needs -  to maintain and advance the 
process of dismantling populist etatisme on the one hand, and to diffuse the political and 
socio-economic crises caused by that very same process on the other.
The key argument in this chapter is that, in the aftermath of the crisis that culminated in 
Sadat’s assassination, the priority of Mubarak’s regime was to establish a “societal truce” 
by seeking national reconciliation, restoring the regime’s hegemony, and dispersing the 
counter-consensus that had emerged from across the political spectrum against infitah’s 
political economy and foreign policy. As such, this “societal truce” did not entail any 
abandonment of the infitah’s premises -  only a deferment of any further large-scale 
liberalisation, whilst the regime re-establishes its legitimacy. All the minor flirtations 
with aspects of “Nasserism”, it is argued, should be understood against this backdrop. 
The regime’s utmost priority was to diffuse the societal crisis -  any other goals simply 
had to wait. For most of the 1980s, the central dilemma of the government was to resolve 
the crisis without prejudice to the foundations of the infitah political economy, or the 
interests of the beneficiaries thereof.
To do so, the regime’s strategy was twofold. Domestically, it embarked on a "public 
relations exercise", during which the regime’s discourse renewed the emphasis on 
distributional justice. Meanwhile, quintennial plans were resumed, with the stated goal of
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rectifying the structural imbalances of the infitah’s political economy. Notwithstanding 
such well-publicised measures, it will be argued, Mubarak’s regime’s actual policies, 
differed only in style, not in substance, from its predecessor (Ayubi 1989b: 12), and 
dismantling populist etatisme continued, albeit at a cautious, slow pace.
Externally, Mubarak had to perform a tightrope act aiming at reviewing some of his 
predecessor’s foreign policies to reproduce the regime’s hegemony without changing 
significantly the basic thrust and orientation of Sadat's foreign policy. Hence, Egyptian 
foreign policy sought to reintegrate in the Arab world and restore diplomatic relations 
with the USSR, whilst maintaining close ties with the US and the west, and without 
jeopardising peace commitments with Israel.
In 1986, these fragile balances were severely strained. The regime faced an acute 
resource crisis due to the fall of international oil prices and the resulting sharp 
deterioration in Egypt’s rentier earnings. Under the crisis conditions, the difficult social 
choices and decisions that the regime sought to evade during the “societal truce” surfaced 
anew. The regime was forced back to negotiations with the IMF, and to a new period of 
attempted, and failed, economic retrenchment and restructuring.
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will examine the “societal 
truce” between 1981 and 1986, and the regime’s attempt to contain the domestic crisis 
and restore its hegemony, whereas the second will examine the resource crisis and the 
regime's management thereof between 1986 and 1990. Finally, the concluding section
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will seek to abstract the patterns of interplay of political economy and foreign policy 
during the “hesitant decade” of the 1980s.
1- The “Societal Truce”: 1981-1986
Sadat’s assassination revealed the dark side of the political flamboyance and economic 
bonanza that characterised his reign: the structural weakness of the quasi-rentier 
economy, a huge mountain of debt, domestic and regional isolation of the regime, and 
unprecedented levels of sectarian violence. Although Mubarak, who had been Sadat’s 
vice-president since February 1975, adopted his predecessor’s key policy principles: 
infitah, cooperation with the US and the west, and peace with Israel, he had to balance 
these commitments with the internal and regional protest against them (Kramer 
1987:378). As a result, during his first five years in office, Mubarak faced the formidable 
task of diffusing the domestic crisis, and overcoming the regional isolation without 
reversing the key policies of the infitah.
To do so, the regime adopted a new master policy under the conciliatory title 
“rationalising the infitah”. Its essence was a delicate, and indeed very fragile balance, 
comprising: a) domestic political reconciliation whilst maintaining the economic status 
quo; and b) overcoming the regime’s regional and international isolation whilst 
maintaining Egypt’s relations with the United States and Israel. In what follows, I will 
seek to examine the regime’s attempts to build a “societal truce”, and the problems 
thereof.
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(1.1) The State
Notwithstanding its severity, the political crisis that followed Sadat’s assassination left 
the ruling coalition, based on the alliance of state and private bourgeoisies that was 
reinforced during the infitah years, intact. It therefore came as no surprise that the 
transition of power was rapid and friction-free. Power was duly transferred without delay 
to the second-in-command, the vice president. Hosni Mubarak was nominated as Sadat’s 
successor on the very night of the assassination, and the parliament supported him the 
following day in an emergency session, setting the stage for a national referendum that 
approved his nomination, making him Egypt’s fourth president on 15/10/1981, less than 
10 days after the assassination (Merriam 1982:6; Hillal-Dessouki 1997:236).
The continuity of the ruling coalition also meant that the key components of the previous 
regime’s social and economic policies, which, naturally, reflected entrenched interests, 
remained unchanged. What the political crisis that the assassination revealed did alter 
profoundly was, however, the new regime’s political agenda. First, it created an urgent 
need for a “societal truce” to contain the mounting social and political pressures, and to 
bring to an end the regime’s domestic and regional isolation. Since Sadat’s visit to 
Jerusalem, the regime grew increasingly isolated from both the political right and left. 
The priority of Mubarak’s regime became, therefore, to restore the regime’s hegemony, 
and broaden its support base. Second, the crisis forced the regime to review its 
perceptions of its allies and enemies. Whereas Sadat insisted that the leftist opposition 
constituted the regime’s “enemy within”, the rise of sectarian violence in the late 1970s
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and, most importantly, the assassination of Sadat in 1981, made it all too clear that 
militant Islamism was the main source of threat to the regime’s stability.
As a result, soon after he assumed presidency, Mubarak held out an olive branch to the 
opposition with the exception of militant Islamists, whom he moved swiftly to isolate and 
crush in the Southern city Assyut shortly after Sadat’s assassination. In his first speech 
before the parliament, he defined his priorities as national unity and domestic stability 
(McDermott 1981a:4). This effectively meant that, with the exception of radical 
fundamentalists, the regime was open to reconciliation with the opposition, and the latter 
was free to express its legitimate interests and hold regular meetings. Thus, on 
25/11/1981, Mubarak ordered the release of 31 prominent, mostly left wing, opposition 
figures, including leaders of opposition parties, and the influential journalist Mohamed 
Heikal. In a symbolic gesture, the prisoners were taken straight from the prison to the 
presidential palace for a meeting with Mubarak (Lief 1981:6). A gradual release of the 
1500 political prisoners arrested in September 1981 followed.
In the same vein, the first years of Mubarak’s reign witnessed many similar gestures of 
goodwill towards the opposition. Hence, the Pope of the Coptic Church, who had lost 
Sadat’s favour, and was deposed in 1981 after refusing to lead a pilgrimage to Jerusalem 
(Merriam 1982:6) was reinstated in 1984. The control of political expression was relaxed, 
as the opposition newspapers, which were closed in Sadat’s final years in office 
(particularly the SLP’s Al-Sha’b and the NPUP’s Al-Ahali) reappeared, and New Wafd 
and the NPUP parties resumed their activities (Ibrahim 2000:275).
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These efforts helped achieve political relaxation and ease the mounting tensions and the 
regime-opposition polarisation, but they were not enough to re-establish the regime’s 
legitimacy. After all, the regime maintained most of its predecessor’s policies -  the very 
same policies that created the crisis conditions that culminated in Sadat’s assassination. 
The regime, therefore, needed more far-reaching measures to detach itself from its 
predecessor’s legacy, and break up the counter-consensus that had formed against its 
policies. The dilemma was to achieve these two goals whilst staying committed to the 
key infitah economic and foreign policy objectives, which were in the interest of the 
ruling social coalition that Mubarak’s regime inherited.
To do so, the regime embarked on an extensive “public relations exercise” aiming at 
breaking the regime’s domestic isolation without prejudice to the economic and social 
pillars of the infitah. First, Mubarak’s government announced that its main goal is to 
“reform and rationalise the infitah” (Ibid:227). In his first speech to the parliament, 
Mubarak pledged to fight the “fat cats” that had emerged during the infitah years 
(McDermott 1982b:4-5). Other measures sought to cultivate an image of Mubarak as a 
cool-headed reformer, seeking to draw together all shades of political opposition to 
reform the infitah and fight corruption. These included: a) calling a national debate over 
economic issues; b) distancing himself from the key politicians associated with his 
predecessor; c) initiating a new tradition in Egyptian party politics by meeting regularly 
with the leaders of the opposition to consult with them on key domestic and external 
decisions; and d) restoring some features of etatisme.
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Thus, a national conference was convened in February 1982 to discuss Egypt’s economic 
problems and to try to find a national consensus on a program of remedy. The key 
outcome of this conference, insofar as re-establishing the regime’s hegemony is 
concerned, was the emergence of a new consensus amongst Egyptian economists of 
different convictions on what might be called “the parasitic explanation o f Egypt’s 
economic predicament”. According to this explanation, the Egyptian economy during 
the infitah years was taken over by a group of “parasitic” opportunists, engaged in non­
productive and occasionally illegal activities. This conviction dominated the discourse of 
opposition parties from across the political spectrum (Soliman 1999:2-3). The 
government, on the other hand, often spoke in a strikingly similar tone, of the need to 
transform the infitah from a “consumerist” to a “productive” infitah (Ibrahim 2000:228; 
Springborg 1993:145) and pledged to eradicate the “fat cats” and curtail conspicuous 
consumption, whilst pursuing a better planned and more orderly liberalisation of the 
economy that would be compatible with greater liberalisation of the political system 
(Bianchi 1986:71).
Implicit in this “parasitic narrative” was a key assumption -  that the infitah policies are 
not inherently flawed. The only problem was the “parasites” that hijacked the infitah. Of 
the three factions of the bourgeoisie, therefore, only one bore the blame for Egypt’s 
economic ills. The organic alliance between the different factions of the bourgeoisie was 
overlooked, and the “parasitic” faction was portrayed as antagonistic to other 
“productive” factions. Hence, all that needed to be done was to get rid of the “parasitic” 
faction and allow the other, “productive” factions to flourish. A return to populist
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etatisme, or any form of state-led economy, was, therefore, not an option, not even for the 
opposition, as a new consensus on “rationalising the infitah” and fighting the “fat cats” 
that hijacked it, was beginning to emerge.
Hence, 1982 witnessed some high-profile trials of some of the infitah’s “fat cats” - most 
notably, Sadat’s own brother Esmat, and the infamous rags-to-riches figure, Rashad 
Uthman (Springborg 1989:73). Under the slogan of “purity” (al-Tahara), the regime also 
razed the luxurious rest houses that were illegally built on the historical Pyramids’ 
plateau -  another much-publicised case of fat cats’ corruption (Ansari 1985:23). The 
attack on members of this faction of the bourgeoisie, however, never went beyond these 
token gestures, which, symbolic as they had been though, were enough to disquiet them 
and instigate some $1 billion capital flight, in graphic display of their power and concern 
(Tucker and Stork 1982:5). When, amid a serious liquidity crisis in 1985, an actual 
attempt was made to curb the influence of the importers’ lobby and currency speculators, 
it was a big failure, demonstrating the strength of this faction of the bourgeoisie on the 
one hand, and the strong ties it had with the other factions, including the state bourgeoisie 
on the other105.
In the meantime, Mubarak’s “state personnel policy” was designed to escape Sadat’s 
legacy. Many high-ranking politicians, associated with Sadat’s rule, were replaced with 
those who were either junior to them in the NDP’s hierarchy, or with technocrats who 
were not previously involved in politics, and were neither distinguished nor notorious
105 I will return to this attempt in more detains in section 1.2 below.
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(Springborg 1989:39). More than any time since 1952, the technocratic nature of the 
Egyptian government was emphasised, with the university staff and state bureaucracy 
becoming the main sources of recruiting ministers, and the share of the military declining 
even further to 15% of all ministerial position during Mubarak’s reign, compared to 
24.7% during Sadat's era and 34% during Nasser's (Ibrahim 2000:231-232).
Mubarak also initiated a new tradition in Egyptian party politics by calling for regular 
meetings with the opposition leaders. In his first four years in office, between 1981 and 
1985, 18 such meetings were held (i.e. one meeting every three months on average), 
cultivating the image that the Mubarak is keen on consulting regularly with the 
opposition on all major economic and political issues. These meetings, however, had 
hardly any real impact on the decision-making processes. They were part of the general 
public relations exercise that the regime conducted during its first years to end its 
domestic isolation. Thence, it was no surprise that the number of these meetings and their 
frequency, dropped dramatically after Mubarak’s first term in office, when they had 
exhausted their “public relations purpose”. Consequently, between 1986 and 1993, for 
instance, notwithstanding the intensifying socio-economic crisis, Mubarak held seven 
meetings only with the opposition (Ibid: 275) -  a substantial, 75% drop from the first four 
years of his reign.
Finally, the early 1980s also witnessed some mild flirtations with aspects of etatisme. A 
new quintennial plan was adopted in 1982 with the aim of rectifying the structural 
imbalances of the Egyptian economy, and redressing the weaknesses of the productive
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sectors. Mubarak also confirmed his commitment to maintaining subsidies on basic 
consumer goods. These measures too were part of the regime’s public relations 
manoeuvre, and did not, as I will explain in the following subsection, result in any 
structural change in the Egyptian economy. If anything, the role of the state diminished 
even further, albeit very slowly. Thence, the political and economic foundations of the 
infitah, and the interests of the beneficiaries thereof, remained intact.
Indeed, apart from the token trials of some of the infitah's opportunists, the ruling 
alliance of the private and state bourgeoisies remained untouched, and was actually 
broadened and reinforced. Thus, the regime sought to incorporate the industrial 
bourgeoisie, which, as I argued in the previous chapter, was left in an unfavourable 
position vis-a-vis commercial and foreign bourgeoisies during the infitah years. In 
November 1981, one month after Sadat’s assassination, Law 159 was issued to place 
local industrial bourgeoisie on the same playing field with foreign investors, and local 
investors using foreign capital (Beattie 2000:219). This was followed by a series of 
policies aiming at encouraging industrial bourgeoisie106. Also, the ties between the state 
and businessmen were significantly reinforced during the 1980s. Alongside the old 
corporatist groups that existed in the pre-1952 era (federation of chambers of commerce, 
and federation of Egyptian industries) and were responsible for negotiating the business 
interests with the state, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of new businessmen 
associations, representing a segment of the haute bourgeoisie with particularly strong 
links with foreign capital, and close relations with the state. These included the various
1061 will return to these measures in the following subsection.
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Egyptian businessmen associations, and the American-Egyptian chamber of commerce 
(Bianchi 1985:151-154; Abdel Mo'ti 2002:116). The newly created mechanism of "joint 
committees" on various policy issues, which included government representatives and 
members of these businessmen associations, meant that the close cooperation and 
partnership between the state and private bourgeoisie was not only enforced but also 
institutionalised (Kandeel 1995:93). Furthermore, the transition of several members of 
the state apparatus to the business sector, especially to board memberships of many 
business associations, as well as the role of the private bourgeoisie in the NDP continued 
and was reinforced during the 1980s.
In 1984, the “feel good aura”, and the shaky balance that the regime’s public relations 
exercise sought to establish domestically started to show serious strains. The 
parliamentary elections, held in May 1984, witnessed the beginning of re-polarisation of 
Egyptian politics, by allowing the resurfacing of several tensions that had been kept 
submerged since Sadat’s assassination (Bianchi 1986:71). Mubarak, in spite of the 
opposition’s pleas, strengthened his identification with the NDP. The results of the 
elections revealed that only one opposition group (an unlikely alliance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood with the purportedly secular New Wafd) managed to surmount the 8% 
electoral hurdle (EIU 1990:4), obtaining 58 seats (8 of which for the Brotherhood 
members). The opposition accused the government of engineering the elections to ensure 
a sweeping victory for the NDP (Hendricks 1985). It was clear that the govemment- 
opposition honeymoon had come to an end. Meanwhile, the pledges of “rationalising the 
infitah” did not materialise, leading to increased frustration and a return of social protest,
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as it became clear that the structural imbalances of the infitah were not redressed 
seriously. The doubling of the bread prices in September 1984, for instance, 
demonstrated that the government was unable, or unwilling, to keep its promises not to 
rescind subsidies on basic consumer goods. Violent rioting followed, mainly in the 
industrial town of Kafr al-Dawwar, resulting in the arrest of eighty-nine workers, and a 
clampdown on the political left which was blamed for the riots (Ayubi 1988:56). Political 
violence, which had stopped during the “honeymoon” that lasted for Mubarak’s first two 
years in office, resumed again in 1984107. Mounting inflation and deteriorating real wages 
sparked a host of localised strikes in individual factories in 1984 and 1985. But it was in 
1986 that the political and social protest hit an unprecedented level, with the escalation of 
acts of violence of Islamist militant groups, including explosions, firebomb attacks on 
video-clubs, cinemas and liquor stores in Cairo and particularly in Upper Egyptian towns 
(EIU 1986c:5). In March 1986, a 20-member Nasserite clandestine organisation called 
"Egypt's revolution", seeking to undermine Egypt's relations with Israel and the US, 
conducted an assassination of two Israeli diplomats in Cairo International Book Fair, 
much to the embarrassment of the government (EIU 1986a:6). But the gravest incident of 
socio-political protest took place in February 1986, when 17000-20000 from the rank and 
file of the paramilitary CSF, which consisted largely of extremely underpaid and 
underfed conscripts rejected by the army for their uncouthness and illiteracy, took to the 
streets, burning down tourist hotels near the pyramids, in violent protest against a rumour
107 A study of political violence between 1981 and 1988, did not record any incidents of political violence 
in 1982 and 1983. Only in 1984 did acts of political violence (including riots, demonstrations, “illegal” 
strikes, and so forth) resume before escalating dramatically from 1986 onwards. See: Yassin et. al. 
(1989:568-582).
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that their three-year service, with its below-subsistence-level salaries108 and appalling 
living conditions, will be extended one further year. The speed with which the first riots 
in Cairo were reflected in the cities of Ismailia, Sohag and Assiyut suggested that the 
grievances were widespread and for the first time since 1977, the army had to be called 
on to restore order. This protest was part of the larger social protest against the 
deteriorating economic conditions in the 1980s, including large and well-organised 
strikes by the railway workers, and the textile workers in Kafr al-Dawwar and Mahala 
(Helal 1987:129). If anything, it was more dangerous, since it demonstrated that the level 
of dissent, even within the state apparatus, was skyrocketing, and underscored the risks 
associated with the exclusive reliance on the state’s security forces to force political 
stability and economic austerity (Springborg 1993:149). To add to the regime's troubles, 
a coup plot was uncovered in December 1986, involving 4 junior military officers (EIU 
1986c:5), suggesting that dissent was reaching the army -the state's traditional bastion of 
security.
In the same year, Egypt was facing an unprecedentedly severe resource crisis, as the 
international oil prices dropped sharply, causing the budget deficit to reach an alarming 
$5 billion. This made economic retrenchment and restructuring imperative, and rendered 
the government’s policy of sustaining the “societal truce” via deferring any difficult 
economic choices unsustainable. Thus ended the “social truce”, and began an extended 
social crisis that lasted for the rest of the hesitant decade of the 1980s.
108 These conscripts were paid a mere £E 6 per month, barely enough to buy cigarettes, let alone to support 
their wives and children. See: Ayubi (1988:66).
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(1.2) Economic Structures and Policies
Of all the different aspects of the new regime’s agenda, it was its economic policies that 
contributed most to the mainstream argument that Mubarak was seeking to strike a 
balance between the policies of his two predecessors. Two factors contributed to the 
predominance of this argument. On the one hand, Mubarak’s discourse on the need to 
shift from a “consumerist” to a “productive” infitah, his call for “rationalising the 
infitah”, and the national conference to which he invited economists from across the 
ideological spectrum to discuss Egypt’s economic problems, all created the impression 
that he is intent on reviewing the process of dismantling populist etatisme. This was 
supported, on the other hand, by several measures that cultivated the image that the new 
regime is restoring some aspects of etatisme. These included: the return to quintennial 
planning in 1982, the government pledges to sustain the levels of subsidies on basic 
consumer goods, and not to jeopardise the “gains of the revolution” (Ibrahim 2000:258).
This mainstream argument was shared by both the optimistic and the pessimistic 
observers inside and outside Egypt. Thus, on 10/1/1982, less than three months after 
Mubarak came into power, the Observer's leading article argued optimistically that 
“Mubarak does not want to reverse the open door policy, but merely to see it properly 
implemented. In other words, it should be joint Westem-Egyptian labour-intensive 
industrial ventures, not squandering foreign revenue brought in by the Suez Canal dues, 
oil and tourism on finished goods”109. Critics, on the hand, accused Mubarak of 
zigzagging between “the corrupt capitalism of the private sector and the wasteful 
socialism of the public sector” (Bianchi 1986:71). Ironically, both arguments,
109 Cited in Soliman (1999:60).
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diametrically-opposed as they might seem, shared one assumption: that Mubarak’s 
policies were deviating from infitah towards incorporating some form of etatisme. They 
only differed on the scope of, and motives behind, such shift.
The problem with this assumption, widespread as it might be, is twofold: methodological 
and empirical. Methodologically, it is based on an extremely voluntaristic view, assuming 
that a new president can reverse at will the economic and social development of his 
country, regardless of the continuity of the social disposition of the ruling alliance. Not 
only is this argument theoretically challengeable, as I had argued in chapters I and II, but 
also it is not validated by the empirical evidence in the Egyptian case. Indeed, any close 
examination of the development of the Egyptian economy during the early 1980s, 
particularly during the quintennial plan of 1982-1987, reveals several anomalies for 
which this line of argument cannot account. For instance, the share of the private sector 
in the GDP increased from less than 50% to 57% during the quintennial plan (Issawi 
et.al. 1989:12). Thus, the role of the state was actually shrinking further, not expanding, 
during the very same years that witnessed this alleged return to etatisme. On the 
distributional level, the 1980s witnessed two key developments that the “return to 
etatisme^ narrative fails to explain: a) a substantial increase in the degree of capital 
concentration in private industries, with the share of industrial enterprises employing 
more than 500 workers increasing from 55.97% of total industrial production in 
1983/1984 to 71.6% in 1992/1993 (Soliman 1999:28); and b) a decline of the share of 
wages in GDP from 46% to 37.5% during the quintennial plan years, whereas the share 
or property earnings increased by 15% during the same period (Issawi et.al. 1989:14).
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Empirical evidence suggests, therefore, that, contrary to the mainstream arguments, the 
developments in the Egyptian economy during the early 1980s represented a continuation 
of the trends demonstrated during the infitah years. Indeed, by the end of the quintennial 
plan, the maldistribution of income in Egypt had returned to the levels of 1950. This 
meant that any improvements in the income distribution that had been made during the 
populist-statist era were completely eroded by the end of the quintennial plan (Helal 
1993:165). Paradoxically, the dismantling of the populist-statist apparatus continued 
steadily during the very same years that witnessed the restoration of several aspects of 
etatisme.
In lieu of the “balancing etatisme and infitah^ line of analysis, this study argues that the 
aforementioned paradox can only be explained against the backdrop of the political and 
legitimacy crisis that culminated in Sadat’s assassination, and threatened that stability of 
his successor’s regime, whilst leaving the social disposition of the ruling elite intact.
When Mubarak assumed presidency, Egypt’s civilian debt had hit a record $21.2 billion. 
The value of debt service had risen to more than $1.5 billion, or 19% or the GDP. The 
richest 5% of Egyptians received 25% of the national income, whereas 44% of the rural 
population and 33% of the urban population lived below the poverty line (Helal 
1987:123). As a result, social protest and radical Islamist groups, whose recruits came 
mainly from the impoverished rural and urban petite bourgeoisie, (Ibrahim 1983:13-14; 
Ansari 1985:23) were on the rise. Meanwhile, some of the underlying trends in the 
Egyptian economy were alarming. Domestic demand for oil, rice and other key foreign-
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currency earners was increasing exponentially, eating away the surplus available for 
export (Owen 1983:15). This indicated that, given the steady rise in imports, the regime 
could be heading for a severer recourse crisis, and created a need for a “societal truce” to 
diffuse the social tension, and redress the resource gap.
Thus, parallel to the political relaxation measures outlined in the previous section, the 
regime’s “public relations exercise” included several economic measures aiming at: a) 
creating an “aura of reformism” and detachment from Sadat’s legacy; and b) finding 
mechanisms to resolve the resource crisis-in-the-making. Hence, on 3 January 1982, a 
new government led by Fu’ad Muhi al-Din was formed110, in which Sadat’s economic 
czar, Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Magid, and all members of the “economic group”111 were 
replaced with new faces. One month later, the national conference that Mubarak called to 
discuss Egypt’s economic problems was convened in February 1982. The conference 
concluded that the conspicuous consumption, corruption and uncontrolled importation 
policies had squandered the substantial capital flows that Egypt witnessed during the 
infitah years. It called for a two-year transitional period to redress the macroeconomic 
imbalances, after which, a national plan for development could be adopted with the aim 
of increasing “self-reliance” and redressing the structural weaknesses of the Egyptian 
economy (its quasi-rentier nature, the weaknesses of the productive sectors..etc) (Helal 
1987:125).
110 This was effectively the first government to be formed under Mubarak. Upon his assumption of 
Presidency, President Mubarak headed a short-lived government that maintained almost all key ministers 
from Sadat’s last cabinet, for a transitional phase between October 1981 and December 1981.
111 The “economic group” was formed since 1977, upon the IMF’s recommendation, and was headed by a 
deputy prime minister for economic affairs, and included all the ministers with economic portfolio.
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However, apart from paying lip service to “self-reliance”, and “rationalising infitah”, the 
government was unwilling, and indeed, given the social disposition of the ruling alliance, 
unable to curb consumption and put restrictions on the imports to redress the 
macroeconomic imbalances. Mobilising external resources to redress the resource gap 
was a more convenient option. Consequently, Mubarak made his first visit in 1982 to the 
United States to discuss increasing American economic assistance to Egypt. In the same 
year, the government also requested a $1.5 billion loan from the IMF to help defend the 
Egyptian pound against the quick appreciation of the Dollar. Both efforts were to no 
avail. Mubarak’s visit to the US revealed that aid, which had increased by leaps and 
bounds from zero to almost $2 billion over the span of 6 years, was now going to increase 
only by tiny increments (Lipmann 1989:83). The IMF, on the other hand, demanded 
several austerity measures, including, most importantly, reducing subsidies, which were 
expected to exceed $2.4 billion, making substantial claims on government revenues 
(Merriam 1983:27). Given the political crisis, and the government’s efforts to strike a 
“societal truce”, these demands were impossible to fulfil, and the government was forced 
to undertake some measures to mobilise the much needed economic surplus domestically. 
Thus, Fu’ad Muhi al-Din formed a new government in August 1982, in which the idea of 
an “economic group” was abolished altogether. This measure demonstrated the 
increasing tensions between the government and the IMF, upon whose recommendation 
the "economic group" was created in the first place. Furthermore, the abolishment of the 
group entailed the relinquishing of the idea that there is a quasi-autonomous sphere of 
economic activity which should be kept free from any "distorting" political influence.
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Mustafa al-Said, the new minister of economy introduced a series of measures aiming at 
increasing the government control over the foreign currency transactions and curtailing 
imports, which were believed to be behind the siphoning away from the official economy 
of the major part of the $3 billion workers’ remittances (Ayubi 1988:58). Several 
restrictions were introduced on the so-called “parallel market” (legal black currency 
market), leading to shortages in import financing (Springborg 1989:46). In 1985, Mustafa 
al-Said went a step further with the introduction of an “import rationalisation committee” 
(Ibid:76). The economic retrenchment measures since 1982 were associated with other 
measures to encourage the industrial bourgeoisie so as to increase exports and reduce the 
trade deficit. These included concessionary interest rate and taxation policies112, as well 
as a series of conferences with different groups of foreign businessmen, in which lists of 
government-approved, predominantly industrial projects were presented for foreign 
participation, provided that these joint-ventures embodied as large an Egyptian input and 
Egyptian-made components as possible (Owen 1983:16).
It is important to look to these two sets of measures as a package. Only by doing so, and 
by placing them within the context of the failure of government attempts to seek 
additional funds abroad since 1982, does it become clear that the aim of these measures 
were not to restore etatisme, but simply to redress critical imbalances at a moment when 
mobilising enough surplus abroad to muffle the domestic imbalances was not a viable 
option.
112 See: Soliman (1999: 49-53).
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However, like the measures that the post-1952 government introduced to encourage 
industrial capitalism, whilst clamping down on agrarian bourgeoisie, discussed in chapter 
II, these twin measures were based on an overstatement of the differences amongst the 
different factions of the bourgeoisie. Al-Said’s decisions, based as they were on the 
aforementioned “parasitic narrative”, overlooked the alliance of the different factions of 
the bourgeoisie. The currency traders, and the importers’ lobby responded harshly, by 
steadily inflating the price of the foreign exchange and demanding al-Said’s resignation 
(Bianchi 1986: 72). More importantly, the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of 
Industry, and the Egyptian Businessmen’s Association acted conceitedly to mobilise 
powerful support within the ranks of the NDP and the government itself, now headed by 
Kamal Hassan Ali after the sudden death of Muhi al-Din in 1984. Al-Said’s decisions 
were not supported by many other cabinet ministers, including the prime minister 
himself, thereby demonstrating clearly the depth of the alliance between the different 
factions of the bourgeoisie, including the state bourgeoisie. In a rather farcical statement, 
Premier Ali announced that the 1985 decisions were not approved by the government, 
and that they only represented Al-Said’s “personal views” (Helal 1987:127). Al-Said 
resigned in April 1985, and the “import rationalisation committee” was abolished the 
following year, in August 1986 (Springborg 1989:75). It was clear that the different 
factions of the bourgeoisie were organically allied, and that any attempt to curb the 
influence of any one faction, and restore any form of state intervention, would not be 
tolerated by the ruling social alliance. Consequently, importing continued unrestrained, 
and the trade deficit rose from $4.9 billion in 1981/1982 to $6.3 billion in 1985/1986 
(Abdalla and Brown 1988:46).
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What, then, were the analysts who spoke of the return of etatisme, even of “neo- 
Nasserism” (Bianchi 1986:72) referring to? They were probably referring to the return of 
quintennial planning, which was perceived as a restoration of a key tool of etatisme, 
especially that the return to planned development was one of the demands of the 
“national economic conference” in February 1982.
However, a closer examination of the quintennial plan that started in the fiscal year 
1982/1983 tells a different story. The priorities of the plan reflected the continued 
dependence upon rentier revenue, the reduction in welfare spending, and the 
encouragement of foreign and local private investment to promote industrialisation 
(Wahba 1994:205). The Egyptian economy continued to depend on the so-called “big 
four” sources of hard currency -  oil exports, emigrant workers' remittances, the Suez 
Canal’s dues and tourism revenues. As a result, notwithstanding the rhetorical 
commitment to redressing the structural imbalances in the economy, the share of 
agriculture and industry in the GDP actually fell from 32.9% in 1981/1982 to 31.5% in 
1986/1987 (Issawi et.al. 1989:39). The share of the trading sector in the GDP, contrary to 
any claims of curbing the "parasitic" activities and shifting to a "productive" infitah, 
increased from 12.8% in 1979 to 19% in 1989. This 48% increase looks even more 
impressive if we take into account that the share of the trading sector increased by a mere 
13% during the infitah years -  from 11.3 % in 1973 to 12.8% in 1979 (Abdel Mo'ti 
2002:103). The quasi-rentier nature was further enforced as the conditions of the 
American economic assistance to Egypt improved, reflecting the continued importance of 
Egypt's "strategic rent". Thus, the grant component of the US economic assistance to
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Egypt increased from 21.3% in 1975 (when the aid programme started), to 78.5% by 
1983, and from 1985, US aid to Egypt was given entirely on a grant basis (Aly 1988:65).
Indeed, examining the government investment policies reveals that there was no serious 
effort to redress the structural weaknesses of the economy. The share of the funds 
allocated to “project completion” amounted to 63% of the total government investment 
during the plan, revealing a de facto reduction in government expenditure on the public 
sector (Ibid:38; Wahba 1994:206). Furthermore, the share of industry in public 
investments actually fell from 28% in 1974 to an average 22.7% per annum during the 
1980s (Amin 1994b: 145). The plan, therefore, was little more than a part of the “public 
relations exercise”, aiming at cultivating an image of reformism, whilst keeping the 
economic tenets of infitah untouched.
In the same vein, the welfare function of the state continued to diminish. Notwithstanding 
the ambiguous government pledges to defend “the gains of the revolution”, the plan 
actually allowed for a decrease in some of the basic services. For instance, the number of 
pupils per classroom was planned to increase from 39.3 in the first year of the plan to 
42.1 in its last year. Similarly, the number of hospital beds per thousand persons was 
allowed to drop from a low 1.97 in 1981/1982 to 1.8 in 1986/1987 (Wahba 1994:208). 
The process of dismantling populist etatisme, therefore, continued to progress, albeit at a 
slow pace and with a very low key approach, in the hope o f not disturbing its efforts to 
restore its legitimacy and build the much needed “societal trace”.
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During the plan years, the economy grew at a nominal rate of 6.8% per annum, compared 
to 8% per annum during infitah years (Helal 1993:165). Moreover, taking the high 
inflation rate (25%-30% annually) into account shows that the real GDP was actually 
shrinking by an average 2% per annum. This meant that the average per capita income 
fell by 4% per annum between 1981/1982 and 1986/1987 (Issawi et.al. 1989:10). Under 
these conditions, the government could only depend on one safety valve to prevent an 
economic collapse -  borrowing abroad. Consequently, Egypt’s debts doubled over the 
span of five years, reaching a towering $43.5 billion in 1986 (Abdalla and Brown 
1988:47). Egypt's merchandise exports in 1986 totalled less than her debt service to non­
communist countries (EIU 1986b:3).
Such were the economic conditions when the international oil prices collapsed in 1986. 
The government oil revenues fell by $2 billion in 1986 (Helal 1987:129). In addition, the 
collapse of oil prices had several knock on effects, such as a reduction in the value of 
workers’ remittances, creating a sudden shock that intensified the resource crisis, and 
upset the fragile social balances on which the “societal truce” rested. The situation was 
made worse by the simultaneous drying up of international credit and foreign aid to 
developing countries (Owen and Pamuk 1998:138). This meant that muffling the crisis 
through borrowing is not possible. Economic retrenchment and restructuring became 
inevitable. Consequently, decisive measures had to be made over the nature and direction 
of this restructuring, and the division of its burdens. The “societal truce” had come to an 
abmpt end.
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(1.3) Ideology
The role of the regime’s ideology during the 1980s, and indeed the very existence of one, 
remains one of the key paradoxes of the “hesitant decade”. On one hand, although his 
predecessors were no ideologues, it was Mubarak who had often been referred to as the 
pragmatic problem-solver who is disdainful of grand ideologies and incapable of bold 
decision-making113. Several reasons underlay this widely held perception. First, 
throughout the 1980s, Mubarak’s regime broke with his predecessors’ tradition of issuing 
ideological pamphlets explaining its worldview and defending its policy choices. 
Furthermore, the regime sought, and indeed managed, to project an image of the new 
leader as a dependable, pragmatic and strong man, more interested in Egypt’s small 
problems than in cutting a deliberate image on the world scene (McDermott 1982b:9).
On the other hand, however, the regime’s central task during the 1980s was, as I argued 
earlier, essentially ideological -  to resolve the hegemonic crisis that followed Sadat’s 
assassination, and to establish a “societal truce”. In so doing, the regime’s political 
discourse demonstrated a significant degree of consistency, indicating that whereas 
Mubarak refrained from issuing an “explicit” ideological document throughout the 
“hesitant decade”, his regime followed a set of coherent, albeit implicit, ideological 
guidelines.
In fact, the lack of elaborate ideological pamphlets throughout the 1980s was actually due 
to the regime’s strategic priorities of national reconciliation and establishing the much-
I]3 Cf.: McDermott (1982); Shamir (1986)
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needed “societal truce”. To achieve this goal, there was a need to avoid controversy and 
to refrain from explicitly stating the regime's commitments to the infitah principles at a 
time when the government was seeking to diffuse the counter-consensus that formed 
against these very same principles. The hegemonic crisis that followed Sadat’s 
assassination meant that his regime was believed not to be sharing the ideas, aspirations, 
and values of its society. Any explicit statement of the new regime’s ideology and 
preferences, which, given the continuity of the ruling alliance from Sadat years, would 
have necessarily been similar to its predecessor’s, could have exacerbated the crisis. As 
soon as this task was accomplished, and the “hesitant decade” was over, the regime 
resorted anew to stating explicitly its ideological commitments, and issuing ideological 
pamphlets during the 1990s114.
Aiming at expanding its support base and re-establishing its hegemony without 
undertaking a radical revision of infitah’s policies, the crux of the new regime’s discourse 
revolved around three inter-related pillars: a) restoring the “technocratic approach to 
politics” that prevailed during the 1960s, albeit for different reasons; b) diminishing 
national expectations of any radical departure from the infitah policies through a 
“realistic” discourse; and c) emphasising the importance of stability in lieu of the large- 
scale, high-profile transformations of his predecessors.
During his first years, Mubarak sought to shun the flamboyance of his predecessor, and 
his “organic corporatism”, cultivating instead the image of a cool-headed, pragmatic
1141 will return to this point in the next chapter.
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reformer who is seeking to forge a nation-wide alliance to fight corruption and reform 
infitah. Organic corporatism was replaced with a revival of the technocratic approach to 
politics that prevailed during the 1960s. Mubarak’s cabinets were overwhelmingly 
technocratic. His eclectic combination of elements of “Nasserism” and “Sadatism” was 
justified by a discourse that emphasised a technocratic “problem-solving” approach, 
explaining the regime’s policy choices on the grounds of their technical soundness, not as 
a part of a broader political vision. As such, the regime believed that its “technical” 
choices would not cause controversy and political polarisation, and would, therefore, 
serve the overarching goal of building the “societal truce”.
Mubarak was also famous for his candid description of Egypt’s problems. His speeches, 
at once sober and bitterly frank, were in sharp contrast with the ideological flamboyance 
that characterised Nasser’s discourse, and the psychological shocks of Sadat’s speeches. 
Indeed, Mubarak made it a point to mention explicitly in his first speech to the parliament 
on 15/10/1981 that he will not make any promises he cannot deliver (McDermott 1981a). 
This “realism” served a key purpose for the new regime -  to lower any expectations of a 
radical revision of the infitah. Hence, social inequality, for instance, was presented as a 
fact that “existed everywhere” and had to be accepted. Consequently, any calls for 
redressing the inequalities or reversing the infitah decisions would be harking back to 
illusions (Aulas 1988:163). This enabled the regime to maintain its image of reformism, 
necessary as it was for restoring hegemony, whilst keeping the basic tenets of infitah 
intact. In the same vein, Mubarak’s speeches, whilst making modest claims to reformism, 
emphasised stability and continuity with Sadat’s policies. In a speech to the parliament
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early in 1982, Mubarak announced, '7  am following the same method (sic.), and the same 
line that President Sadat adopted, and I  consider the coming period to be a continuation 
o f what Sadat actually achieved”115. This served, as Ansari (1985:22) argued, the twin 
purposes of lowering any expectations of change, and assuring the entrenched interests.
Domestically, Mubarak’s speeches during the early 1980s focused on two issues: a) 
confronting militant Islamists; and b) reforming the infitah. His very first speech to the 
parliament emphasised the shift of the regime’s security priorities from the political left 
to militant fundamentalism, promising to continue the fight with the Islamists, without 
making any reference to the arrest of sixty communists accused of trying to overthrow the 
regime on that same week (McDermott 1981a:4). Other speeches extended a call of 
national reconciliation to all members of the opposition except the Islamic militants. 
Furthermore, Mubarak sought to distinguish between two versions of Islamism: a 
reformist version, with which he was willing to cooperate (hence, for instance, the 
regime’s toleration of the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1984 elections, 
in alliance with New Wafd), and a militant one, which should be isolated and confronted 
(Abou Zeid 1990:77). On the other hand, another key component of the regime’s “public 
relations exercise” was its continuous pledges to “rationalise the infitah”, emphasising the 
“parasitic explanation of Egypt’s economic predicament” and the concomitant call to 
transform the “consumerist” infitah to a “productive” one. As Springborg (1993:145) 
explained, the adjective "productive", was not intended by Mubarak's government to 
signal any serious departure from the original liberalisation plan, but rather to dissociate 
the process from previous errors and excesses. On the distributional level, Mubarak
1,5 Cited in: Al-Salehy (1990:671).
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sought to reassure the opposition by announcing, on his May Day speech in 1983, that his 
policy aims to “maintain the gains of the revolution, defend the public sector and prevent 
any attempt to privatise it” (Owen 1983:16). This "reformist" discourse was echoed by a 
flood of writings emphasising the "parasitic narrative". Alongside various articles and 
academic books, Naguib Mahfouz published a novella Ahl-Alkemma (People at the top), 
criticising the infitah parasites and blaming them for all infitah's vices. Like his Al- 
Karnak in the 1970s, Ahl-Alkemma was made into a popular movie, and a trend of 
movies covering the same themes followed suit116.
The challenge before the regime’s foreign policy discourse was, however, more difficult, 
since it was Sadat’s foreign policy that presented the crux around which the opposition’s 
counter-consensus revolved. The political right and left, for instance, disagreed on the 
desirability of the infitah’s economic policy, but were united on the rejection of Sadat’s 
“accommodating” foreign policy towards the United States and Israel.
Mubarak’s attempt to achieve the paradoxical goal of restoring the regime’s hegemony 
without reversing its policies was reflected in his eclectic approach to the questions of 
Egypt’s “national role”, and her relations with the United States. Thus, Mubarak 
announced that his regime’s foreign policy aims at restoring Egypt’s relations with her 
Arab brethren without sacrificing its “Egypt first” commitments (Abou Zeid 1990:83). 
This meant that reconciliation with the Arab world is welcome but only on Egypt’s terms, 
i.e., without the pre-condition of renouncing the peace treaty with Israel or reviewing the
116 These included, most notably, Atef El-Tayeb's critically-acclaimed Sawak Al-Autobis (Bus Driver), as 
well as Samir Seifs Al-Ghoul (the monster), Mohamed Fadel's Hob Fil Zinzana (Love in the Prison Cell), 
and Mohamed El-Naggar's Zaman Hatem Zahran (The Age of Hatem Zahran).
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“special relations” with the United States (McDermott 1981b:6). Likewise, Mubarak 
emphasised that the Egyptian “special relations” with the United States did not 
undermine Egypt’s independence. He even made explicit references in some of his 
speeches to restoring the “non-aligned role” of Egypt (McDermott 198la:5), thereby 
reassuring the opposition that he is not continuing his predecessor’s unconditional pro- 
Americanism; whilst simultaneously hinting to the US not to suffocate him with difficult 
demands.
Several developments made the new foreign policy discourse, notwithstanding its 
eclecticism and in many instances incongruous nature, quite successful in restoring a 
substantial part of the regime’s hegemony. These included: a) some gestures aiming at 
emphasising the regime’s national independence, most notably, the much-publicised 
rejection of the American demand to establish a military base in Ras Banas on the Red 
Sea in 1983 (Richards 1983b:8); and b) the toning down of the debate over “Egypticity 
versus Arab nationalism”, and the re-emergence of a new consensus amongst most 
Egyptian intellectuals over a mild version of Arab nationalism. The Israeli de facto 
annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights in December 1981, and the invasion of Lebanon 
in 1982, led several of the anti-Arabist intellectuals to review their position and voice 
more pro-Arab views. Tawfiq Al-Hakim, for instance, a key proponent of “Egypticity” 
and Egypt’s “neutrality” between the Arabs and Israel, renounced his earlier views in a 
famous article published in November 1982 (Ibrahim 1983:202). This led to a gradual re- 
emergence of the consensus on the importance of Egypt’s pro-Arab role, albeit a much 
less flamboyant one, thanks to the diminished expectations that the regime sowed through
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its “realistic discourse”, and that the failures of the “rejectionist” Arab States seemed to 
validate. Indeed, the forced return of Iraq to Egypt for military and political support in its 
war against Iran, and the “Prince Fahd’s peace initiative”, adopted by the Fez Summit in 
1981 were portrayed by the state-controlled media as justifications of Egypt’s course of 
action, thereby, contributing significantly to vindicating the regime’s policies, and 
restoring its hegemony117.
However, the lack of an explicit ideological conceptualisation of the regime’s eclectic 
policies, central as it was to the regime's effort to restore its hegemony, had two serious 
shortcomings:
i) The eclectic and inarticulate nature of the regime’s discourse rendered 
Mubarak’s regime vulnerable to the opposition’s criticism of being unable to 
fulfil its pledges to restore Egypt’s national role. Thus, foreign policy surfaced 
anew, on various occasions, as the banner of political protest (e.g. in the 
aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; against the Israeli participation 
in Egypt’s international book fair in 1985..etc) (Bianchi 1986:73).
ii) The absence of an ideological "sense of purpose" made it difficult for the 
Egyptian people to accept their economic hardships. Under Nasser and Sadat, 
the flamboyant discourse made it possible for the Egyptians to accept present 
sacrifices in the hope of a better future (Cassandra 1995:18). Lacking such 
justification, the success of the regime’s policies was measured strictly and 
exclusively by material criteria. And the results were hardly conducive to the 
restoration of the regime's hegemony.
117 See: Boutrous-Ghali (1991); (Richards (1983a); McDermott (1981a).
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Hence, when the economic crisis hit in 1986, it threatened to erode any gains made by the 
regime during its first five years in terms of restoring its legitimacy, and the regime was 
not particularly well suited to provide justifications for the new economic hardships. The 
resource crisis, and the rise of social protest exposed the fragility of the balances on 
which the “societal truce” was based, and threatened to reproduce the hegemonic crisis 
anew.
(1.4) Foreign Policy
Foreign policy issues were at the heart of the counter-consensus that emerged from across 
the political spectrum during the final years of Sadat’s reign. This meant that, at least 
during Mubarak’s first years, the main function of the new regime’s foreign policy would 
be to restore its lost hegemony. Its other function, rent generation, was less pressing a 
concern during the first half of the 1980s, given the steady flow of oil-related revenues as 
well as the American economic assistance. Furthermore, the failure of Mubarak’s early 
attempts in 1982, a few months after he assumed presidency, to generate more “strategic 
rent” and increase the US economic assistance118, demonstrated that the was no 
immediate prospect for the “rent generating function of Egypt’s foreign policy”, and 
provided further impetus to the concentration on its “hegemonic function”.
As soon as he assumed presidency, Mubarak’s was under contradicting pressures: from 
the US and Israel to confirm his commitment to his predecessor’s foreign policy 
priorities, and from the domestic opposition to renounce and reverse them. The US made 
a vigorous effort to confirm its commitment to Egypt’s new president from the very
118 See section 1.2 above.
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outset, promising to increase its mission in Egypt, which already had the largest number 
of staff anywhere in the world (Merriam 1982:25), and promising to continue (but not to 
increase) its economic assistance. Similarly, the Israeli government moved swiftly to 
explore Mubarak’s commitment to the peace process. Israeli Premier extended an 
immediate invitation to Mubarak to visit Israel, and the Israeli government suggested that 
the two countries sign a new document confirming their commitment to the Camp David 
process. On the other hand, domestic opposition and regional forces expressed their 
hopes that the new president’s priorities would be to re-integrate in the Arab world and to 
freeze the Camp David process, if not to abandon it altogether.
Trapped between these opposing pressures, Mubarak’s strategy was twofold. On one 
hand, he sought to reassure the entrenched domestic and international interests that he 
shared his predecessor’s foreign policy priorities. His first speeches sought to emphasise 
continuities with Sadat, and promised to continue on the same political line119. On the 
other hand, Mubarak, seeking to maintain some manoeuvring space, refused to undertake 
any further commitments towards Israel or the United States. Thus, he refused to sign any 
documents re-affirming his adherence to Camp David, arguing that no such re­
affirmation is needed (Richards 1982b). He turned down Begin’s invitation, announcing 
that he cannot accept such invitation if it included a visit to Jerusalem, since this would 
mean a de facto recognition of the Israeli annexation of the holy city (McDermott 
1982a:5). Mubarak's strategy was to emphasise that peace between Egypt and Israel does 
not grant the latter any favourable position in Egypt. Israel's embassy, he stated, is "just 
one of some 120 embassies in Egypt, no more and no less" (Hillal-Dessouki 1988:97).
119 For more details, see Al-Salehy (1990).
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Meanwhile, Mubarak moved promptly to resume his contacts with the Arab States. The 
process of political reconciliation with the Arabs began immediately after Sadat’s funeral 
(Tucker and Stork 1982:4). Mubarak expressed in his early speeches a general concern 
for Arab reconciliation, announcing that he will pursue such reconciliation, whilst 
scrupulously observing Egypt’s “contractual commitments” (i.e. Camp David accords) 
(Abou Taleb 1990:622). Thus, Mubarak ordered the press to refrain from attacking the 
other Arab states, even if his regime was attacked by Arab radios and press (Tucker and 
Stork 1982:4). In a reassuring gesture to Libya, He announced that Egypt refuses under 
any circumstances, to enter into a military conflict with a “neighbouring Arab country” 
(Abou Taleb 1990:623). This conciliatory tone was as aimed to the domestic public 
opinion as it was to Egypt’s regional environment. A centrepiece of Mubarak’s domestic 
“public relations exercise” was to distance himself from his predecessor’s unpopular 
foreign policy, and prove that he was no hostage of the past. He needed to emerge from 
the shadow of his predecessor, and implement his own agenda.
In so doing, Mubarak defined his priorities as follows:
i) Regaining some foreign policy manoeuvring space via diversifying Egypt’s 
foreign relations. This meant to restore Egypt’s relations with the USSR, and 
her non-aligned role, whilst maintaining the “special relations” with the 
United States.
ii) To observe meticulously Egypt’s commitments to the Camp David, without 
assuming any further commitments, or deepening the relations with Israel.
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iii) To restore Egypt’s regional role, and her relations with the Arab states, 
without abandoning the “contractual commitments” of Camp David.
In order to restore Egypt’s relations with the USSR without provoking the US, and 
risking the loss of the latter’s economic assistance, Mubarak adopted, a low key, 
functional approach to the relations with the USSR, which were formally severed in 
September 1981. Egypt and the USSR moved slowly and gradually towards 
normalisation, starting with technical co-operation. Thus, in January 1982, Egypt’s 
minister of electricity, Maher Abaza, announced that Egypt welcomed Soviet experts’ 
participation in modernising the Aswan High Dam -  a symbol of the golden age of 
Egyptian-Soviet relations (McDermott 1982a:4). Soon thereafter, the Egyptian-Soviet 
cooperation moved from the “low politics” areas of technical cooperation, to arms 
purchases, with the declaration of a “tanks deal” with the Warsaw pact in 1983, and in 
July 1984 the two countries decided to exchange ambassadors and their relations were 
fully normalised (Yefimov 1988:70).
This step was, naturally, welcomed by broad sections of the Egyptian opposition, since it 
was seen as a step towards restoring a “balanced” foreign policy, and reducing Egypt’s 
over-reliance on the US. Mubarak’s speeches sought to confirm this conviction. Hence, 
he made frequent references to Egypt’s non-aligned role, and pointed out to the example 
of India, which, he argued, had “special ties” with the USSR and normal relations with 
the US. Egypt’s “special ties” with the US would not be contradicting her non-aligned 
role, since they were balanced with normalised relations with the USSR (Ibid.).
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Mubarak’s motives behind the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR were, 
however, a mixture of domestic concerns for restoring his regime’s hegemony, and
realpolitik. In 1983, Mubarak’s regime was put under increasing pressure from the
Reagan administration, concerned as it was with the Second Cold War considerations, to 
exchange the economic assistance for a military base in Egyptian territory. The Congress 
asked for a formal lease of Ras Banas air and naval base on the Red Sea. Mubarak’s 
turning down of the offer was highly publicised, and indeed contributed immensely to his 
image as a “balanced” or even “neo-Nasserist” leader. However, the US request itself 
made clear the dangers of over-reliance on the US, and the need to increase Egypt’s
manoeuvring space. It therefore came as no surprise that a few weeks after the
announcement of Egypt’s rejection of the US request, the Egyptian government 
announced its intention to buy tanks from the Warsaw Pact (Richards 1983b:8), and the 
Egyptian-Soviet relations witnessed a qualitative improvement. This improvement also 
proved particularly convenient given the several embarrassing incidents that the 
Egyptian-American relations witnessed in the 1980s -  the Achille Lauro affair and the 
interception by American fighter planes of the Egyptian Aircraft carrying Palestinian 
commandos in October 1985, and the American raids on the Gulf of Sirte in Libya in 
March 1986, then the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on April 15th, 1986. With the 
increased Egyptian dependence on US economic and military assistance preventing the 
government from going beyond the soft-worded protests, improving relations with the 
eastern bloc was important to quieten the angry public opinion, and to show that Egypt is 
gradually moving towards restoring a balanced foreign policy, which will then enable her 
to respond more forcefully to any such embarrassments in the future.
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Regarding Egypt’s relations Israel, with the Sinai withdrawal due in six months, Mubarak 
started his term in office by reassuring the Israeli government of his commitment to the 
Camp David peace process. Alongside his early speeches which reaffirmed these 
commitments, Mubarak avoided making any uncalculated response to Israel’s de facto 
annexation of the Syrian Golan heights, in December 1981. His reaction was measured 
and deliberately ambivalent. On one hand, he voiced a stem condemnation of the Israeli 
measure, reassuring the domestic opposition and the Arab states of his serious intentions 
towards restoring Egypt’s Arab role. On the other hand, the government announced that 
the Israeli decision would have no effect on the relations with Israel (McDermott 
1981b:6).
Israel’s return of Sinai to Egypt in April 1982, then her invasion of Lebanon six weeks 
later, marked a turning point in Egyptian regional foreign policy. On one hand, the return 
of Sinai increased the manoeuvrability of the Egyptian regime domestically and 
internationally, as Mubarak gained substantially in terms of his legitimacy, and was 
relatively freed from the much of the pressures to avoid provoking Israel. On the other 
hand, the invasion put in question anew the merit of Camp David accords, and their 
implications for Egypt’s regional role (Bianchi 1986:73). The week before the invasion 
witnessed a high-profile visit by an Egyptian delegation headed by Mustafa Khalil, the 
deputy prime minister, to Israel (Hillal-Dessouki 1988:98). The invasion, coming after 
such a strong "normalisation" measure, seriously undermined the government's position, 
not unlike the Israeli raids on Iraq and Lebanon in 1981, shortly after Begin's meeting 
with Sadat. Once more, the Egyptian government appeared either as complicit in the
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bombing, or as a weak regional actor whom nobody took into account. After the invasion, 
Egypt’s policy was a combination of strong condemnation and no sanctions. However, 
after the massacre of Sabra and Shatilla in September 1982, Mubarak recalled the 
Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv and laid down firm conditions from his return -  
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, resolution of the border dispute over the Sinai town of 
Taba (Ibid:74).
The most difficult aspect of Mubarak’s foreign policy was the Arab dimension. Egypt 
sought to reintegrate in the Arab world without giving up her Camp David commitments.
To do so, Mubarak distinguished between the two aspects of the Camp David accord. 
Whereas he observed strictly the Egyptian Israeli agreement, the second phase -the 
autonomy talks of the occupied territories- was gradually undermined, and later on 
abandoned altogether. Thus, Mubarak was not prepared to conclude an agreement on the 
question of the Palestinian autonomy before the withdrawal from Sinai as Israel requested 
(McDermott 1982a:5). Mubarak announced that Egypt would not negotiate in lieu of the 
Palestinian national movement (Bianchi 1986:74), and welcomed, with varying degrees 
of enthusiasm, all alternative arrangements for the autonomy question, including the 
“Prince Fahd’s peace initiative”, and the “Reagan peace plan” in 1982. In so doing, the 
purpose of Mubarak was twofold: a) to hint to the other Arab states that Egypt was 
willing to compromise on this aspect of Camp David; and b) to lay ground for 
reconciliation with Jordan and the PLO, and to reassure them that they would not be 
excluded from the negotiations. Both parties responded positively to the Egyptian 
gesture, and in December 1983 PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, prompted by a bitter conflict
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with Syria that ensured the final evacuation of his forces from Lebanon, paid his first visit 
to Egypt since 1977. In May 1984, Jordan became the first Arab country to resume 
diplomatic relations with Egypt (Ingram 1984:9).
The Early 1980s witnessed a parallel rapprochement, albeit without resumption of 
diplomatic ties, with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Under the pressures of her war with Iran, 
Iraq turned to Egypt for mines, ammunition, and spare parts. Mubarak declared that 
Egypt is providing this assistance in accordance with the Arab League Joint Defence 
Treaty (Tucker and Stork 1982:4), thereby serving the dual purposes of announcing the 
erosion of his regime’s regional isolation, and establishing the regime’s legitimacy by 
proclaiming the revival of Egypt's Arab role, and the resumption of her "national" support 
for her Arab brethren.
In the same vein, the war, and the Saudi fear of an increasing Iranian influence in the 
Gulf region laid the ground for rapprochement with Egypt. Thus, Saudi radio urged the 
Arab States to tone down their criticism of the Egyptian regime, and the Saudi 
government began quietly restaffing their embassy in Cairo immediately after Mubarak 
came in power, and by mid-May 1982, it had reached pre-Camp David levels, with only 
the ambassador missing (Ibid).
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By and large, three key developments contributed to the success of Mubarak’s regime’s 
bid to make the necessary alterations to aspects of its predecessor’s foreign policy 
without jeopardising its principal commitments to the US and Israel:
i) The advent of the Second Cold War, which increased Mubarak’s
administration’s “manoeuvring space”, and enabled it to diversify its 
international relations and assume a more independent stance vis-a-vis the 
US administration without jeopardising the latter’s economic assistance.
ii) Regional developments, from the first Gulf War to the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, which created a need for the Arab States to end Egypt’s isolation 
and reintegrate her in the Arab world, and led to the gradual erosion of the 
Iraqi-led rejectionist “steadfastness front”.
iii) The failure of the “rejectionist line” to develop a feasible alternative to
Camp David in Fez Summit in 1981, which was considered a vindication 
of the Egyptian foreign policy, and made it easier for the Egyptian 
leadership to reintegrate in the Arab world without having to denounce its 
Camp David commitments.
These developments, alongside the steady flow of rent during the early 1980s, enabled 
the new regime to fulfil its urgent task -  to restore its legitimacy without giving up any of 
its key political lines. During this period, Egyptian foreign policy was focused, almost 
exclusively, on its "legitimacy forming" function. The resource crisis that hit the 
Egyptian economy hard in 1986 changed the situation, as it created an urgent demand for 
the second function of the Egyptian foreign policy -rent generation to resolve domestic
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crises- and from that moment onwards, the Egyptian foreign policy was faced with the 
need for both functions and the challenge of finding a balancing point between them.
2- The Resource Crisis and Failed restructuring: 1986-1990
Under the conditions of the economic and political crisis of 1986, some form of 
economic retrenchment and restructuring was urgently needed. This necessitated difficult 
decisions on dividing the burdens of restructuring, which were, expectedly, determined 
by the balance of power amongst the key social forces. Given the social disposition of the 
elite, it came as no surprise that the way out of the crisis was negotiated with the IMF. 
However, the regime's concern for domestic stability and maintaining its hegemony, and 
its “January riots complex”, made it difficult to comply with the IMF’s demands. As a 
result, during the four difficult years between 1986 and 1990, the regime was locked in a 
vicious cycle of extended economic and social crisis, escalating political and sectarian 
violence, and endless, and fruitless rounds of negotiations with the IMF's and Egypt's 
creditors.
The conflicting needs of reflecting the interests of the social elite, whilst maintaining the 
regime's hegemony and political stability meant that there was no easy way out of the 
political and economic crisis, and doomed all far-reaching economic and social 
restructuring measures to failure. Thus, in lieu of resolving the crisis, the regime was 
forced to settle for managing it. This continued until 1990, when regional and 
international developments offered the regime a new opportunity to use its foreign policy
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as a means of jumping over its internal contradictions, and trading its “strategic rent” for 
a better deal with its creditors that facilitated the launching of the second the second wave 
of restructuring in the 1990s, to which I will devote the next chapter.
(2.1) The State
The legitimacy-restoring, "public relations exercise" came to an end with the 
multidimensional crisis that hit in 1986. Alongside the resource crisis and the need for 
austerity and economic restructuring, from 1986 onwards, Mubarak's regime faced three 
key challenges: a) the escalation of social protest and political violence; b) a dangerous 
political debt to the already formidable chief of the military, Field Marshal Abou 
Ghazala; and c) the political "long march" of the Islamists to take over the state and civil 
society.
After a short societal truce from 1981 to 1984, social protest and political violence 
resumed, reaching unprecedented levels in 1986. This meant that the risks involved in 
implementing the required economic restructuring plans that the IMF proposed were 
paramount. The resource crisis hit at a time when the restoration of the regime's 
hegemony was not completed yet, and any dramatic restructuring would have meant a 
further escalation in the political and social unrest. As a result, the regime had to settle for 
managing the crisis, not resolving it. This socio-political setup, not the president's 
cautious or indecisive nature, is what explains the hesitant economic reforms that the 
regime sought to implement during the crisis years, and the melange of political 
oppression and liberalisation that took place between 1986 and 1990.
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In the meantime, the fact that the regime had to resort to the military to curb the CSF riots 
entailed an additional political debt to the already too powerful Field Marshal Abou 
Ghazala (EIU 1986a:5). Abou Ghazala, a former military attache in Washington, had 
particularly good relations with the US. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 1989b:7) 
reported that he was often regarded as Washington's closest ally in Cairo, and Springborg 
(1987:7) noted that one version of the events that took place during the Achille Lauro 
crisis holds that it was Abou Ghazala who notified the US, through the military mission 
in Cairo, that the hijackers were being flown to Tunis. With his immense popularity in 
the army, which has since the 1973 restored its image as the successful defender Egypt's 
national interests, and his excellent relations with the US, Abou Ghazala was a serious 
challenge to the president, especially if Mubarak's regime was unable to bring about a 
clear solution to the mounting social and political crisis, or if, in so doing, it was further 
alienated from the poor and middle-classed majority of the Egyptians.
Last but not least, Mubarak's regime had to face the most serious civilian challenge to his 
rule -  the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood did not settle for its token participation 
in the parliamentary elections, focusing instead for dominating the professional 
syndicates and student unions (EIU 1988a:5). In March 1986, the Brotherhood, feeling 
strong enough to challenge the regime in the parliament, rallied 100 members of the 
political assembly (including many NDP members) to sign a petition calling government 
to take action to make the Islamic Shari’a the sole and binding source of law (EIU 
1990:5). This indicated that the Brotherhood was able to defy classical party boundaries 
and set the terms for the political debate in Egypt.
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In facing these challenges, Mubarak's response to re-establish his power base and restore 
political order was fourfold. First, Mubarak sought to restore his regime's legitimacy 
through calling new parliamentary elections in April 1987. The elections came in the 
aftermath of a court ruling that the election law of 1984 was unconstitutional, and 
Mubarak needed to legitimise the parliament which was supposed to nominate him for a 
second term in office in October (EIU 1987a:5). As a result, the opposition was allowed 
to significantly increase its representation, and was now led by a Muslim-Brotherhood- 
led "Islamic coalition" (Ayubi 1989b: 15). The opposition, notwithstanding the typical 
protests at elections violations, responded positively to Mubarak’s gesture, and allowed 
his presidential nomination in October to go unchallenged (EIU 1987c:5), thereby 
conferring a much-needed legitimacy on his regime.
Second, whereas Mubarak's unopposed re-election reinforced the regime's legitimacy, 
Mubarak also needed a reliable, core social base to embark on any economic 
restructuring programme. The otherwise conveniently amorphous social base of the NDP 
was not very reliable at a time of difficult economic retrenchment decisions that would 
necessarily alienate much of the lower and middle classes. Thus, the regime made a 
strategic decision to re-enforce its alliance with the haute bourgeoisie -  the only social 
stratum that backed full economic liberalisation unreservedly whilst refraining from 
demanding a significant share in political power and government. The regime, therefore, 
moved swiftly to consolidate its alliance with the businessmen associations (the 
institutional embodiment of the haute bourgeoisie). Govemment-business joint 
commissions increased in number and in influence, businessmen were increasingly
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becoming full partners in economic decision-making, and they were assuming an 
increasing role in the economic activity as a result of the IMF-induced economic 
restructuring. The income differentials within the state bureaucracy increased further, as 
the senior state officials were able to earn further income through these symbiotic 
linkages with the haute bourgeoisie (Ayubi 1989b: 11), and were further alienated from 
the middle-class, lower echelons of the bureaucracy. Finally, the state enforced 
reconciliation in 1989 between businessmen associations and the federation of chambers 
of commerce (which represented the other factions of the private bourgeoisie), and 
henceforth, the federation became a minor partner to the businessmen associations which 
maintained a quasi-monopoly on the access to the senior-level decision makers120.
Third, alongside a "legitimate" re-election, and a consolidation of the alliance with the 
haute bourgeoisie, Mubarak needed to restore political control, to increase stability on 
one hand, and decrease his dependence on the military, which has reached a dangerous 
level during the 1986 riots, on the other. To do so, Mubarak moved swiftly to replace the 
minister of interior, Ahmed Roushdy, whom he held responsible for failing to control the 
CSF riots, with the hard-line, confrontational Zaki Badr. This move meant the regime 
was willing to take as many oppressive measures as it took to restore its control. Not 
surprisingly, the number of political detainees skyrocketed between 1986 and 1990. The 
security forces were given orders to adopt an iron-fist policy vis-a-vis the fundamentalists 
in Upper Egyptian cities, particularly in Assyut, the stronghold of the Jama'a Islamiya 
(Islamic association). All forms of political and social protest were equally oppressed.
120 A joint communique was signed in 1989 to that effect. See: Kandeel (1995:154); Abdel Mo'ti 
(2002:116).
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Fourth, although Ahmed Roushdy was thought of as a counter-balance to Marshal Abou 
Ghazala, and hence his replacement was considered by analysts such as Springborg 
(1987:7) a political victory for Abou Ghazala, it was actually Zaki Badr's iron-fist 
policies that reduced Mubarak’s dependency on Abou Ghazala for his regime's security. 
Under Badr, the police forces and CSF resumed the role as the regime's key protectors. 
This probably facilitated Mubarak's seemingly abrupt decision in 1989 to demote Abou 
Ghazala to the ceremonial post of assistant to the president without portfolio (EIU 
1989b:7).
The aforementioned measures meant that a) Mubarak's regime was fully preoccupied 
with the task of restoring his legitimacy and power hold during the crisis' years; and b) 
that whereas its social base, depending primarily on a coalition of the haute bourgeoisie 
with senior state bureaucrats, was strong enough to ensure that an IMF-led route out of 
the crisis was the only one considered by the regime121, it was not broad enough to 
undertake any far-reaching restructuring of the political economy without risking serious 
social and political upheaval. The regime remained vulnerable to its opposition's critiques 
of failing to respond to the needs of the poor masses or restore economic growth.
Such critiques were all the more embarrassing given the rapid success of the "Islamic 
investment companies", which maintained close relations with the members of the 
"Islamic coalition" in the parliament. In the middle of its crisis in 1986, the regime 
granted these limited liability companies an exception from law 159 of 1981, which
121 This was becoming abundantly clear in the aftermath of the dismissal of the minister of economics in 
April 1985, and the abolition of the import rationalisation committee in August 1986 (see sections 1.1, and 
1.2 above).
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confines the right of raising money publicly to joint-stock companies, which are listed 
and whose operations are closely monitored to protect shareholders (Abdel-Mo'ti 
2002:120). It was particularly worth noting that instead of requesting that the "Islamic 
investment companies" registered themselves as joint-stock companies, in compliance 
with law 159 of 1981, the crisis-ridden regime sought to appease the political Islamists by 
granting their companies an exception from the law. In 1988, there were 154 such 
companies, using deposits from Egyptians estimated at $20 billion, and dubiously 
investing them in the world financial and commodity markets (Ali 1988:83). Realising 
that they were becoming intolerably powerful, the government decided to clamp down on 
these companies in 1989, thereby destroying an essential power base of its fundamentalist 
opposition. The clampdown, however, did not only reveal the shady nature of their 
business, it also uncovered the huge losses made by large strata of the Egyptian middle 
classes whose savings were predominantly directed towards these companies.
With the middle and lower classes trapped between the pressures of the government's 
economic retrenchment measures122 on one hand, and the losses in the "Islamic 
investment companies" on the other, political and social unrest escalated further. Starting 
from 1984, and throughout the 1980s, Egypt witnessed 112 strikes, 26 rioting events, 175 
demonstrations, the assassination of the parliament speaker, and three failed attempts to 
assassinate three successive ministers of interior (Helal 1993:197). The vast majority of 
these events took place between 1987 and 1990. The government responded by further 
intensifying its oppressive measures, and Zaki Badr escalated his iron-fist policies, and 
unorthodox violent tactics, further alienating himself from the opposition. The row
122 This will be examined in detail in the next subsection.
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between Badr and the opposition reached no return point in March 1989, when Bard 
engaged in a fist-fight with two opposition members of parliament during a televised 
parliamentary session. A month later, he announced the arrest of 1000 opposition 
members (EIU 1989b:7)
By the end of 1989, the crisis conditions had reached a very serious level with sectarian, 
social and political violence mounting; the strife between the government and opposition 
escalating; and no deal underway with the IMF. Mubarak's regime made several 
desperate moves to contain the crisis. Zaki Badr was sacked, several foreign policy 
gestures sought to capture the public sentiments, including restoring relations with the 
Arab states, flirting anew with the USSR, and embarking on a new Arab Unity scheme, 
with the creation of the "Arab Cooperation council" with Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen123.
As far as containing the tense domestic situation was concerned, these gestures proved 
necessary but not sufficient. Domestic tensions and sectarian and political violence 
continued, but never reached an unmanageable level. To add to the government's agonies, 
the constitutional court ruled in May 1990 that the electoral law of 1987 was 
unconstitutional, thereby creating the regime's second constitutional crisis in three years, 
and forcing Mubarak to dissolve the parliament. The two main opposition forces, the 
secular New Wafd and the "Islamic Coalition" boycotted the elections, as a result of the 
regime's reluctance to respond to their demands for political concessions including the 
termination of the state of emergency (Hopwood 1993: 187-189). Naturally, the NDP's
1231 will return to these measures in some detail in section 2.4 below.
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parliamentary majority increased, but the social and political support bases of the regime 
were shrinking further.
The regime’s foreign policy manoeuvres seemed equally ill-fated, with developments in 
the Eastern Block rendering any flirtations with the USSR unrealistic, and the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait bringing to a quick end the Arab Cooperation council. Paradoxically, 
however, it was the latter development that offered the regime the long-awaited chance to 
use its "strategic rent" to negotiate a way out of its mounting crisis and brought forth of a 
second wave of restructuring the Egyptian political economy and foreign policy.
(2.2) Economic Structures and Policies
The 1986 resource crisis was characterised, and its management was determined, by three 
key factors: its size, social context, and timing. First, with a decline of $2 billion in 
government oil revenues (a 70% drop from the previous year), a simultaneous decline in 
workers’ remittances and tourism revenues (in the aftermath of the scare caused by the 
CSF riots), the government's manoeuvring space shrank considerably, and painful 
economic restructuring was imperative.
Second, equally important was the fact that this crisis took place in the aftermath of the 
triumph of the private bourgeoisie. Mustafa Al-Said's attempt in 1985 to curb imports had 
been defeated124, the haute bourgeoisie was well represented in the govemment-business 
joint commissions, and was given further concessions as the minister of supply issued a 
decree in 1986 granting the private sector a carte blanche to import food products (Abdel
124 See section 1.2 above.
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Fattah 2003:55). This meant that crisis management by means of curbing consumption 
and curtailing the privileges of the haute bourgeoisie through an austerity program and a 
return to etatisme was not a viable option. Restructuring through an IMF-led 
liberalisation programme was the only possible alternative given this social context of the 
resource crisis.
Third, notwithstanding the magnitude of the crisis (which made restructuring imperative), 
and its social context (which determined the nature and direction of the restructuring), the 
timing of the crisis put serious limitations on the government's ability to undertake any 
far-reaching restructuring of the political economy. Political tension had reached 
unprecedented levels when the resource crisis hit, and any far-reaching economic 
restructuring was bound to intensify the social and political protest from the increasingly 
impoverished and alienated lower and middle classes.
It was the combined effect of these three factors, not Mubarak's "natural indecisiveness" 
that resulted in the dilatory, and in many aspects failed, restructuring attempt between 
1987 and 1990, when the government proved willing to go to the IMF and undertake 
some liberalisation measures, but unwilling to embark on a full-scale, politically risky, 
liberalisation.
Thus, in May 1987, Egypt agreed on a $325 million standby loan with the IMF over 
eighteen months, including an immediate payment of $150 million. This was combined 
with debt rescheduling arrangements with Egypt's western creditors (the Paris Club), and
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a softening of the US stance on Egypt’s military debt (EIU 1987b:3). In return, Egypt 
embarked on an economic restructuring programme that had six components125:
a) Gradual simplification of the exchange rate structure and setting the exchange 
rate according to market conditions. This entailed a de facto devaluation of the 
Egyptian currency;
b) Increasing domestic energy prices towards parity with international prices;
c) Liberalising Agriculture through terminating the compulsory delivery quotas 
and raising procurement prices for agricultural crops;
d) Adjusting public investment programme to match the availability of resources. 
This necessarily meant reducing the already declining public investment 
levels;
e) Reducing the budget deficit; and
f) Increasing domestic interest rates.
This programme, however, was a little too ambitious, particularly given the political 
circumstances between 1986 and 1988. The government, aware of these risks, resorted to 
delaying tactics, conducting the restructuring measures as slowly and gradually as it 
could (Richards 1991:1721). Restructuring was introduced by stealth, rather than by 
public announcement, for fear of riots. This was, for instance, how electricity and 
Kerosene bills were raised (EIU 1989b: 8). As a result, implementation of the standby 
package fell behind the targeted date of January 1989. If anything, he picture of the 
Egyptian Economy in 1989 looked even bleaker. The IMF, displeased with Egypt's pace 
of implementing the restructuring package, refused to release the second tranche of the
125 This summary of the restructuring measures is adopted from Abdel Khalek (2001:25-27).
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970 Yasser M. Elwv 266
standby agreement on Spring 1988 (Owen and Pamuk 1998:138). Egypt sought to 
approach her creditors directly for a relief arrangement bilaterally, without giving a 
timetable for restructuring. The attempt failed, forcing Egypt to enter into a new series of 
negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank, during which the two institutions added 
to their previous demands a call for the rolling back of the state control of the economy 
(Ibid.). Between the increasing demands of the two institutions, and the reluctance of 
Mubarak's regime to tackle the politically sensitive issues of stabilisation and structural 
adjustment, negotiations reached an impasse.
On the other hand, the debt burden continued to grow, swallowing more than 40% of the 
total export earnings of Egypt, and forcing the government to let deadlines pass on debts 
in 1989. By 1990, the debt had skyrocketed to $50 billion (Richards 1991:1722). On the 
distributional level, the picture looked equally alarming. Inflation reached an 
unprecedented rate of 35%, taxing the salaried strata severely (EIU 1989a:6), and 
unemployment rose to 20% in 1989, compared to 9% in 1980 (Helal 1993:170) -  
doubling through the years of the "hesitant decade". As a result, 43% of the urban 
households were living below the poverty line in 1989, compared to 33% in 1981/1982 ( 
Ibid: 167). In the meantime, the haute bourgeoisie flourished even further, being the main 
beneficiary of any liberalisation measures, and the least affected by the rising inflation 
and unemployment rates126.
126 Prominent Egyptian economist, the late Ramzi Zaki, devoted a series of books works to elaborate a very 
detailed analysis of the means through which inflation further deepened social inequalities, as the haute 
bourgeoisie was able to transfer any impact of the inflation to the other social strata. See particularly: Zaki 
(1993); (1996); and (1999).
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It was becoming increasingly clear that whereas the nature and direction of the economic 
structuring measures between 1987 and 1990 were determined by the social disposition 
of the ruling elite, its magnitude and pace was limited by the government's limited ability 
to pressurise the already strained lower and middle classes, especially at a time of 
political unrest. With Egypt still in the process of re-entering the Arab regional system, 
foreign policy manoeuvres could not be relied upon to generate enough strategic rent to 
resolve the resource crisis. This was particularly evident in the government's failure to 
reach a relief arrangement with its creditors in 1989. Thus, the government had to settle 
for crisis management, and tight-rope manoeuvres with its creditors and its people (e.g. 
gradualism, liberalisation by stealth...etc). In 1990, the situation changed profoundly. 
Egypt had fully re-entered the Arab regional system, and was therefore standing in good 
stead to seize the opportunity of the 1990 Gulf crisis to negotiate a way out of its 
economic impasse, and embark on the second wave of restructuring in the 1990s.
(2.3) Ideology
By 1986, Mubarak's regime seemed to be on the verge of a renewed hegemonic crisis. 
The intense resource crisis put an end to the regime's "public relations exercise", since, 
under the crisis conditions, the regime’s social and political preferences became more 
explicit. The government faced the challenge of defending its IMF-led economic reform 
package, and the social consequences thereof. On the other hand, developments in the 
domestic polity, from the mounting social protest, to the rising popularity of Field 
Marshall Abou Ghazala, and the Islamists' bid for ideological hegemony, created serious 
challenges to the legitimacy of Mubarak's regime that required more proactive
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideology and Modernisation since 1970_________ Yasser M. Elwv 268
hegemony-restoring measures. The regime's policy of restoring its hegemony through 
Ideological evasiveness and avoiding voicing any explicit policy choice was proving both 
insufficient and unsustainable.
In responding to these challenges, the regime's discourse developed along three lines: a) 
justifying the government's economic choices through a combination of the "logic of 
necessity" and emphasising the government's "nationalistic approach to the negotiations 
with the IMF"; b) qualifying Mubarak's "technocratic" image through the development of 
a personality cult; and c) portraying Egypt's return to the Arab league as a step towards 
restoring Egypt's national role, based on a milder form of Arab nationalism that 
emphasised the primacy of the contradictions between the Arab states and Iran instead of 
the Arab-Israeli contradiction.
Naturally, the government's decision to seek an IMF-led economic package in the face of 
the mounting resource crisis undermined all previous claims to restoring etatisme. The 
governmental discourse justified this decision through emphasising its inevitability on 
one hand, and highlighting its skilful and "nationalistic" approach to the negotiations with 
the IMF on the other. To demonstrate the inevitability of resorting to the IMF, the 
government's discourse invoked two key arguments. First, it emphasised that the question 
of structural adjustment is of a highly technical and apolitical nature. It was therefore 
reflective of "scientific" realities, not a result of the regime's social disposition or 
ideological preferences. Any opposition to this decision was dismissed as purely 
"ideological" -  a term invoked in the official discourse in a pejorative sense, based on
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contrasting the government’s professionals debating scientifically the problems and 
deciding on the only possible ’’scientific" policy option, and the opposition's ideologues 
and rabble-rousers (Wahba 1993:51-53). Second, the government held the population 
growth responsible for the economic crisis (Aulas 1988:155). As such, the people, not the 
government, were to be blamed for the government's "inevitable" decision to resort to the 
IMF. All that could be done, therefore, was for the government to undertake the difficult 
negotiations with the IMF to find a way out of the problems caused by its own population 
growth.
In so doing, the governmental discourse celebrated the “national struggle” of the 
Egyptian government to resist the IMF's pressure to apply a rigid prescription regardless 
of its social and political costs (Wahba 1993:59). The government proclaimed its success 
to negotiate a package that is "hundred percent Egyptian", and assured its population that, 
in accordance with its famous slogan "La Massass ” (no jeopardising [of the gains of the 
poor]), subsidies to the poor will not be reduced (Ibrahim 2000:258). After years of 
"realistic" discourse that succeeded in lowering the popular expectations from the state, 
the government could now confine its economic role to "resisting" the IMF pressures for 
even costlier reforms, and, as Premier Atef Sidki announced in a speech to the people's 
assembly on 29th December 1986, "[to] spare no effort to create the proper climate for 
private sector's growth" (EIU 1987a:9). The government still rejected privatisation, but 
made no commitments to developing the public sector or restoring its leading role in the 
economy (Ghoneim 2005:130). Furthermore, on 29th May 1989, a joint communique by 
the National Labour Union and the Egyptian Businessmen Association called for further
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liberalisation, reforming the public sector and making it more profit-oriented, and 
confining the government’s role to policy planning (Ibid., p.89). Etatisme was gradually 
forgone.
However, in a time of a severe resource crisis coupled with increasing social and political 
protest, claims to technocratic efficiency were hardly enough to establish the regime's 
legitimacy. Thus, Mubarak's second presidency witnessed the development of a 
personality cult in lieu of the hitherto technocratic image of the president (EIU 1987d:5). 
The official narrative of the October 1973 war was revised, portraying the "first air 
strike", conducted by Mubarak, commander of the Air Forces at the time, as the key 
decisive factor in victory. This new presidential silhouette served the twin purposes of 
emphasising Mubarak's national and military credentials -  particularly in the face of 
Abou Ghazala's popularity in the army -  as well as preparing the population for the 
difficult economic and political decisions to come (Ibid., p.6) by adopting a grander 
image of a national leader entitled to asking for sacrifices from his population.
Such grander image required more than personality-based propaganda. A certain "cause" 
was required that could justify sacrifices. This remained the regime's central weakness. 
With no resources, ability or willingness to undertake any grand causes, the regime's 
discourse opted for portraying Egypt's return to the Arab league as a step towards 
restoring Egypt's national role, based on a mild form of Arab nationalism based on the 
primacy of the contradictions between the Arab states and Iran. Mubarak's first speech 
before the parliament after Egypt's readmission to the league in the Amman Summit in
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November 1987, outlined his perception of Egypt's Arab policy, which should a) arrive 
at a common security policy (implying a leading role of Egypt in formulating and 
implementing such a policy, as was demonstrated in the Gulf War); b) remain committed 
to the Arab Joint Defence Treaty (which he vigorously claimed to have done by 
supporting Iraq); c) work for solidarity rather than unity because the former is more 
practical and reliable (thereby defending his choice of a less flamboyant version of Pan- 
Arabism); and d) preserve its resources for developmental purposes (thereby securing a 
strong argument against his radical opposition's demands for extending military support 
to the Palestinian intifada)121.
Egypt's readmission to the league, Mubarak's open critique of the Israeli government's 
oppression of the Palestinian intifada, and the creation of the short-lived "Arab 
Cooperation council" with Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, were represented as indicators of a 
re-emerging Arab role of Egypt. More importantly, however, the new official discourse 
on Egypt's Arab role focused on Iran, not Israel, as the key threat to the Arab cause. 
Routine criticisms of Israeli policies vis-a-vis the intifada continued, but the 
government's discourse on Iran emphasised its "aggression" on the "Iraqi brothers", as 
well as its commitment to toppling the Arab regimes -  including Egypt's- and replacing 
them with fundamentalist regimes. A succession of announcements of discovered 
Iranian-backed plots to politically destabilise Egypt further emphasised this point. 
Thence, in 1987, members of the clandestine Jihad group were arrested, charged of 
attempting an Iranian-style revolution, with the support of Tehran. In May 1987, the 
Iranian interest section was closed, and the only resident Iranian diplomat was expelled
127 See: Canton (1991:356-357).
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(EIU 1987c:3). And in June 1988, the Egyptian police announced the detention of 
another Iranian-backed underground group that allegedly maintained contacts with the 
Iranian intelligence, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and the outlawed Iraqi Da'wa party (EIU 
1988c:7). Meanwhile, Egypt's political and military support for Iraq in its war against 
Iran continued, as did its depiction in the local media as indicative of the rejuvenation of 
Egypt's national role. Unsurprisingly, the "Iran-as-the-new-regional-villain narrative" 
also served domestic purposes, as it offered the grounds for questioning the nationalism 
and patriotism of the regime's established "enemy within" -  the Islamists.
However, between the severe resource crisis which the government could only manage, 
not resolve, and the continued ascent of political Islamists, the success of the regime's 
trilateral hegemony-restoring strategy was meagre. All the government's discourse could 
do, during the "crisis management years" between 1986 and 1990, was a) to utilise 
Egypt's foreign policy breakthroughs on the Arab level to rebuild its image as a re- 
emerging regional power; and b) to attempt to minimise the damage caused by the 
resource crisis and the ensuing IMF-led reform package, and to cast the negotiations with 
the IMF in a nationalistic form, in which the government claims to be the defender of the 
national economic interests that sought to minimise the otherwise inevitable price for the 
damage made by its own population's growth. Only after the Gulf Crisis in 1990, and the 
launching of the second wave of restructuring, was the government able to adopt a more
10SKaggressive discourse, and voice its hitherto implicit ideological preferences .
1281 will examine this development in the following chapter.
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(2.4) Foreign Policy
Unlike the first half of the 1980s, in which Egyptian foreign policy could focus 
exclusively on the hegemony-restoring function, the crisis conditions since 1986 should 
have led to a shift in the planning and conduct of Egyptian foreign policy to meet the 
rent-generation demands of the resource crisis. This, however, did not happen, and 
Egyptian foreign policy remained devoted, almost exclusively, to its first function 
throughout the "crisis management years". The reason for that was threefold: a) with 
Egypt still, in 1986, out of the Arab league, and with a small part of Sinai (the border city 
of Taba) still under Israeli occupation, there remained unfinished business insofar as 
restoring the regime's hegemony is concerned; b) the socio-economic crisis conditions 
rendered many of the other hegemony-restoring tools, namely, those based on flirting 
with aspects of etatisme, unfeasible, and indeed led to certain mild arrangements that 
further reduced the social base of the regime and alienated much of the middle and lower
1 ?Qclasses . Foreign policy, therefore, remained the only possible tool to restore the 
regime's legitimacy, and providing an ideological compensation for the economic and 
social sacrifices to come; and finally c) the unfinished business of restoring Egypt's 
regional status meant that there were hardly any strategic assets on which the regime can 
rely as a basis of foreign-policy-related rent, as its predecessors frequently did. This can 
be demonstrated by comparing the failure of the government to negotiate a less-costly 
deal with the IMF between 1986 and 1990, to the swift easing up of Egypt's economic 
burdens in the fall of 1990, which witnessed over the span of a few weeks a $20.2 billion 
reduction of Egypt's debt, thanks to the conditions resulting from Egypt's re-entry to the 
Arab world combined with the impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
129 See sections (2.1) and (2.2) above.
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At the heart of this hegemony-restoring foreign policy was, obviously, arranging Egypt's 
re-entry to the Arab regional system -  a pre-requisite for both liquidating a centrepiece of 
the domestic counter-consensus against the regime's foreign policy, and for reclaiming 
Egypt's regional role, which is her key strategic asset and the necessary condition for any 
rent-generation in the future. To do so, Mubarak's plan was twofold: a) to re-enter the 
Arab regional system "physically", by securing Egypt's re-admission to the Arab league; 
and b) to re-enter the Arab regional system "politically", by restoring Egypt's central role 
in the regional politics.
Egypt's return to the Arab regional system had already started gradually since 1984, as I 
argued in sub-section 1.4 above, but the qualitative leaps started only in 1987. In April 
the secretary general of the Arab league announced that Egypt would be welcome back in 
the organisation. In November, the Arab summit in Amman decided to authorise Arab 
States to resume bilaterally diplomatic relations with Egypt should they so decide. Nine 
Arab countries immediately did, leaving only Syria, Algeria and Libya. In December, 
Mubarak toured the Gulf States, met with Saddam Hussein and Yasser Arafat in 
Baghdad, and concluded with a meeting with King Hussein in Aqaba, Jordan (Cantori 
1991:357-358). In the Arab summit in Casablanca in 1989, which Mubarak attended, a 
decision was taken to return the headquarters of the Arab league to Cairo, thereby 
announcing that Egypt is officially, and indeed literally, returning to the Arab centre- 
stage. By that time, even Syria, the bitterest of Egypt's Arab critics, resumed diplomatic 
relations, giving up her demand of Egypt's renouncement of Camp David (Hopwood 
1993:191).
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This swift re-admission of Egypt to the Arab league was a result of realpolitik 
calculations not just by Egypt but also by the Arab states. On one hand, several factors 
contributed to Egypt's increased need for manoeuvring space, and awareness of the 
limitations of her increased dependence on the US. First, as Cantori (1991:343) noted, the 
US support for Israel put Egypt in a trilateral relationship with Washington, in which 
"issues nominally o f bilateral character between Cairo and Washington or Cairo and Tel 
Aviv repeatedly became a 'ganging up' phenomenon with Israel using her special 
influence in Washington to put pressure on Egypt". Meanwhile, the unfolding of the Iran- 
Contra affair raised further suspicions in Cairo as to the nature of the US interests in the 
region and their possible contradictions with Egypt's national interests, and led Mubarak 
to cancel his annual trip to the US in protest to the implications of the affair (EIU 
1987a:7), and convinced him of the need to explore other foreign policy options. Thus 
alongside the regional moves aiming at restoring Egypt's Arab relations, Mubarak's 
regime flirted more openly with the USSR. As a result, in February 1987, a protocol was 
signed by both countries on financial, trade and economic relations, as well as to grant 
Egypt a generous rescheduling of her $4 billion military debt to the USSR (EIU 19871:7; 
EIU 1989b:5). The Russian cultural centre was reopened in Cairo in March 1988, and in 
May, Egypt's foreign minister, Esmat Abdel Meguid visited Moscow, the first visit by an 
Egyptian foreign ministers since 1972, when Sadat expelled Russian experts from Egypt 
(EIU 1988b:8). His counterpart Edward Shevemadze reciprocated by making Egypt the 
centre of his Middle East tour in 1989. It was in Cairo that he met, separately, with 
Yasser Arafat and the Israeli foreign minister Moshe Arens, followed by a three-hours
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meeting with Mubarak that resulted in Egypt's support for a "Soviet peace initiative" 
(EIU 1989a:7-8) that actually never materialised.
On the other hand, perhaps more importantly, the developments in the Gulf -  the 
successful Iranian ground offensive, the Iran-Contra affair and the tank war that followed 
it, the flagging of Kuwaiti ships, and the US naval deployment in the gulf -  all created an 
atmosphere of a regional crisis that prompted, as Cantori (1991:341) noted, a nearly 
unanimous Arab states' concurrence in the need to re-establish diplomatic relations with 
Egypt. As Egypt continued to extend military support to Iraq, ranging from arms sales 
that amounted to more the $3 billion in value, to freeing a number of army officers to 
serve in the Iraqi armed forces (Tripp 1989:177), the alarmed Gulf States moved swiftly 
to restore relations with Egypt. Thus, a Gulf Cooperation Council summit in January 
1987 laid the ground for the readmission of Egypt in the Islamic Conference Organisation 
meeting in Kuwait at the end of the same month, and pushed for the re-admission of 
Egypt in the Arab league later in the same year. It was clear that, in the aftermath of the 
Iran-Contra affair and the simultaneous Iranian advances in the Gulf War, Egypt figured 
prominently in the Gulf States' foreign policy planning as they sought to marshal regional 
support in the face of the Iranian influence, after what they perceived as abandonment by 
the US -  a perception that was so profound that even the US decision to re-flag Kuwaiti 
ships as a goodwill gesture to the Gulf States was not enough to change (Cantori 1991: 
355-356).
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In the meantime, Egypt continued her efforts at eliminating the differences between 
Jordan and the PLO a in an effort to create a unified Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating 
team to take over negotiations over the future of the occupied territories, since Egypt, as I 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, had already abandoned the second phase of the Camp 
David accord in favour of Palestinian self-representation. Mubarak also sought to mediate 
between the PLO and Washington (Talhami 1990:236), but his efforts bore no fruition. 
The outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in December 1987 not only rendered any such 
efforts at mediating a peace agreement more difficult, but also led to revival of questions 
on the regime's legitimacy and the impact thereupon of the Egyptian-Israeli relations. The 
regime's response was twofold. First, Mubarak condemned the "Israeli oppression of the 
intifada", and Boutros Ghali, the state secretary for foreign affairs, announced that 
Egypt's relationship with Israel has become a "cold peace" (EIU 1988c:5). This was 
supported by the swift recognition, on November 20th, 1988 of the Palestinian State 
declared five days earlier at the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers. The 
gesture, as well as Israeli Defence minister Yitzhak Rabin's condemnation thereof as a 
deviation from Egypt's commitments under the Camp David accords (EIU 1988d:5), 
were conducive to the regime's claim to a revival of its Arab role -  particularly important 
when it came at a time of economic hardships and very difficult negotiations with IMF. 
Second, acknowledging the complexity in the Middle East conflict brought about by the 
Intifada, Mubarak regime shifted the focus of its Arab policy from the Arab-Israeli 
conflict to the Gulf. Thus, Egypt's support to Iraq and concerns for the "Iranian threat" to 
the stability of the Gulf were emphasised in the regime's foreign policy discourse. 
Mubarak toured the Gulf States, emphasising not only Egypt's concern for their stability,
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but also calling for economic integration as the more realistic manifestation to Arab 
solidarity. In 1989, Egypt formed the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) with Iraq, Yemen 
and Jordan. The ACC was presented, not only as a further indication of the return of 
Egypt's leading Arab role, but also as a new political centre of gravity in inter-Arab 
politics (Hinnebusch 2002:107). The same year witnessed another foreign policy triumph 
for Mubarak's regime. The international arbitration committee on Taba ruled in Egypt's 
favour. Thus Taba was to return to Egypt's sovereignty, and Egypt would only have to 
pay $37 million in compensation for the Avia Sonesta Hotel, built there by an Israeli 
entrepreneur -  less than half of the $80 million that Israel demanded for the facility (EIU 
1989a). At once, Mubarak's regime was able to boast the completion of the liberation of 
Egypt's occupied Sinai, the return of Egypt to the Arab league, and the resumption of 
Egypt's efforts at Arab integration through the establishment of the ACC.
Naturally, this was conducive to the regime's restoration of hegemony, and at least partly 
made up for lack of economic success. However, these diplomatic successes were not 
enough to enable Egypt to resume the strategic rent generation -  much needed as it was 
during the "crisis management" years to facilitate the necessary shift from "crisis 
management" to "crisis resolution".
It was only when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 that the opportunity of resuming 
the second function of Egypt's foreign policy, i.e. rent-generation, surfaced anew. With 
the Arab world shaken to its core by the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait; many other Gulf States, 
particularly Saudi Arabia, recognising the need for Egyptian support; and the US need for
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an Arab participation in any military operation in the Gulf, lest it appears as a "western 
crusade not far from the holy sites in Saudi Arabia", Mubarak moved swiftly, and at a 
summit in Cairo he forced through a resolution condemning Iraq. Furthermore, Egypt 
immediately decided to send troops to Saudi Arabia to participate in the US-led 
international coalition to liberate Kuwait. This diplomatic aggressiveness was almost 
instantaneously rewarded by a generous financial package, examined in more detail in the 
next chapter, that ended Egypt's tight-rope manoeuvres to manage the socio-economic 
crisis, and made "crisis resolution" possible through a far-reaching economic 
restructuring plan that took place almost immediately after the guns in the Gulf fell silent.
And between the regime's legitimacy restoration on one hand, and the strategic rent 
resumption on the other, the "hesitant decade" has effectively come to an end, and a 
second wave of restructuring Egypt's political economy, and foreign policy, was about to 
start.
3- Conclusion: The Patterns of Interplay of Egyptian Political Economy 
and Foreign Policy
Throughout the 1980s, Egypt's foreign policy was focused on the second of its two 
traditional functions -  acting as a source of legitimacy and restoring the regime's 
hegemony. This overarching concern with the restoration of the regime's hegemony was 
an important key to understanding the sometimes contradictory manoeuvres conducted by 
Mubarak’s regime domestically and internationally throughout the "hesitant decade".
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideology and Modernisation since 1970 Yasser M. Elwv 280
Foreign policy issues were at the heart of the counter-consensus that emerged from across 
the political spectrum during the final years of Sadat’s reign, and Mubarak had to make 
some careful alteration in some aspects of his foreign policy to restore his regime's 
legitimacy. Since his predecessor's foreign policy options were, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, embedded in a broader process of restructuring the Egyptian political 
economy in response to changes in the social disposition of the ruling elite and its 
economic and political choices as well as its international alliances, any alteration in 
Egyptian foreign policy had to be carefully made so as not to jeopardise the regime's 
domestic and international network of alliances. Such was the tight-rope act that Mubarak 
was forced to perform during the 1980s.
Domestically, a "public relations exercise" involving token flirtations with etatisme 
sought to disguise the fact that the basic thrust and orientation of the first wave of 
restructuring of populist etatisme continued, albeit at a slower pace, during the 1980s, 
leading to further erosion of the regime's social base. Internationally, Egypt's foreign 
policy sought to reintegrate in the Arab World without prejudice to her relations with 
Israel or the United States. The process started in 1984 but was only able to bear fruition 
in 1989, with the return of the Arab League headquarters to Egypt. Alongside the return 
to the Arab world, Mubarak's regime could only in the very same year, 1989, boast the 
full return of Egypt's occupied territories. With these two developments, as well as other 
foreign-policy-demonstrations of Egypt's resumption of her Arab role -  albeit with a 
focus on the Gulf region in lieu of the Arab Israeli conflict as the heart of Egypt's foreign 
policy -  the regime was able to use foreign policy successes to restore its hegemony.
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That such hegemony restoration process took the whole of the 1980s had two key 
corollaries. First, it rendered the regime's ability to count on foreign policy acumen to 
help resolve the inherent contradictions through the 1980s impossible. Second, it made 
serious economic restructuring in response to the resource crisis that struck in 1986, i.e. 
before the regime's foreign policy exercise to restore its hegemony bore fruition, 
politically risky. Thus the regime had to settle for "crisis management" until the regional 
developments made possible to resume the generation of strategic rent and embark on a 
second wave of restructuring the Egyptian political economy and foreign policy in the 
aftermath of the Gulf Crisis on 1990-1991. The transformation from "crisis management" 
to "crisis resolution" through a second wave of restructuring proved largely dependent on 
the ability to resume the second function of Egyptian foreign policy.
However, the resumption of the second function of Egyptian foreign policy at the end of 
the decade brought anew the question of the potential contradictions between the two 
functions which had previously appeared on two occasions since the 1952 revolution: in 
the resource crisis that forced the restructuring of populist etatisme after 1965, and 
throughout the first wave of restructuring in the 1970s. Egypt's ability to resume the 
second function of her foreign policy was possible only through joining a US-led 
coalition in war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. This not only spelled the death of the 
much-hyped-but-short-lived ACC and stood in stark contrast with Egypt's military 
support of, and close relations with Iraq during the latter's war with Iran, but also was in 
many ways incompatible with the regime's claims to restoring any form of Arab 
nationalism. In fact, it led to a serious questioning of the relevance of Pan-Arabism, and a
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resurfacing of the “Egypticity versus Arabism” debate. Furthermore, the intense Western 
military presence in the Gulf raised serious questions about whether there will be any 
room for a leading Egyptian regional role in the post-war Gulf. The short-lived attempt to 
reinvent the Gulf as the focus of Egypt's Arab policy was proving unsustainable.
Thus, if the direction of the second wave of restructuring populist etatisme in Egypt was 
obvious, given the nature of the social base of the regime and the shifts therein in the 
1980s, which in fact deepened the alliances between the three branches of the 
bourgeoisie, with an increased role of the haute bourgeoisie through such mechanisms as 
the joint-commissions and businessmen associations much to the alienation of other 
social strata, the foreign policy aspects thereof were quite problematic. The questions of 
Egypt's ability to find a balancing point between the hegemonic and rent-generating 
functions of her foreign policies resurfaced, and were reflected in renewed debates about 
Egypt's regional role that were closely intertwined with the socio-economic 
transformations brought about by the second wave of restructuring, and the debates 
thereabout. It is to the analysis of the second wave of restructuring Egypt's political 
economy, and to the foreign policy questions that such wave entailed, that the final 
chapter of this study will be devoted.
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Chapter V
The Second Wave of Restructuring: 1990-2008
“It is as i f  the body [was] deprived o f  its soul” 
Marie-Christine Aulas, State and Ideology in Republican Egypt
“Is this you, Egypt? 
Are you Egypt?” 
Mahmoud Danvish130
This Chapter will account for the interplay of political economy and foreign policy 
during the second wave of restructuring etatisme in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, the Gulf Crisis offered the Egyptian regime a long- 
awaited opportunity to use diplomatic acumen to generate strategic rent, thereby 
facilitating a more aggressive redressing of the resource crisis that had been looming 
since 1986.
The direction of the second wave of restructuring was obvious, given not only the social 
disposition of the regime, but also a set of regional and international developments which 
helped present the neo-liberal path to restructuring as the only viable course. However, 
this did not mean that the restructuring process was smooth. From its first days, the 
second wave of restructuring was replete with political and social crises, culminating in 
an acute and comprehensive crisis of governance in the early 2000s.
First, the strategic rent generation made possible by Egypt’s participation in the US-led 
international coalition during the Gulf War was short-lived. Post-war economic resources
130 From his poem: “Return o f the captive".
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came with immediate and unequivocal conditionality. Egypt had to go through a rigorous 
IMF-led economic restructuring programme, which severely limited the state’s ability to 
mitigate the social costs of economic austerity. Second, Egypt’s position during the Gulf 
War caused a re-surfacing of the legitimacy crisis as a broad counter-consensus was 
formed, challenging not only Egypt’s position during the Gulf War, but also her 
subsequent foreign policy moves. This was reflected in the heated debates over the “role 
of Egypt”. Last but not least, Egyptian foreign policy became a victim of some of its very 
successes, which, paradoxically, contributed to the erosion of Egypt’s regional role. This 
in turn limited Egypt’s ability to mobilise resources through diplomatic clout.
Caught between the limited financial means on one hand, and the controversial and 
occasionally self-defeating foreign policy on the other, the government responded with a 
mix of political de-liberalisation measures, and some token foreign policy gestures that 
indicated Egypt’s intention to maintain her leading role in the region.
These efforts were, however, in vain. Economically, restructuring yielded hardly any 
fruits beyond the improvement of macroeconomic indicators in the first half of the 1990s. 
Even these rapidly eroded as the implications of a series of financial crises in different 
parts of the world hit the Egyptian economy hard by the late 1990s, causing a new 
resource crisis. The problem was that this resource crisis hit at a time when Egypt’s 
ability to fill the resource gap through diplomatic acumen had deteriorated, resulting in 
the government’s forced reliance on domestic resource mobilisation, with the twin
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consequences of a rapidly mounting domestic debt, and a further erosion of the state’s 
social base.
In the meantime, the need for a simultaneous execution of both functions of foreign 
policy -  rent generation to facilitate the economic transformation, and hegemony 
restoration to help mitigate the increasing social and political discontent, proved to be an 
overwhelming strain, and Egyptian foreign policy ended up in a vicious cycle of an 
eroding “regional role” leading to an eroding ability to mobilise strategic rent, and vice 
versa.
Thus, the second wave of restructuring rapidly developed from a “troubled liberalisation 
phase” during the 1990s to a full-fledged “crisis of governance” in the early 2000s. To 
examine such development, this chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will 
examine the interplay of political economy and foreign policy during the 1990s, and the 
dynamics that rendered restructuring etatisme after the Gulf War problematic. The second 
will examine the evolving crisis of governance since 2000, as Egypt was caught in a 
three-legged quandary: an unfruitful economic liberalisation programme, a state with an 
eroding social and political bases, and a foreign policy that is neither capable of 
mitigating the economic predicament, nor restoring the regime’s legitimacy on the eve of 
a looming power vacuum. Finally, the concluding section will seek to abstract patterns of 
interplay between Egypt’s political economy and foreign policy during the second wave 
of restructuring.
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1- The Troubled Liberalisation: 1990-1999
As a result of Egypt’s foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis, a large part of her external 
debt was written off by her creditors. Consequently, Egypt appeared in good stead to 
embark on aggressive economic restructuring. The direction of restructuring was 
straightforward. Managing the social consequences thereof was not.
In spite of significantly more favourable economic and political conditions than those of 
1987, when Egypt made her failed attempt to agree to an IMF-led restructuring 
programme, the resources made available through diplomatic rent-generation were not 
only finite but also conditional. Furthermore, the regime’s foreign policy choices during 
the crisis and afterwards were not popular, forcing it to juggle the two traditional 
functions of its foreign policy, mostly with limited success.
Between the social disposition of the rulers making it clear how the costs of economic 
retrenchment would be divided, and the foreign policy failing to sustain rent-generation 
or defend the regime’s legitimacy against the increasing popular discord, Egypt navigated 
through the troubled waters of the second wave of restructuring. In what follows, I will 
examine the dynamics of this navigation, and the problems thereof.
(1.1) The State
After Egypt’s participation in the “Desert Storm” military operation in 1991, her $14 
billion military debt was written off, and Paris Club creditors, agreed to halve the $20.2 
billion debt (Bromley & Bush 1994:202). These resources were large enough to facilitate
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the launching of the second wave of restructuring, but the accompanying conditionality 
meant that the benefits of debt relief would be devoted to financing restructuring, not to 
buying off support of the disadvantaged strata.
Added to that was the erosion of many of the “hegemony restoration” gains of the 1980s. 
Whereas the regime could by the late 1980s boast its return to the Arab league, and the 
restoration of Egypt’s “Arab role”, Egypt’s participation in the US-led coalition amid 
unprecedented polarisation in the Arab world was quite controversial. Nationalists, 
Islamists, and the left accused the regime of “complicity with American imperialism” in 
the region. Any claims to a significant role in Gulf security was negated by the rapid fall 
of the short-lived “Damascus Declaration”. The combined effect of limited resources and 
legitimacy problems rendered the second wave of restructuring problematic from its 
onset.
Islamist opposition underwent its worst and longest upsurge since the assassination of 
Sadat, thriving off the legitimacy problems posed by the Gulf Crisis, and using it as 
further “evidence” of the regime’s collaboration with the deployment of “infidel troops” 
in “Islamic lands”. The sporadic clashes between the militants and state security in 1991, 
developed into a full-fledged war in Upper Egypt by 1992. Thirty deaths were counted in 
1991. They increased exponentially to 93 in 1992, 208 in 1993 and 373 in 1995 (Kienle 
1998: 226). Violent attacks on tourists dealt a heavy blow to Egypt’s $3 billion-a-year 
tourism industry, adding to the economic agonies of the country. Militants were able to
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreign Policy: State. Ideology and Modernisation since 1970 Yasser M. Elwv 288
draft recruits from the disaffected middle and lower-middle class youth in the 
economically depressed areas.
Mubarak’s regime was facing two challenges: fighting the insurrection and addressing its 
economic causes (Springborg 1998:32). Subscribing to the neoliberal thesis that the 
benefits of restructuring would eventually trickle-down to the economically depressed 
classes and address the latter challenge, the more pressing need was, therefore, to face 
militant Islamism. For that, the regime relied on the heavy hand of its security apparatus, 
alongside a series of far-reaching de-liberalisation measures131. First, the emergency law, 
introduced right after Sadat’s assassination, was renewed repeatedly by the Egyptian 
parliament. The penal code was amended in July 1992, introducing harsh penalties for 
“belonging to organisations seeking to undermine social peace and the rule of law”. All 
such “crimes” became under the jurisdiction of the state security courts, which were 
quick to sentence convicts to death or to long spells of forced labour. Between 1992 and 
1996, 74 civilians were sentenced to death by military judges, and the number of political 
detainees was reported to be around 16000 in 1996.
Second, the government took active measures to restrict political and civil liberties. The 
“parties’ committee” continued to refuse the requests to establish new political parties, 
raising the number of rejected applications since Mubarak assumed presidency to 50 
(Hirst 1999). The few legal political parties were denied the right to organise and 
assemble. Most professional syndicates, traditionally the most vibrant civil society 
institutions, were brought under direct government control.
131 The following summary of the de-liberalisation measures is adopted from: (Kienle 1998; Kienle 2001).
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Explanations of these de-liberalisation measures normally fall into two categories: the 
first adopts a “static approach” considering them yet another phase of the continued 
authoritarianism of the post-1952 regimes in Egypt (cf.: Kassem 2004; Fahmy 2001). The 
second is best represented by Kienle’s (1998; 2001) and Wickham’s (1994) argument that 
the active de-liberalisation during the 1990s was a deliberate measure to curb both the 
threat of Islamic militants as well as the social unrest in the wake of economic 
restructuring. The shortcomings of the first line of analysis are obvious -  it fails to 
account for the dynamics of Egyptian governance, such as introducing some liberalisation 
measures in certain periods of time, say the late 1960s, between 1974 and 1976, and in 
the early 1980s, then retracting them in others.
This study accepts the second explanation, but argues that whilst it sheds more light on 
the dynamics of de-liberalisation in the 1990s, it does not fully explain its scope. The 
battle with the Islamists did not necessitate the closure of the main channels of political 
expression (political parties, syndicates...etc), particularly those in the hands of secular 
forces. Regional and international developments (from the Gulf War to the fall of the 
USSR) had demoralised and weakened the opposition to the regime on nationalist or 
leftist grounds by the early 1990s, when most of the de-liberalisation measures were 
introduced. The militant Islamist threat from 1992 onwards had turned to a security, not a 
political threat. It can therefore only be a pretext for, not a cause of, the active state 
control over civil society.
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Instead, this study argues that the scope of de-liberalisation can be understood against the 
backdrop of the steady erosion of the social base of the Egyptian state during the 1990s. 
The 1980s, as I argued in the previous chapter, witnessed a reinforcement of the alliance 
between the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy and the haute bourgeoisie, and the 
relative marginalisation of the middle and working classes. The resulting balance of 
power was, naturally, reflected in dividing the burdens of economic retrenchment. The 
subsequent transformation of the Egyptian state from a quasi-Keynesian etatisme to a 
neo-liberal state, as Ghoneim (2005:9) argued, broadened the prospects for social and 
class conflict and eroded the state’s ability to mitigate it.
The de-liberalisation measures were an integral part of a process of reinforcing the ruling 
alliance’s control over the state, and the exclusion of, and shifting the burdens of 
economic restructuring to, social strata that had hitherto been amongst the beneficiaries 
of etatisme in Egypt. The resulting erosion of the social base of the state was reflected in 
three developments: a) the increasing role of the haute bourgeoisie in the direct 
governance of the state, and the deepening of their alliance with the upper echelons of 
state bureaucracy; b) the withdrawal of several social and economic gains that the 
workers and peasants have acquired during the populist-statist years; and c) the increased 
marginalisation of the urban middle classes.
The weight of the haute bourgeoisie in the ruling elite increased significantly in the 
1990s. Govemment-business joint commissions continued to increase not only in 
number, but also in their political role. The early 1990s witnessed the creation of a series
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of govemment-business councils between Egypt and her main economic partners, most 
notably the Egyptian-American Businessmen Council, whose spokesman was Mubarak’s 
own son, Gamal, later to be groomed to succeed him. These forums often exceeded their 
main function of discussing bilateral economic relations to coordinating policies, and 
sometimes even discussing political relations. Businessmen were frequently invited to 
accompany Mubarak and his foreign minister on their external trips. Increasing numbers 
of businessmen gained parliamentary membership, especially after the 1995 
parliamentary elections -  considered by many observers the least democratic since the 
restoration of multi-party system in 1976- and then moved on to join key economic and 
legislative parliamentary committees (Mitchell 1999; Kienle 1998). Thus, the 1990s 
witnessed the early beginnings of a slow process through which the very essence of the 
alliance of the haute bourgeoisie and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, hitherto based on the 
former’s support for and partnership in economic restructuring without demanding a 
significant share in government was changing, with consequences that I will return to 
later in this chapter.
This rise of the haute bourgeoisie was facilitated by the deepening of its ties with the 
upper echelons of state bureaucracy. Several mechanisms enforced these ties -  some 
legal, others not quite. One such mechanism was the creation, within the programme of 
privatisation, of several joint-ventures between public and private sectors, whose 
directors invariably came from the public sector. These directors received ludicrous 
salaries and benefits in these profit-making joint-ventures whilst maintaining their
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1 ^9positions in their loss-incurring public sector enterprises (Ghoneim 2005:111-112) .
Critics argued that these vast benefits were in fact the price of transferring profits from 
the public sector enterprises to the newly-created joint-ventures.
Second, in the name of encouraging investment, state-owned land was sold at nominal 
prices to businessmen, and credit was offered by government-owned banks to 
businessmen without requiring guarantees. By 1998, 64% of the total credit provided to 
businessmen was offered without any guarantees (Abdel Fadil 2000). Thus, the 1990s 
witnessed the rise of some thirty business tycoons who, Hirst (1999) argued, thrived off 
two worlds: the freedoms of the new economy and the favours of bankers and high 
functionaries in the old state-controlled one.
Both the haute bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie flourished during the early 
1990s. The workers and peasants did not. They had to bear the costs of restructuring. The 
transformation from etatisme to a neoliberal state was nowhere reflected as clearly as it 
was in the erosion of the benefits of etatisme to the workers and peasants. Law 203 of 
1991, the public business sector law, which replaced law 97 of 1983, required that the 
workers should have a share of no less than 25% in the companies’ profits -  compared to 
at least 50% in the earlier law. Article 3 of the same law required that the workers have 
one representative in the board of directors -  a violation of article 36 of the constitution, 
which required a 50% workers’ representation in the board of directors of public-owned 
enterprises (Ghoneim 2005: 101-102).
132 This indeed was a revival of one of the key mechanisms adopted during infitah years (cf.: chapter III).
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Thus, in the 1990s, workers faced the pressures of: a) a stagnating economy, with annual 
real GDP growth rate below 1% until 1993, before rising to the 2-3% range between 
1994-1996, and eventually to 5% in 1996/1997 -  staying well below the 8% required to 
maintain the current unemployment levels (El-Sayed et.al 2001:7); and b) a new legal 
framework that eroded their share in companies’ profits and management. They 
protested. The annual number of strikes rose from 8 in 1990, to 26 in 1991, 28 in 1992, 
and 63 in 1993 (Kienle 1998:233).
The level of workers’ protest throughout the 1990s, however indicative of the regime’s 
alienation from one of its key support bases, did not seriously threaten political stability. 
In part, this was because the 1990s were the years when thousands of workers were 
“bought out” of the labour force by the early retirement packages as part of the 
privatisation process. Many workers accepted these packages because with their low 
wages, and the wilful decline of their industries due to the government’s decision, as part 
of its new fiscal policy, to stop investing in public-owned industries, the temptation of 
cash was too great. On average, between 50 and 100 thousand workers “retired early” 
every year between 1993 and 1998 (CSS 1999:23).
On the other hand, Law 96 of 1992 amounted to what many argued was a rolling back of 
the agrarian reform laws of the 1950s and 1960s. It stipulated for a full overhauling of the 
relationship between landowners and tenants, hitherto based on fixed rents at a rate equal 
to seven times the land tax. According to the new law, the land rents were allowed to 
triple between 1992 and 1997, and from October 1997, all old rent contracts were
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terminated, tenants lost all legal rights to the land they have lived off for decades, and 
were required to negotiate new tenancy agreements in which the rent was to be 
determined solely by market forces (Ashmawy 2001:225-248).
This law led to an immediate increase in the cost of living for tenants, representing the 
large rural lower-middle classes, numbering some 7 million with their families (Ghoneim 
2005:114-115), and to further erosion of the social base of the state. This was further 
reinforced as the government resorted to its security apparatus to force the 
implementation of this law amidst large protests from those affected thereby. Hundreds 
of protesters were arrested under the emergency law, particularly in Gharbeya and Menya 
govemorates (El-Naggar 2005:20). Many were forced off the countryside altogether, 
contributing to the ever-increasing illegal and unplanned slums that encircled Cairo, 
which comprised some 84% of the accommodation built since the end of the 1980s (Hirst 
1999), and joining the informal economy.
Finally, the impoverishment and alienation of the urban middle class was deepened 
during the 1990s. Mitchell (1999) noted that real wages in the industrial public sector 
dropped by 8% per annum from 1990/1991 to 1995/1996. Other public sector wages that 
stabilised during these years were effectively below a living wage, amounting to less than 
2 dollars a day for a schoolteacher or other public sector employee. Household 
expenditure surveys showed a sharp decline in real per capita consumption between 
1990/1991 and 1995/1996 and an increase in the number of people below the poverty line 
over the same period from 40% (urban and rural), to 45% in urban areas and 50% in the
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countryside. Between economic entrenchment and political repression of civil society 
and political parties (hitherto the main outlet for middle class political activity), the 
middle class was increasingly alienated from the rapidly eroding social base of the 
regime.
Mubarak’s regime subscribed to the notion that the erosion of the social base of the 
emerging neoliberal state will be reversed as the growth rates “take o ff’. The 
appointment of a new government in 1996 was meant to launch this “take o ff’. For the 
first two years of this government, economic performance was mediocre, never 
approaching the required 8% to maintain the current unemployment rate, let alone reduce 
it. Later on, the financial crisis that extended between 1997 and 1999 from Asia to Russia 
and Latin America began to take its toll on the Egyptian economy, which entered a new 
resource-crisis and began experiencing stagflation for the first time in modem Egyptian 
history133.
The political significance of this crisis was twofold: a) that the years of “troubled 
liberalisation” have come to an end with no significant economic benefits for the majority 
of the population; and b) that the resource crisis came at a time when the social base of 
the state had significantly eroded, making further entrenchment politically risky. The 
political risk was made all too clear when, in the 2000 parliamentary elections, for the 
first time since the restoration of multi-party system, the ruling party failed to gain the 
parliamentary majority. NDP won 170 from 444 parliamentary seats (a massive drop 
from 410 seats in the previous parliament). Opposition parties won sixteen seats. The
1331 will return to this in subsection 2.2 below.
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Muslim Brotherhood won seventeen seats. The rest (256 seats) were won by 
independents, reflecting public distrust not only in NDP, but also in the restricted partisan 
life as a whole (Abdel Latif 2001:276-277). That 218 “independents” joined NDP after 
the elections, giving it the much-needed majority, did not hide the fact that a serious 
political crisis was looming. The years of “troubled liberalisation” were over, and the 
extended crisis of governance, which continued since 2000, was only starting.
(1.2) Economic Structures and Policies
In spite of the short-term losses incurred by the Egyptian economy during the Gulf crisis, 
resulting from decreased revenues from tourism and workers’ remittances, the crisis 
presented the regime with the opportunity to generate enough strategic rent to embark on 
the second wave of restructuring. Confident of both the prospects for strategic rent- 
generation and the direction of restructuring, Mubarak announced a “1000 days” 
programme of economic liberalization as early as December 1990 (Lofgren 1993:411), 
two months before the Gulf War, five months before the actual signing of the standby 
agreement with the IMF in May 1991, and almost a year before obtaining the structural 
adjustment loan from the World Bank in November 1991. Together, the agreement with 
the IMF and the World Bank structural adjustment loan constituted the economic reform 
and structural adjustment programme (ERSAP) that signalled the beginning of the second 
wave of restructuring of the Egyptian political economy134.
ERSAP comprised four main components: a) macroeconomic reforms, b) public 
enterprise reform, c) domestic price liberalization, and d) foreign trade liberalization.
134 The following description of the main pillars of ERSAP is adopted from Abdel Khalek (2001:44-50).
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Macroeconomic reforms involved i) a fiscal policy aiming to trim off the double digit 
fiscal deficit to a mere 1.5% by 1996, via a reduction of public expenditure, and a 
substantial hike in public revenues through the introduction of a broad range of indirect 
taxes; and ii) a monetary policy involving liberalising interest rates, eliminating all credit 
lines between the central bank and the government, creating a market for treasury bills, 
devaluation and simplifying the exchange rate system.
The centrepiece of public enterprise reform was the law 203 of 1991, discussed in the 
previous subsection, amongst the implications of which was the increased financial and 
administrative autonomy of company managers whose sole objective was now to 
maximise profitability. Domestic price liberalisation meant primarily raising domestic 
prices of petroleum and electricity prices. Measures in the agricultural sector included the 
removal of the delivery quota for rice, bringing cotton prices closer to world prices, and 
most importantly, law 96 of 1992, discussed in the previous subsection. Finally, foreign 
trade liberalisation involved two sets of measures: reducing import bans, and a general 
lowering of tariffs.
The outcome of the first five years of ERSAP was ambivalent. The macroeconomic 
success was unequivocal with budget deficit reduced to less than 1% of GDP, inflation 
reduced to 5%, its lowest level for more than two decades, and foreign currency reserves 
were at a record $20 billion (Springborg 1998:33). The real economy, however, remained 
stagnant with very low growth rates and rising unemployment. The regime responded 
with a forward leap aimed at deepening the restructuring measures with the appointment
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of Kamal El-Ganzouri’s government in 1996, which announced that the stabilisation 
phase was successfully concluded, and that economic take off was about to start.
El-Ganzouri announced shortly after his appointment that his government’s priorities 
would be: a) achieving an annual growth rate of more than 7% within two years; b) 
tripling exports within five years to redress the trade deficit; c) encouraging investments 
and speeding up privatisation and d) increasing the national savings rate from 18% to 
25% (EIU 1997:16-17).
The actual economic performance of El-Ganzouri’s government fell short of these goals. 
Growth rate never exceeded 6% in its first two years. Exports stagnated and failed to 
cover more than 29.7% of the imports bill. Imports on the other hand increased by a 
staggering 70.4% from $1.7 billion in 1996 to $2.9 billion in 1997/1998 (El-Naggar 
1999:28). The resulting trade deficit put pressure on the exchange rate, forcing 
devaluation in 1998 (El-Gebaly 1999:28). The private sector achieved only 52% of the 
investments targeted in the quintennial plan (1997-2002), with the industrial sector 
particularly lagging, achieving only 26% of its targets (Ghoneim 2005:95). This was not 
compensated for by public sector investments, which, as a percentage of GDP, had 
halved during the first five years of the 1990s and continued to decline thereafter 
(Ibid: 149). Far from launching a productive take off, the share of commodity producing 
sectors in total value added continued to decline, demonstrating unmistakable signs of the 
“Dutch disease” in the Egyptian economy (Abdel Khalek 2001:159). Unemployment rate
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rose to an alarming 11.3%, according to official figures, with unofficial estimates 
doubling it (El-Sayed et.al 1998:110).
The string of financial crises between 1997 and 1999 from Southeast Asia to Russia and 
Latin America exacerbated the weaknesses of Egypt’s real economy, gradually spilling 
over the macroeconomic level, and threatening to roll back the gains of the stabilisation 
phase. A wave of cheap imports flooded the Egyptian market, increasing the trade deficit 
exponentially. A large drop in international oil prices from $20 per barrel in 1996 to $9 in 
1998 resulted in a sharp decline in the state’s revenues (Issawi 2007:181-182). 
Consequently budget deficit as a share of GDP increased rapidly from 1.5% in 1995/1996 
to 2.9% in 1998/1999 to 3.9% in 1999/2000 -  almost trebling in less than four years (El- 
Naggar 2005:63). The increasing trade and budget deficits pressured the Egyptian pound. 
To defend the exchange rate, the government was forced to use the international reserves 
which declined subsequently from $20.3 billion in 1996/1997 to $18.6 billion in 1999 
(Ghoneim 2005:97). By the end of the 1990s, the government was facing a second 
resource crisis and a stagnating economy.
The transformation to the neo-liberal state was almost complete, but at the cost of 
alienating large social strata, and with no fulfilment of the take off promise. This was 
reflected in the patterns of distribution of the burdens of ERSAP and the ensuing 
mediocre economic performance. It also rendered further economic retrenchment 
politically risky. With the regime’s ability to mobilise resources through its foreign 
policy eroding, as I will argue in subsection 1.4 below, resources had to be mobilised
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domestically, however politically risky that might be. This was how the troubled 
liberalisation of the 1990s ended and the governance crisis of the 2000s began.
(1.3) Ideology
The second wave of restructuring started amid a set of regional and international 
developments that not only furnished the resources needed to embark on ERSAP, but also 
weakened any domestic opposition to the transformation from etatisme to a neo-liberal 
state. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent demolition of Iraq in the war 
discredited radical pan-Arabism. The simultaneous developments in Eastern Europe and 
the fall of the USSR discredited command economies. Combined, these developments 
furnished the government with the opportunity to justify both its foreign policy during 
and after the crisis, and the neoliberal path of restructuring the political economy on 
grounds of lack of any viable alternatives. The government’s discourse emphasised a 
mixture of the technocratic argument employed frequently by Mubarak’s regime since 
the 1980s -that technical, apolitical macroeconomic reforms were chosen exclusively on 
their problem-solving efficiency, not their ideological significance- alongside a local 
variation of Margret Thatcher’s famous TINA (‘There is no alternative’) slogan135.
Thus, the scope of political debate was narrowed, with most of the public discussion 
about economic restructuring casted in the abstruse terminology of neoclassical 
economics (Mitchell 1999). The government’s argument, reiterated vehemently in the 
regime’s press, was threefold: a) that Egypt’s economic ailments were the product of the
135 In so doing, the Egyptian regime was invoking a recurrent argument that prevailed in several parts of 
Eastern Europe, to justify similar measures. Cf.: Kagarlitsky (1999); Callinicos (2001).
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inefficiencies of etatisme, b) since 1967 etatisme became evidently unworkable, and c) 
the restructuring steps taken since infitah were too limited to produce meaningful reform 
(Bromley & Bush 1994:203).
Unlike ERSAP, Egypt’s foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis was more intelligible, 
thereby more controversial. A Nasserist, Islamist, and leftist counter-consensus emerged, 
condemning the regime’s foreign policy and accusing it of being a pawn of American 
imperialism. The government’s first response was to enforce the “personality cult” that 
began to develop since the beginning of Mubarak’s second presidential term in 1987. 
Thus, the state-owned media trumpeted, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of 
Mubarak’s accession to presidency, his “masterly and statesmanlike” management of the 
crisis, occasionally leaking to the media stories about his firm opposition the Americans’ 
attempts to develop the “Desert Storm” offensive into Iraqi territories. Mubarak was 
therefore depicted as the wise statesman, committed to “moderate pan-Arabism” -  
fulfilling his obligations towards Kuwait under the Arab Joint Defence Treaty, whilst 
standing firmly against any American intentions to invade Iraq (EIU 1991c: 10).
The government’s campaign was unsuccessful, however, particularly in the face of 
Islamists’ accusations of complicity with the deployment of the “infidel” troops in the 
“holy lands”. The Islamists’ attacks, being an integral part of their violent offensive 
throughout the early 1990s, merited a stronger response.
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The government employed the same strategy that it used in the early 1980s, defining 
Islamists as the immediate danger, and invoking a public relations manoeuvre to co-opt 
the secular opposition. The economic conference of 1982 and the “parasitic explanation 
of Egypt’s economic predicament” served that purpose in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the 
centrepiece of the new public relations exercise was “defending the civic nature of the 
Egyptian state”. A series of publications, comprising a mix from early writings of 
“Egyptian renaissance” and critiques of the Islamists by modern-day seculars, appeared 
in the markets in 1992 and 1993. The series was titled al-muwajaha (the confrontation), 
and its books were sold at nominal prices (Soliman 2005:86-87).
The assassination of the secular writer Farag Fouda, the assassination attempt on Egypt’s 
most celebrated novelist Naguib Mahfouz, as well as numerous burnings of theatres and 
bookshops in Upper Egypt during the early 1990s, played a key role in convincing the 
secular intelligentsia (particularly its culturally influential leftist prong) to accept, if only 
tactically, the “lesser evil” of Mubarak’s secular regime and to focus on preventing the 
advent of an Islamists’ theocracy. This was particularly evident in the discourse of 
NPUP’s newspaper Al-Ahali, as well as the increasing number of contributions of leftist 
intellectuals in government press’s attacks on the Islamists, particularly in the weekly 
magazine Rose Al-Youssef, which under the editorship of Adel Hammouda during the 
early 1990s was devoted to the battle with the Islamists. A new “political contract” was 
formed between the regime and the secular intelligentsia, based on the primacy of the 
Islamists’ threat, and the need to defend the “civic nature of the state”.
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This “political contract” formed the basis of a “national dialogue” conference called on 
by Mubarak in 1994, with the stated goal of “determining the priorities of the 
development needs and national security” (El-Kora’y 2000). Islamists were virtually 
excluded from the invitation136, and notwithstanding the conference’s ambitious claims, 
the developmental questions (e.g. debating the neoliberal restructuring) were virtually 
neglected, and the conference focused on the “civic question”.
On the longer term, however, the emphasis on secularism was not sufficient to face 
challenges to the government’s legitimacy by the mid-1990s, when the social 
implications of ERSAP began to unfold. As the social base of the state rapidly eroded, 
the secular left resumed its attacks on the government’s social and economic policies, 
going as far as to blame these policies for the rise of fundamentalism.
The government’s ideological Achilles’ heel, however, was more its foreign, than its 
domestic policy. The Gulf-centred Arab role celebrated by the regime’s press since the 
late 1980s was dealt a serious blow with the fall of the Damascus declaration. The 
Madrid peace process, insofar as Egypt’s regional role was concerned, raised more 
questions than it answered. The first question was existential -  questioning the need for 
Egypt’s role as a mediator between the Arabs and Israel, now that the latter are involved 
in direct negotiations. The second came with Shimon Peres’ (1993) much-publicised 
argument that the peace process would lay the foundations for a new Middle East in 
which Israel leads with her technological superiority, entering in a partnership with the
136 Only Islamist intellectuals with traditionally close relations with the regime, such as Ahmed Kamal 
Aboul Magd, were invited. Islamist activists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood were not.
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vast capital of the Gulf States and Egypt contributing cheap labour. This argument was 
reiterated by Peres in the MENA conferences137 in Casablanca in 1994 and in Amman in 
1995, inviting a harsh response from Egypt’s outspoken foreign minister Amr Moussa 
(Satloff & Pipes 1996). The threat of being reduced from the regional leader to a mere 
supplier of cheap labour to a region run by other powers led to an intense debate amongst 
intellectuals, diplomats and politicians on the “role of Egypt”138. Nationalists accused the 
government’s foreign policy of squandering Egypt’s regional leadership, and turning the 
country to an American satellite. A nationalist public opinion which is highly critical of 
the Pax Americana emerged in Egypt, and many intellectuals were re-discovering Nasser 
(cf.: Jacquemond 1997). On the other hand, Lutfi El-Kholi (1994; 1995) led a small 
group of intellectuals calling for a new “Middle Eastern” identity, and arguing that 
“normalisation” with Israel is inevitable139.
The government’s response to the accusations of squandering Egypt’s leading role in the 
region was ambivalent, and on occasions self-contradictory -  denying the accusations 
whilst appeasing the accusers, and occasionally throwing the neoliberal argument that 
everything will be alright as soon as the economy takes off.
Thus, the regime’s first reaction was to deny that Egypt’s role is eroding. Mubarak’s 
political advisor Usama El-Baz (1996) edited a book to which influential writers and the 
regime’s ideologues contributed chapters denying the erosion of Egypt’s leading role,
137 The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) conferences constituted the economic side of the 
multilateral prong of the peace process.
138 See: Abou Taleb (1996); El-Kholi (1994; 1995); Said (1995, 2000); El-Baz (1996); El-Dessouki et.al 
(1999); Salama (1995); Jacquemond (1997); El-Mashat (1995).
139 See also: Said (1995; 2000).
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which was a “structural trait” that no other country possessed, and promising brilliant 
prospects after the economic take off. The official media trumpeted every trip by 
Mubarak as another sign of Egypt’s international indispensability. The government’s 
discourse emphasised that the peace process, far from undermining Egypt’s regional 
influence, is in fact the necessary condition for Egypt’s economic development (Fathi 
2003:154).
In the meantime, the regime sought to appease its nationalist critics, which were rapidly 
growing in number and in influence. Thus, the government-owned television produced a 
popular movie on Nasser and two movies on Egypt’s military deeds in the wars with 
Israel140. Celebrations of the anniversaries of 1952 and the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal became more elaborate, and several of the regime’s foreign policies were dressed 
in Nasserist robes by the official press (Doran 2001:117). Finally, Egypt’s foreign 
minister became increasingly outspoken and critical of Israel and the US, gaining a level 
of popularity that none of his predecessors ever enjoyed.
The self-contradictory discourse on Egypt’s national role was also reflected in realm of 
policies. Thus, Amr Moussa would criticise what he called “al-harwala ” (the scramble) 
towards Israel in the MENA conferences in Casablanca and Amman, arguing fervently 
that “normalisation” cannot precede the conclusion of final, just and durable peace 
agreements between Israel and the Arabs (Satloff & Pipes 1996), before moving on to 
host the third MENA conference in Cairo in 1996.
140 These were: Nasser 1956 by Mohamed Fadel, Hikayat El-ghareeb (tales of the stranger) and Al-Tareeq 
ila Eilat (the road to Eilat) by Ina’am Mohamed Ali.
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His. defence was that the conference was important to promote foreign investment in 
Egypt, and that Egypt would not turn it into a “normalisation” conference. However 
unconvincing to his critics, it was indicative not only of the regime’s “role crisis” and 
bewilderment vis-a-vis the legitimacy challenge put forth by its foreign policy choices, 
but also of the government’s conviction that economic growth remains the ultimate 
priority of all state policy. Anything could, in the last resort, be justified on grounds of 
promoting economic growth, which, according to the regime’s neoliberal orthodoxy, 
would eventually trickle down to all social strata, resolving Egypt’s economic 
predicament.
In the same vein, the government returned to its long-deserted strategy of issuing 
ideological pamphlets. For the first time in 23 years, El-Ganzouri’s government issued in 
March 1997 a document entitled “Egypt and the twenty first century”, claiming to set 
forth a grand strategy for a “long term renaissance”, and outlining Egypt’s plans until 
2017 (Issawi 2004:299; Aouda 2004:118-125). Its main problem, however, was that it 
tried at once to announce a new phase in Egypt’s economic development, whilst stating 
that all the policies it advocated are those that Egypt had already been adopting in the 
previous 16 years of Mubarak’s rule. Paradoxically, the document argued that a new 
qualitative leap in economic performance was going to happen as a result of adopting the 
same policies of the previous 16 years (Issawi op.cit.). In essence, it amounted to little 
more than reiterating the positions outlined in the 1974 October paper (Aouda 2004:123).
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Expectedly, it was neither convincing nor capable of raising expectations, let alone 
resolving the regime’s legitimacy problem. It was quickly dropped from the 
government’s discourse, and was hardly referred to again within less than a year. It 
became even less relevant as the economic slowdown hit and the resource crisis surfaced 
anew by the late 1990s, thereby confining all references to this document to sardonic 
articles by opposition writers comparing the ambitious rhetoric of the document with the 
disappointing economic realities.
On the other hand, the aforementioned regional developments and the confused attitude 
towards the Middle East peace process and the question of “normalisation” rendered 
futile any attempt to rely on foreign policy to restore the regime’s hegemony. Between a 
poor economic performance, an eroding social base of the state, and accusations of 
squandering Egypt’s leading role in the region, the regime was facing a serious 
hegemonic crisis by the end of the 1990s, manifested by the NDP’s unprecedented failure 
in maintaining its parliamentary majority in the 2000 elections. This was also when the 
economic resource crisis surfaced anew, bringing to an end the “troubled liberalisation” 
years and signalling the onset of the “crisis of governance” of the 2000s.
(1.4) Foreign Policy
Realising the rent-generation prospects of the Gulf Crisis, Mubarak moved quickly to 
identify himself with the war. Hence, in addition to hosting an Arab summit on August 
10th 1990, in which he forced through the “US-led forces” option, and refused to allow 
discussion, amendments, or votes for alternatives (Hinnebusch 1994:170-171), two
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armoured divisions and a commando regiment were in the frontline at the start of the war. 
With around 27000 men in Saudi Arabia, and another 5000 in the UAE, Egypt furnished 
the second largest contingent in the Gulf war after the United States (EIU 199la:8). 
Egypt’s foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis rendered substantial, albeit conditional and 
indeed one-off economic dividends, and was instrumental in facilitating the second wave 
of restructuring. However, it was deleterious to the regime’s hegemony, with Islamists, 
Nasserists and leftists accusing the government of being the conduit of American 
imperialism in the region.
Unlike the first wave of restructuring, the second wave was neither conducted against the 
backdrop of a major legitimacy-building event like the October 1973 war, nor amidst a 
significant financial bonanza. As a result, for the first time since the beginning of 
restructuring in the 1970s, the two functions of Egyptian foreign policy had to be 
performed almost simultaneously.
Participation in the US-led coalition secured rent-generation. Restoring the damage 
caused thereby to the regime’s legitimacy was more complicated. The official discourse, 
emphasising that Egypt’s participation in the war was in compliance with her 
“contractual obligations” under the Arab Joint Defence Treaty (Ibid.), was not sufficient 
to face the growing counter-consensus against the war. The government needed to be 
seen as a partner in the post-war security arrangements, not, as the opposition claimed, a 
mere client of the US. To this end, on March 6th 1991, few days after the guns fell silent, 
Egypt, Syria and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) signed the
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Damascus declaration, which was designed to be the back-bone of an inter-Arab post-war 
security arrangements. Stipulating that the Egyptian and Syrian forces should constitute 
the nucleus for an Arab peace force to guarantee the security and safety of the GCC 
countries, the declaration involved, at least in theory, a barter of Gulf oil wealth for 
Egyptian and Syrian military power, and furnished a clear role for Egypt in the Gulf 
region (EIU 1991b:7). Moreover, Egypt and Syria were to benefit from the formation of a 
$1 billion Gulf development fund -  a seemingly perfect combination of the two functions 
of Egypt’s foreign policy.
From its first days, however, implementation of the Damascus declaration was replete 
with problems (Hillal-Dessouki 1992:34), eventually rendering it ineffectual. The Gulf 
States quickly changed plans, opting for bilateral security agreements with the US and 
other European countries. As a result, on May 8th 1991, Mubarak decided abruptly to start 
withdrawing the Egyptian troops from the Gulf. The Gulf development fund never 
materialised. The Damascus declaration was all but dead. Egyptian newspapers were 
criticised the “ungrateful” Gulf States (EIU 1991b:9), but it was clear that a Gulf-centred 
Arab role was not possible, and the attempt to restore the regime’s hegemony through the 
Damascus declaration had failed.
As a result, the regime shifted its attention to the Levant, focusing on the Middle East 
peace process, and pledging to contribute to the resolution of the Arab Israeli conflict. 
Mubarak announced that achieving peace is Egypt’s top foreign policy priorities, and 
foreign minister Amr Moussa claimed that Egypt with her working relations with all
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parties, including Israel, is best suited to be the broker of negotiations (Hillal-Dessouki 
1992:34). This served the twin purposes of giving Egypt’s regional role a new mission, 
and validating the regime’s choice for peace, now that the Arab states were following 
Egypt’s footsteps and engaging in direct negotiations with Israel. Thus, Egypt took a 
central part in an intensive round of diplomacy in preparation for the Madrid peace 
conference, during which, Cairo was a prime destination for a succession of statesmen 
including US secretary of state James Baker and his Soviet counterpart Boris Pankin 
(EIU 1991c:8).
Recognising that there are no real prospects for an Egyptian mediating role in the 
Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese negotiating tracks, the Egyptian role was effectively 
confined to the Palestinian track. However, between Egypt’s limited ability to deliver any 
significant pressure on Israel, and the establishment of a secret negotiations channel 
between the PLO and Israel in Oslo, even this role became increasingly problematic.
The peace negotiations developed along two tracks: a) a bilateral track devoted to the 
conclusion of peace agreements between Israel and each of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon the 
Palestinians, and b) a multilateral track addressing regional economic cooperation, 
disarmament, water management, and so forth. As the peace process progressed, Egypt 
appeared to have worked herself out of a job. The Arabs were already engaged in direct 
talks with Israel, and the latter was actively pursuing an economic diplomacy to end the 
Arab economic boycott to Israel and was achieving important breakthroughs with Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia and some Gulf countries (Gerges 1995:70). Not only did this raise
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serious questions about the need for an Egyptian mediatory role between parties 
negotiating directly, but it also questioned the future role of Egypt as a regional leader.
In the first of the MENA conferences in Casablanca in 1994, Shimon Peres mocked 
Egypt’s political and economic agonies, arguing that 40 years of Egypt’s leadership 
brought failures to the Arab world, and promised significant improvements as Israel takes 
the reins of leadership in the region (Ibid.:71). Amr Moussa replied harshly, criticising 
both Peres’ redicule and the Arab states’ scramble “harwala” towards Israel (Satloff & 
Pipes 1996). However, the damage to Egypt’s pride, and to the regime’s legitimacy, was 
done. The opposition accused the regime of dissipating Egypt’s regional leadership with 
its misguided foreign policy choices. The resulting role-crisis was reflected in the intense 
debate on Egypt’s role, discussed in the previous subsection.
Paradoxically, when the hawkish Benjamin Netanyahu replaced Peres as Israel’s prime 
minister, bringing the peace process to a complete standstill, the role-crisis only 
intensified. It appeared that Egypt was losing in both scenarios. In Peres’ Middle East 
there was hardly any place for Egypt. In Netanyahu’s, there were no prospects for the 
peace process itself. In the former case, Egypt’s pride was hurt. In the latter, the raison 
d ’etre of her foreign policy for over two decades was discredited.
Ideologically, the regime’s ambivalent response combined, as I argued in the previous 
subsection, denial of the accusations of squandering Egypt’s regional leadership with the 
appeasement of its critiques with a “quasi-Nasserist” pro-Arab discourse. In the realm of
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policies, this was reflected in the regime’s attempt to perform a tight-rope act, reiterating 
its commitment to the peace process and the main tenets of Egypt’s foreign policy since 
1979, whilst outspokenly criticizing Netanyahu and calling for a freeze of 
“normalisation” with Israel.
Thus, shortly after co-hosting with the United States a “peace summit” in March 1996 to 
rescue the peace process from the verge of collapse (EIU 1996:16), Egypt convened, in 
the aftermath of Netanyahu’s election in 1996 an Arab summit designed to place the new 
Israeli government before an Arab consensus. This was the first summit since the great 
rift between the Arab states in the 1990 summit in Cairo. It was dubbed by the local press 
“the solidarity summit” and presented in Nasserist shades (Doran 2001:117).
In the same vein, Egypt hosted the third MENA conference in Cairo, in spite of her 
critique of “al-harwala” during the previous conferences, and before moving on to 
boycott the fourth MENA conference in Doha in November 1997 (Tabler 1998:174) -  an 
act which contributed to the cancelling of MENA conferences altogether. Finally, in 
April 1997, the Arab League Council passed a resolution, proposed by Egypt, to cease all 
forms of “normalisation” with Israel (Yassin 1997:16). Ironically, the resolution included 
a special waiver for the Egyptian government, allowing for its “contractual 
commitments” according to the Camp David accords, thereby rendering the “hegemony 
restoring” aspects of the resolution futile.
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However unsuccessful these self-contradictory attempts were to restore the regime’s 
hegemony, they subjected Egypt’s strategic alliance with the United States to 
considerable tension. The decision to boycott the Doha conference particularly strained 
the ties with the US administration. The American press became increasingly critical of 
Egypt, publishing embarrassing stories about Egypt, and outlining a lengthy list of 
differences between Egypt and the US -  from Egypt’s relations with Libya, to her 
opposition to the US calls for tougher sanctions on Iraq, and the congressional 
accusations to Mubarak’s regime of persecuting the Coptic Christians (EIU 1997:16). 
More importantly, when considering foreign assistance in 1997, the senate committee on 
foreign relations omitted the annual $2.3 billion earmarked for Egypt. This was 
ultimately restored in the final version of the bill, but only after it was reduced by $50 
million (given to Jordan) and the US administration had pledged to gradually phase out 
the economic assistance (Springborg 1998:37). This decision did not only demonstrate 
the limited prospects for the rent-generation function of Egypt’s foreign policy, but it was 
also indicative of Egypt’s role-crisis.
Thence, the government was neither capable of buying off political support of the 
alienated social strata, nor of justifying, as it did during Nasser and Sadat’s years, 
economic difficulties through foreign policy achievements. This spelled the end of the 
“troubled liberalisation” years, and the beginning of the “crisis of governance”.
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2- The Crisis of Governance 2000-2008
The troubled liberalization years of the 1990s gave way to an acute social and political 
crisis in the 2000s. The continuous erosion of the social base of the state throughout the 
1990s resulted in NDP’s unprecedentedly poor performance in the 2000 elections, and in 
a string of political crises thereafter. The economic slowdown led to an unprecedented 
rise of social and political protest, especially with the regime’s inability to count on 
diplomatic acumen to secure its hegemony or generate enough rent to relieve the social 
costs of the crisis.
Also, the crisis of governance since 2000 developed against the backdrop of an 
unfavourable international environment. Several regional and international developments, 
from the second intifada in September 2000, the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, to 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, not only exacerbated the regime’s hegemonic crisis and 
gave further reasons for political protest, but also created external pressures on the regime 
to undertake political reforms. Caught between external pressures for change, mounting 
domestic protest, and the prospects of a sudden political vacuum at the top, as Mubarak 
approached his 80th birthday with no designated vice-president, the questions of political 
change and succession dominated the political scene in Egypt throughout the 2000s.
In what follows, I shall seek to outline the dynamics of the unfolding crisis of governance 
since 2000, and the regime’s attempt to address the questions of change and succession, 
whilst deepening, in spite of a rapidly eroding social base, the second wave of 
restructuring.
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(2.1) The State
Egypt’s prospects at the dawn of the millennium looked gloomy. The first decade of the 
second wave of restructuring had alienated most of the traditional support bases of the 
regime. The protest of the alienated strata mounted, particularly as the economic slump 
exacerbated the social cost of restructuring, and stagflation intensified after two 
successive devaluations of the Egyptian pound in 2001 and 2003. Not only was this 
reflected in the alarming results of the 2000 elections, but also in the violent protests that 
broke at the wake of the second intifada in September 2000, in which such biting anti­
regime slogans as “Husni Mubarak zay Sharon, nafs el-shakl wa nafs el-lon ” (Husni 
Mubarak is like Sharon, same looks, same colours), and "Thawra Thawra hata al-nasr, 
Thawra f i  Filasteen we f i  Masr” (Revolution, revolution until victory! Revolution in 
Palestine and Egypt) (El-Ghobashy 2003a), were indicative of the scope of the regime’s 
hegemonic crisis. These were arguably the largest anti-regime demonstrations and the 
harshest slogans since the 1977 bread riots (EIU 2002a: 15). That is, until March 20th 
2003, when demonstrators took-over Tahrir square in the middle of Cairo, for the first 
time since 1972141. Like the 2000 demonstrations, the demonstrators’ slogans were as 
much against the regime’s domestic policies as they were protesting the assault on Iraq.
Meanwhile, after September 11th 2001, and particularly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
the Bush administration showed a greater inclination to pressure Mubarak’s regime on 
political reform (Hamzawy 2004), especially amid growing international concerns about 
a possible sudden vacuum at the top of the regime (Rodenbeck 2003:42).
141 Even in the 1977 bread riots, demonstrators were not allowed to reach Tahrir square. See (Schemm 
2003).
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The regime’s reaction to these mounting domestic and international pressures was 
threefold: a) announcing its refusal to succumb to any pressures and insisting on its 
“Egyptian particular path” to reform, based on deepening the second wave of 
restructuring etatisme; b) consolidating its ruling alliance, based on the continued rise of 
the haute bourgeoisie, and its direct participation in governance; c) addressing the 
question of political succession so as to guarantee, political stability and the continuance 
of the second wave of restructuring etatisme.
A broad counter-consensus emerged in Egypt, covering liberals, Islamists and the left, on 
the main steps needed to realise the desired political reform, including direct presidential 
elections, limiting presidential terms and powers, terminating the emergency laws and 
reducing controls on civil society and political parties (Hamzawy 2004). Mubarak’s 
regime ignored these demands, denouncing them as an “imported recipe for reform”. The 
government argued that it is following an “Egyptian path to reform” based on continuing 
the reforms that Egypt had started since the 1990s. Only token reforms were conceded, 
including the appointment of Egypt’s first female judge, the creation of a human rights 
council, and the designation of Coptic Christmas as a national holiday (El-Ghobashy 
2003a:29). The governmental discourse maintained that once the economic reforms were 
concluded, a trickle-down effect would solve Egypt’s economic agonies, thereby creating 
the basis for a safe transfer to full democracy (Hamzawy 2004). In other words, the 
government prioritised continuing the “second wave of restructuring”, which, ironically, 
was essentially based on economic liberalisation and political de-liberalisation.
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Meanwhile, the alliance of the haute bourgeoisie and the upper echelons of the 
bureaucracy was consolidated, and the share of the haute bourgeoisie in direct 
governance underwent a qualitative leap. The 2000 elections witnessed not only an 
increase in the parliamentary seats held by members of the haute bourgeoisie, but more 
importantly, for the first time since 1952, their rise to the chairmanship of key 
parliamentary committees, thereby giving a greater impetus to the process of 
restructuring.
The most important component of the regime’s strategy of responding to the domestic 
and international calls for change, however, was the revamping of NDP shortly after the 
2000 elections. A committee was formed by the president to restructure the party after the 
appalling electoral performance. A key member of this committee was Mubarak’s own 
son Gamal, who was beginning to be groomed as his potential successor (Abdel Latif 
2001:278). In the NDP’s eighth conference in 2002, a group of younger technocrats, mid­
career professionals and members of the haute bourgeoisie were injected in the newly- 
formed “Policies Secretariat” (PS) headed by Gamal Mubarak (El-Sayed et.al 2005:25- 
30), and the party raised the slogan “new thought” in this and all the subsequent 
conferences (Abou taleb 2004:425). In July 2004, the Gamal Mubarak-led “new guard” 
went a step further, with the formation of a new cabinet led by Ahmed Nazif, in which, 
not only were PS members appointed to the ministries of finance and investment, but 
also, for the first time since 1952, members of the haute bourgeoisie took office (EIU 
2004b: 14). Nazif s cabinet announced that its main priority is to redress the stagnating
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economy, leaving very little doubt about the regime’s commitment to the “primacy of 
economics” approach to the question of reform.
The formation of Nazif s government was also seen as a further step in Gamal Mubarak’s 
presidential bid. In spite of his ambiguous dismissal of having “personal wishes to run for 
presidency”, with a commanding share in government, and the PS chairmanship, as well 
as the position of NDP’s undersecretary, Gamal Mubarak seemed ready for presidential 
candidacy in the 2005 elections. He was presented as the embodiment of the new ruling 
alliance (being both the son of a former military bureaucrat, and a businessman who 
spent most of his professional career as a banker and a manager of a private equity fund), 
and stories were leaked to the government-controlled press on the “need for a president 
like Gamal Mubarak”142.
Political protest rose almost instantly. In August 2004, only a few weeks after the 
formation of Nazif s government, the Egyptian Movement for Change, was formed, 
began protesting against what it saw as transforming Egypt to a “republican monarchy”, 
and quickly became known by its slogan Kefaya (enough!) (Dunne 2008). The movement 
was joined by other middle-class movements that spanned the different strata of the 
middle class, and included students, independent political activists, journalists, judges143, 
opposition parties, as well as the “National Rally for Democratic Transformation” which 
included several intellectuals, retired army officers and bureaucrats, and was headed by 
former prime minister and etatisme veteran Aziz Sidky (ICG 2005:9).
1421 will return to this point in section 2.3 below.
143 Alongside Kefaya, other middle-class reformist organisations included: students for change, 9th of 
March university professors’ movement, journalists for change, and the Judges’ club.
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The government responded to the mounting protests by calling, at the end of 2004, less 
than a year before the presidential and parliamentary elections, for a national dialogue. 
Political parties were invited. Middle-class protest movements and the Muslim 
Brotherhood were not. The political parties accepted to postpone their demand for 
constitutional reform until after the elections. Kefaya, other middle-class movements, and
ththe Muslim Brotherhood refused, and continued protesting. On February 26 2005, 
Mubarak succumbed to the pressure and called for the amendment of article 76 of the 
constitution to allow direct, multiple-candidates presidential elections (Madi 2009:152). 
This conceded one of the protestors’ demands, whilst ignoring other, more radical 
demands such as limiting presidential terms and powers, terminating the emergency laws 
and appointing a vice president.
Fearing that the amendment might be yet another way of furthering Gamal Mubarak’s 
presidential schemes, the middle-class movements escalated their bitter criticism of 
Mubarak and his potential heir. The level of political protest rendered Gamal Mubarak’s 
presidential candidacy risky, especially that the reaction thereto of other centres of power 
in the Egyptian regime, particularly the army -the final arbiter in politics since 1952 -  
remained unknown. Thus, the question of succession was postponed and the 77 year old 
Mubarak ran for presidency, and was easily re-elected (Dunne 2008).
The 2005 parliamentary elections dealt another blow to Gamal Mubarak and his “new 
guard”. In spite of all the hype about the “new thought” and NDP restructuring, the party 
performed even worse than it did in the previous elections, gaining 149 seats (down from
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170). And in spite of the repeated claims by Gamal Mubarak that NDP would no longer 
tolerate the “rebels” who challenged its favourite candidates, the results forced him to 
swallow his pride and re-admit to the NDP 167 “independents” so as to secure its much- 
needed parliamentary majority (El-Amrani 2005).
Notwithstanding both setbacks, Gamal Mubarak’s “new guard”, with full support of, and 
close partnership with the haute bourgeoisie strengthened their political control. Thus in 
July 2005, a wholesale change of the editors of the state-controlled press brought the 
“new guard’s” favourite candidates to key opinion-forming positions (ICG 2005:24). In 
December, a cabinet reshuffle further increased the share of the haute bourgeoisie and 
Gamal Mubarak’s aides in the cabinet. PS members from the haute bourgeoisie were 
appointed to the ministries of trade and industry, health, tourism, housing, transport and 
agriculture. Gamal Mubarak’s technocratic aides took the ministries of economy, 
investment, and finance. On the other hand, despite the setback in the parliamentary 
elections, NDP (enforced by the “independents”) managed to elevate members of the 
haute bourgeoisie to the chairmanship of all the economic committees of the new 
parliament.
The continued and uninterrupted rise of the haute bourgeoisie since 2000 resulted in 
further alienation of another support base of etatisme -  the workers. This was reflected in 
the law 12 of 2003 (the unified labour law) which increased the management rights to 
change or terminate contracts or reduce salaries and allowances, even below the 
minimum level of wages, for “economic reasons”. Workers hired after the law was
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passed were denied all rights provided for by the previous labour laws of the quasi- 
Keynesian welfare state. Article 192 of the law, acknowledged the workers’ right to 
strike, but required a long list of conditions that need to be met before the strike can take 
place, rendering it, as Ghoneim (2005:105) pointed out, practically impossible. The 
acceleration of privatisation processes under Nazif s government resulted in a sharp rise 
both in unemployment as well as the threat thereof for employed workers, thereby 
rendering them unable to negotiate pay rises to compensate for the strong inflationary 
pressures in the aftermath of two successive devaluations. Between law 203 of 1991, and 
law 12 of 2003, the workers’ benefits from etatisme all but eroded. They protested.
Thus, the 18 months between 2003 and mid-2004 witnessed 161 workers’ protests 
(strikes, sit-ins, hunger strikes, demonstrations and so forth). This was the beginning of 
what Benin and Hamalawy (2007) argued, was the longest and strongest wave of labour 
protest since the end of World War n. In 2006, the protests rose to 222 (Ibid.), then 
almost tripled in 2007 to 614, including 106 strikes, and 608 in 2008, including 122 
strikes144.
A series of foreign policy embarrassments, discussed in subsection 2.4 below, robbed the 
government of its ability to use foreign policy to restore the hegemony lost by the erosion 
of the social based of the state. The government, therefore, resorted to a second round of 
political de-liberalisation. From 2007, a series of de-liberalisation measures were 
introduced, ranging from arrests and a financial campaign against the Muslim
144 The figures for 2007 were calculated from the statistics published by El-Ard centre for human rights 
('http://www.lchr-eg.orgT The figure for 2008 was published by both El-Masry El-yawm and El-Badeel 
newspapers on 12/9/2009.
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Brotherhood, constitutional amendments that removed the judiciary’s role as electoral 
supervisor, and the extension of the state of emergency in 2008 (Dunne 2008).
As Mubarak turned 80 in May 2008, raising more concerns about a sudden power 
vacuum, the post-2000 crisis of governance was reaching a deadlock -  with no signs of 
easing up. Indeed, on April 6th 2008, a call by some middle-class internet literate activists 
for a general strike, posted on facebook, proved exceptionally successful, and coincided 
with a general labour strike in the industrial city of Mahala, which quickly turned into 
massive and violent riots, in which some 20,000 protesters burned pictures of Mubarak, 
and engaged in street fights with the anti-riot forces. 100 were injured, and 331 were 
arrested on the same day -  the largest single-day arrests since the antiwar protests in 
2003. The prime minister visited Mahala a few days later, and announced in a speech 
before press cameras a one-month bonus for the workers because “they did not bum the 
factories” (sic.)145.
With the sharp erosion of the social base of the Egyptian state, and the unprecedented 
levels of political and social protest from the alienated working and middle classes, the 
prospects for Gamal Mubarak succeeding his father, ensuring political stability and 
continuance of restructuring, remained unclear. As Dunne (2008) noted, after more than 
eight years of his political ascent, “succession fatigue” became palpable, with Gamal 
Mubarak increasingly looking like the Prince Charles of Egypt -  forever in waiting. He 
has also been socked with the lion’s share of the blame for Egypt’s political and 
economic agonies, and questions were raised about a possible political struggle between
145 This account of the April 6th 2008 incidents is adopted from El-Marghani (2008).
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Gamal Mubarak and the haute bourgeoisie on one side, and the predominantly middle- 
class military bureaucracy on the other, in the case of a sudden power vacuum. 
Speculations on the results of such power struggle146, apocalyptic predictions of chaos or 
implosion (Bradley 2008; Bizry 2009), and even calls by some members of the middle- 
class intelligentsia for the army intervention to stop Gamal Mubarak and the haute 
bourgeoisie from “taking over” the country,147 abound.
Such is how the post-2000 crisis of governance developed, with the regime approaching 
the end of another term of its octogenarian president, amidst an unprecedented challenge 
to the regime hegemony, acute social and political crises, a series of foreign policy 
embarrassments, and a looming vacuum of power.
(2.2) Economic Structures and Policies
Egypt’s economic agonies in the early 2000s included an economic slowdown, a resource 
crisis resulting in mounting trade and budget deficits, and a limited ability to use foreign 
policy to generate resources, thereby forcing the government to mobilise domestic 
resources, and further eroding the social base of the regime.
The financial crises of the late 1990s had a profound effect on the Egyptian economy. 
First, with the decline in the international prices of hydrocarbons and derivatives, which 
accounted for more than 55% of Egypt’s export earnings (EIU 2008B:31), the capital 
flows to all emerging markets, including Egypt, and the Suez Canal revenues, the growth
146 Cf: Dunne (2008); Rodenbeck (2003)
1471 will return to these calls and the implications thereof in section 2.3 below.
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rates steadily decelerated, from 5.1% in 2000 to 3.5 in 2001, to 2% in 2002 and 2.8% in 
2003 (El-Naggar 2004:217). Second, the declining revenues exacerbated the budget 
deficit, to 5.6% of GDP in the fiscal year 2000/2001, to 5.8% in 2001/2002, 6.3% in 
2002/2003 and 9.4% in 2003/2004 (El-Naggar 2005:63), eroding a key achievement of 
ERSAP, and fuelling inflationary pressures. A flood of cheap imports from the East 
Asian countries, whose currencies were devalued in the aftermath of the crisis, led to a 
staggering trade deficit averaging $7-8 billion annually between 2001 and 2003. 
Together, the budget and trade deficits created mounting pressures on the exchange rate, 
forcing the government to undertake two successive devaluations. Thus on August 5th, 
the government devalued the Egyptian pound by 6.4%, the largest single-day devaluation 
in eight years (EIU 2001b: 19). When the devaluation had little impact on the economy, 
the government announced a full liberalisation of the exchange rate on January 1st 2003, 
leading to a further devaluation by 25% (Ghoneim 2005: 98).
In so doing, the government was both faithful to the neoliberal argument that devaluation 
would boost competitiveness of the Egyptian exports, which is the key to ending Egypt’s 
economic predicament, and reflective of the social disposition and economic agenda of 
the ruling alliance. The results were, however, problematic. Since 72% of Egypt’s 
consumer goods, foodstuffs, and industrial inputs were imported, the devaluation led to a 
skyrocketing of the prices for basic consumer goods, and the Egyptian economy showed 
symptoms of stagflation for the first time in Egypt’s modem economic history (Ibid.). 
The rise in consumer price inflation also acted as an income distribution mechanism in 
favour of importers and business owners (who could offset the implications of inflation
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by raising their sale prices) at the expense of the salaried middle and working classes, 
whose purchasing powers underwent a prolonged slide, and their frustration skyrocketed 
(EIU 2002a:7).
Furthermore, these inflationary pressures came on top of a liquidity crisis and a forced 
credit crunch, as a result of bad debts given by banks to members of the haute 
bourgeoisie with no guarantees (Gamal 2007a:3), estimated by the central bank of Egypt 
to constitute 14.4% of the total credit facilities of Egypt’s banking sector (El-Naggar 
2005:118), and double digit unemployment, feeding the rising social and political protest.
These economic problems were also particularly embarrassing politically to Gamal 
Mubarak and his “new guard”, whose discourse focused on their technical credentials as 
economic problem-solvers, and to the regime at large, given its emphasis on an “Egyptian 
path to reform” based on the primacy of economic reforms, and the belief in the trickle- 
down political effects of a robust economy.
Gamal Mubarak’s team maintained that the problem is that reforms were not vigorous 
enough, and pointed out to the “un-economic” remnants of etatisme, especially subsidies 
and high tax burdens, which were crippling the economy and discouraging investors 
(Soliman 2005:52; Gamal 2007b). As a result, with the appointment of Nazifs 
government, and the elevation of liberal technocrats and members of the haute 
bourgeoisie to ministerial positions and the chairmanship of the parliamentary 
committees, the second wave of restructuring etatisme gained a strong momentum.
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A series of aggressive liberalisation measures followed, including, in addition speeding 
up privatisation and approving the partial divestiture of one of the four large banks (a 
traditional privatisation taboo), raising diesel prices by 50%, a new income tax bill 
entailing halving the maximum corporate and personal income taxes from 40% to 20% 
(EFG-Hermes 2005:5). Such measures were meant to encourage investors by increasing 
profitability. However, they also increased income disparities, and the rise in diesel price 
was reflected in an immediate increase in the transportation costs of practically all 
consumer goods, adding further burdens to the alienated social strata. Attempts to use 
foreign policy to mobilise resources from abroad to provide some minimal safety nets 
failed148, the government was forced to mobilise resources domestically. This meant that 
there limited additional resources for buying off the support of the alienated strata. Even 
maintaining the current level of subsidies and public expenditure, insufficient as it was to 
ease the crisis conditions, required a rapid increase in domestic debt, which rose by a 
staggering 117.2% in five years, between 2000 and 2005 (El-Naggar 2005: 62), and 
subsequently exacerbated the resource crisis.
The net result of the aggressive restructuring under Nazifs government was ambivalent. 
On one hand, economic growth rates started to accelerate anew, averaging 5-7% between 
2004 and 2007 -  still lower than the 8% required to maintain the current level of 
unemployment (El-Beblawy 2008:35). The “new guard” attributed this growth to the 
restructuring measures, renewing the pledge of an eventual trickle-down of the growth 
dividends to the disadvantaged social strata. Critics countered that the sources of post- 
2004 growth were: a) the hike in international oil prices as a result of the Asian recovery
148 See section 2.4 below
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and the war on Iraq; and b) the rise of Suez Canal revenues as a result of the world 
recovery after the 1999-2003 slump, whilst pointing out that the productive capacities 
were not coping with the import drive, resulting in a 60% increase in trade deficit to $12 
billion by 2007, and raising serious questions about the regime’s claims about an export- 
led growth -the centrepiece of its “Egyptian particular path” to reform (Gamal 2007a:4).
Apart from the controversies over the sources of the post-2004 growth, it was clear that, 
for the marginalised social strata, the dividends of this growth were meagre. Inflation 
rose to more than 20% in 2006/2007 (El-Hawit et.al. 2009:93), resulting in further 
impoverishment of the salaried social strata, and the budget deficit increased to 9% of 
GDP fuelling further inflationary pressures. Net domestic public debt increased to 80% of 
GDP, plus some 30% in foreign debt (El-Beblawy 2008:35). Unemployment reached 
22% according to international estimates and 12% according to government figures 
(Gamal 2007a:3). Finally, according to the United Nations Development Programme, the 
richest 20% received 43% of the national income, compared to 8.6% for the poorest 20% 
(UNDP 2008).
These increasing socio-economic disparities dealt serious blows to Gamal Mubarak’s 
succession plans, which depended in the main part on his image as an economic problem- 
solver. He was therefore blamed for the economic agonies. In the face of these criticisms, 
and, more importantly, the unprecedented wave of workers’ protest since 2006, the NDP 
acknowledged the gravity of the problem, and announced that “social justice” would be 
the main theme of its annual conference in October 2008. That same year, however,
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witnessed the strongest wave of international recession in decades, threatening a further 
deepening of the resource crisis and a sharp decline in the state revenues and growth rates 
(AbouAli 2008).
As Mubarak’s fifth term in office headed towards its end, and questions were raised on 
political succession in Egypt, and a possible power struggle between Gamal Mubarak’s 
“new guard” of technocrats in partnership with the haute bourgeoisie, and the 
predominantly middle and lower-middle class army, the “new guard”, who controlled 
both the government and the parliament’s economic committees, faced the difficult 
choices put forth by the second resource crisis in less than a decade. On one hand, there 
were no prospects of a one-off positive shock that would rescue the economy due to 
foreign policy manoeuvres, like the Gulf Crisis in 1990. On the other hand, mounting 
political and social protest rendered any attempt to respond to the resource gap through 
further economic entrenchment too dangerous for Gamal Mubarak’s succession plans. 
The second wave of restructuring was heading towards an impasse.
(2.3) Ideology
The troubled liberalisation years gave way to a serious hegemonic crisis, as the regime 
faced the twin challenge of: a) increasing pressures for reform and; and b) mounting 
accusations of dissipating Egypt’s regional clout.
The regime’s first reaction was to denounce the calls for reform as an outside imposition, 
and demand US intervention to resolve the Palestinian question which constituted the
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root cause of religious extremism and terrorism, especially that Egypt was already 
democratic, and becoming more so all the time149.
However, the question of reform continued to dominate the political scene, as Kefaya and 
other middle-class movements mushroomed in the early 2000s150. Denial was no longer 
viable. The regime had to counter with its own reform plan. This rested on three pillars:
a) an “economics first” approach; b) gradualism and controlled change; and c) the rise of 
Gamal Mubarak and his “new guard”, as the application of the desired reforms.
Mubarak maintained that vigorous reforms had started since 1990 and all that needs to be 
done was continuing them. This meant, in effect, that the primacy should be given to 
restructuring etatisme. On the other hand, the official press emphasised the need for a 
gradual approach for reform, citing the sectarian violence in Iraq as an example of 
“uncontrolled change” (Hamzawy 2004).
The official press also trumpeted Gamal Mubarak’s rise from 2000, and particularly after 
the NDP’s conference in 2002, and the advent of the “new thought”, citing it as the 
application of an “Egyptian path to reform”, involving: a) the rejuvenation of the political 
leadership; b) the introduction of new concepts to NDP’s discourse and literature 
covering such topics as “citizenship”, “women’s rights”, and so forth; and c) the 
formation of a new cabinet with many young members from the PS, to implement the 
“new thought” (Abou Taleb 2004:425-429; EL-Sayed et.al 2005:25-26).
149 Cf.: the editorial of the Washington Post “Our man in Cairo”, 12/4/2004.
150 See section 2.1 above.
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Opposition press accused the regime of ignoring the demands for democratisation, and 
opting for “cosmetic reforms” to pave the way for a dynastic succession (Rodenbeck 
2003:42). El-Araby, the mouthpiece of the Nasserist party launched a long campaign 
against Gamal Mubarak since 2002 (El-Ghobashy 2003b). Leftist and Islamist 
newspapers, and the independent El-Dostour followed suit, accusing Gamal Mubarak of 
seeking a “hereditary transfer of power” and “handing over the state to business tycoons”. 
The official discourse countered by emphasising the “generational aspects” of change 
within the NDP and Nazif s cabinet, rather than the social background of the new 
appointees, and reiterating the regime’s favourite “technocratic argument” on policies 
(and people) chosen on grounds of technical efficiency. In this context, the official press 
highlighted Gamal Mubarak’s economic credentials, and his banking and business 
background, implying that he is best suited for leading Egypt out of the economic 
bottleneck. Rose Al-Youssef, now under the editorship of Abdallah Kamal -  a confidant 
of Gamal Mubarak -  became the PS’s unofficial mouthpiece, running campaigns on the 
“need for Gamal Mubarak’s leadership”, and hardly a week went without Gamal 
Mubarak’s name, picture and opinion appearing on front pages of the official 
newspapers.
However, as Kefaya and the protest movements upped their criticisms prior to the 2005 
elections, under the dual slogan “la lil-tajdid, la lil tawrith” (no to renewal, no to 
dynastic succession) (El-Ghobashy 2003b), the technocratic defence based on 
emphasising the “new guard’s” technical qualifications was rendered insufficient. 
Therefore, during Mubarak’s presidential campaign, the official discourse underwent a
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brief populist twist, with Mubarak seeking to appease the alienated strata, pledging to 
create 4.5 million job opportunities in his new 6-year tenure. However, critics were quick 
to point out that the regime had no funds for this ambitious scheme, given that the 
Egyptian economy managed to create only 4.4 million job opportunities in the previous 
12 years (Naguib 2007:10). The sharp rise in inflation and employment in the following 
years rendered any such populist discourse futile. Thus, the regime’s discourse returned 
to the “technocratic” rationale for its policy choices, with occasional vague pledges to 
“social justice” as the workers’ protest rose sharply against Nazif s cabinet and its 
neoliberal policies151. The hegemonic crisis continued, and intensified.
Foreign policy, on the other hand, once a key tool in the regime’s hegemony-restoring 
arsenal, became a heated domain for contesting its legitimacy. The early 2000s witnessed 
successive foreign policy embarrassments, including, the second Palestinian intifada, 
Yasser Arafat’s siege in his Ramallah residence, the US invasion of Iraq, and Israel’s 
wars on Lebanon in 2006 and on Gaza in 2008. With every new embarrassment, the 
regime’s inability to influence the course of events, or justify its foreign policy choices 
became clearer. Popular protest in the wake of every foreign policy humiliation, 
invariably blamed the regime’s foreign policy choices for squandering Egypt’s regional 
role, and demanded dramatic policy changes (e.g. cutting off diplomatic ties with Israel; 
allowing volunteers to fight in the occupied territories...etc).
151This was exemplified, as I mentioned in the previous subsection, by choosing “social justice” as the 
theme for the NDP’s annual conference in 2008.
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At first, the official line maintained that Egypt’s “structural propensity for regional 
leadership” remained intact, and accused critics of adventurism. Nevertheless, between 
the regime’s limited ability to influence developments in the region, the magnitude of 
protest, and the Islamist/Nasserist/leftist counter-consensus on foreign policy issues, a 
more aggressive strategy was needed.
Consequently, for a brief period in 2002 and 2003, the official discourse flirted anew with 
Egypticity and openly challenged Arabism for the first time since 1981. Rose Al-Youssef 
published a series of articles under the title “Egypt first” for five months in the run-up to 
NDP’s eighth conference in 2002. NDP’s conference documents in 2002 and 2003 
focused on Egypticity and the importance of avoiding “fighting other people’s wars”. 
Underlying this discourse was the assumption that foreign policy debates stemmed 
primarily from a misconception about Egypt’s identity and national interests, and a belief 
that isolationism is conducive to solving Egypt’s economic and political problems (Abou 
Taleb 2004:437-438).
The problem with the emphasis on Egypticity was that, in the actual practice of foreign 
policy, the regime could not afford Egypticity and isolationism. As Hinnebusch 
(1994:167) explained, “Egypt’s Arabism, at least that o f the foreign policy establishment 
is instrumental -  less a commitment for its own sake than a tool in the service o f state 
interest”. Internal legitimacy and rent generation were dependent largely on diplomatic 
acumen. Any form of isolationism would inevitably reduce the Arab centrality which 
makes Egypt important to the United States and the west.
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As a result, the regime’s discourse maintained the self-contradictory position of 
appeasing critics by arguing that Egypt remained the natural leader of the Arabs, whilst 
arguing that she should stay away from their problems. Thus, during the second intifada, 
Egypt’s foreign minister Ahmed Maher even accused Ariel Sharon of practicing “state 
terrorism” against the Palestinians, and pointing that Egypt, the largest Arab state, cannot 
accept his stances (EIU 2002a: 14). Mubarak, speaking as the leader of the Arab world, 
criticised, in a television interview with the Dubai-based Arabiya on April 9th 2006, the 
Iranian regional ambitions, refusing the intervention of a non-Arab country in Arab 
Affairs. Meanwhile, arguments with isolationist undertones continued, refusing 
adventurism and calls to “fight the wars of others”. In one such incident, Egypt’s prime 
minister Atef Ebeid went as far as to say that the Arab states should put up $100 billion to 
fund Egypt if they wanted her to go to war with Israel (EIU 2002a: 16).
The ambivalence of the regime’s discourse on both foreign policy and the questions of 
economic and political reforms undermined its credibility. Critics continued to cite 
foreign policy embarrassments, economic difficulties, and corruption scandals152, and to 
blame them on Gamal Mubarak and his clique. In July 2008, the influential analyst Diaa 
Rashwan published a series of articles in the independent newspaper El-Masry El-yawm 
calling for the intervention of what he dubbed “the hardcore of the Egyptian state” to 
rescue the country from Gamal Mubarak and his business tycoons, fuelling the intense 
debate about the possible scenarios of post-Mubarak’s Egypt, and the ambiguous political
152 For a brief but illuminating account of some of these scandals, involving high-profile government 
officials and senior members of NDP, see: El-Sayed et.al. (2005:28-29); Soliman (2005: 98-100).
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1 ^role of the military in Egypt . This debate broke a major taboo in Egyptian politics. It 
was the first open invitation for the army to interfere and seize power, and it presented a 
serious challenge to Gamal Mubarak’s succession bid, indicating that a significant section 
of the intellectuals might support the middle-classed military bureaucrats in any future 
succession struggle. Above all, it reflected the magnitude of the regime’s hegemonic 
crisis, the controversial succession scenarios on the eve of an anticipated troubled 
transition of power.
(2.4) Foreign Policy
As the crisis of governance of the 2000s unfolded, the two functions of Egypt’s foreign 
policy were urgently needed: a) generating rent to ease of the social costs of the 
economic restructuring amidst an economic slowdown and an increased erosion of the 
social base of the neoliberal state; and b) resolving the hegemonic crisis fuelled thereby.
Ariel Sharon’s infamous “visit” on September 28, 2000, to the “noble sanctuary” -  where 
Al-Aqsa mosque is located in Jerusalem- and demonstrations that followed were the 
overture of the second Palestinian intifada, igniting an unprecedented level of political 
protest (Elwy 2002:3). The government’s response was twofold. First, it sought to 
appease the protesters, and decided to withdraw the Egyptian Ambassador in Tel Aviv on 
November 21st 2000. This gesture fell short of the protestors radical demands, even 
though it was the strongest diplomatic action taken against Israel since the invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 (EIU 2001a: 15). Second, the government made it clear that recalling the
153 See: Rashwan (2008a; 2008b, 2008c, 2008d); Ateya (2008a; 2008b). Rashwan’s articles were reprinted 
in and cited by several opposition newspapers. Nationalists supported him, the left was divided, and 
Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, stayed silent.
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ambassador did not mean rethinking the commitment to Arab-Israeli peace. Instead, the 
overriding concern of Egyptian diplomacy became persuading George W. Bush’s 
administration to step up its engagement in the conflict, and bring pressure on Israel so as 
to allow the peace process to restart (EIU 2002a: 13). Central as it was to vindicate her 
“moderate” foreign policy in the face of critics, Egypt’s ability to impress this view on 
the US was very limited.
Already strained since the late 1990s, September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks further 
complicated the Egyptian-American relations. First, the majority of the culprits were of 
Egyptian and Saudi origins, raising questions within Bush’s administration about 
feasibility of supporting its Arab dictatorial allies unconditionally (EIU 2003b:8). The US 
started pressuring Egypt on reform issues. Furthermore, instead of joining the so-called 
“coalition against terrorism” as the US administration expected, based on the Gulf Crisis 
experience, Mubarak’s regime questioned the effectiveness of the war on terrorism, 
maintaining that the only way to beat terrorism was solving the Palestinian question, and 
expressing its concern that Afghanistan might not be the only target and the Iraq might be 
“phase two” of the campaign (EIU 2002a: 14-15).
However, Mubarak, not wanting to jeopardise the alliance with the US, proposed a 
compromise. Egypt could join the “coalition against terrorism” on two conditions: a) the 
war on terror would be waged under the aegis of the UN to ensure the campaign’s 
international legitimacy; and b) international observers would be installed in the West 
Bank and Gaza -  at once reflecting the popular concerns on the “double standards” of the
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US, and bringing the US to interfere in the Palestinian question and putting pressure on 
Israel (EIU 2001c:13).
Bush’s administration rebuffed these suggestions, and the Egyptian-American relations 
hit the lowest point of Mubarak’s presidency. In August 2002, Bush’s administration 
turned down an Egyptian request for additional assistance to ease the deteriorating 
economic situation (EIU 2002b: 15). The differences over the invasion of Iraq 
exacerbated tensions between the two countries, and the US upped its protest against 
human rights violations, and demanded the release of the Egyptian-American sociologist 
and activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the former presidential candidate Ayman Nour.
Egypt’s regional role rested in part on her relations with the US, and her alleged ability to 
influence the latter towards extracting concessions from Israel. As the Egyptian- 
American relations deteriorated after 2000, Egypt was forced to take an unfamiliar 
backseat in regional diplomacy, as a new “Arab peace initiative” was proposed by the 
Saudi crown-prince in February 2002 (EIU 2002a: 13).
Faced with the threat of losing his traditional mediating role, Mubarak searched for a 
modus vivendi with the US administration. Thus, whilst dismissing the US “Middle East 
Partnership Initiative” December 2002, as an attempt to impose reforms from abroad, and 
keeping a critical distance from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Egypt worked tirelessly in 
support of the launch and maintenance of the US-backed “road map” (EIU 2003b: 15). 
Egypt went further to host closed-door talks with the main 12 Palestinian factions in
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January 2003, aiming to achieve a one year cease-fire -a  de facto termination of the 
intifada (EIU 2003a: 16). The talks failed.
On the other hand, Ariel Sharon’s successive escalatory measures rendered Egypt’s 
efforts to reinvigorate the peace process fruitless. Yasser Arafat’s siege in Ramallah and 
the assassination of Hamas leaders Ahmed Yassin and Abdel-Aziz Rantisi dealt serious 
blows to Egypt’s diplomatic efforts, and eroded the regime’s legitimacy. The Egyptian 
reaction followed a clear pattern: Hard-worded denunciation of Israel’s actions and bitter 
attacks on Ariel Sharon in the official press aimed at appeasing the angry protestors. 
Invariably, this was followed by calls for reviving the peace talks and resuming contacts 
with Sharon’s administration (Ibid: 17). The regime seemed to be clinging desperately to 
the peace process, amidst accusations by the opposition of “selling out” the Arabs, and no 
tangible outcomes to its diplomatic efforts. The regime’s image suffered, and the 
successive embarrassments culminated in a major humiliation during Egypt’s foreign 
minister Ahmed Maher’s visit to the Aqsa-mosque in Jerusalem, when he was jostled by 
an angry crowd in the mosque dubbing him a traitor and a collaborator with Israel. The 
official press blamed the “ungrateful Palestinians”, but the damage was done (EIU 
2004a: 18). Egypt’s leverage on the Palestinians, one of the few remaining assets for her 
role, and her importance for the US administration, was quickly eroding, as Hamas 
started to dominate the Palestinian scene after the demise of Arafat in 2004, and 
particularly after Hamas’ sweeping electoral victory in 2006, then its coup in Gaza in 
2007. The latter development particularly alarmed Mubarak’s regime, given the historic 
ties between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (which, with 88 members in the 2005
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parliament, was the largest opposition group and a major threat to the regime). Instead of 
being an Egyptian bargaining-chip, and a cornerstone of Egypt’s regional influence, the 
Palestinian politics were turning to “a threat to Egypt’s national security”, as foreign 
minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit declared (EIU 2007:16). Hamas’ leader Khaled Mashaal 
was more influenced by Damascus and Tehran than by Cairo, and reportedly turned down 
several invitations to visit Cairo (EIU 2006:16).
Save for an agreement regulating the transport of individuals from Rafah crossing 
(linking Egypt and Gaza), in the wake of the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 
2005, and a six months fragile ceasefire in Gaza in 2008, the peace process reached a 
complete deadlock. As a result, not only was the regime increasingly vulnerable to 
accusations of losing its last bastion of influence, but the crux of its foreign policy for 
almost three decades was discredited.
On the other hand, the decline in Egypt’s regional clout further strained her relations with 
the US. With Bush’s administration showing little interest in the Israeli-Palestinian peace, 
especially after the steady rise of Hamas, and focusing its attention on areas where Egypt 
had little or no influence (e.g. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon), Egypt was increasingly losing 
her utility to the US.
Thus, US pressures for reforms in Egypt escalated, jeopardising Egypt’s prospects for 
reducing the trade deficit through a free trade area with the US, which was dismissed by 
the US secretary of state, Condoleeza Rice in her visit to Egypt in February 2006. In May
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2006, the US Senate voted to further reduce by 10% the annual assistance to Egypt, citing 
the country’s failure to introduce democratic reforms as the reason behind this decision 
(EIU 2006a: 16-17). It was increasingly clear that the rent-generation prospects of Egypt’s 
foreign policy were steadily deteriorating.
Throughout Bush’s second term in office, the US administration stopped sending 
Mubarak its annual invitations to visit the white house, settling instead for US visits from 
his senior staff to meet with their American counterparts, and a single, unsolicited visit by 
Gamal Mubarak in 2006.
In 2008, as Mubarak turned eighty, and the concerns over a sudden power vacuum 
intensified, his regime was dealt two major foreign policy blows. In June, whilst Egypt 
was hosting the World Economic Forum in the Middle East, George W. Bush arrived late 
for Mubarak’s opening speech, and Mubarak then missed Bush’s speech, in which, he 
criticised the suppression of dissidents in Egypt. He left Egypt without seeing Mubarak. 
Foreign minister Abul Gheit responded by blaming US military presence in Iraq for the 
region’s problems (EIU 2008a:9-10).
In December 2008, the Israeli war on Gaza broke two days only after a visit by Israeli 
foreign minister Tzipi Levni, in which she met with Mubarak, making him appear either 
as complicit in the war, or as an impotent leader, failing to prevent it.
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The crisis of legitimacy mounted, with the opposition accusing Mubarak’s regime of 
complicity, so as to appease the US and secure Gamal Mubarak’s presidential chances. 
The war became yet another weapon in the arsenal for the supporters of an intervention 
by the “hardcore of the state”. The calls for such intervention were even echoed in the 
Arab world, as Hizbullah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, who had gained considerable 
popularity in Egypt during Israel’s war on Lebanon in 2006, called on the Egyptian Army 
to force a profound change in Egypt’s policies (Darwish 2008).
The regime’s attempt to use diplomatic clout to muddle through the post-2000 “crisis of 
governance” through a tightrope act seeking simultaneously to appease the pro-Arab 
protesters, and maintain the strategic relations with the US had clearly failed. Instead, 
foreign policy embarrassments became a salient pillar of Egypt’s three-legged quandary, 
alongside the unyielding economic liberalisation, and the eroding social base of the neo­
liberal state.
3- Conclusion: The Patterns of Interplay of Egyptian Political Economy 
and Foreign Policy
Egypt’s foreign policy choices during the Gulf crisis were imperative to generating the 
much-needed strategic rent to start the second wave of restructuring etatisme, albeit at a 
substantial cost in terms of the regime’s hegemony.
However, the resources made available by Egypt’s participation in the US-led coalition 
during the crisis came with unequivocal conditionality. Thus, between the finite, one-off
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resources made available for the second wave of restructuring, and the hegemony 
challenges put forth by unpopular foreign policy choices during and after the Gulf crisis, 
the questions of Egypt's ability to find a balancing point between the hegemonic and rent- 
generating functions of her foreign policies surfaced anew. This proved a daunting task.
The conditionality of the financial resources made available for the second wave of 
restructuring, meant that the disadvantaged strata could not be bought off. The division of 
the social costs of restructuring was, obviously, determined by the social disposition of 
the ruling elite, characterised by a strong alliance between the upper echelons of the state 
bureaucracy and the haute bourgeoisie. Throughout the second wave of restructuring this 
alliance was enforced, and even witnessed an unprecedented role for the haute 
bourgeoisie in the direct governance, at the cost of alienating the traditional support base 
of etatisme -  the urban middle classes, workers, and peasants. To make up for this 
erosion in the social base of etatisme, the second wave of restructuring followed a 
particularly unpopular formula -  economic liberalisation and political de-liberalisation. 
They alienated strata protested and challenged the regime’s hegemony, particularly as 
stagflation hit the Egyptian economy at the end of the 1990s, and the resource crisis 
surfaced anew.
Foreign policy, on the other hand, could not be relied on to restore the regime’s 
hegemony. Egypt’s position during the Gulf War, fulfilling as it was of the rent- 
generation function of foreign policy, was a key source of the legitimacy crisis. 
Subsequent foreign policy moves intensified the crisis. After the failure to maintain a
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Gulf-centred Arab role with the fall of the short-lived Damascus declaration, Egypt 
devoted her foreign policy almost entirely since the early 1990s to the question of 
resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The inherent logic was straightforward -  
bringing the parties of the conflict to direct talks mediated by Egypt, and using Egypt’s 
strategic alliance with the US to extract concessions from Israel. Ideally, this should 
make Egypt the champion of the Palestinian cause, restoring the regime’s hegemony, and 
boosting its regional clout. In turn, an increased regional role would render Egypt more 
valuable to the US, thereby increasing prospect of strategic rent generation, and 
alleviating the social cost of the second wave of restructuring.
The reality proved more problematic. As the peace talks progressed, Egypt seemed to 
have worked herself out of a job. The earlier successes of the peace process in the early 
1990s (an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement in 1994, interim Israeli-Palestinian 
agreements in 1993 and 1994, and a steady progress in economic normalisation) brought 
forth the prospects of a Middle East where Egypt would be reduced from the status of a 
(mostly) undisputed regional leader, to a mere supplier of cheap labour. The mediating 
role too was becoming less important, since the Arabs were talking directly to Israel. 
Paradoxically, the deadlock in the peace process since 1996 made things only worse, as 
the very raison d’etre of Egypt’s foreign policy for the previous two decades was 
questioned. In either case, the regime’s hegemony suffered.
Thus, the second wave of restructuring rapidly developed from a “troubled liberalisation 
phase” during the 1990s to a full-fledged “crisis of governance” in the early 2000s,
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involving: a) an unprecedented level of public discontent, reflected not only in the 
appalling performances of NDP in the 2000 and 2005 elections, but also in the 
mushrooming of middle-class protest movements, and the longest wave of labour protest 
since World War II; b) an unyielding economic liberalisation programme, both during 
the slowdown phase (2000-2003), or during the brief moderate growth phase (2004- 
2007); c) a pressing question of political succession with Mubarak turning eighty, not 
appointing a vice-president, and grooming his son to succeed him; and d) an inability to 
count on diplomatic acumen to secure the regime’s hegemony in the face of the mounting 
protest, or generate enough rent to relieve the social costs of the crisis.
Indeed, the crisis of governance broke out at a time when Egypt’s ability to mobilise 
resources through diplomatic acumen had severely deteriorated, resulting in the 
government’s forced reliance on domestic resource mobilisation, with the twin 
consequences of a rapidly mounting domestic debt, and a further erosion of the state’s 
social base. The need for juggling the two functions of foreign policy was more pressing, 
but less possible.
Instead of relieving either the hegemonic or the resource crises, Egyptian diplomacy in 
the early 2000s faced the dual challenges of a seriously strained relation with the US, and 
the rapid deterioration in Egypt’s regional clout. The heightening tensions in the 
Egyptian-American relations meant that: a) Egypt stood limited chance at impressing her 
views on the primacy of the Palestinian question on Bush’s administration, thereby losing 
her only hope of influencing the course of events in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; b)
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Bush’s administration joined the demanders of reform in Egypt, increasing the pressures 
on the regime on the eve of a looming succession crisis; and c) the prospects of rent- 
generation were dim. Indeed, the second wave of restructuring witnessed three successive 
decisions made by the US to turn down requests for additional assistance by Egypt to 
mitigate the costs of the crisis (in 2002), and even reduce the existing economic 
assistance to Egypt (in 1998 and 2006). The inability to influence the course of events in 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, exacerbated by the rise of Hamas after Arafat’s demise, 
reduced regional clout -  the main source of Egypt’s utility to the US. Thus, Egypt’s 
foreign policy ended up in a vicious cycle of a strained relation with the US and an 
eroding “regional role” leading to an eroding ability to mobilise strategic rent and an 
intense legitimacy crisis, and vice versa.
Throughout the different phases of the second wave of restructuring, foreign policy was 
an integral part of the broad transformation process of etatisme. In 1990, it facilitated the 
beginnings of restructuring. In 2008, it became a central part the crisis of governance and 
the looming succession crisis. Calls for political change capitalised on the successive 
foreign policy embarrassments as much as on the unyielding economic liberalisation and 
the eroding social base of the state. Likewise, the opposition to Gamal Mubarak’s 
presidential bid and calls for an intervention by the middle and lower-middle class 
“hardcore of the state” combined nostalgia for Nasser’s foreign policy clout, with hopes 
of redressing the rise of the haute bourgeoisie. The interplay of political economy and 
foreign policy was, therefore, central to the beginning of the second wave of 
restructuring, central to its crisis on the eve of the looming power vacuum, and is very
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likely to be central to its end (in the case of the “hardcore” succession scenario), 
resurrection (in the case of Gamal Mubarak’s succession scenario).
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Conclusion
“The purpose o f  anyone who writes the history o f  any large epoch must 
necessarily be to impose a pattern on events or at least discover a pattern ”
George Orwell
This study sought to explore the relation between economic liberalisation and foreign 
policy restructuring in Egypt, and to challenge the mainstream analyses of the large-scale 
transformation of Egyptian foreign policy since 1970, which have been dominated by the 
psychological-perceptual analysis of the Egyptian presidents’ belief systems. It also 
sought to redress a key anomaly in the literature on Egypt’s political economy and 
foreign policy. The former is dominated by the socially deterministic arguments about the 
Egyptian “hydraulic society”. The latter assumes the primacy of the Egyptian leader’s 
individual choices, codes of behaviour and belief systems, regardless of the social 
structures and forces. To transcend this fundamental incompatibility, this study sought to 
present a more holistic account of the patterns of interplay between the internal and 
external activities of the Egyptian state.
The central argument was that the roots of Egyptian foreign policy restructuring since 
1970, and its subsequent development, were intertwined with the simultaneous process of 
transforming populist etatisme in Egypt. The task of this study was, therefore, twofold:
A) to demonstrate that the coincidence of economic liberalisation and foreign policy 
restructuring in Egypt since 1970 entailed correlation; and b) to identify the patterns of 
interaction of the Egyptian political economy and foreign policy throughout the different 
phases of the restructuring process.
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The interplay of foreign policy and political economy was central to the very creation of 
Nasser’s populist etatisme. The crisis of the pre-1952 regime, and the rise of the petite 
bourgeoisie since the 1930s, particularly with the admission of its members in the army 
from 1936 onwards, coupled with the military defeat in Palestine in 1948, furnished the 
necessary conditions for the free officers’ “revolution-from-above” in 1952. The 
subsequent rise of populist etatisme, as I argued in chapter two, was also a result of the 
interplay of domestic developments and international pressures.
As Clapham (1985: 113) argued, the foreign policy of developing countries is the result 
of the interaction between their modernisation efforts and the international setting. Egypt 
was no exception. As Egypt developed a populist-statist political economy, her post-1952 
foreign policy developed to reflect the fundamental needs of the Egyptian politico- 
economic system. Throughout the populist-statist years, foreign policy served two key 
functions: a) as a means of facilitating the development of populist etatisme, and 
containing or resolving its inherent contradictions, primarily through rent-generation; and
b) as a hegemony-building (or restoring) mechanism, and a key source of the regime’s 
legitimacy. The two functions continued ever since, with varied emphasis on either 
function at different stages, and different patterns of interplay between these two 
functions to correspond with the modernisation needs of the different epochs.
Theoretically, the two functions were complimentary -  regional clout facilitating rent- 
generation and vice versa. The analysis of their actual patterns of interplay since the rise 
o f populist etatisme in Egypt, however, demonstrated that, with the exception of a brief
A Political Economy o f  Egyptian Foreien Policy: State. Ideoloev and Modernisation since 1970 Yasser M. Elwv 348
period (1956-1965) when the exceptional conditions of the Cold War allowed Egypt to 
perform both functions simultaneously, the two functions were inherently contradictory, 
rendering any attempt to perform them at the same time problematic.
Thus, rent generation (after the first quintennial plan in 1965, during the infitah years, 
and during the Gulf crisis) often came at the cost of the regime’s hegemony. Similarly, at 
the times when the regime’s priority was to establish (or restore) its legitimacy (Sadat’s 
first three years in power, and the “hesitant decade” of the 1980s), the ability to generate 
strategic rent was hampered.
Chapters two and three demonstrated that the transformation of populist etatisme and the 
realignment of Egyptian foreign policy were reflective of broader social forces that 
developed within the earlier populist-statist years under Nasser, particularly since 1965, 
thereby challenging the psychological perceptual analysis which attributed the change to 
the rise of Anwar Sadat, and the ways in which his “perceptive screen” differed from 
Nasser’s.
However, Nasser’s charisma, his need to preserve his populist-statist legacy, and the 
political conditions in the aftermath of the military defeat in 1967 held in check, and 
indeed slowed the pace of transformation during his years. The foreign policy 
breakthrough in 1973 made possible the launching of the first wave of restructuring 
during the infitah years. The same applies to the role of Mubarak’s foreign policy choices 
during the Gulf crisis in facilitating the second wave of restructuring.
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In other words, to locate foreign policy restructuring in the broader context of the 
development and subsequent transformation of Egypt’s political economy, is not to 
reduce it to the mechanical outcome of developments in the political economy, with no 
significance whatsoever to the policy preferences and choices of the rulers. The aim of 
this study was to historicise foreign policy restructuring, and place it in a broader context 
of economic and political transformation, without suggesting any determinism or 
teleology. To the contrary, this study sought to demonstrate that the interplay of political 
economy and foreign policy was, on the whole, two-way.
In any rate, Sadat’s rise to power and particularly his victorious emergence from the May 
1971 power struggle were indicative of a fundamental shift of the balance of power 
within populist etatisme that favoured economic and foreign policy restructuring. The 
main obstacles were a) Sadat’s need to consolidate his rule and establish an independent 
source of legitimacy, before embarking on a wholesale transformation of Egypt’s 
political economy and international alignments; and b) the fundamental contradiction 
between the political-military conditions that necessitated the increased reliance on the 
USSR, and the economic shift rightwards. The October War solved both problems and 
the restructuring gained tremendous momentum during the first three years of infitah 
(1974-1977).
Nevertheless, the extensive restructuring during the infitah years demonstrated the 
inherent contradictions between the two functions of Egyptian foreign policy. The very 
same foreign policy measures (realignment with the US, and reconciliation with Israel)
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which were instrumental to resolving the contradictions that had hampered the 
transformation of populist etatisme prior to the 1973 war, created a hegemonic crisis for 
the regime on one hand, and alienated part of its conservative support base (the religious 
right) on the other, culminating dramatically in the assassination of Sadat in 1981.
As chapters three and four argued, political assassination, however indicative of the 
regime’s hegemonic crisis, remains essentially a random act, in that it does not alter the 
social disposition or policy preferences of the ruling elite. This was particularly 
demonstrated in the rapid and friction-free transformation of power to the second-in- 
command, Husni Mubarak, after Sadat’s assassination, and in Mubarak’s pledge to 
follow the footsteps of his predecessor.
Yet, the magnitude of the hegemonic crisis that resulted in the assassination of Sadat 
meant that Egypt’s foreign policy had to be focused on the second of its functions -  
hegemony restoration, throughout the 1980s. Foreign policy issues were at the heart of 
the counter-consensus that developed from across the political spectrum in the last years 
of Sadat’s reign, and Mubarak had, therefore, to make some alterations in some aspects 
of his foreign policy to restore the regime’s hegemony. However, Since these foreign 
policy choices were embedded in the broader process of restructuring populist etatisme, 
in response to the changing social disposition of the ruling elite, and its economic and 
political choices, any alterations had to be made carefully so as not to jeopardise the 
regime’s domestic power base and international alliances. Such was the tight-rope act 
that Mubarak was forced to perform during the 1980s.
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In chapter four, I sought to demonstrate that these objective conditions, and the tight-rope 
act they necessitated, are the key to understanding the sometimes contradictory 
manoeuvres by Mubarak’s regime domestically and internationally during the 1980s, and 
not, as several analysts argued, a hesitant tendency in Mubarak’s character -  another 
shortcoming of the predominance of the psychological-perceptual paradigm.
Mubarak’s regime undertook a “public relations exercise” throughout the 1980s, which 
involved token flirtations with aspects of etatisme. However, the process of restructuring 
continued, albeit at a slower pace. The ruling alliance, based mainly on the alliance of the 
bureaucratic and haute bourgeoisie, remained intact, and was indeed reinforced through 
the 1980s. Meanwhile, Mubarak’s foreign policy sought to reintegrate Egypt in the Arab 
world, without prejudice to Egypt’s relations with the United States and Israel -  a process 
that started slowly in 1984, and only bore fruition in 1989, with the return of the Arab 
league headquarters to Cairo, and the lull return of Egypt’s occupied territories.
The hegemony-restoration process, therefore, took all of the 1980s, with the twin 
corollaries of: a) hampering the regime’s ability to use foreign policy manoeuvres to 
generate rent and help resolve the inherent contradictions in the political economy; and b) 
forcing the regime, when the resource crisis struck in 1986, to postpone any radical 
economic retrenchment, which would have been detrimental to his overarching 
hegemony restoring concern, and settle for “crisis management” until regional and 
international developments made it possible to resume the generation of strategic rent and 
embark on the second wave of restructuring in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis on 1990-
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1991. The transformation from “crisis management” to “crisis resolution” through a 
second wave of restructuring, therefore, proved largely dependent on the ability to 
resume the second function of Egyptian foreign policy.
Egypt’s foreign policy choices during the Gulf Crisis facilitated the launching of the 
second wave of restructuring, but threatened to erode the regime’s hegemony, to the 
restoration of which the Egyptian foreign policy throughout the 1980s was devoted. The 
social disposition of the ruling elite made clear the direction of transformation. However, 
the relatively limited, one-off nature of the resources that facilitated the launching of the 
second wave of restructuring, and the accompanying conditionality created a pressing 
need, throughout the second wave of restructuring, for a simultaneous performance of 
both functions of Egypt’s foreign policy, to redress the twin challenges of: a) a 
hegemonic crisis created by the foreign policy choices of Egypt during and after the Gulf 
Crisis, and exacerbated by the increasing erosion of the social and political support bases 
of the Egyptian state as the second wave of restructuring progressed; and b) the need for 
generating strategic rent to mitigate the cost of restructuring, and the resulting protest. 
Once more, the inherent contradictions between the two functions of Egypt’s foreign 
policy prevailed, and juggling them proved impossible.
Indeed, the interplay of domestic, regional and international developments, as the second 
wave of restructuring unfolded, rendered the regime incapable of performing either 
function satisfactorily. Instead, foreign policy became at the heart of the mounting 
legitimacy challenge to the regime, as the second wave of restructuring developed from
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the “troubled liberalisation” phase in the 1990s, to the “comprehensive crisis of 
governance” in the early 2000s, and a new resource crisis surfaced anew.
Unlike in earlier resource crises, foreign policy could not be counted on to resolve the 
regime contradictions, or restore the regime’s legitimacy. Consequently, the crisis 
intensified, with the second wave of restructuring reaching an impasse, and a looming 
power vacuum at the top of the regime, as the fifth term of Egypt’s octogenarian 
president approached its end, with no appointed vice president, and widespread 
speculations about a possible power struggle for succession between his son Gamal 
(backed primarily by the haute bourgeoisie, and some upper-middle class technocrats) 
and the predominantly middle and lower-middle class military bureaucrats.
Whether this comprehensive crisis of governance will bring to an end the second wave of 
restructuring, or give it “second wind”, is to a great extent dependent on the different 
succession scenarios and the patterns of interplay they will entail between Egypt’s 
political economy and foreign policy. Thus, the interplay of political economy and 
foreign policy, which proved central to the rise and subsequent transformation of populist 
etatisme, is also expected to be central to development of post-Mubarak Egypt. It is 
unlikely the “twain could be separated” -  at least not in Egypt’s case.
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